



## D2.3 Desk and field research report

BOND

Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities



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## Introduction

Deliverable 2.3 is in WP2 of the BOND project and contains the results of T1.1 Desk research and T2.2 Field research.

The main aim of the deliverable is to provide an overview of the situation of antisemitism in the project implementation countries. The detailed objectives of the tasks connected to the deliverable are:

- T2.1 Desk research aimed to identify antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices, perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community, perception of antisemitism in the population, including the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the level of enmity against other minority groups, address intersections between antisemitism and other forms of hatred, and the role of gender in antisemitic attitudes.
- T2.2 Field research aimed to
  - to gain an in-depth understanding of 1) the situation of the Jewish communities in the country, 2) the history and trends of antisemitism and other forms of intolerance in the country, 3) the challenges of dealing with these topics on a professional level; and 4) personal interests concerning the topic of Jewry.
  - to supplement the social attitudes revealed by the desk research with expertise, opinions, and impressions of relevant stakeholders on the investigated topics.

Deliverable 2.3 contains four national reports (HU, IT, PL, RO) in English and the local languages, as well as a compiled report concluding the results of the national reports.

Deliverable 2.3 provides information for further tasks of the project, such as:

- WP2, T2.3 Monitoring antisemitic narratives
- WP3, T3.1 Educational curriculum and training material for youth
- T4.2 Interfaith and inter-community dialogue
- T4.3 Local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion

Two deadline extensions were requested for D2.3. According to the original plan, all partners should prepare the first version of their national reports by the middle of July 2023. As it became clear that one of the partners could prepare their report only by the beginning of September, we requested the first deadline extension until 31 November 2023. As it turned out, all partners needed more time to write their reports; the first versions were ready between September and October 2023. As more checking rounds were needed, the final versions were prepared by the middle of October. To ensure the quality of the reports, we requested a second deadline extension until 15 January 2024.

## Table of contents

1. Compiled report – Antisemitism in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania .....	12
Introduction to the BOND project.....	12
The project .....	12
The research and methodology.....	12
Antisemitism in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania .....	14
Introduction to the compiled report.....	14
The situation of the Jewish population .....	14
Level and trend of antisemitism.....	15
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, and conspiracy theories .....	16
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes.....	16
COVID-19 related antisemitism .....	17
Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community .....	17
Antisemitism in politics .....	17
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	18
Enmity against other minorities .....	18
Antisemitism and education.....	18
Antisemitism in Hungary.....	20
Executive Summary .....	20
The situation of the Jewish population in Hungary.....	20
Level and types of antisemitism .....	22
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories.....	24
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes.....	25
The Jewish community's experiences and perceptions of antisemitism.....	26
Antisemitism in politics .....	26
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	27
Prejudice against other minorities .....	28
Antisemitism and education.....	29
Antisemitism in Italy .....	33
Executive summary .....	33
The situation of the Jewish population in Italy.....	33

Level of antisemitism in society .....	34
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, and conspiracy theories .....	37
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes.....	38
Antisemitism in politics .....	38
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	39
Enmity against other minority groups in the country .....	39
Prevention of antisemitism in education .....	40
Bibliography.....	44
Antisemitism in Poland .....	47
Executive summary .....	47
The situation of the Jewish communities in Poland .....	47
Level and trend of antisemitism in Poland .....	48
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories.....	50
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime .....	51
Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community .....	52
Antisemitism on the political level .....	53
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	54
Enmity against other minority groups in the country .....	54
Antisemitism and education.....	55
Bibliography.....	57
Antisemitism in Romania .....	59
Executive summary .....	59
The situation of the Jewish communities in Romania .....	59
Level and trend of antisemitism in Romania .....	60
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories.....	63
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime .....	64
Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community .....	66
Antisemitism on the political level .....	66
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	67
Enmity against other minority groups in the country .....	68
Antisemitism and education.....	69
Bibliography.....	71

2. National report: Hungary .....	74
Executive Summary .....	74
Introduction .....	74
The BOND Project and Research .....	74
Methodology .....	75
The situation of the Jewish population in Hungary.....	75
Antisemitism in Hungary .....	77
Level and types of antisemitism .....	77
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories .....	79
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes.....	80
Antisemitism in politics .....	81
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	82
The Jewish community's experiences and perceptions of antisemitism.....	82
Prejudice against other minorities .....	83
Hate speech and hate crimes against other minority groups .....	84
Antisemitism and education .....	84
Antisemitism and other prejudices in schools.....	84
Topics related to Judaism, antisemitism and the Holocaust in the official curriculum .....	85
The role and possibilities of education in combatting antisemitism and other forms of prejudices ...	85
Educational materials and programmes.....	86
3. National report: Italy.....	88
Executive summary .....	88
1. Introduction .....	89
a) The project and the research .....	89
b) Methodology.....	89
2. Situation of Jewish communities in Italy.....	89
a) General characteristics .....	89
b) Social, political, economic, religious and cultural life.....	90
3. Antisemitism in Italy.....	91
a) Level of antisemitism in society .....	91
b) Profile of antisemites .....	92
c) Most prevalent forms of antisemitism .....	92



d) Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes .....	95
e) Antisemitism on the political level .....	95
4. Enmity against other minority groups in the country .....	95
5. Intersections of antisemitism with other forms of racism and intolerance .....	97
6. Prevention of antisemitism in education .....	99
Bibliography .....	103
4. National report Poland.....	106
Executive summary .....	106
Introduction .....	106
The project and the research .....	106
Methodology .....	106
The situation of the Jewish communities in Poland.....	107
Antisemitism in Poland .....	108
Level and trend of antisemitism in Poland .....	108
Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories .....	110
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime .....	111
Antisemitism on the political level .....	112
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	113
Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community .....	113
Enmity against other minority groups in the country .....	114
Antisemitism and education .....	115
Topics related to Jewry, antisemitism, and the Holocaust in the official educational curricula .....	115
Educational materials and activities addressing antisemitism .....	116
References .....	117
5. National report: Romania.....	119
Executive summary .....	119
Introduction .....	119
Methodology .....	120
Limitations .....	120
The situation of the Jewish communities in Romania.....	120
Antisemitism in Romania .....	121
Level and trend of antisemitism in society .....	121

Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories.....	123
Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime .....	125
Antisemitism on the political level .....	126
Antisemitism in the sporting sphere .....	127
Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community .....	128
Enmity against other minority groups in the country .....	129
Antisemitism prevention in education.....	130
Jewry, antisemitism and the Holocaust in the official educational curricula .....	130
Educational materials and activities addressing antisemitism .....	131
Needs of FLPs in addressing antisemitism through education.....	132
Bibliography .....	133
Annexes.....	136
ANNEX 1: Hungarian national report in the local language .....	136
Bevezetés .....	136
Vezetői összefoglaló .....	137
1. A magyar zsidóság helyzete.....	138
2, Antiszemizmus Magyarországon.....	139
3. Más kisebbségi csoportokkal szembeni előítéletesség .....	145
4. Antiszemizmus és az oktatás .....	147
Hivatkozások.....	150
ANNEX 2: Italian national report in the local language.....	154
Sommario .....	154
1. Introduzione .....	155
1. Background: una breve panoramica della situazione attuale delle comunità ebraiche in Italia.	155
3. Antisemitismo in Italia.....	157
4. Inimicizia nei confronti di altri gruppi nel paese .....	162
5. Intersezioni dell'antisemitismo con alter forme di razzismo ed intolleranza .....	164
6. Prevenzione dell'antisemitismo nell'educazione .....	166
Bibliografia .....	170
ANNEX 3: Polish national report in the local language .....	173
Streszczenie .....	173

Wprowadzenie .....	174
Sytuacja społeczności żydowskich w Polsce .....	174
Antysemityzm w Polsce .....	175
Wrogość wobec innych grup mniejszościowych w kraju.....	182
Antysemityzm a edukacja.....	183
Odwołania .....	185
ANNEX 4: Romanian national report in the local language.....	187
Rezumat.....	187
Introducere.....	188
Situția comunităților evreiești din România .....	188
Antisemitismul în România.....	190
Inamia față de alte grupuri minoritare din țară.....	197
Prevenirea antisemitismului în educație .....	199
Bibliografie .....	202

## 1. Compiled report – Antisemitism in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania

## Introduction to the BOND project

### The project

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) project<sup>1</sup> is being implemented between January 2023 and December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. It aims to address the deep-rooted prejudices, hate attitudes and behaviours of society, particularly towards European Jewry. The project also aims to promote understanding, tolerance and dialogue. Special emphasis is put on raising young people's awareness of Judaism and antisemitism and on fostering intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The activities of the project include research on antisemitism, monitoring antisemitic narratives, developing educational curriculum, training for teachers, youth education and exchange, interfaith and inter-community dialogue and local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion. The project uses the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).<sup>2</sup>

### The research and methodology

The research was carried out as one of the first steps of the BOND project. All phases of the research were completed until September 2023, so events after October 7, 2023, and their impact are not included.

The research aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitism in Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Poland as a basis for further project activities. The research had limitations: it was conducted within the timeframe and scope defined in the project and along with topics relevant to the further activities of the project. The research results are published in four national and one compiled research report.

The research consisted of two parts in terms of methodology: desk research and field research. Within the desk research, all partners collected, processed, and summarised the available literature and data on antisemitism in their respective countries over the last ten years. The field research aimed to supplement the information gathered within the desk research by interviewing representatives of previously defined target groups about their expertise and experiences related to the topic. The field research consisted of 8-10 individual and 4-6 focus group interviews in each country. The 60-120-minute interviews were conducted with representatives of the following groups in all countries: 1) key experts, 2) first-line practitioners (FLPs), 3) Jewish community leaders and members, 4) non-Jewish religious and minority community leaders, and 5) Jewish and non-Jewish youth.

The following interviews were conducted in the project countries:

- **Hungary:** The field research included nine individual and five focus group interviews. The individual interviewees included two first-line practitioners, five experts on antisemitism and/or minority issues, one NGO representative working on LGBTQ+ issues and one Christian religious leader. Focus group interviews were conducted with the following groups: young people with a Jewish identity, young people with a non-Jewish identity, first-line practitioners, leaders and staff of Jewish NGOs

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<sup>1</sup> Webpage of the BOND project: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>2</sup> IHRA: Working definition of antisemitism. <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

and Jewish religious leaders.<sup>3</sup> Participants were selected within the defined target groups using both a targeted approach and a snowball method.<sup>4</sup>

- **Italy:** The research involved eight individual interviews and four focus group interviews. The individual interviews were conducted with two key experts (specialising in antisemitism and international relations), two FLPs (a sociologist and a Catholic priest), and four community leaders (Islamic community, Orthodox Church, LGBTQ+ community, community of asylum seekers). Focus group interviews were conducted with the following groups: Jewish youth, including four women and six men from Rome; Italian university students, consisting of three women and three men from various Italian cities; members of the Italian Islamic community, comprising eight men from various cities; and upper secondary school teachers, encompassing eight teachers (four women, four men).
- **Poland:** In June 2023, five focus groups were conducted with the following groups: Jewish leaders, including five women and one representative from various organisations; Jewish secondary school-aged youth, consisting of two women and two men; national and ethnic minority leaders, comprising five women from minority groups and one representative from various organisations; educators, encompassing five teachers – four women, one man – from small towns in Lubelskie Voivodeship; non-Jewish secondary school-aged youth from small towns in Lubelskie Voivodeship, comprising three women and two men. In total, 20 women and five men participated in the focus groups. In July 2023, four individual interviews were conducted with key experts with specialized knowledge in antisemitism and other forms of intolerance, including one woman and three men. These interviewees ranged from academics and practitioners to a participant in the Future Leaders Program, a religious leader from a non-Jewish community, and a minority community leader. On average, these individual interviews lasted 87 minutes.
- **Romania:** The research involved eight individual and four focus group interviews. The interviews included three experts, three first-line practitioners (teachers and educators), and two community leaders (Roma and Hungarian minorities). The four focus groups (FGs) were conducted with the following stakeholders: FG1: first-line practitioners (teachers and educators); FG2: leaders of religious minorities; FG3: youth from majority and minority communities, and FG4: leaders and members of the Jewish communities. Thematic analysis, guided by the literature review, was used to structure and analyse the data from the field research.

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<sup>3</sup> The main characteristics of the focus groups were: 1) young people with Jewish identity in the capital: aged 18-25, 8 persons - 5 boys, 3 girls; 2) young people with non-Jewish identity in the capital and in the countryside: 18 to 25 years old, 6 persons - 3 girls, 3 boys; 3) professionals working with young people in the capital and the countryside: 9 persons - 6 men, 3 women; 4) leaders and staff of Jewish NGOs in the capital: 7 persons - 4 men, 3 women; 5) Jewish religious leaders in the capital and the countryside: 4 persons - 3 men, 1 woman. The interviews were conducted between 30 May and 4 July 2023 and the focus groups between 31 May and 14 June 2023.

<sup>4</sup> A limitation of the research was that several of the people we wanted to interview individually or in focus groups could not be reached or appointments could not be made.

## Antisemitism in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania

### Introduction to the compiled report

This comparative summary is based on the national reports the BOND project's consortium member organisations prepared. This part summarises the results of each report to give a comprehensive picture of the situation of antisemitism in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania, highlighting the similarities and differences. A detailed description of the situation in each country can be found in the country chapters of the document. Concerning the brevity of the summary, references to the information and data included in this part can be found in the detailed descriptions.

### The situation of the Jewish population

Telling the exact number of the Jewish population in the countries examined is problematic for multiple reasons. Even though census data is available in each country, the number of Jews estimated by researchers is usually higher than the census results. As all census is based on self-declaration, people don't have to reveal whether they consider themselves Jewish. Also, in some countries, Jews are considered an ethnic minority, while in others, a religious minority, which also makes it difficult to determine their exact number.

Census data from 2021/2022 is available from almost all the four countries. According to these, in 2021/2022, the number of Jews was 7,635 in Hungary (about 0.08% of the Hungarian population), 17000 in Poland (about 0,045% of the Polish population), and 2,700 in Romania (about 0.015% of the Romanian population). The Italian census does not collect data on religion, but according to different estimates<sup>5</sup>, the Jewish population in Italy is between 24,000 and 34,000 (about 0.05% of the Italian population).

In all four countries, the Jewish population is primarily urban, living in bigger cities and mainly in the capital. Jewish minorities in these countries are highly integrated or assimilated into the majority population both socially and culturally. While in Italy and Poland, Jews do not stand out from the majority population in terms of social status or level of education, in Hungary and Romania, the social status of the Jewish population is higher than the average, and they pursue intellectual professions to a greater extent. Also, in Romania, the Jewish population is ageing, with most Romanian Jews being over the age of 70.

While for many Hungarian Jews, Jewish and Hungarian identity is equally second after their European identity, for many Italian Jews, Jewish identity comes before their Italian identity. In Romania, many of the younger generations, particularly those who have returned from Israel, do not identify themselves as part of the Jewish community. It is common in all four countries for Jews to hide their Jewish identity in public to avoid antisemitic incidents. Among many Italian Jews, a desire to preserve ethnic, religious, and cultural Jewish identity is present. At the same time, in Italy, the estrangement of Jewish individuals from the Jewish community and their lack of participation in community life is considered a problem. The majority of the Hungarian and Polish Jews are not religious.

Internal conflicts are present within the Hungarian and Italian Jewish communities. In Hungary, Jews are politically divided, and Jewish religious communities are politically and economically dependent on the state.


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<sup>5</sup> NOA. National Report Card on Government Measures to Counter Antisemitism and Foster Jewish Life. Brussels: NOA and CEJI, 2023. [https://www.noa-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023-10-31-NOA\\_NationalReportCard\\_Italy\\_Final.pdf](https://www.noa-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023-10-31-NOA_NationalReportCard_Italy_Final.pdf)

In Italy, Jewish communities are in an internal conflictual situation originating from the lack of organisational renewal, effective leadership, and cooperation.

### Level and trend of antisemitism

A study<sup>6</sup> on antisemitic prejudices in 16 European countries<sup>7</sup> gave an overview of the level of antisemitism in the four countries. The survey examined the presence of antisemitism in three categories: primary<sup>8</sup>, secondary<sup>9</sup> and new antisemitism<sup>10</sup>. According to the results, in all three categories, the level of antisemitism is the highest in Poland, followed by Hungary and Romania, and with the lowest level in each category, Italy.



The level of antisemitism has not been stable in any of the four countries over the last ten years. In Italy, while according to experts, antisemitism is on the rise, research showed that the perception of the prevalence of antisemitism declined between 2021 and 2023. In Poland, researchers observed a general decrease in antisemitism in 2021, yet its extent varied across different types of antisemitic attitudes. In Hungary, the level of antisemitism increased significantly around 2010; it was quite steady between 2015 and 2019 and has increased slightly since then. In Romania, the number of antisemitic incidents increased significantly, with a peak in 2017.

Considering the size of the Jewish population in all four countries, the phenomenon called antisemitism without Jews can be observed – antisemitism is present even though many citizens supposedly haven’t met a Jew in their lives. In addition, in Italy, a general unawareness of antisemitism can be observed. Even though antisemitism is considered to appear in a low intensity, it is probably a result of the phenomenon that antisemitism in Italy tends to be perceived as usual and harmless. This phenomenon, besides normalising the presence of antisemitism to an extent, also supports its spreading.

<sup>6</sup> Kovács, András; Fischer, Gyorgy, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries”. Action and Protection League. 2021. <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-2408>

<sup>7</sup> Austria, Belgium, Czech Republik, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

<sup>8</sup> According to the research, primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>9</sup> According to the research, secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

<sup>10</sup> According to the research, new antisemitism is anti Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

## **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, and conspiracy theories**

In all four countries, a variety of antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, and conspiracy theories are present. The following categories are present in all or at least three countries.

- In almost all countries, conspiratorial antisemitism is the most widespread, particularly online. The most common forms of such narratives are centered around the assumption that Jews have too much – mainly economic and/or political – power and influence.
- Traditional religion-based antisemitism is present in all countries except Romania. The most common narrative is that “Jews killed Jesus”.
- Narratives relativising or distorting the Holocaust are present in all four countries. These mainly state in some form that the Holocaust did not happen or that Jews talk too much about it.
- Antisemitic narratives related to Israel are present in all countries.
- Narratives suggesting that Jews are “alien to the nation” are present in all four countries, mainly by stating that Jews cannot be loyal to the respective nation as they serve other interests.
- Stereotypes that the Jews are intelligent or wealthy are also widespread in all countries. The latter is so common in Poland that many don’t even consider it antisemitic, and some people in Romania consider it a compliment rather than a stereotype.

Some stereotypes are not present in all four countries but in at least two of them. The stereotype that Jews exclusively prioritise their own community is present in Romania and Hungary. Also, antisemitic narratives connected to George Soros appear in these countries. Antisemitic narratives rooted in history are present in Hungary and Poland, in both countries accusing the Jews of collaborating with the communist authorities against the citizens of these nations. The stereotype that Jews think they are superior to others is present in Italy and Hungary. In addition to all of this, in Romania, antisemitism is present in connection to the current Russian aggression against Ukraine, stating that Jews are profiting from the war.

## **Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes**

Antisemitism is present in similar forms in the four countries. Its most common form is hate speech; hate crimes appear in negligible numbers, according to the data available. Everyday casual antisemitism, such as antisemitic jokes, is present in most of the examined countries. In Poland, the presence of antisemitism is also common in the public discourse.

In all four countries, antisemitic hate speech is widespread, particularly in the online space. According to the available data, the majority of antisemitic incidents in the countries were online antisemitic hate speech, and their appearance showed an increasing trend over recent years. In Hungary, state authorities do not publish official data on hate speech and hate crimes differentiated for minority groups. Hence, the data available on these incidents is not exhaustive and does not fully reflect reality.

The number of physical atrocities against Jews is low in all four countries. This is in line with the phenomenon present in Europe that in many countries where the level of antisemitism is high, anti-Jewish violence is rare. In contrast, acts of violence occur more often in countries where antisemitism is low. In the examined countries, antisemitic incidents besides hate speech mainly involve vandalism and very rarely physical violence.



## **COVID-19 related antisemitism**

The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the level of antisemitism and led to the emergence of new antisemitic narratives in the examined countries. COVID-19-related antisemitism, in most cases, appeared in the form of conspiracy theories and hate speech, predominantly online, but also in protests related to the pandemic. The emerged conspiracy theories were similar in most cases, built on the idea that the virus was created and spread by Jews based on economic or political interests, and in Hungary, as an act of revenge against their historical oppressors. In Romania, antisemitism related to COVID-19 was particularly significant, with protests using the narrative that Jews and the fight against antisemitism are more dangerous for Romania than the COVID-19 virus. Antisemitic narratives trivialising the Holocaust were also present in anti-vaccine protests in the country.

## **Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community**

Most of the Jewish respondents have experienced antisemitic bias-motivated attacks or incidents, mostly verbally and many times online. This is why Jewish people in all four countries tend to hide their Jewish identity in public, as mentioned earlier. According to our interviewees with Jewish identity, common forms of antisemitism are Holocaust distortion and denial, anti-Israel attitudes, and antisemitic vocabulary and stereotypes, also appearing in everyday conversations. There are some differences in the perception of the level of antisemitism in the examined countries. The fear of antisemitic attacks was high among Polish Jewish respondents. According to Romanian Jews, antisemitism is widespread and pervasive in their country, and they have noticed an increase in violent acts of antisemitism recently. Hungarian Jews, despite also experiencing antisemitism personally, perceive the level of antisemitism in the country as low.

## **Antisemitism in politics**

Antisemitism in politics in all four countries is mainly expressed by the far right. In some cases, it is also expressed by right-wing and left-wing parties, except for Hungary. The antisemitic narratives mostly appear in a historical context and remembrance politics, e.g. by the denial of historical responsibilities or glorifying known antisemites. In addition, antisemitic tropes often appear for political gain.

In Hungary, antisemitism after 2010 was mainly present in the far-right Jobbik party and currently in the far-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland). Even though the governing populist radical right Fidesz party proclaimed zero-tolerance against antisemitism in 2013, it has strategically taken over topics from the far right, many of which have antisemitic connotations. In Italy, there are two openly neofascist groups, CasaPound and Forza Nuova. Antisemitism, mainly in the form of criticising Israel, has also been present in the extreme left-wing parties, particularly among some members of the Democratic party. In Poland, antisemitism in politics has been dominated by the populist radical right Law and Justice (PiS) party and other radical right and far-right actors. Nevertheless, it has also appeared on the right and left sides, aiming to discredit the political opponent. In Romania, antisemitic remarks mainly have emerged by the right-wing National Liberal Party (PNL) and the far-right nationalist party, Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR). Romanian political actors have mainly used antisemitism to promote a nationalist and anti-communist historical narrative. The Romanian Government adopted the first National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Antisemitism, Xenophobia, Radicalization and Hate Speech in 2021. Still, it has not yet been widely implemented on the local level.

## Antisemitism in the sporting sphere

In all four countries, antisemitism in the sporting sphere is the most prevalent in football. In each country, there are examples of antisemitic incidents during football games. Thus, antisemitic narratives, chants, and gestures are mostly in stadiums by fans and supporters' clubs. Even though there were attempts in more cases to eliminate this phenomenon, these efforts do not seem effective so far.

## Enmity against other minorities

In all four countries, other, mainly ethnic minority groups are more rejected than Jews. These groups mainly include the Roma, the LGBTQ community, and refugees/immigrants. Hate speech is prevalent in all countries against all or some of these minorities.

In all countries, the Roma and the LGBTQ community are among the most rejected minorities. In addition, high rejection is present in Italy and Hungary against migrants and the Muslim minority, in Poland against refugees, and in Romania against the Hungarian minority.

## Antisemitism and education

Little data is available on the extent to which antisemitism is present in schools. The presence of antisemitism has increased significantly in Italian schools over the past ten years. In Hungary, the presence of antisemitism in the education sector is highly school-specific. When it is present, it mainly appears among students many times without the teachers being aware of it. According to Hungarian and Romanian first-line practitioners, antisemitic attitudes among students originate mainly from increased online content consumption. Hungarian teachers also mentioned family patterns as the roots of antisemitic attitudes. According to them, in most cases, these antisemitic statements are not motivated by genuine antisemitic feelings but rather by rebellion against prohibitions, ignorance, or the use of the word "Jew" as a slur.

In all four countries, Holocaust education has been part of the official curriculum – in Italy and Romania only for the past few years. However, in all countries, Holocaust education has been criticised over the years. In Romania, clear guidelines for the curriculum are missing, while in Poland, concerns were raised regarding the quality and accuracy of Holocaust education. In Hungary, antisemitic historical figures have become part of the national curriculum since its 2020 modification. The lack of involvement of the Jewish community in creating the latest version of the national curriculum was underlined by Hungarian interviewees as a problem. In Hungary and Romania, first-line practitioners mentioned that systemic barriers in the educational environment – such as lack of teachers, time for such topics in the classes, support from the school leadership, etc. – hinder efforts in combating antisemitism and teaching about the Holocaust in schools.

Educational materials alongside the official state curriculum are available in all four countries, often online in digital format. However, Italian and Polish first-line practitioners have emphasised the need for more available materials. The available educational materials provide teachers with resources on teaching the Holocaust, applying various approaches to the topic. More teachers interviewed also highlighted possible difficulties in using such materials. For instance, in Romania, many of them are only available in English. Hence, having these materials available in the local language could multiply their application. It was also highlighted in Hungary, that it would be important to provide teachers with courses to obtain a broader knowledge of issues connected to antisemitism.

First-line practitioners in all four countries proposed possible actions to help them better address antisemitism through education and help the students better understand the topic. These included the following:

- having a sufficient number and quality of updated materials that were pilot-tested and appropriate to young people and that thoroughly highlighted the issues connected to antisemitism and the Holocaust,
- presenting an overview of the social context and mentioning local examples, connecting young people with the history of the local community while discussing related topics,
- using positive images in connection to Jewry, respecting the rights of the victims of the Holocaust when using pictures in pedagogical settings,
- providing background information on Jewish history and religion,
- including information about Jewry in a contemporary context,
- showing the diversity of Jewish people,
- using personal narratives and building on empathy and emotional connection rather than dry facts or prohibition,
- helping the students to identify hate speech and prejudice, deconstruct antisemitic narratives, and combat prejudices,
- organising events where students can talk to members of minority groups, and possibilities to participate in various project works, including extracurricular activities such as cooperation with NGOs.

## Antisemitism in Hungary

### Executive Summary

In general, the Jewish population in Hungary has a high level of education and is in a good position socially and financially, according to the available literature and our interviewees. Those who identify as Jews are mostly non-religious and consider themselves predominantly European citizens or equally Jewish and Hungarian.

According to research, the level of antisemitism in Hungary increased significantly around 2010, presumably due to the rise in popularity of the far-right Jobbik party. Since 2015, the available data show that the level of antisemitism has not changed significantly. At the same time, most interviewees reported a general increase in antisemitism in the country, citing the internet as the primary cause, as well as the family background, deficiencies of the education system, the polarisation of society, and the government's Soros campaign.

In Hungary, antisemitism is most often manifested in the form of conspiracy theories, but other forms are also present (e.g. emotional antisemitism, new antisemitism). According to the available data, the most common form of antisemitism is hate speech. The number of hate crimes is negligible.

At the political level, antisemitism emerged from the second half of the 2000s in connection with Jobbik and has been one of the tools of far-right parties (currently Mi Hazánk – Our Homeland) ever since, albeit in a less direct form than before, disguised by coded speech and appearing mainly as conspiracy theories. Although the Fidesz government announced zero tolerance towards antisemitism in 2013, it has focused its communication on several issues related to antisemitism in recent years. These include the campaign against George Soros, the glorification of antisemitic politicians (e.g. Miklós Horthy) and artists (e.g. Albert Wass) between the two world wars, the distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, and the fight against the global external enemy. Antisemitism is also present in the sports fan milieu, primarily in the football fan scene and especially in the ultra scene.

According to a 2017 survey, half of Hungarian Jews have experienced antisemitism in their lifetime, and all of our Jewish interviewees mentioned such experiences. Many of them highlighted the government's antisemitism-related double-talk's negative effects on their sense of security.

While antisemitism is undoubtedly present in Hungary, research and interviewees also suggest that society is much more prejudiced towards other minorities, especially the Roma, the LGBTQ+, and migrants.

According to first-line practitioners, the extent to which antisemitism is present among students depends on the school. When it appears among students, it is primarily present in verbal forms, and often, there are no real antisemitic sentiments in the background. Several interviewees identified education as one of the most important tools to reduce antisemitism.

### The situation of the Jewish population in Hungary

The estimated number of Jews in Hungary in 2015 was between 58 936 and 110 679, according to a 2017 survey.<sup>11</sup> In addition to available databases on the Jewish population, the research was conducted by

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<sup>11</sup> Kovács András and Barna Ildikó, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei* (Budapest: Szombat, 2017), 12-15.

“In the estimation, the researchers projected the demographic characteristics of the Budapest population as a whole - the live birth and death rates of the age-grouped Budapest population - onto the Jewish population of the country,

interviewing subjects who identified themselves as Jewish and had at least one Jewish grandparent. The results showed that roughly 85% of Jews lived in Budapest, with an ongoing movement from smaller settlements to cities. Their educational level was higher, and their social and financial situation was better than the average in Budapest. While 78% of the Jewish population had a degree, the proportion was 32% for the population aged 18 and over in the capital. 52% of the Jewish population had an intellectual job, and 17% worked in a managerial position, while for the total Budapest population, the former rate was 20% and the latter 6%. Regarding identity, most Jews identified themselves as European citizens (30%) or as equally Jewish and Hungarian (29%).<sup>12</sup> According to the census, 10 965 people declared themselves Israelites in 2011 and 7 635 in 2022.<sup>13</sup>

These data were also confirmed by the interviewees. Most of them agreed that Jews are in a privileged position in Hungary compared to other minority groups. They highlighted that this was particularly true in Budapest. In the countryside, mainly because of the Holocaust, the Jewish presence is much smaller, and the circumstances are difficult. According to some, this presence is increasingly active, but some Jewish leaders believe that the Jewish population in the countryside is disappearing.

According to the 2017 survey, most of the Hungarian Jewish population is not religious. Although 70% of the respondents did not want Jews to assimilate fully, the majority supported mixed marriages. The vast majority (75%) felt a sense of belonging to Israel but were not seriously considering moving there. Hungarian Jews were more likely than the general population to be opposition voters and consumers of left-liberal-oriented media. In terms of worldview and political attitudes, they were also more accepting and open-minded compared to the rest of society.<sup>14</sup>

There are three recognised Jewish churches in Hungary: 1) the Association of Jewish Communities of Hungary (Mazsihisz) – the best known in 2017 among the population identifying themselves as Jews<sup>15</sup> – which represents the neologic faction<sup>16</sup>) the second best known, the Unified Hungarian Israelite Congregation (EMIH), which represents the status quo ante, i.e. the middle way faction<sup>17</sup>; and 3) the Hungarian Autonomous Orthodox Israelite Congregation (MAOIH), which represents the orthodox faction<sup>18</sup>. In addition, there are two smaller Jewish religious communities, the reform Beit Orim<sup>19</sup> and Sim Shalom<sup>20</sup>.

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because two-thirds of the surviving Jews were Budapest residents, and the majority of rural Jews gradually moved to the capital. Estimates of population growth (in our case, decline) were based on female population figures, in accordance with the rules of demographic calculation. Available data on emigration were taken into account in the estimation.”

<sup>12</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 64.

<sup>13</sup> Census data available on the website of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office ([www.ksh.hu](http://www.ksh.hu)).

<sup>14</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 156.

<sup>15</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 177.

<sup>16</sup> Mazsihisz, “Magyar zsidó történelem az ókortól napjainkig,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://mazsihisz.hu/a-zsidosagrol/tortenelem/magyar-zsido-tortenelem/magyar-zsido-tortenelem-az-okortol-napjainkig>.

<sup>17</sup> EMIH, “Bemutató: Az Egységes Magyarországi Izraelita Hitközség,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://zsido.com/emih/bemutakozas/>.

<sup>18</sup> MAOIH, “Bemutató: Az orthodoxia rövid története,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://maoih.hu/bemutakozas/orthodoxia-tortenete/>.

<sup>19</sup> Bét Orim, “A Bét Orim története,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://betorim.hu/kozosseg/dokumentumok/a-bet-orim-tortenete/>.

<sup>20</sup> Szim Salom, “Kik vagyunk?,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://www.szimsalom.hu/bemutakozunk/kik-vagyunk/>.

The state supports several Jewish organisations but in an ideologically selective way that creates divisions among Jewish organisations.<sup>21</sup> According to interviewees with a Jewish identity, even large subsidies can increase antisemitism in society.

According to several interviewees, Jewry is present in Hungarian society primarily culturally but also religiously. Interviewees active in Jewish civil life emphasised that the Jewish civil and religious spheres in Hungary today are separated. Almost all interviewees mentioned that Jews are politically divided in Hungary and that Jewish churches are politically and economically dependent on the current political situation.

### Level and types of antisemitism

In Hungary, after the fall of communism, antisemitism, which had been suppressed until then, resurfaced immediately. Nevertheless, its level did not increase significantly in the two decades that followed – around a quarter of the adult population of the country could be considered antisemitic.<sup>22</sup> The level of antisemitism increased significantly around 2010, which, by several studies, was linked to the rise in popularity of the far-right Jobbik party.<sup>23</sup> According to surveys conducted over several years using András Kovács' methodology – which can be called traditional in Hungary – the level of antisemitism did not change significantly between 2015 and 2019. In 2019, 36% of society was considered moderately or strongly antisemitic<sup>24</sup>; in 2021, according to research by the Action and Protection League covering 16 countries, 42%.<sup>25</sup> In Hungary, as in the Visegrad countries, antisemitism mostly appears in the form of conspiracy theories.<sup>26</sup>

Available research distinguishes the following forms of antisemitism:

- *Primary antisemitism*, or traditional antisemitism, covers three categories. *Cognitive antisemitism* – referring to negative misconceptions about Jews – was strongly present in 17% of Hungarians and moderately present in 42% of Hungarians in 2021. *Affective antisemitism* – referring to negative feelings about Jews – was strongly held by 25% of Hungarians and moderately held by 23% in 2021. *Conative antisemitism* – measuring the willingness to act or discriminate based on anti-Jewish prejudice – was strongly present in 15% and moderately present in 34% of respondents in 2021. Combining all categories, Action and Protection League's 16-country survey found that 24% were strongly and 18% moderately considered to be primarily antisemitic in 2021, for a total of 42% of the Hungarian population.<sup>27</sup>
- *Secondary antisemitism* refers to statements that deny, distort or relativise the Holocaust. According to the Action and Protection League's 2021 research, 17% of Hungarians were considered strongly and 46% moderately antisemitic.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>21</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről (Brüsszel: NOA és CEJI, 2022), 10.

<sup>22</sup> Kovács, András, *Stranger at hand. Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

<sup>23</sup> Hann Endre and Róna Dániel, *Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban* (Budapest: TEV, Medián, 2015), 13; Barna, Ildikó and Félix Anikó, ed., *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrad Countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2017), 14; Félix Anikó, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020* (Budapest: Mazsihisz, 2020), 47.

<sup>24</sup> Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*.

<sup>25</sup> Kovács, András and Fischer György, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries* (Budapest: Action and Protection League, 2021), 58.

<sup>26</sup> Barna, Ildikó et al., *Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2022).

<sup>27</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 19-36.

<sup>28</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 47-49.

- The *new antisemitism*, in simple terms, refers to antisemitic criticism of Israel or anti-Israel sentiment, which is projected onto Israel, putting Israel at the centre of the antisemitic sentiment and allowing antisemitic statements to be made in a politically correct way.<sup>29</sup> This includes expressions that see the State of Israel as inherently evil - demonising it, applying double standards against it and denying Israel's right to exist.<sup>30</sup> In Hungary, according to the Action and Protection League's 2021 survey, 13% strongly and 40% moderately held antisemitic views against Israel.<sup>31</sup>
- *Latent antisemitism*: we call those who try to avoid giving antisemitic answers in surveys measuring antisemitism latent antisemites. In general, they succeed with it at questions measuring traditional antisemitism but not for questions measuring secondary and new antisemitism, which is not necessarily perceived as antisemitic by them.<sup>32</sup>

In addition, one of the interviewees in the field of antisemitism research distinguished three levels of antisemitism in society: 1) prejudice, negative stereotypes about Jews, 2) the presence of antisemitic language in social discourse and media, and 3) antisemitism for political purposes. These three levels are pyramidally related: a large proportion of those who use antisemitic language presumably are also prejudiced, while not all those who are prejudiced use antisemitic language.

The majority of interviewees defined antisemitism as a feeling of aversion, opposition, or negative expressions towards Jewry. Besides, a first-line practitioner described it as a worldview. As possible manifestations, emotional, verbal, non-verbal and physical antisemitism were mentioned. A distinction was also made between religion-based and 'race-based' antisemitism, and more interviewees highlighted that, in their experience, antisemitism often mixes interpretations of Jewishness as religion, people/ethnicity, and culture or tradition. Conspiracy theories were considered by many to be the most typical form of antisemitism in Hungary, and some highlighted that antisemitism most often appears in an economic context. Several interviewees referred to new antisemitism (antisemitic criticism of and opposition to Israel) as a complex area of antisemitism, where it is difficult to determine whether a particular statement is antisemitic and which is more prevalent in Western Europe, but also on the rise in Hungary, especially on the (radical) left. Researchers and members of the Jewish community have also emphasised antisemitism connected to the issue of the Hungarian responsibility in the Second World War and the Holocaust in Hungary.

Most interviewees agreed that antisemitism has increased to some extent over the past 10-15 years. The main reason given for this was the internet, which they said supports the rapid spread of antisemitic content and normalises its presence. Secondly, they mentioned family patterns brought from home, but several also mentioned the deficiencies of the Hungarian education system. According to several interviewees, Hungarian society is fundamentally receptive to prejudice, including antisemitism. Interviewees agreed that crises – including the COVID-19 pandemic – always have an impact on prejudice, as these subvert the current social order and often result in widespread financial insecurity. In such cases, many people look for scapegoats, which are usually found in minority groups by political actors. In many cases, the COVID-19

<sup>29</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 15.

<sup>30</sup> Natan Sharansky, "3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, no. 3-4 (2004).

<sup>31</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 54.

<sup>32</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 56.

epidemic has led to loneliness among young people, which has also made them more open to conspiracy theories against minorities.

According to the experts in the field of antisemitism interviewed and a 2022 study<sup>33</sup>, gender is also fundamentally irrelevant to antisemitism. According to the latter research, the effect of gender is only significant in most cases when other attitudinal factors (e.g. prejudice against other groups, populism, nationalism) are not mediated. The study has also shown that gender may still have an effect on different types of antisemitism – for example, in the case of secondary antisemitism, men are more antisemitic.

### **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories**

Antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices in Hungarian society can be sorted into several categories. A 2022 cross-national research<sup>34</sup> surveyed beliefs in different types of antisemitic prejudice. One category studied was traditional, religious-based anti-Judaism. This includes, for example, the claim that the crucifixion of Jesus is an unforgivable sin of the Jews (16% agreed). Another category is conspiratorial antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices. These include, for example, that Jews have too much influence in Hungary (25% agreed), Jews aim to dominate the world (23% agreed) and seek to extend their influence on the global economy (40% agreed), that they are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals (18% agreed), and that they often operate in secret behind the scenes (17% agreed).<sup>35</sup> Antisemitic narratives about the Holocaust also appear in Hungary. Examples include that Jews try to take advantage of their persecution during the war and the Holocaust (28% agreed), Jews are to be blamed for their persecution (17% agreed), and they talk too much about the Holocaust (31% agreed).<sup>36</sup>

In addition to these categories, other antisemitic theories are also present. For example, Jews cannot be equal members of a country because they will always remain more loyal to Judaism or Israel than to the nation, with which 35% of the total population in Hungary agreed in 2019.<sup>37</sup> There are also antisemitic theories regarding the COVID-19 pandemic: the COVID-19 virus was created and/or spread by Jews for political or economic gain or to take revenge on their enemies and avenge their historical oppressors.<sup>38</sup> Among antisemitic topos on the far right, there is also a narrative that conflates communism and Jewry, blaming Jews for the crimes of the communist regimes against the Hungarian people.<sup>39</sup>

In the intersection of different prejudicial narratives, Jews are often presented as the "secret power" responsible for the activities of other minority groups in Hungary. According to these narratives, they aim to undermine the Hungarian nation. Narratives from the far right, for example, suggest that Jews (e.g. George Soros) are organising Muslim immigration to weaken Christian Europe and nation-states.<sup>40</sup> Besides, Jews use

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<sup>33</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 90.

<sup>34</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries.

<sup>35</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 27-32.

<sup>36</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 54-63

<sup>37</sup> Félix, Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020, 84.

<sup>38</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Knap Árpád, "An exploration of coronavirus-related online antisemitism in Hungary using quantitative topic model and qualitative discourse analysis," East European Journal of Society and Politics 7, no. 3 (2021): 80-100.

<sup>39</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Knap Árpád, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary: Exploring Topics of Antisemitism in the Far-Right Media Using Natural Language Processing," Theo Web Academic Journal of Religious Education 18, no. 1 (2019): 75-92.

<sup>40</sup> Barna and Knap, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary", 75-92.



the Roma as a "biological weapon" against Hungarians<sup>41</sup>, and as "homopropagandists", they work to spread homosexuality and deviance in opposition to Christianity and white people<sup>42</sup>.

Interviewees also mentioned that common stereotypes against Jews include the crooked nose, sideburns, and wearing a hat. Additional stereotypes are also present: Jews are left-wing, smart, influential, insatiable, consider themselves culturally superior, communist, and wealthy, occupy leadership positions, and help each other to get into these positions at the expense of Hungarians. In line with the above-presented research results, more interviewees mentioned the stereotypes that Jews talk too much about the Holocaust and that they always portray themselves as victims for financial gain. In the context of conspiratorial antisemitism, several people mentioned the blood libel of the 19th century, the stab-in-the-back myth of the 20th century holding Jews responsible for Trianon, the belief that they caused the Great Depression, and the post-COVID New World Order Theory, which holds that Jews aimed to use the pandemic and the following economic problems to expand their influence and power over people and countries.<sup>43</sup> Linked to new antisemitism, a common view is that Jews are killing Palestinians.

### Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes

In Hungary, state authorities do not publish official data on hate speech and hate crimes differentiated for minority groups. The available official statistics treat all cases of violence against members of minority groups as one and do not necessarily reflect reality.<sup>44</sup> Based on these, the number of hate crimes is negligible.<sup>45</sup> In Hungary, there is no systematic and comprehensive monitoring. Still, according to NGOs working on the issue, there are roughly 30-60 antisemitic incidents per year in the country – the most common being hate speech. At the same time, physical violence against persons or property is negligible.<sup>46</sup>

All interviewees agreed that antisemitism in Hungary is mainly verbal, but some also mentioned the vandalism of cemeteries and synagogues. According to the interviewees, antisemitism primarily appears in the form of conspiracy theories, but several emphasised that covert, hidden antisemitism appearing as allusions and antisemitic humour are also widespread.

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<sup>41</sup> Barna and Félix, ed. *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*, 67.

<sup>42</sup> Barna and Knap, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary", 75-92.

<sup>43</sup> **Blood libels** dating back to the Middle Ages claim that Jews killed Christian children for religious rituals and used their blood to make Passover unleavened bread. According to the 20th-century **stab-in-the-back myth**, one of the reasons for Germany's defeat in World War I was the Jews, who, as internal enemies, stabbed German troops in the back with their destructive behaviour. The theory also took root in Hungary, and it was part of the narrative between the two world wars that the loss of the war was not the fault of the troops but of the press. According to the 21st century **New World Order theory**, the global political and economic elite are planning to create a world government through shadow governments, whereby sovereign governments will be abolished and authoritarian world governance will emerge.

<sup>44</sup> Uszkiewicz, Erik, "Anomalies in the application of law related to hate crimes," *Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies* 61, no. 3 (2021): 325-41; FRA, *Antisemitism: Overview of antisemitic incidents in the European Union 2011-2021* (Bécs: FRA, 2022).

<sup>45</sup> Ministry of Interior, "Crime Statistics System," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://bsr.bm.hu/Document>.

<sup>46</sup> Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*, 10-16; TEV, *Antiszemita gyűlölet-bűncselekmények és incidensek Magyarországon: 2020. éves rövid jelentés* (Budapest: TEV, 2020); FRA, *Antisemitism*.

## The Jewish community's experiences and perceptions of antisemitism

According to a 2017 survey<sup>47</sup>, 48% of Hungarian Jews have experienced antisemitism during their lives, which is a significant decrease compared to the 1999 survey<sup>48</sup>, where this rate was 75%. In contrast, according to Hungarian Jews' perceptions, antisemitism in Hungary has increased since 1999: in the 2017 survey, respondents were more likely to perceive Hungarian society as antisemitic and considered more likely the persecution of Jews to happen than in 1999.<sup>49</sup> Although Jewish organisations believe that the government adequately guarantees the safety and physical integrity of the community, they think it does not do enough to combat prejudice in areas such as education, media and intercultural dialogue.<sup>50</sup>

All interviewees with Jewish identity had encountered antisemitic comments about them, either in verbal or written (online) form. Many of them mentioned that they hid their Jewish identity to avoid antisemitic incidents. Despite this, several interviewees with a Jewish identity considered the level of antisemitism in Hungary to be low and did not perceive it to have increased in the last 10-15 years. Besides believing that the country is safe for Jews, several of them also experience – due to the double-talk in politics – a constant sense of uncertainty that the current situation could change at any time. A Jewish religious leader highlighted that there are several antisemitic narratives among Christians rooted in religion, which churches could reduce by providing adequate information. According to several young interviewees with Jewish identity, Jewish communities and churches also tend to build their Jewish identity on the trauma of the Holocaust, which, in their opinion, does not help to reduce antisemitism in the country.

### Antisemitism in politics

The presence of antisemitism in Hungarian politics in the years after 2010 is mainly related to the far-right Jobbik party (before its mainstreaming<sup>51</sup>). However, the increasing public appearances and growing popularity of the extremist party in the years before 2010 had already noticeably increased the presence and acceptance of antisemitism in public discourse and then had also demonstrably strengthened antisemitic attitudes.<sup>52</sup> Although in 2013, the Fidesz government proclaimed zero tolerance of antisemitism<sup>53</sup>, an integral part of the party's electoral and communication strategy is to borrow topics of the far right, which are then disseminated to the whole society through the government-controlled media<sup>54</sup>. Such antisemitism-linked topics include conspiracy theories about George Soros, glorification of Horthy, distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, and the constant rhetoric that Fidesz is protecting the nation from an external,

<sup>47</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 111.

<sup>48</sup> Kovács András, ed., *Zsidók a mai Magyarországon. Az 1999-ben végzett szociológiai felmérés eredményei* (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő Kiadó, 2002).

<sup>49</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 121.

<sup>50</sup> NOA, *Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről*, 24.

<sup>51</sup> Bíró-Nagy, András and Boros, Tamás, "Jobbik going mainstream: Strategy shift of the far-right in Hungary," in *Extreme right in Europe*, ed. Jamin Jerome (Brussels: Bruylant, 2016): 243–63; Héjj, Dominik, "The rebranding of Jobbik," *New Eastern Europe* 29, no. 6 (2017): 83–90.

<sup>52</sup> Hann and Róna, *Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban*, 2015, 13; Barna and Félix, *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*, 14; Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*, 47.

<sup>53</sup> Webpage of the Prime Minister, "Zéró tolerancia van az antiszemitizmussal szemben," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/zero-tolerancia-van-az-antiszemitizmussal-szemben/>.

<sup>54</sup> Bálint Kata et al., *„Minél jobbra, minél jobban” – A magyar (szélső)jobb 100 évvel Trianon után* (Budapest: Political Capital, 2020), 14.

global enemy.<sup>55</sup> In addition, since 2015, several public figures known for their extremist, antisemitic statements have received high state awards (e.g. Zsolt Bayer, Ernő Raffay).<sup>56</sup> Among political actors, the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk), which split from Jobbik in 2018, is the most prominent to use antisemitic elements, although instead of the previously typical for Jobbik, sometimes openly antisemitic statements, Our Homeland coded, covert, largely conspiratorial antisemitic language (e.g. attacking the Rothschilds, promoting the New World Order theory). The political presence of antisemitism is strongly connected to the kuruc.info portal linked to Előd Novák, formerly a prominent politician of Jobbik and now a prominent politician of Our Homeland.<sup>57</sup>

According to several interviewees, antisemitism in Hungary is a politicised topic. Many highlighted the Fidesz government's campaign against George Soros as having had an impact on antisemitism. Although the government did not consider the campaign to be antisemitic<sup>58</sup>, most interviewees perceived it as such, as the campaign portrayed George Soros with traditional antisemitic stereotypes. The impact of the campaign also reinforces the antisemitic interpretation: as many times antisemitic slogans and symbols (e.g. "stinking Jews", Star of David) were drawn on the anti-Soros posters,<sup>59</sup> the campaign undoubtedly mobilised antisemitic sentiments. According to several experts, those who have antisemitic feelings decoded the campaign as antisemitic, while for those who don't have such feelings, it did not carry antisemitic connotations. In addition, several mentioned that the Hungarian government's inadequate remembrance policy could also have an impact on antisemitism.

More interviewees with a Jewish identity highlighted that the government does a double-talk on antisemitism: while proclaiming zero tolerance for antisemitism and supporting Jewish organisations and causes with large amounts of money, albeit selectively, it also supports antisemitic individuals and collaborates with actors who promote antisemitic ideas.<sup>60</sup>

### Antisemitism in the sporting sphere

In the Hungarian sporting sphere, antisemitism is most prevalent in football. The discriminatory and racist behaviour of Hungarian football fans has caused problems several times: during the 2020 European Football

<sup>55</sup> Berend, Nóra, "Renationalized History and Antisemitism in Hungary," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2022): 216-28.

<sup>56</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 10.

<sup>57</sup> Barna and Knap, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary," 75-92.

<sup>58</sup> HVG, "Így válaszolt Orbán a Mazsihisz-elnöknek, aki a Soros-kampány leállítására kérte," HVG, July 7, 2017. [https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170707\\_orban\\_mazsihisz\\_valasz](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170707_orban_mazsihisz_valasz); HVG, "Szijjártó a Jerusalem Postnak: Nem azért utáljuk Sorost, mert zsidó," HVG, February 21, 2019. [https://hvg.hu/vilag/20190221\\_Szijjarto\\_a\\_Jerusalem\\_Postnak\\_Nem\\_azert\\_utaljuk\\_Sorost\\_mert\\_zsido](https://hvg.hu/vilag/20190221_Szijjarto_a_Jerusalem_Postnak_Nem_azert_utaljuk_Sorost_mert_zsido); ATV, "Szijjártó Péter: azok az antiszemiták, akik azt állítják, Soros Györggyel a vallása miatt vitatkozik a kormány," ATV, July 23, 2020. <https://www.atv.hu/belfold/20200723/szijjarto-peter-azok-az-antiszemita-akik-azt-allitjak-soros-gyorggyel-a-vallasa-miatt-vitatkozik-a-kormany>.

<sup>59</sup> The then president of MAZSIHISZ, András Heisler, wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about the antisemitic messages on Soros posters. 444, "A Mazsihisz elnöke Orbánnak: Vonják vissza utcáinkról és tereinkről a plakátokat!," 444, July 6, 2017. <https://444.hu/2017/07/06/a-mazsihisz-elnoke-orbannak-vonjak-vissza-utcainkrol-es-tereinkrol-a-plakatokat>.

<sup>60</sup> 24.hu, "Állami támogatásból vett dobogókői telket a Kitérés túra szervezője, de senki sem árulja el, hol épül fel a turistaház," 24.hu, 2023. október 31. <https://24.hu/kozelet/2023/10/31/hazajaro-honismereti-es-turista-egylet-egyesulet-kitores-tura-allami-tamogatas-bethlen-gabor-alapkezeslo-moys-zoltan-dobogoko-turistahaz/>; Bálint et al, „Minél jobbra, minél jobban.

Championship, it caused international repercussions, and in 2021, UEFA, among other things, fined the Hungarian Football Association (MLSZ) €100 000.<sup>61</sup> According to a survey, 57% of respondents found fine right, and only 38% thought it was too harsh.<sup>62</sup> In 2022, UEFA classified depicting Greater Hungary as a political symbol and banned banners and accessories picturing it at UEFA-organised competitions.<sup>63</sup>

According to the expert interviewed, there are three types of antisemitism appearing on the football stands: 1) open antisemitism (e.g. against Israeli athletes); 2) conspiratorial antisemitism (e.g. alleged Jewish interests behind punishments); 3) the use of the word "Jew" as a negative adjective without ideological or political content. In sporting games, the most common manifestation of racism is anti-Gypsyism; antisemitism is less frequent, but the content of racism is always heavily influenced by the current political discourse.

### Prejudice against other minorities

Hungarian society is quite exclusionary towards minority groups; prejudices and stereotypes are widespread against many of these. According to surveys, Jews are one of the least rejected groups. While until 2014, the highest level of rejection was the highest against Roma, later immigrants/migrants have become the most rejected group.<sup>64</sup>

According to several interviewees, prejudices generally have the same roots, such as insecurity (social, economic, existential), lack of information, education problems, political attitudes, bad experiences, and envy or lack of solidarity. All interviewees perceived rejection against minority groups in Hungary as the strongest towards Roma, migrants and the LGBTQ+ community. Many of them felt that anti-Gypsyism is a part of everyday conversations, and anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-migrant sentiments are also considered acceptable by society, which is not the case for antisemitism. A leader of an LGBTQ+ community emphasised that while the Hungarian government considers Jews and Roma as equal in political terms, it is not the case for the LGBTQ+ community and migrants.

Anti-Gypsyism sees Roma as a grassroots economic, cultural and physical threat; it appears primarily in dehumanisation and agreement with negative stereotypes.<sup>65</sup> A first-line practitioner explained that antisemitism and anti-Gypsyism position these groups both economically and socially: while antisemitism is motivated by envy of the perceived or real better position of Jews, anti-Gypsyism is motivated more by fear of being placed in the perceived or real worse position of the Roma.

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<sup>61</sup> Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség, "Közlemény az Euro 2020 három magyar mérkőzése kapcsán hozott fegyelmi döntés háttéréről," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://szovetseg.mlsz.hu/hir/kozlemeny-az-euro-2020-harom-magyar-merkozese-kapcsan-hozott-fegyelmi-dontes-hattererol>.

<sup>62</sup> Félix, Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020, 21;

<sup>63</sup> Telex, "UEFA: We have not permitted the use of Greater Hungary symbols at football matches," Telex, March 22, 2022. <https://telex.hu/english/2023/03/22/uefa-we-have-not-permitted-the-use-of-greater-hungary-symbols-at-football-matches>.

<sup>64</sup> Hann Endre and Róna Dániel, Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban (Budapest: TEV, 2019); Kende Anna et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon: Projektzáró tanulmány (Budapest: Political Capital, 2018); Republikon, Előítéletesség, antiszemitizmus: A ComAnCE projekt kutatási eredményei II (Budapest: Republikon Intézet, 2019).

<sup>65</sup> Kende et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon; Vanja Ljubic et al., "Romaphobia: A unique phenomenon?," *Romani Studies* 22, no. 2 (2012): 141-52.

Government communications on the 2015 refugee crisis portrayed refugees and migrants as a physical, security, health, social, labour market, and cultural/civilisational threat.<sup>66</sup> Since the mid-2010s, social attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ community have also been heavily influenced by government policies and communications that have framed LGBTQ+ and gender as a cultural, value system, and demographic threat.<sup>67</sup>

### **Hate speech and hate crimes against other minority groups**

Hungary's official number of hate crimes is negligible<sup>68</sup>, although the actual number certainly and probably significantly exceeds the statistics<sup>69</sup>. The Ministry of Interior does not allow these data to be differentiated by minority groups, but according to data and research sent to the OSCE, the vast majority of these are crimes against Roma, followed by homophobic incidents.<sup>70</sup> While there is no data on hate speech against Roma<sup>71</sup>, members of the LGBTQ+ community experience a large amount of hate speech<sup>72</sup>.

Discrimination against Roma is everyday and institutional: they face discrimination in everyday life in the labour market, housing, health, education, guardianship, and law enforcement. The lack of access to legal protection and representation compounds these.<sup>73</sup>

### **Antisemitism and education**

#### **Antisemitism and other prejudices in schools**

First-line practitioners and young people agree that the extent to which antisemitism is present in the educational environment is very school-specific. They also agreed that if antisemitism is present among students, teachers rarely become aware of it. In schools, antisemitism is most often verbal. According to many of the first-line practitioner interviewees, the root of this is superficial online content consumption and family patterns. In their opinion, behind most of the antisemitic statements of the students, there are no real antisemitic sentiments, but rather a rebellion against prohibitions, ignorance, or the use of "Jew" as a slur (the same applies to the words "gipsy" and "faggot"). Many have questioned the extent to which such statements can be considered antisemitic. Rarely, classical antisemitic narratives are also used by students who are more interested in and knowledgeable about Jewish history and traditions. Non-antisemitic students also often have misgivings about the Holocaust, not understanding what it has to do with them and

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<sup>66</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Hunyadi Bulcsú, Report on Xenophobia, Discrimination, Religious Hatred and Aggressive Nationalism in Hungary in 2015 (Budapest: Political Capital, 2016); Sik Endre et al., "Az idegenellenesség alakulása és a bevándorlással kapcsolatos félelmek Magyarországon és a visegrádi országokban," Régió 24, no. 2, (2016): 81-108.

<sup>67</sup> The Hátér Society's website provides a chronological list of government statements and actions: <https://hatter.hu/hirek/a-magyar-allam-nem-hogy-nem-vedi-aktiv-an-alaassa-az-lmbtqi-emberek-szabadsagat-es-jogait>; Political Capital, A comparison of the anti-gender and anti-LGBTQI mobilisation in Hungary and Poland (Budapest: Political Capital, 2022).

<sup>68</sup> Ministry of Interior, "Crime Statistics System,".

<sup>69</sup> FRA, Antisemitism.

<sup>70</sup> Information available on the website of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): <https://hatecrime.osce.org/hungary>.

<sup>71</sup> Kende et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon;

<sup>72</sup> Luke Hubbard, Speak Out: A Survey of Online Anti-LGBT+ Hate Speech and Hate Crime (online, 2019). Letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://en.hatter.hu/publications/speak-out-a-survey-of-online-anti-lgbt-hate-speech-and-hate-crime>.

<sup>73</sup> Király Júlia et al., Romák Magyarországon: A diszkrimináció kihívásai (Budapest: MRGE, 2021).

why they should learn about it. Young people highlighted that it is often unclear to them how to talk correctly about socially sensitive issues.

According to the interviewees, anti-Gypsyism is more prevalent in schools than antisemitism. Several first-line practitioners highlighted that politically motivated social polarization and government campaigns spreading hateful messages also have an impact on young people, as exemplified by the rise of anti-migrant sentiment among students in the wake of the 2015 anti-refugee campaign.

### **Topics related to Judaism, antisemitism and the Holocaust in the official curriculum**

In 2012, the government created a new National Core Curriculum and a unified textbook system.<sup>74</sup> In the process, it consulted the Jewish Community Roundtable<sup>75</sup>, which includes Jewish NGOs and congregations, on relevant curriculum changes. The curriculum was amended again in 2020, but the Roundtable was not involved. Although parts of Jewish history were not removed, antisemitic historical figures (e.g. Albert Wass or Joseph Nyíró)<sup>76</sup> were included in the curriculum. Teaching topics necessary to counter antisemitism, such as human rights, critical thinking, acceptance and intercultural dialogue, is inadequate, not only because of the deficiencies of the curriculum but also because of the lack of adequate support and guidance for teachers.<sup>77</sup>

Several interviewees criticised the National Core Curriculum for omitting authors who could be used to talk to students about the Holocaust and antisemitism effectively.

### **The role and possibilities of education in combatting antisemitism and other forms of prejudices**

Research has shown that in secondary school, students' prejudice is strongly influenced by whether they perceive prejudice or acceptance as the norm in their community. While, in general, the majority tends to be unprejudiced, if the community is perceived as prejudiced, it makes prejudice the norm.<sup>78</sup> Establishing intergroup and extra-group relations also helps to ensure that prejudice does not become the community norm in school.<sup>79</sup> Teachers and schools, therefore, have a crucial role in reducing prejudices. It can be assumed that if a teacher is able to support the development of inclusive community norms among students that reject prejudices, for example, by giving space to unprejudiced voices already existing in the community, it is likely to reduce prejudices among students.<sup>80</sup>

Several interviewees identified education as one of the most important tools to reduce prejudices, as it is a way to reach many young people in a targeted way. Foreign language teaching and human rights education were seen as important subjects in this regard, and young people highlighted critical thinking, the ability to

<sup>74</sup> Krausz Viktória, "Tájékep tankönyvviták közben," Szombat folyóirat, 2015. március 24. <https://www.szombat.org/politika/tajkep-tankonyvvitak-kozben>.

<sup>75</sup> Szunyogh Szabolcs, Áttekintés a Nemzeti alaptantervvel, a kerettantervekkel és a tankönyvekkel kapcsolatban (Budapest: TEV, 2015).

<sup>76</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 14.

<sup>77</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 24.

<sup>78</sup> Váradi, Luca, "Youths Trapped in Prejudice: Hungarian Adolescents' Attitudes Towards the Roma," *Politische Psychologie*, 2014: 61-83; Váradi, Luca et al., "Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice? The Dynamics of Perceived Group Norms and Prejudice in New Secondary School Classes," *Frontiers in Psychology* 11, (2021): 1-17.

<sup>79</sup> Váradi et al., Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice?.

<sup>80</sup> Váradi et al., Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice?.

recognise fake news, and self-awareness. They also emphasised the importance of training teachers to react appropriately to prejudice among students. According to several interviewees, NGO project days and cultural, artistic, and encounter-based programmes work well in sensitisation. Many interviewees stressed that reducing prejudice is a slow process, takes time and energy, is essentially achieved through face-to-face discussions, and it is important to involve the whole school staff.

According to several interviewees, experience has shown that antisemitism cannot be curbed by prohibition, as this way, prejudice is only eliminated, not suppressed, and leads to rebellion against prohibition. At the same time, direct sensitisation can be easily counterproductive if the wrong tool is chosen. Methods based on emotional empathy and personal contact are much more effective than fact-based information. According to many interviewees' experiences, sensitisation about the Holocaust works better with personal stories to which the student can relate than with dry facts and figures. A trauma-based narrative is very strong in Hungary, which is often ineffective for young people.

According to a first-line practitioner, the majority in a student community is usually not prejudiced or accepting but thinks nothing of these issues. Therefore, one of the aims of education should be to educate them to be people of feeling and solidarity.

According to several interviewees, the possibilities of education to reduce prejudice in Hungary are limited. The education system is in crisis with a shortage of teachers, large class sizes, centralised management, changes in the National Core Curriculum, and a general lack of time. Although some schools consider it important to tackle prejudice, these efforts are also hindered by a lack of appropriate knowledge and methods.

In addition to emphasising the importance of education, interviewees identified several possible ways to reduce prejudice, including antisemitism. Examples include community building, self-awareness and experiencing diversity. Giving people the chance to learn about Jewish religion and culture and to interact with Jewish people can also help to reduce antisemitism. Among young people, but also at the societal level, it is of utmost importance to counteract offensive and hateful narratives against minorities and ensure their proper representation in the media.

### **Educational materials and programmes**

Several NGOs have created educational materials to help reduce prejudice or have held regular school sessions for professionals working with young people. Regarding antisemitism, the examples include but are not limited to, the Zachor Foundation, the Haver Foundation, the Centropa Foundation, and the Action and Protection League. Regarding reducing prejudices against other minorities, some of the organisations are the UCCU Foundation, the Menedék Association, the Labrisz Association, the Symposium Association, the Foundation for Democratic Youth, the Network of Human Rights Educators, the Down Foundation, the Menhely Foundation, the Independent Theatre, and Amnesty International Hungary.<sup>81</sup>

In addition to textbooks, a range of digital teaching materials on Jewry and the Holocaust are available for teachers. However, teachers need to be provided with methodological training and familiarisation with digital teaching materials to use these materials properly. It is also necessary to provide schools with the

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<sup>81</sup> Euroguide, *Hogyan beszéljünk fiatalokkal érzékeny társadalmi kérdésekről? - Ötletgyűjtemény és módszertani segédanyag fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek számára kiadvány* (online, 2021). accessed December 19, 2023. <https://euroguide-toolkit.eu/language-select/hu/hu-kezikonyv-bevezeto/>.

appropriate technical background for using such teaching materials, to develop relevant curricula, teaching, and materials, and to provide enough time.<sup>82</sup> Creating an environment in education and public life that does not urge teachers and school administrators to self-censor, fearing the reaction of educational authorities, politicians or parents, but encourages and supports them to be active in reducing prejudice and raising awareness of minority groups.

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<sup>82</sup> Mezei Mónika, “Holokausztoktatás online. Közművelődési intézmények, közgyűjtemények és civil szervezetek online oktatási anyagai,” in *A Holokauszt, az iskola és a tanár*, szerk. Forrás-Bíró Aletta (Budapest: OKFI, 2016).



## Antisemitism in Italy

### Executive summary

This document was prepared based on the analysis of materials found through documentary research, in particular, based on materials and sources made available by CDEC and the UCEI portal, and based on the analysis of data acquired through the responses of the interviewees provided structured and documented information on the phenomenon of antisemitism in Italy today. In particular, the report focuses on the situation of Italian Jewish communities and Jewish life in its social, political, economic, cultural and religious dimensions.

The most substantial part of the report concerns the level of antisemitism in Italian society, its prevalent forms and the areas in which it manifests itself. With reference to the different manifestations of antisemitism, it's pointed out which stereotypes are present in society and which are the most prevalent. From this analysis, it's clear that the forms and areas in which antisemitism manifests itself differ according to the degree of schooling, cultural formation and socio-economic background of the perpetrators of antisemitic acts, so it is difficult to rigidly identify the profile of the antisemite.

The areas where acts of hatred and hate crimes are most prevalent are social media and sports, particularly football. Still, even in the political debate, it's evident that more or less latent forms of antisemitism related to Nazi-fascist ideology are present for far-right movements and anti-Zionism for the extreme left wing.

The report also aims to highlight which other minorities are most discriminated against in Italy and what the stereotypes and prejudices associated with them, as well as what are the intersections between antisemitism and other forms of racism and intolerance. Considerable space is, finally, devoted to the educational strategies implemented in schools to counter and prevent antisemitism as the direction of the Italian Ministry of Education and Merit (IMPE) points to the dissemination and implementation of the *Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism (2019)* in public schools and the promotion of a culture of dialogue and peace.

### The situation of the Jewish population in Italy

Today, the Italian Jews registered in the country's 21 Jewish communities in 2018 were less than 30,000 out of a population of 57 million, half of whom live in Rome and less than 10,000 in Milan. The others are scattered in communities, defined as 'medium' – such as those in Turin, Florence, Trieste, Livorno, and Venice– or 'small'. The various communities are united in the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, which has its headquarters in Rome and represents Jews in relations with the government and public institutions. The Union coordinates the cultural needs of the Jewish Communities and supports the smaller communities. Despite its many problems, Italian Judaism remains alive and vibrant and represents an element of stimulation, reflection and confrontation within the surrounding society.

For a more in-depth overview, it is interesting to note that the focus group conducted with the Union of Young Italian Jews revealed the presence of a strong ethnic, religious, and cultural identity and the desire to preserve it within Italian society; the Italian identity is perceived as second to Jewish identity. Despite this, there is a tendency among these young people to conceal their identity for various reasons, such as the shame of their Jewish affiliation and the avoidance of the attention and curiosity of others about their origins and their religious and cultural customs.

Another peculiarity of the Italian situation, as highlighted also by community leaders, as evident in the dossier “Ebrei d’Europa”<sup>83</sup> published on the Italian Jewish portal MOKED in May 2022, is the weakness of educational bodies and the complexity and conflictuality of community bodies. Nine out of ten respondents in the dossier mentioned above put at first place the problem of estrangement from community life, which in concrete terms means lack of participation, non-attendance at synagogues, community centers, community schools, and less interest in the role played by Jewish communities in national politics. This explains why, for the Jewish Italians, more than for other Jewish Europeans, it seems very relevant to improve dialogue and cooperation both at the Jewish community level and between the Jewish community and the Jews who are not inside the Jewish community. It is also important for them to create partnerships with other Jewish institutions, improve communication, and develop awareness-raising strategies for non-members.<sup>84</sup>

Even though the Union of Italian Jews and the local community do a lot to combat antisemitism – as the field research revealed – according to a recent survey<sup>85</sup>, Jewish leaders prioritise finding solutions internal to the community. The primary concern of Jewish communities is the loss of the sense of belonging of the affiliates (but not the sense of Jewish identity), i.e. the distance and alienation from community life – as shown by the declining number of members of the Jewish community –, the lack of commitment to community activities, the declining knowledge about Judaism, the lack of renewal on the organisational level, and the lack of effective leadership.<sup>86</sup>

In the interviews, academic and professional experts in the field of antisemitism highlighted the high level of professional, cultural and social integration of the Jewish community into the Italian socio-economic system. They also emphasised that the strong ethnic-religious identity prevents a fertile and constructive exchange. The cultural initiatives of Jewish communities are, in fact, scarcely publicised, and they receive just modest attention from a small number of non-Jews.

### Level of antisemitism in society

Research from 2021<sup>87</sup> found that 19% of Italians can be considered antisemitic in terms of primary antisemitism<sup>88</sup>, 35% in terms of secondary antisemitism<sup>89</sup>, and 45% in terms of new antisemitism<sup>90</sup>. A specific trait of the country seems to be “Italian unawareness”, which brings a lack of public debate and collective historical reflection on the issue of racism and antisemitism. Not being aware of its own racism (indeed wanting to build a collective image on the idea of openness and tolerance), Italy tends to legitimise and downplay the seriousness of forms of antisemitism and racism, thus contributing to their spread.<sup>91</sup> The

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<sup>83</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>84</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>85</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>86</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>87</sup> Kovács. e Fischer, “Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries.”

<sup>88</sup> Primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>89</sup> Secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

<sup>90</sup> New antisemitism is anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

<sup>91</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

average Italian suffers from a chronic form of ignorance due to the reductions<sup>92</sup> regarding their responsibility in spreading antisemitic sentiment in Italy and Europe.

The antisemitism that characterises Italy could be defined as “low-intensity”, which, even if it does not give rise to urgent problems, means dealing with a pervasive and creeping phenomenon. For this very reason, it is more dangerous because it easily ends up de-rubricated acts of antisemitism and racism for “normal” and harmless “things”.<sup>93</sup> Exponents of Italian politics, especially on the right side, think antisemitism is less widespread in Italy than in other European countries<sup>94</sup>.

According to research commissioned by Solomon Observatory on Discrimination and conducted by Alessandra Ghisleri's Euromedia Research in 2019<sup>95</sup> 53.5% of Italians believe that antisemitism is not widespread in Italy, and 52.7% believe that anti-Zionism, i.e. the opposition to the State of Israel is little or not widespread. However, the opinion of the experts in this field is that antisemitism is on the rise, even though the semantic space of the term is very wide and ranges from the expression of prejudices, stereotypes, and opinions to more or less serious concrete actions.<sup>96</sup> The research results also showed that both Holocaust distortion/denial and conspiratorial antisemitism are present: 1.3% of Italians believe that the Holocaust is a legend, 10.5% think that the final figure of the victims (6 million Jews) is actually much less and 49% say Jews are a financial powerhouse. The Annual Report on Antisemitism in Italy 'also shows an important decline concerning the perception of the prevalence of antisemitism in Italy: whereas in 2021, 55% considered it fairly widespread, by January 2023, the percentage had dropped to 42%. It can be assumed that priorities such as COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have decreased sensitivity to antisemitism'.<sup>97</sup>

Mainly due to their visibility in terms of identifiable clothing, Jewish men are more likely to experience physical attacks, be subject to offensive or threatening comments, and experience offensive gestures and staring. Also, they are more likely to experience antisemitism online. Conspiracy theories usually place Jews in male-dominated sectors (political and economic), and antisemitic drawings and cartoons also depict Jews as men.<sup>98</sup>

The interviews with academic experts showed that antisemitism is different from other forms of discrimination, as it's also evident from the data collected through desk research, because the Jewish minority, unlike other minorities, is not excluded because it is considered weak, but based on its presumed superiority as politically and economically powerful. Interviews with leaders of ethnic and religious minorities and leaders of minority communities such as LGBTQ+ and political refugees revealed the absence of their direct experience of antisemitic acts; these people have never witnessed any episodes of antisemitism.

The Union of Young Italian Jews highlighted the need to distinguish contemporary antisemitism, as a feeling of aversion towards the Jewish people, from antisemitism of Nazi-fascist origin. The former appears more

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<sup>92</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>93</sup> Rete nazionale per il contrasto ai discorsi e ai fenomeni d'odio, “Antisemitismo italiano a bassa intensità.”

<sup>94</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>95</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni. “Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani”. Euromedia Research. 2019.

<sup>96</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo”.

<sup>97</sup> CDEC, “Relazione annuale sull'antisemitismo in Italia 2022”.

<sup>98</sup> Cambuzzi, “Discussions about antisemitism need to include gender and sexuality”.

insidious and dangerous today as it includes antisemites who despise Jews because of their alleged socio-economic power and because they are critical of Israel.

The field research showed that young Italians know how to define antisemitism by identifying its historical reasons; they are able to recognise the main stereotypes linked to the Jewish people (e.g. deicide, usury, economic power). They have the awareness that in many people, there are latent antisemitic feelings and attitudes that act at a subconscious level as a cultural heritage and that, in most cases, are not explicitly connoted at an ideological-political level. These attitudes leak out mainly in the language of football supporters, in the language of young people with lower-middle-class culture, in the presence of peers or more on social networks because they can do it anonymously.

Today's antisemitism is related to economic, sociocultural, psychological, political and religious variables, i.e. the profile of antisemitism is not unique and, therefore, not easy to trace. The elements often combined in antisemitic statements are social frustration due to economic hardship that leads to feelings of anger and resentment, information and media bewilderment, ignorance, aversion to Israel, racism, populism, conspiracy, and religious hatred. Moreover, while one agrees with the idea of antisemitism linked to right-wing populism, it's equally evident that there is antisemitism also linked to the fringes of the extreme left.<sup>99</sup>

The obvious fact that emerged from both the individual interviews and the focus groups is the idea that the profile of the antisemites, in any case, is generally associated with the male gender and adulthood, as well as with political connotations of two different types, that are linked to extreme right-wing parties, which have inherited the antisemitic and racist prejudice of totalitarian regimes, and that related to extreme left-wing parties, which connotes itself as antisemitic based on criticism of the policy adopted by the state of Israel with regard to the Palestinian question.

The most widespread form of antisemitism is conspiracy theories spread on social media channels, as conspiracy theories are all reducible to antisemitism to some extent.<sup>100</sup>

The most archaic form of antisemitism is linked to Nazi-fascist ideology in which ethnic, religious, and conspiratorial elements are mixed. This type of antisemitism persists in some fanatical individuals who profess to belong to extreme right-wing political movements that expressly refer to fascism, such as Lega, Fratelli d'Italia, Ordine Nuovo and CasaPound (CP).<sup>101</sup> The form of antisemitism centered on Israel, on the other hand, is anti-Israel bias, i.e. the aversion to the Jewish state, regarded as the root of all evil, or a country that, as a historical ally of the USA, is held responsible for the devastating geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East. Some people in Italy think that antisemitism as anti-Israel bias is a left-wing identity trait and that this can be significantly fuelled by the presence of the Muslim minority in Italian cities and sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.<sup>102</sup> Another form of antisemitism, less mentioned, is Holocaust denialism and distortion. This issue is at the heart of the efforts of the International Holocaust Remembrance

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<sup>99</sup>Pagine Ebraiche, "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>100</sup>Pagine Ebraiche, "Dossier/Antisemitismo.", 15.

<sup>101</sup>Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Technical Working Group for the recognition of the definition of antisemitism approved by the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, "Final report. National strategy for combating antisemitism."

<sup>102</sup>Pagine Ebraiche, "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

Alliance (IHRA).<sup>103</sup> According to the IHRA, the goals of denialism are often the rehabilitation of overt antisemitism.

### **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, and conspiracy theories**

Antisemitism is an ancient, heterogeneous and persistent phenomenon as it's underpinned by a series of stereotypes and prejudices that are present in society across the board. Antisemitism is nurtured on a psychological level by the reduction of the real Jew to the imaginary one in which the Jew subsumes certain characteristics and alleged goals. The emotional dimension of experiencing the economic crisis, uncertainty, the fragility of the systems of representation, and globalisation as a threat to identity all of which contribute to antisemitic urges. The most important factors are those historically and socially rooted prejudices and stereotypes that produce distrust of diversity and widespread conspiracy thinking. Studies show that both Christianity and Islam have embedded antisemitic prejudice in their cultural and religious memories and have been important in the dissemination of antisemitism around the world. According to the most accepted historical perspective, the roots of antisemitism can be traced back to the ancient anti-Judaism of the Catholic matrix, which persists in certain stereotypes and prejudices, such as that of deicide (Jews killed Jesus), Jews are conspirators, or Jews are the carriers of evil.<sup>104</sup>

The DOSSIER/Antisemitism<sup>105</sup> published on Pagine Ebraiche in January 2022 shows that among the most shared prejudices in the Italian population that contribute to resentment and hatred are the wealth and economic power of Jews, membership of financial and cultural lobbies and strong social cohesion. The figure of the Jew is classified as a figure of power, and this does not happen to any other discriminated race or minority in Italy. The adjectives associated with the Jew are 'different' and 'dangerous' because they are morally perverse: greedy, individualistic, selfish, ready to exploit the weakest, scheming and treacherous. In addition, Jews are often seen as a distinct and separate group from the rest of society, very cohesive and inaccessible, almost a sect convinced it possesses the truth, and this arouses mistrust and antipathy.

According to research conducted by Euromedia Research<sup>106</sup>, the most common clichés are in percentage order:

1. Jews have too much power in the international financial-economic world
2. Jews think they are superior to others
3. Jews do not care what happens to others but only what happens to themselves
4. Jews are much more loyal to Israel than to Italy
5. Palestinians are victims of genocide by Jews
6. Jews still talk too much about what happened during the Holocaust.

Current antisemitism mainly appears in the form of conspiracy theories, which have been reinvigorated by the economic and other crises of the last decade. During the COVID-19 pandemic, online hate speech

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<sup>103</sup> International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

<sup>104</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "L'antisemitismo."

<sup>105</sup> Pagine Ebraiche, "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>106</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni, "Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani".

increased by 40 per cent compared to the previous year in Italy.<sup>107</sup> In such a phase, the stylistic features of historical anti-Jewish propaganda may come to the fore again. Indeed, it seems that antisemitism is always ready to re-emerge in certain crucial periods, such as the economic crisis or the recent pandemic. The old narratives have been joined by new ones blaming Jews for the pandemic, and antisemitic incidents in EU states, including Italy, increased in 2020.<sup>108</sup> Italy registered 101 incidents of antisemitism, the highest number recorded in the last ten years.<sup>109</sup>

### Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes

The Annual Report on Antisemitism in Italy for the year 2022<sup>110</sup> shows that the Antisemitism Observatory of the CDEC Foundation received 327 reports on different cases, 241 of which were classified as acts against Jews: “The data for 2022 show an increase compared to 2021 (226 episodes). 164 relate to antisemitism on the Internet, while 77 concern incidents that occurred physically, including two assaults, ten cases of threats and a serious act of vandalism against the synagogue in Trieste”.<sup>111</sup> The danger of the web as a place for disseminating hatred and antisemitism is now well established because the speed with contents appearing online leaves no space for ethical reflection. With the web, the area for the expression of antisemitism and the visibility of antisemitic feelings have grown enormously because people with the same ideology can easily contact on social media, which can make a dangerous impact outside the virtual world. The internet provides a means for antisemites to spread their narrative either through explicit hate speech or coded manifestations in implicit or indirect speech.<sup>112</sup> According to the dossier “When the Poison is Social”, the net favours antisemitism because of three phenomena: anonymity, the speed of the tool with which one can spread one's thoughts, and the consensus one receives that one is right. Therefore, there is a clear need for legal and criminal measures to discourage hate speech, antisemitic speech and actions.<sup>113</sup> The Italian penal code does not specifically regulate incitement to hatred. Still, the Mancino law of 1993 (Article 604bis of the penal code), later amended in 2006, establishes penalties of up to one year and six months imprisonment for persons found guilty of incitement or racist propaganda on ethnic, national or religious grounds.<sup>114</sup>

### Antisemitism in politics

Research has shown that there are two types of political narratives: that of the xenophobic extreme right-wing parties in Europe, which to a marginal extent is also present in Italy (the two main openly neo-fascist groups still present in Italy are Casapound and Forza Nuova), and that of the extreme left-wing parties (in particular some members of the Democratic Party), which are critical of the policy of the state of Israel with regard to the handling of the conflict with Palestine.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Cambruzzi, “Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homobiphobia in the Italian context”.

<sup>108</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “Nuovo rapporto sull’antisemitismo dell’Agenzia dell’Unione Europea per i Diritti Fondamentali (FRA): pandemia e antisemitismo cresce l’allarme”.

<sup>109</sup> Moked. Il portale dell’ebraismo italiano, “Pandemia e antisemitismo in Europa. Pericoloso aumento degli incidenti”.

<sup>110</sup> CDEC, “Relazione annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia 2022”, 10.

<sup>111</sup> CDEC, “Relazione annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia 2022”, 10.

<sup>112</sup> Pagine Ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>113</sup> Pagine Ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>114</sup> Cambruzzi, “Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homobiphobia in the Italian context”.

<sup>115</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “Forza nuova e casa pound le maggiori organizzazioni del radicalismo di destra in Italia.”

## Antisemitism in the sporting sphere

Antisemitism in sports, especially football, is a phenomenon not only in Italy but in many countries worldwide, especially in Europe, particularly in Belgium, England, and Germany. During 2022, numerous antisemitic incidents occurred in these countries. The phenomenon is widespread in some supporters' clubs, even in Italian football.<sup>116</sup> One example is the Lazio-Roma derby, held in the Italian capital on 19 March 2023, where a Lazio<sup>117</sup> ultras of German origin entered the stand of the Olympic Stadium wearing a shirt glorifying and praising Adolf Hitler. Antisemitic chants are a 30-year problem of the Lazio supporters, according to the team itself, but this time, the ethical code against antisemitic discrimination has been applied, which is a turning point in the history of Italian football. Even though fines and revocations do not have the intended effect of removing antisemitism from the stadiums, many countries have realised that to eradicate this behaviour, a re-education of the perpetrators is needed to make them understand the seriousness of these acts. The publication "Combating Antisemitism in Sport" is based on these values of re-education and cooperation, creating an international network that brings these activities together with the view that sport can be a useful means of promoting peace, tolerance and respect for human rights.<sup>118</sup>

## Enmity against other minority groups in the country

While antisemitism is present in Italy, other minority groups are also targets of discriminatory practices to a bigger extent. While antisemitism is considered to be marginal, many times not an intentional attitude, other forms of discrimination are more evident.<sup>119</sup> The most affected groups include the African and Middle Eastern Immigrants, Muslims, Roma and Sinti, as well as the LGBTQ+ community.<sup>120</sup> For example, the 2017 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) survey revealed that minorities experience discrimination in various areas of their life. Among African and Asian ethnicities, one of the most targeted attributes is the colour of their skin and religion. The FRA survey demonstrated that even second-generation immigrants experience discrimination to a similar extent as their parents. Discrimination can even impact their job environment and opportunities.<sup>121</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic boosted online hate speech against many minorities, targeting mainly the LGBTQ+ community (98,2%), Roma (47,6%), Muslims (46%), and NGOs and human rights workers (25,9%).<sup>122</sup>

Different stereotypes are present linked to minorities, such as delinquents, drug dealers, taking jobs away from Italians, in reference to African immigrants; terrorists, untrustworthy, restricting women's freedom, not respecting their rights, imposing their faith on others, in reference to Arab and Muslim; thieves who steal, in reference to Roma; they are sick, not respecting Catholic morals and social norms in reference to LGBTQ+. These stereotypes, which originate mainly from nationalist and anti-European-oriented media and partly political narratives, are present mainly online in the form of insults or accusations and, only in rare cases, reach levels of extreme violence.<sup>123</sup> Discourses that are potentially very dangerous are those that are

<sup>116</sup> Il portale dell'ebraismo italiano, "Un calcio all'antisemitismo".

<sup>117</sup> Il fatto quotidiano, "La lotta all'antisemitismo nel calcio fra i provvedimenti anche il divieto della maglia numero 88."

<sup>118</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Combattere l'antisemitismo nello sport la nuova iniziativa del wjc per ridurre fan e atleti."

<sup>119</sup> Liberties-Monitoraggio UE, "La discriminazione su base etnica continua in Italia e in tutta Europa."

<sup>120</sup> Post.Quotidiano online, "Minoranze in Italia".

<sup>121</sup> Liberties-Monitoraggio UE, "La discriminazione su base etnica continua in Italia e in tutta Europa," 1.

<sup>122</sup> Amnesty International, "Barometro dell'odio: intolleranza pandemica".

<sup>123</sup> Osservatorio di politica internazionale, "Nuove forme di antisemitismo e mezzi di contrasto".

inherently fascist but in which the nationalist ideology is not overtly recognisable. These construct enemies out of minorities in two steps: 1) naming the enemies using generic categories like “immigrants” or “Muslims”, 2) dehumanising the enemy by conveying that they are not respectable. For example, in the Italian media, Muslims are often portrayed as terrorists, and Roma are labeled thieves. These narratives are present in an “ostensibly democratic” manner, using the supposed democratic principle of giving everyone a voice. Still, it is more the systematic repetition of simple slogans implanting prejudices in people’s heads and thus giving rise to stereotypes that fuel the leadership of potentially dangerous political figures.<sup>124</sup>

As the interviews revealed, a judgment shared especially by young students and university students is that the state should take charge of minorities by guaranteeing the application of the rights enshrined in the Italian constitution as well as launching new measures to combat discrimination because the existing ones have not proved effective.

Many of the interviewees have been subject to acts of discrimination linked, on the one hand, to traditionalism and cultural conservatism of a Catholic matrix, for example, concerning different sexual orientations. On the other hand, it is linked to the racism of some Italian citizens, hostile to the reception of migrants and refugees, for reasons related to identity nationalism and the Italian socio-economic situation, which only constitutionally but not de facto, guarantees all citizens the same rights relating to work and dignified life.

Narratives connecting Jews with ‘perverted’ sexual habits, paedophilia, homosexuality, and wanting to subvert or disrupt ‘normalcy’ have been long present in Italy. Besides, narratives about Jews imposing LGBTQ+ rights and activities on Europe/West, even though they don’t want to have it in Israel, are also prevalent in the country. Minorities can also be subjected to prejudices from other minority communities, e.g. Jews are subjected to antisemitism within the LGBTQ+ community or vice versa. As homophobic, transphobic, antigypsyism, racist, etc., hatred is often spread online by the same profiles. To combat these, a holistic and intersectional-framed approach is needed.<sup>125</sup>

### Prevention of antisemitism in education

The field research showed that young students in Italian schools and universities have little knowledge of Judaism due to a lack of experience and direct contact, or possibility for dialogue with the Italian Jewish community, weak historical and religious knowledge because of the lack of accurate education on the subject, and also due to the lack of involvement of the population in Jewish cultural initiatives and events. As shown by the important collection of articles concerning incidents of antisemitism in schools from 2013 to the present, produced by the Observatory of Antisemitism<sup>126</sup>, the phenomena of antisemitism in schools have increased significantly in recent years<sup>127</sup>.

To contain and prevent these phenomena, there are some important educational actions:

- Extend the public debate on antisemitism and racism in general and be strong in condemning all acts of intolerance and hatred;

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<sup>124</sup> Murgia, Istruzioni per diventare fascisti.

<sup>125</sup> Cambuzzi, “Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homobiphobia in the Italian context”.

<sup>126</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “L’antisemitismo nella scuola.”

<sup>127</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “Episodi di antisemitismo a scuola”.



- Foster dialogue between cultures;
- Get to know the Jewish world as a whole;
- Put antisemitism in relation to other forms of intolerance;
- Create alliances and opportunities to meet in the world of sport, especially football, where episodes of antisemitism and/or Holocaust trivialisation are often encountered;
- Prosecuting hate speech and actions;
- Responding, i.e. on the web and social media;
- Bringing the Jewish story to date by placing it in a contemporary context.

In November 2021, *The Guidelines on Countering Antisemitism in Schools*<sup>128</sup> were published in Italy containing important tools for institutions, schools, universities, and the world of communication. Through this instrument, Italy has shown that it aims to develop the work of educating and training youth in schools to enhance the history of the Jewish people, to try to decouple the work on antisemitism from the Shoah, taking into account that online new media education and digital literacy are also decisive. The Ministry of Education promotes the preservation of the memory of the Shoah and the education to respect differences against all forms of violence and discrimination. With this objective, it has established a series of collaborations with the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI), the National Museum of Italian Judaism and the Shoah (MEIS) and the Shoah Memorial.<sup>129</sup>

Since 2001, the Ministry, in cooperation with the UCEI, has annually launched the national competition *Young people remember the Shoah*, dedicated to all school students of all levels and organises several remembrance trips for students, teachers and institutions each year.<sup>130</sup> To provide Italian teachers and students with a training tool on the themes of the Shoah, antisemitism and indifference to discrimination, the Ministry, in cooperation with the UCEI, has launched the portal School and Remembrance<sup>131</sup>, which offers a platform for the exchange of best practices in the teaching of the Shoah among schools throughout the country.

Museums and Holocaust Memorials in Italy created the 'The Italian Network of Remembrance'.<sup>132</sup> With law no. 211 of 20 July 2000, the Italian Parliament recognised 27 January, when the gates of Auschwitz were torn down, as the 'Day of Remembrance in remembrance of the extermination and persecution of the Jewish people and Italian military and political deportees to Nazi camps', specifying in art. 2, that on the occasion of that day 'ceremonies, initiatives, meetings and common moments of narration of the facts and reflection shall be organised, particularly in schools of all levels, on what happened to the Jewish people and the Italian military and political deportees to the Nazi camps to preserve in the future of Italy the memory of a tragic and dark period of history in Italy and Europe, and so that similar events may never happen again'.<sup>133</sup>

According to the survey reported in the CDEC Foundation's Annual Report on Antisemitism in Italy 2022, 90% of students think remembering the Shoah is important, of which 70% think it is very important. This result is highly positive, proving the efficiency of the work of governments, institutions and schools in remembering

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<sup>128</sup>Ministero dell'Istruzione e del Merito. "Linee guida di contrasto all'antisemitismo nella scuola".

<sup>129</sup><https://www.miur.gov.it/scuola-e-shoah>

<sup>130</sup><https://www.miur.gov.it/-/i-giovani-ricordano-la-shoah-xxii-edizione-del-concorso-per-l-anno-scolastico-2023-24>

<sup>131</sup>Materiali e fonti consultate su [www.scuolaememoria.it](http://www.scuolaememoria.it)

<sup>132</sup><https://www.miur.gov.it/scuola-e-shoah>

<sup>133</sup>[www.scuolaememoria.it](http://www.scuolaememoria.it)

the Shoah.<sup>134</sup> Despite these results, there is a need for more knowledge about Jews and Jewish identity in schools.

In 2017, to coincide with the Holocaust Memorial Day celebrations, the Ministry sent a letter to schools of all levels containing the "National Guidelines for Holocaust Education at School"<sup>135</sup>. It is also worth mentioning that educational materials and activities dealing with the themes of Judaism and antisemitism are available on many sites, reported in the research, including the website of the Antisemitism Observatory, which makes brochures, films, documentaries and lessons available to teachers and trainers.<sup>136</sup>

The field research revealed a number of critical issues in terms of school and education and antisemitism, such as:

1. The lack of Jewish experts in schools;
2. The need to programmatically include the history of the Jewish people, culture and religion in the three years of high school also through specific projects;
3. Partial use of available digital resources;
4. Lack of activities and projects related to knowledge, dialogue and social inclusion of discriminated minorities;
5. There is a need to increase the number of materials, experiences, and human resources available to the school, such as expert trainers, scholars, and researchers.

The topics on which we propose to work and reflect in terms of education and antisemitism are:

- improving knowledge of Jewry and Judaism concerning history, culture and religion, explaining, for example, the due differences between Orthodox Judaism and Reform Judaism, also referred to as liberal and progressive;
- disassociate the discussion of Judaism from antisemitism;
- identify unconscious prejudices that underlie individual and collective thinking and acting;
- uncover conspiracy theories and deconstruct the stereotypes and prejudices that support them concerning antisemitism and other forms of discrimination present in Italian society;
- address the negation, distortion and trivialisation of the Shoah;
- dealing with antisemitism online;
- improving knowledge of the situation in the Middle East to make young people aware of the differences between Jews and the state of Israel.

Trainers' strategies for educating young people about diversity should include analysing topics or conducting research and activities that aim to develop feelings of solidarity, inclusion and support for discriminated minorities through:

- The use of personal narratives to emphasise the diversity within the Jewish world to show that Jews, like people of other traditions, have many different religious beliefs and practices or none at all; the commonalities between Jews and others, such as cultural, socio-economic, geographical, linguistic

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<sup>134</sup> CDEC, "Relazione annuale dell'antisemitismo in Italia, 2022".

<sup>135</sup> Ministero dell'Istruzione e del Merito, "Linee guida nazionali per una didattica della Shoah a scuola".

<sup>136</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Materiale per il contrasto all'antisemitismo".

and other characteristics; the positive impact that Jews, or other people from different religious or cultural communities, have on local, national and/or international contexts.

- The use of history lessons - at school, teach the history of Jews as part of local, national or international history, including the history of the State of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian situation and using a multi-viewpoint approach; personalise history and tell the personal stories of Jews (common and well-known people who have contributed to the development of science, the arts, philosophy, etc.); consider how Jews, or other people from different religious or cultural communities, have contributed to the development of science, the arts, philosophy, etc.; considering how they have contributed to the development of the world. Take into account how various socially accepted stereotypes have had and have negative consequences regarding the rights enjoyed by men, women and members of certain groups or communities, including Jews, at various times in history and in the present; teach the origins and causes of antisemitism before and after the Holocaust, reaching out to the world today and taking care not to replace these lessons with specific lessons on the Holocaust.
- The use of personal narrative to emphasise the diversity within the Jewish world to show that Jews, like people of other traditions, have many different religious beliefs and practices or none at all; the commonalities between Jews and others, such as in terms of cultural, socio-economic, geographical, linguistic and other characteristics; the positive impact that Jews, or other people from different religious or cultural communities, have on local, national and/or international contexts.
- The use of students' various identities to create their own self-portrait (in written, graphic or poetic form); working on individual ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural diversity, sexual orientation, hobbies, interests, and ideals; guide the students towards identifying certain aspects of their own self-portrait that may reveal or generate a stereotype based on factors, such as inner choices and external pressures, that influence thoughts and actions, to demonstrate how social narratives are constructed, analyse the relationship between a student's perception of some particular traits of themselves and others perceive these.

The work of educators must aim to achieve better results than in recent years with regard to combating ignorance, raising the cultural level of young people, including those who do not go to university studies, and refining critical thinking. In this perspective, it will also be possible to counter young people's precocious tendency to stereotyping and prejudice categorisation caused by media overexposure, leading to pseudo-learning of a vast amount of information adolescents cannot handle. It would be necessary as well as desirable that, among the skills that a young person must develop at the end of secondary and university schooling, there be inclusive social-relational skills to build a peaceful and supportive multi-ethnic European society capable of breaking down physical and mental walls and barriers between its citizens.

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## Antisemitism in Poland

### Executive summary

Antisemitism is still a significant problem in Polish society. This is the conclusion that emerges from the quantitative data from previous years and the statements of our interviewees.

Within the Jewish community, members often report encountering antisemitism in the form of unsavoury jokes and stereotypes rather than overt discrimination. However, conversations around the Holocaust and Polish-Jewish history frequently led to antisemitic stereotypes and hate speech. Interestingly, the Holocaust is often the subject of jokes. This may be attributable to the perception of Jews as a historical minority who once lived in Poland.

In educational settings, courses on the Jewish community are overwhelmingly historical, primarily focusing on World War II. Almost all respondents, except non-Jewish youth, agree that contemporary Jewish topics are seldom covered in schools. This gap in multicultural education has led to a lack of understanding about non-discrimination and minority-related issues across various age groups in Polish society.

While younger generations appear to be more tolerant toward minorities and more open to learning about them, the term "Jew" is still reportedly used as an insult among them. Discrimination is not limited to the Jewish community; focus group respondents also identified Ukrainians, Roma, people of colour, and the LGBTQ+ community as other discriminated groups. Despite the majority of focus group participants being women, only one person in each group cited women as a discriminated-against minority.

### The situation of the Jewish communities in Poland

Historically, Poland had a significant Jewish population dating back to the tenth century, contributing to the country's cultural, economic, and political life. Jewish autonomy was established in the thirteenth century. However, their emancipation varied under different occupying powers after 1795. In the interwar period, Polish Jews were officially citizens but often faced discrimination. Before World War II, Polish Jews comprised around 10% of the population, but the Holocaust tragically reduced their numbers by around three million. Post-WWII emigration further decreased the size of the community.<sup>137</sup> According to the 2011 census<sup>138</sup>, about 8,000 people identified as Jewish in Poland, a small fraction of the total population of 38.5 million. According to the 2021 census<sup>139</sup>, this number has significantly increased, with 17,000 people identifying as Jewish. This increase may be attributed to the option of selecting more than one national identification in the latest census.

Data on the socio-economic status of Polish Jews is limited, but they are primarily urban, secular, and assimilated into mainstream Polish culture.<sup>140</sup> According to the interviewees, the Jewish community does not

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<sup>137</sup> Barna Ildikó. "Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries, historical/discourse analysis. Accessed September 28, 2023. [https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern\\_Antisemitism\\_in\\_the\\_Visegr%C3%A1d\\_Countries](https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern_Antisemitism_in_the_Visegr%C3%A1d_Countries)

<sup>138</sup> Nowak, L., & Adach-Stankiewicz, E. (2012). Raport z wyników Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011. Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, Warszawa.

<sup>139</sup> Gus (2023) Tablice Z Ostatecznymi Danymi W Zakresie Przynależności Narodowo-etnicznej, Języka używanego W Domu Oraz Przynależności do Wyznania Religijnego, stat.gov.pl. Accessed: 04 December 2023: <https://stat.gov.pl/spisy-powszechne/nsp-2021/nsp-2021-wyniki-ostateczne/tablice-z-ostatecznymi-danymi-w-zakresie-przynaloznosci-narodowo-etnicznej-jezyka-uzywanego-w-domu-oraz-przynaloznosci-do-wyznania-religijnego,10,1.html>.

<sup>140</sup> Barna Ildikó. "Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries, historical/discourse analysis. Accessed September 28, 2023. [https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern\\_Antisemitism\\_in\\_the\\_Visegr%C3%A1d\\_Countries](https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern_Antisemitism_in_the_Visegr%C3%A1d_Countries)

stand out from Polish society in terms of social, political, and economic status. During the interviews, an expert specialising in the study of antisemitism and other forms of intolerance mentioned, based on his observations, that there is a notable presence of Jews in the IT department. In terms of education level, Jews were said to be no different from the Polish society in general. The results of the field research showed that Jews do not stand out from society in appearance either. Sometimes, they even hide signs suggesting they belong to the Jewish community. Consequently, their belonging to the community is only revealed in conversation if someone asks.

### Level and trend of antisemitism in Poland

Antisemitism is still a significant problem in Polish society. This is the conclusion that emerges from the quantitative data from previous years and the statements of our interviewees. According to a study from 2012<sup>141</sup>, antisemitism is a complex issue consisting of three elements: traditional prejudice, secondary prejudice, and belief in a Jewish conspiracy. Traditional prejudice, rooted in historical religious motives, involves beliefs such as Jews using Christian blood ritually or bearing responsibility for Christ's death. Secondary antisemitism is subtler, it includes denying one's anti-Jewish biases, downplaying the Holocaust, and sometimes holding Jews accountable for it while viewing the Holocaust as a tool for Jewish advantage. Holocaust denial and distortion play a significant role in this form of antisemitism, justifying antisemitic beliefs by accusing Jews of fabricating history. This denial can be both "hard" (rejecting the historical truth of the Holocaust) and "soft" (covertly questioning aspects of it). Essentially, the legacy of the Holocaust, which includes those forms of denial and distortion, is used to perpetuate antisemitism.<sup>142</sup> Belief in a Jewish conspiracy is associated with the view that Jews secretly try to control the world order.<sup>143</sup> It is a form of modern antisemitism centering around the idea that Jews seek power. It attributes unity and secrecy to them.<sup>144</sup> In Poland, secondary antisemitism and conspiracy antisemitism were relatively widespread in 2021. This is evidenced by high averages on scales measuring these attitudes, while traditional antisemitism was less present. On a scale where the maximum value was seven, the average score for secondary antisemitism was 3.39, suggesting a moderate level of secondary antisemitic beliefs among the study participants. Similarly, the average score for conspiracy antisemitism was also 3.39, indicating a moderate level of belief in antisemitic conspiracy theories. In contrast, the mean score for traditional antisemitic beliefs was lower at 1.96. This suggests that participants showed, on average, a lower level of belief in traditional antisemitic ideas compared to secondary and conspiracy antisemitism.<sup>145</sup> Antisemitic attitudes in Poland are, to some

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<sup>141</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antisemitism in current Poland: economic, religious and historical aspects. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>142</sup> Barna, Ildikó, Tamás Kohut, Michał Bilewicz, Olga Gyarfášová, Jiří Kocián, Grigorij Mesežnikov, and Maria Babińska. "Survey on Antisemitic Prejudice in the Visegrád Countries: Research Report." Tom Lantos Institute, 2022. Accessed September 28, 2023.

<sup>143</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antisemitism in current Poland: economic, religious and historical aspects. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>144</sup> Bulska, Dominika., Winiewski, Mikołaj. "Diagnosis and consequences of antisemitism in Poland" in *Polish Prejudices Survey 2017- Faces of intergroup violence* edited by Anna Stefaniak, Mikołaj Winiewski, 221-252. Warsaw: LiberiLibri, 2018.

<sup>145</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in *Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology* edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.



extent, also linked to criticism of Israel. Anti-Israel attitudes are most correlated with conspiracy antisemitism. However, survey results indicate that even a traditional form of prejudice can reinforce resentment toward Israel.<sup>146</sup>

In 2021, researchers observed a general decrease in the level of antisemitism in Poland, but this change varied across different types of antisemitic attitudes. While acceptance of traditional antisemitic views increased significantly in 2017 compared to 2014, there was a substantial decline in these attitudes by 2021. The changes in antisemitic sentiment appear to be primarily linked to the socio-political climate within the nation. Secondary antisemitism, on the other hand, remained relatively stable from 2009 to 2021, indicating that modern forms of antisemitism appear to be resistant to socio-political changes. As for the belief in a Jewish conspiracy, the trend declined until 2014 but experienced an uptick in 2017 before declining again in 2021.<sup>147</sup> It seems interesting that most respondents (80%) of the Polish Prejudice Survey from 2021 declared that they did not personally know any Jews. Over the period 2009-2021, the level of declared contact did not change much. This context is noteworthy because it highlights the presence of strongly negative attitudes toward a group whose members Poles rarely experience personally.<sup>148</sup> This phenomenon is referred to in research on antisemitism as 'antisemitism without Jews'.<sup>149</sup>

Limited data exists on the correlation between the COVID-19 pandemic and antisemitism in Poland. The topic of the significance of the pandemic for antisemitic attitudes practically did not appear in the interviews. However, a report on social trends among Poles during the pandemic revealed heightened emotions toward minority groups and increased levels of disgust directed at these groups. According to a study published in 2021, in terms of positive sentiments towards outgroups, Jews did not receive high rankings among Polish individuals. They were situated in the middle of the scale regarding being associated with feelings of disgust. Hence, the survey implies a need for improvement in expressing positive emotions towards Jews.<sup>150</sup> On a global scale, antisemitic incidents during the COVID-19 pandemic have been notably prevalent in Europe – and thus presumably also in Poland –accounting for nearly 50% of incidents against minority groups in 2021. Since the onset of the pandemic in 2020, conspiracy theories have emerged linking Jews or the State of Israel to COVID-19, suggesting they benefit from global suffering. Antisemitism and hate speech have notably surged on social media platforms. There has been an alarming increase in the

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<sup>146</sup> Bulska Dominika., Winiewski Mikołaj. "Anti-Israel attitudes and anti-Semitism in Poland. A report based on the 2013 Polish Prejudice Survey." Prejudice Research Center. Accessed October 8, 2023

<sup>147</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>148</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>149</sup> Cooper, Leo. "Anti-Semitism without Jews." In the Shadow of the Polish Eagle, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000.

<sup>150</sup> Molenda Zuzanna., Marchlewska Marta., Górka Paulina., Michalski Piotr, Szczepańska Dagmara., Furman Aleksandra., Malinowska Katarzyna. "Coronavirus in Poland: A social psychology perspective. Results of the first wave of longitudinal study conducted on a representative sample of Poles." Accessed September 28, 2023. <http://cbu.psychologia.pl/2021/02/20/koronawirus-w-polsce-perspektywa-psychologii-spoecznej/>

trivialisation of the Holocaust, with Holocaust symbols used in protests against COVID-19 measures, accompanied by inappropriate comparisons of pandemic restrictions to the persecution of Jews.<sup>151</sup>

In reports listing which demographic characteristics are relevant to the expression of antisemitism, gender is one of the significant factors.<sup>152</sup> The results show that men express antisemitic attitudes more often than women. Factors such as age, level of education, and income also, to some degree, contribute to holding antisemitic beliefs. Antisemitism is more often expressed by older people, those with lower levels of education, and people with lower incomes.

In our field research, participants expressed concern about overtly problematic actions, such as cemetery vandalism and the appearance of swastikas. They underscored the absolute inappropriateness of such acts and the necessity to confront them. Nevertheless, the interviewees highlighted a deeper unease stemming from ambiguous remarks, often beginning with 'I don't have anything against Jews, but...' and expressions of nostalgia for the pre-war Jewish community that do not translate into active support for today's Jewish population. The participants cited statements where Poles professed acceptance of Jews only if they remained inconspicuous in public spaces. To summarise, there seems to be an affection for Jews as long as they are out of sight, not encountered face-to-face. This reveals a stark lack of interaction with the Jewish community. Antisemitic attitudes, it appears, are rooted in fantasy, myths, and perhaps a fear of real-life contact.

### **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories**

A study conducted by The POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews revealed dominant narratives and language used to discuss Jews in contemporary Poland.<sup>153</sup> The research involved the analysis of a wide range of materials, including newspaper articles, tweets, books, films, television series, covers and graphics from 1950 to 2022. The study identified ten main themes in these narratives. One major theme was the belief in the existence of a 'Jewish lobby', closely linked to the actions of the State of Israel and the global Jewish diaspora, particularly in relation to their claims to pre-war property. Other common narratives included the belief that Jews contributed to a negative image of Poland, a belief that Jews refused to acknowledge the hospitality of Poles and their shared victimhood during the war. Additionally, conspiracy narratives that portrayed Jews as secret agents linked to Freemasonry, global conspiracies, and the global leftist movement. Finally, some narratives blamed Jews for all negative world events, associating them with concepts such as disease, corruption, and danger.

The findings from the field research confirmed the existence of the prejudices mentioned above and stereotypes about Jews that are prevalent in Poland. The respondents' examples were consistent with the desk research outcomes, illustrating several prevalent misconceptions. Firstly, according to the interviewees, there is a persistent stereotype associating modern Jews with the death of Jesus Christ. Additionally, there

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<sup>151</sup>Raheli Baratz-Rix. "The State of Antisemitism in 2021." Department for Combatting Antisemitism & Enhancing Resilience. Accessed September 28, 2023. [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/wzo24012022/en/file\\_2021%20report-final.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/wzo24012022/en/file_2021%20report-final.pdf)

<sup>152</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>153</sup>Damaszko, Joanna., Napiórkowski, Marcin., Polak, Krzysztof., Żurawicka, Marzena., Bierca, Marta., Wiszejko-Wierzbicka, Dorota. "Kogo widzą Polacy, kiedy widzą Żyda. Raport z badań realizowanych przez Muzeum Żydów Polskich POLIN" edited by Marcin Napiórkowski. Warsaw, 2023

are beliefs attributing exceptional intelligence and an ability to navigate life successfully to Jews, which can be a veiled form of conspiratorial antisemitism. Common stereotypes also encapsulate the notion that Jews are somehow not genuine Poles and the idea that they are inherently smarter and wealthier. A common erroneous assumption is that all Jews adhere to Orthodox traditions, which leads to the misconception of the Jewish community as a strictly Orthodox sect.

The interviewees suggested that there is a form of cultural antisemitism in Poland, particularly related to stereotypes associating Jews with wealth (e.g. the belief that Jews always have money, unjustly but cunningly earned). These stereotypes have been deeply rooted in Polish culture for many years. Some people may not even recognise these cultural codes as antisemitic, further illustrating the normalisation of these beliefs in society. The stereotype of Jews having money is so vivid in Poland that some people do not consider it antisemitic.

The most common conspiratorial antisemitic narratives center around claims that Jews pursue domination over financial institutions, the global economy, and even the entire world and that they act secretly.<sup>154</sup> Jewish interviewees faced similar conspiracy theories in our field research. The belief they most commonly mentioned is that influential global corporations and economic dynamics are invariably under the control of Jews or other mystical forces, with the presumption of a Jewish presence coordinating these movements extending into political and economic spheres since 1989. It was also an interesting observation that some conspiracy theories contradict perceptions of Jews in other countries, such as the US. Interviewees explained that in Poland, the stereotype of Jews secretly ruling the country has been combined with the same content regarding Freemasonry, while the two groups in the USA are their opposites. These findings align with the results of the POLIN's research. Their analyses also repeated narratives showing Jews as members of influential groups such as Freemasonry or simply as the elite of society.<sup>155</sup>

Beliefs based on historical context were also mentioned during the field research. One of these is the belief that Jews, as police officers, collaborated with the communist authorities and arrested Poles. It was clarified that the majority of police officers were Poles, and a small percentage were Jews. Nonetheless, there is an association of Jews with the security forces. Another conspiracy theory holds that the Holocaust either did not occur or that it was the responsibility of Jews. The last example brought up during the interviews stems from a myth propagated within the Catholic community, which is the baseless narrative that Jews abduct Christian girls to use their blood for ritual purposes.

### **Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime**

According to a survey from 2016<sup>156</sup>, Jews are one of the most disliked groups in Poland. In 2017, a survey on hate speech<sup>157</sup> found that approximately two-thirds of respondents had experienced hate speech directed

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<sup>154</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antisemitism in current Poland: economic, religious and historical aspects. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>155</sup> Damaszkó, Joanna., Napiórkowski, Marcin., Polak, Krzysztof., Żurawicka, Marzena., Bierca, Marta., Wiszejko-Wierzbicka, Dorota. "Kogo widzą Polacy, kiedy widzą Żyda. Raport z badań realizowanych przez Muzeum Żydów Polskich POLIN" edited by Marcin Napiórkowski. Warsaw, 2023

<sup>156</sup> Center for Public Opinion Research. "Attitudes toward other nations. Research announcement." Accessed September 28, 2023. [http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K\\_053\\_16.PDF](http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_053_16.PDF)

towards Jews. Surprisingly, comments directed at Jews were considered the least insulting compared to hate speech against Ukrainians and refugees.

The research from 2021<sup>158</sup> indicates a slight correlation between all forms of antisemitism and respondents' education level, age, and political preferences. Specifically, individuals with lower education levels, older respondents, and those identifying as 'right-wing' politically tend to exhibit a higher propensity for expressing antisemitic views. People who are more educated and from large cities have more contact with hate speech and are more sensitive to it and perceive it as more offensive.

### **Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community**

When answering the questions on personal experiences with antisemitism and other forms of intolerance against minority groups, Jewish participants in our field research recalled their first experiences. They stated that when experiencing antisemitism, they were unaware of what they faced and only felt internal objections without knowing why or how to react. Those encounters took place in school or at the university. Presently, the respondents are mostly faced with antisemitism online. Holocaust distortion was the most common example of antisemitism among respondents' non-Jewish friends. A widespread form of antisemitism was anti-Israeli attitudes expressed both by the right and the left side of the Political sphere and predominantly by younger people prone to misinformation and fake news. However, the fear of antisemitic attacks was not very high among all the Jewish respondents, even though only 20% have experienced it in recent years. All the attacks they have experienced in recent years were verbal and carried out by random strangers and as a result of "going public". The experiences described include an instance where a respondent's Jewish identity was revealed online, leading to an online hate attack. Another respondent encountered a passerby who bumped into her and expressed frustration by hostile shouting. Additionally, an intoxicated man yelled while passing by a synagogue on a Saturday night. These incidents illustrate various forms of discrimination and hostility faced by individuals due to their Jewish identity.

Interestingly, respondents indicated that Poles react to someone being Jewish with surprise and confusion, highlighting a significant lack of awareness about interacting with members of minority groups in Poland. Verbal forms of antisemitic attacks resulted in feelings of surprise, fear, and anger in the victims. To cope, they sometimes resort to humour as a defence mechanism to lessen the sting of such encounters, paradoxically giving their aggressors an opportunity for self-reflection and potentially a path to redemption. However, this leaves the victims burdened with feelings of distress and desolation. Moreover, respondents noted an increased sense of alertness following such incidents, which is further intensified by media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Antisemitic slurs, slogans, and tropes about Jews are popular and firmly embedded in the Polish language. As a result, many antisemitic sayings and expressions are present. According to the interviews, the most common are: "Jews have money and influence.", "Jews all know each other.", "They are always behind political events.", and the accusations of Israel being a terrorist country and occupier.

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<sup>157</sup> Hansen Karolina. "Hate speech: Report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 3." Prejudice Research Center. Accessed September 28, 2023. [http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/PPS3\\_MowaNienawisci\\_Hansen\\_fin.pdf](http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/PPS3_MowaNienawisci_Hansen_fin.pdf)

<sup>158</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

According to respondents participating in the field research, talking about the Holocaust in Poland and the Polish-Jewish history always results in mentioning antisemitic stereotypes and hate speech. The interviewees also spoke about the handling of antisemitism by the Jewish community and its leaders. Interviewees noted that some Jews do not read certain attitudes as discrimination (e.g. football chants or everyday catchphrases with antisemitic content). The reason may be that they have experienced such attitudes too often and are used to them. This process of getting used to antisemitism can sometimes also play the role of managing the fear of being harassed. That is, when experiencing hate speech or antisemitic behaviour, members of the Jewish community explain it to themselves as being common. To cope with antisemitic harassment, some members of the Jewish community attempt to normalise these encounters and emotionally distance themselves from the attacks. Additionally, there are efforts within the Jewish community to mitigate future harassment by engaging with local residents. They are establishing inclusive environments aimed at fostering familiarity and positive interactions. Some synagogues have opened their spaces to the neighbourhood, organising social and cultural events and various activities to promote community and understanding.

### **Antisemitism on the political level**

For the last eight years, right-wing parties, particularly Law and Justice (PiS), have dominated Polish politics in terms of antisemitic narratives, with a focus on maintaining Poland's and the Polish people's reputation. These narratives tend to be protective, centered around the Holocaust, World War II, and relations between Poles and Jews. Right-wing politicians highlight the mutual victimisation of Poles and Jews during the Second World War and blame the Germans for this victimisation. While acknowledging Polish involvement in the Holocaust, some politicians of Law and Justice view instances of Poles killing Jews as the actions of a demoralised social minority. In addition, certain narratives allege that Jews were complicit in their tragic fate by collaborating with the perpetrators.<sup>159</sup> The last debate on this topic in Poland in 2018 came with a proposed amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance. In this debate, besides the arguments mentioned above, appeared a narrative that Jews were responsible for crimes committed against Poles in the period after World War II.<sup>160</sup>

Right-wing parties are particularly characterised by expressions of prejudice and the use of hate speech. However, our interviewees pointed out that all political parties, to a comparable degree, insinuate the Jewish origin of their opponents to deprive them of the trust of voters. One expert explained that the significant aspect of this narrative is that both the political right and left employ the term “Jew” as an insulting epithet. This suggests that individuals engaged in politics, when faced with disagreement, are derogatorily labelled as Jewish. This is an example of antisemitism that relies on creating a connotation between a sense of untrustworthiness, Jewish origin, and a particular politician.

Results of the field research showed that politicians use prejudice and hate speech against minority groups in political discourse as a strategy to gain the support of citizens. Therefore, hateful narratives by politicians

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<sup>159</sup>Babińska Maria. “Individual and intergroup determinants of social representations of attitudes towards Jews during World War II”, 48-50, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2023. <https://uwedupl.bip.gov.pl/doktoraty-udostepnione-na-stronie-bip-zgodnie-z-art-188-ust-1-i-2-ustawy-z-dnia-3-lipca-2018-r-prawo-o-szkolnictwie-wyzszym/maria-babinska.html>

<sup>160</sup>Babińska Maria, Bilewicz Michał, Bulska Dominika, Haska Agnieszka, Winiewski Mikołaj. “Attitudes towards Jews and their history after the introduction of the IPN law” Prejudice Research Center. Accessed October 8, 2023. [http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/Analiza\\_Skutki\\_ustawy\\_o\\_IPN.pdf](http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/Analiza_Skutki_ustawy_o_IPN.pdf)

are particularly common during election periods. These statements align with the findings of a study conducted in August and September 2023, which monitored the prevalence of hateful content on public television during the pre-election period. The study revealed that content relating to Jews ranked fourth in terms of frequency amongst hateful content relating to all the examined minorities.<sup>161</sup> Some politicians exploit these prejudices to gauge public reactions and gain attention from citizens. Antisemitism frequently ranks among the top three or four issues in public discussions, often coinciding with anti-LGBTQ+, anti-refugee, or anti-immigrant narratives. Notably, there is an overlap between antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiments. Often, multiple biases against different groups, most commonly antisemitism, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-refugee sentiments, are publicly highlighted simultaneously.

### **Antisemitism in the sporting sphere**

Despite the small size of the Jewish minority in Poland, a significant portion of the population still displays antisemitic attitudes, which is particularly evident in football stadiums where the term 'Jew' is frequently used in a derogatory sense. Research on antisemitism in Polish football culture classifies and analyses information related to this problem, revealing that it often occurs in cities with a history of Polish-Jewish coexistence and lingering tensions. Various forms of antisemitism are identified within football, with a notable focus on the intense relationship between fans and the figure of the "Jew" as a means of expressing contempt and hatred. This phenomenon stands as a striking example of antisemitism in an environment devoid of Jewish individuals.<sup>162</sup>

The interviewees also mentioned so-called soccer fan antisemitism. In Poland, a distinction is made between soccer fans who are interested in sports and those who exhibit aggressive behaviour and treat the context of a match as a battlefield or an excuse to lash out. In these fan communities, popular chants and shouts often include antisemitic hate speech. The popularity of these antisemitic phrases, particularly evident on the internet, was also pointed out during our interviews.

### **Enmity against other minority groups in the country**

Poles' attitudes toward various minority groups have fluctuated over time. Until 2013, they were becoming more open toward Jews, Romas, and Ukrainians, but from 2014 to 2017, there was a decrease in acceptance. In 2021, positive attitudes toward these minority groups increased again. Meanwhile, from 2016 to 2021, acceptance of refugees and homosexuals also changed, with the largest increase in acceptance in 2021. Still, the most rejected in 2021 were refugees, Roma, and homosexuals.<sup>163</sup>

Field research identified Ukrainians as the minority group most frequently affected by discrimination, with Russians, Belarusians, and ethnic and religious minorities such as Roma and Muslims also significantly impacted. LGBTQ+ individuals, women, and people of colour were mentioned with comparable frequency. Additionally, several responses highlighted discrimination faced by people with disabilities and those who are non-neurotypical. The respondents attributed the decline in minority conditions after 2015 to a political

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<sup>161</sup> "Monitoring Treści Nienawistnych W TVP: 05.09 – 24.09.2023 " Otwarta Rzeczpospolita." Otwarta Rzeczpospolita RSS, September 25, 2023. <https://www.otwarta.org/monitoring-tresci-nienawistnych-w-tvp-05-09-24-09-2023/>.

<sup>162</sup> Kucia, Marek, and Bogna Wilczyńska. "Antysemityzm stadionowy: analiza i interpretacja zjawiska." *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 58.4 (2014): 171-200.

<sup>163</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in *Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology* edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

crisis and the use of propaganda characterised by hateful and divisive rhetoric. The situation deteriorated with the arrival of Syrian refugees at the Belarusian border and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, leading to increased hostility towards the Russian minority in Poland. This hostility has expanded to include prejudices against other groups, with narratives falsely accusing Chechens and Belarusians of supporting Russia, contributing to civilian attacks on these communities and escalating discrimination against refugees, Ukrainian Roma, and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Summarising the field research findings, the most prevalent prejudices and stereotypes depict minorities as a nuisance and as entitled to special treatment. This results in feelings ranging from annoyance to outright hostility. Ukrainian men are often told to go home and fight in war. Ukrainian women are accused of taking social benefits from Poles and destroying Polish marriages. Roma are called Gypsies and portrayed as thieves who dishonestly make money. Representatives of the LGBTQ+ community are dehumanised; for example, gay men are accused of harming children. Similar accusations are directed at people of colour. The last group, women, are considered unstable, hysterical, unprofessional, and assigned to the role of mother.

Field research has led to the conclusion that the most prevalent form of prejudice manifestation is the use of hate speech on social media. The frequency of different types of prejudice reported was fairly uniform across the focus groups, with each group identifying a distinct type of prejudice as most prevalent. This variance could be attributed to the groups' more frequent exposure to certain types of prejudice. The most frequently observed form of prejudice was identified as everyday, casual antisemitism, characterised by telling antisemitic jokes and using offensive language. Respondents noted that while any minority could be subjected to attack, the absence of discourse about a minority is also perceived as discriminatory. This neglect is rooted in a tendency among the Polish majority to perceive society as homogenous, with a mindset that 'others' are viewed negatively and 'their problems are not ours to solve'. This marginalisation extends beyond religious or ethnic minorities to include individuals with disabilities, who face exclusion at educational, social, and political levels. Respondents also reported that hate speech is widely accepted in society and that prejudices exist throughout the population. According to them, biases and a lack of anti-discrimination sensibility are prevalent among teachers, who are unwilling to open up and learn.

## **Antisemitism and education**

### **Topics related to Jewry, antisemitism, and the Holocaust in the official educational curricula**

Before the collapse of Communism, Polish students lacked awareness of Jews' prevalence in various Polish towns; however, the existence of death camps for Jews on Polish land was largely present in school curricula. Since 1989, Holocaust education has been mandatory in Poland but not as a standalone subject. Recently, there has been a trend towards historical denial and revisionism, attempting to diminish the historical involvement of Polish citizens in antisemitic pogroms. Legal restrictions and international criticism have prompted concerns regarding the quality and accuracy of Holocaust education in Poland, particularly under the Law and Justice government which is perceived as conservative and nationalist.<sup>164</sup>

Drawing from our field research, in Polish schools, the topics of Jews, antisemitism, and the Holocaust are introduced, primarily within history and Polish language classes. Mandatory readings cover subjects like

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<sup>164</sup> Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Jolanta. 2019. "The Uses and the Abuses of Education about the Holocaust in Poland after 1989." *Holocaust Studies* 25 (3): 329–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17504902.2019.1567668>.

pogroms in Poland and the Holocaust. However, the depth of discussion and explanation of these topics to students largely depends on individual teachers. Personal experiences with compulsory readings in school, such as "Mendel Gdański" by Maria Konopnicka and "Medaliony" by Nałkowska, provided the first exposure to the concept of pogroms during education and were recalled in the field research as quite shocking.

### **Educational materials and activities addressing antisemitism**

According to the interviewees' experience, numerous academics, researchers, educators, and leaders within the Jewish community are actively engaged in combating antisemitism. They create and utilise various resources, including reports on antisemitism in Poland as well as educational materials about Israel.

The interviewees emphasised the importance of countering antisemitism through improved education that offers accurate information about Jews and their history. They also recommended organising events that facilitate interactions between Poles and members of minority groups. Another effective approach would be to invite Israeli experts to participate in university conferences to foster closer connections and dispel hostility. Additionally, creating materials to help identify hate speech and prejudice is essential. Notably, there is a need for specific Polish examples of Holocaust denialism tailored to the linguistic and social context and aligned with the statements of public figures. This localised approach would address the unique aspects of the issue within the Polish context.



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## Antisemitism in Romania

### Executive summary

This research report presents the findings of an extensive study conducted in Romania between March and September 2023, focusing on the multifaceted issue of antisemitism in the country. The study provides an analysis of the contemporary situation of Jewish communities in Romania, the prevalence and perceptions of antisemitism, and its intersection with other forms of intolerance. Additionally, the report examines efforts to prevent antisemitism through educational initiatives. The research reveals that antisemitism in Romania has deep historical roots, and it is still pervasive and widespread. It typically takes the form of latent stereotypes and prejudices, manifested in narratives that are deeply intertwined with complex conspiracy theories and nationalist interpretations of Romanian history. Many individuals are unaware of the current-day expressions and manifestations of antisemitism, and this lack of awareness further exacerbates the problem. Although Romania has introduced legislation in recent years to combat antisemitism and other forms of discrimination and intolerance, the enforcement and implementation of these laws are inconsistent and sporadic. A positive development is the introduction of Holocaust education as a mandatory subject in high schools, starting in 2023. However, there are challenges in the effective implementation of this curriculum. Teachers call for clearer guidelines, training, and updated educational materials to ensure the new curriculum fulfils its goals.

The research underscores the pressing need for efforts to acknowledge and address antisemitism in Romania. These efforts should include increasing awareness about contemporary manifestations of antisemitism, consistent enforcement of existing legislation, and working collaboratively across sectors to strengthen Holocaust education initiatives. These steps are essential in combating the deeply entrenched antisemitism in the country and promoting a more inclusive and tolerant society for all.

### The situation of the Jewish communities in Romania

Before WWII, Romania was the home of around 800,000 Jews<sup>165</sup>. Currently, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) estimates a core Jewish population of about 8,700<sup>166</sup>, but the latest census from 2021 reveals a much lower number: 2378<sup>167</sup>. According to the 2021 census, the majority of Romania's core Jewish population (906) reside in Bucharest. Smaller groups reside in Timis (144), Cluj (139), Bihor (135), and Iasi (133), and are spread across the country.<sup>168</sup> Most of the Jewish population are over the age of 70, and very few youth (under the age of twenty-five) currently live in Romania.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC European Jewish Congress, 2022, accessed 13 September 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>166</sup> "Romania," JPR Institute for Jewish Policy Research, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://www.jpr.org.uk/countries/how-many-jews-in-romania>

<sup>167</sup> "Rezultate definitive: Caracteristici etno-culturale demografice". Populația după etnie la recensămintele din perioada 1930-2021 (Etnii, Județe). Recensământul populației și locuințelor 2021, accessed 1 December 2023: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-definitive/>

<sup>168</sup> "Rezultate definitive: Caracteristici etno-culturale demografice". Populația după etnie la recensămintele din perioada 1930-2021 (Etnii, Județe). Recensământul populației și locuințelor 2021, accessed 1 December 2023: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-definitive/>

<sup>169</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 13 September 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

Despite the Communist regime prohibiting all Zionist activity, organised Jewish life, including religion, culture and education, was active after WWII.<sup>170</sup> After 1989, the Jewish communal property was returned to the Federation of Jewish Communities. Remnants of ‘shtetl’ (Jewish village) life still remain present in some parts of Romania.<sup>171</sup> Synagogues and religious infrastructure are maintained, although less and less are operational. In Bucharest, three Synagogues<sup>172</sup> still hold weekly services. There are kosher cafeterias in some cities, and all Jewish children receive basic Jewish education<sup>173</sup>. Following the transition to democracy, a Jewish publishing house called *Hasefer* was established, and the *Center of Jewish History in Romania*, founded in 1976, gained legal status. In Bucharest, a department dedicated to Jewish studies was established. The Jewish community in Bucharest also operates an elderly retirement facility, a Jewish hospital, a clinic, and a pharmacy.<sup>174</sup>

The interviews confirmed that the Jewish community is small and inconspicuous compared to other minority groups (IR1). According to an interviewee, the Federation of Jewish Communities (JCC) in Romania reports 7,000 to 8,000 members, which is much higher than the 2021 census records (IR2). Some expatriates have returned from Israel but are not actively participating in the Jewish community (IR2). The lack of visible identification, such as wearing a *yarmulke*, makes it difficult for others to discern their Jewish background (FG4). The shrinking of the Jewish community is accompanied by challenges related to assimilation and an ageing population (IR3). According to the interviews, Jewish community members are perceived as being well-integrated and well-adjusted, with high social status and respectable professions (IR1). There are religious Jews within the Jewish community, and despite the general perception of Jewish affluence, many lead humble lifestyles (IR3). Interview respondents confirmed that the Jewish community in Romania is ageing; many of the younger generation, particularly those who have returned from Israel, no longer identify themselves as part of the Jewish community (IR3). Efforts are made by organisations like the JCC to preserve traditions, language and other aspects of the Jewish heritage. There are still significant places of remembrance, such as graveyards and synagogues, although the latter often serve multiple functions unrelated to their original purpose (IR3). Many Romanians have had little or no interaction with Jewish people (IR6, FG3), contributing to the overall perception that there are very few Jews in Romania today (IR7).

### Level and trend of antisemitism in Romania

The results of research by the Action and Protection League from 2021<sup>175</sup> found that Romania’s combined proportion of latent and manifest antisemitism was above average (53%), and 16% of respondents in Romania answered that they “rather have negative feelings” about Jews. According to the same research, 28% of Romanians can be considered antisemitic in terms of primary antisemitism<sup>176</sup>, 63% in terms of secondary antisemitism<sup>177</sup>, and 49% in terms of new antisemitism<sup>178</sup>. Religious antisemitic beliefs were

<sup>170</sup> “Back to communities: Romania,” EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>171</sup> “Back to communities: Romania,” EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>172</sup> The Yivo Encyclopedia for Jews in Eastern Europe: Bucharest. <https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Bucharest>

<sup>173</sup> “Back to communities: Romania,” EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

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<sup>175</sup> Kovács, András, Fischer, Gyorgy, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries”. Action and Protection League. 2021, p. 33, accessed 3 November 2023, <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-2408>

<sup>176</sup> Primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>177</sup> Secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

particularly high (second only to Greece in the same study of 16 European countries), with 30% agreeing with the statement: “Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews”.<sup>179</sup> Interestingly, while the proportion of antisemites in Romania was high, the report also found a high proportion of Israel sympathisers (44%).<sup>180</sup> Like in most other post-communist countries, when measuring both indicators for “philosemitism”, the report shows that support for Israel is much higher than support for Jews in Romania.<sup>181</sup>

Likely because of the small size of the Jewish population in Romania, antisemitism expresses itself mainly as historical revisionism, Holocaust denial and/or trivialisation, and global antisemitic conspiracy narratives.<sup>182</sup> It is mainly oriented around issues of memory and history – on a nationalist interpretation of Romanian history, especially the discussions of communism vs fascism, rather than immediate current events.<sup>183</sup> The lack of education about the Holocaust is illustrated by the fact that only 32% of respondents in Romania believed that the Holocaust happened in Romania, according to the results of research from 2021.<sup>184</sup> It mainly involves acts of vandalism, sabotage or harmful incidents, extremism in public institutions, trade-in fascist literature and objects, ceremonies and commemorations of militant neo-nazi groups, antisemitism and trivialisation of the Holocaust in the parliament, and antisemitism and Holocaust denial online.<sup>185</sup>

The field research indicated that most people are unaware or unable to identify manifestations of antisemitism. When asked directly, many respondents could not come up with examples of antisemitism; however, through conversations, they often present unconscious biases, prejudices or historical interpretations that place Jews in a negative light. Confirming what has been mentioned in the literature, antisemitism in Romania is expressed through history revisionism, nationalist rhetoric, failure to mention the Holocaust, or making it seem like what happened at that time was not Romania’s responsibility (FG3).

The COVID-19 pandemic had affected antisemitism in Romania: anti-restriction protests during the pandemic brought antisemitic rhetoric onto the streets.<sup>186</sup> In May 2020, a group of protesters put a protective mask on the statue of Elie Wiesel in Bucharest, explaining that “this personality transmitted a virus which is much more dangerous than the Wuhan virus [...]”.<sup>187</sup> The protesters were promoting a narrative presenting the fight against antisemitism and the ideas that accompany it as a virus more dangerous than COVID-19.<sup>188</sup> In March 2021, protesters continued promoting Holocaust-trivialising messages, comparing Romania with a Nazi camp and likening mandatory vaccinations to the medical experiments that were performed on victims of the Holocaust.<sup>189</sup>

In May 2021, the Romanian Government adopted the first National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Antisemitism, Xenophobia, Radicalization and Hate speech and appointed a special representative

<sup>178</sup> New antisemitism is anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

<sup>179</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 27.

<sup>180</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 68.

<sup>181</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 68.

<sup>182</sup> Carstocea, “Between Europeanisation and Local Legacies,” p. 318.

<sup>183</sup> INSHR-EW and Studio12, “Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania”, p.12.

<sup>184</sup> Studio12, “Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania”, p.15.

<sup>185</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023”.

<sup>186</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 51.

<sup>187</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.20.

<sup>188</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.20.

<sup>189</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.21.

for the promotion of memorial policies and the fight against antisemitism and xenophobia.<sup>190</sup> Nonetheless, at the local level, there is poor understanding and a lack of awareness and responsibility, which hinders the practical implementation of the legislation.<sup>191</sup> Despite improved legislation, however, streets, statutes and other institutions are still named after known antisemitic war criminals.<sup>192</sup> The sporadic enforcement and lack of response from the authorities have emboldened a segment of society with extremist attitudes and behaviours.<sup>193</sup>

Expressions of antisemitism appear to be somewhat more prevalent among people who identify as politically conservative or right-wing.<sup>194</sup> A survey from 2021 found that 22% of Romanians believe that Jews act to destabilise the society.<sup>195</sup> The minority holding this view is over-represented by youth (18-29) without higher education, people who adhere to populist political views, who rarely, if ever, watch news on the TV, and who often comment on online articles (daily or several times per week).<sup>197</sup>

Gender does not appear to play a significant role in antisemitism in Romania. Research by ADL in 2014-2015 found that 47% of Romanians hold antisemitic attitudes, with a higher prevalence among males (54%) compared to females (40%).<sup>198</sup> However, experts suggest that, while men might be more loud or visible in expressing antisemitism, gender is not a determining factor in antisemitic behaviour and attitudes (IR2). Rather, experts argue that antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices are pervasive in society, with no noticeable gender differences (IR2).

Practitioners (FG1) express concerns about young people's growing fascination with nationalist historical narratives, such as the Legionary Movement. Such content is circulating on social media (TikTok) and could lead to the adoption of corresponding ideologies, including antisemitism (FG1). Jewish respondents (FG4) and experts (IR5) argue that antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices are deeply ingrained in people's subconscious and not recognised as antisemitic by those who hold them. Some might even interpret certain stereotypes, like the notion that Jews are financially savvy, as compliments rather than harmful stereotypes (FG4).

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<sup>190</sup> Guvernul Romaniei, "Fresh news: The Romanian government officially starts the implementation of the 2021-2023 National Strategy for preventing and combating anti-Semitism, xenophobia, radicalisation and hate speech, Press Release," Tuesday 22 March 2022, accessed 7 August 2023, <https://gov.ro/en/news/the-romanian-government-officially-starts-the-implementation-of-the-2021-2023-national-strategy-for-preventing-and-combating-anti-semitism-xenophobia-radicalization-and-hate-speech>

<sup>191</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>192</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021", p. 2-3.

<sup>193</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie: RAPORT 2021-2022," July 2022, accessed 16 August 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/monitorizarea-antisemitismului-in-romania-raport-2022/>

<sup>194</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie: RAPORT 2021-2022," July 2022, p. 3.

<sup>195</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.22, accessed 7 August 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Raport-monitorizare-2021.pdf>

<sup>196</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

<sup>197</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

<sup>198</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015, Accessed 7 August 2023, <https://global100.adl.org/country/romania/2014>

## Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories

ADL's report from 2015<sup>199</sup> identified that the most commonly held antisemitic stereotypes in Romania include "Jews talk too much about what happened to them during the Holocaust" (63%), "Jews have too much power in the business world... in international financial markets" (61% and 59%, respectively), and "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country in which they live" (58%)<sup>200</sup>. INSHR-EW's monitoring report (2021)<sup>201</sup> categorised the online manifestations of antisemitism into the following categories:

1. "Jews run the world or Romania" (increased from 70% to 73% in the sources monitored from 2020 to 2021),
2. "Judeo-Bolshevism", equating Jewishness with communism (decreased from 25% in 2020 to 11% in 2021),
3. Holocaust-denial or trivialisation/relativising,
4. Economic and religious antisemitism (to a lesser extent).

Antisemitic discourse on social media is often context-driven and can, therefore, be difficult to identify by artificial intelligence or people not specifically trained for it.<sup>202</sup> Usually, links to news stories about the Israel-Palestine conflict or current events involving Jews are antisemitic because of how they are connected to a narrative that incites hatred.<sup>203</sup> Most commonly, these messages target the entire Jewish population (rather than particular individuals). About 65-70% of antisemitic messages on Facebook promote the narrative that "Jews rule the world or Romania". Many other messages don't fit the typical antisemitic rhetoric but are generally insulting, disapproving or resisting anything related to Judaism or the Jewish identity.<sup>204</sup>

The most prevalent stereotypes that emerged in the field research include Jews being affluent and possessing business acumen, Jews wielding significant power and influence, and Jews being highly intelligent and remarkably capable and productive. Members of the Jewish community in Romania report being perceived as exclusively prioritising their own community or being frugal and self-centred (FG4). The field research brought up occurrences of the use of the derogatory Romanian term "jidani", which has Slavic origins (IR1). Jews are often associated with power and negative symbols, such as George Soros being a symbol of evil and attributing societal problems to him (IR5). Others described passive antisemitism, where Jews are portrayed as culprits responsible for conspiracies and legends (IR2).

Conspiratorial antisemitism is also present in Romania. A majority of antisemitism on social media revolves around conspiracy theories<sup>205</sup>, most of which circulate the themes of Judeo-Bolshevism, Holocaust denial, and narratives about Jewish intervention in politics or the economy<sup>206</sup>. INSHR-EW's report from 2021 showed a slight increase (3%) between 2020-2021 of antisemitic conspiracy-type content online, specifically on the topic of "Jews rule the world or Romania"<sup>207</sup>. In recent years, many of the articles published systematically use the war in Ukraine as a starting point to validate the antisemitic theories about how Jews

<sup>199</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015.

<sup>200</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015.

<sup>201</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.35.

<sup>202</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.35.

<sup>203</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.35.

<sup>204</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p. 36-37

<sup>205</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>206</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023" p. 51

<sup>207</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.28.

rule the world.<sup>208</sup> Throughout 2021, there was a resurfacing of online content endorsing antisemitic ideologies and celebrating the Legionary Movement<sup>209210</sup>. Presently, the discourse is intricately connected to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In various conspiracy narratives, Jews are portrayed as individuals who profit from or have vested interests in the war<sup>211</sup>.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought up new conspiratorial antisemitic narratives. Much of the antisemitic content that was found online at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020 blamed Jews for the medical crisis. Some of the related messages developed and shared between 2020-2021 include: “Jews fund companies that produce the serum and encourage vaccination to gain control, as well as for economic gain; Jews encourage vaccination, but the serum administered to them and that given to non-Jews is different, the latter having harmful effects; Jews encourage discrimination and segregation of the ones who refuse vaccination”. 13% of the articles monitored in relation to the COVID-19 vaccines were linked to this topic, supporting the idea that the global systems are controlled by Jews.<sup>212</sup> There was a surge in popularity around the QAnon movement on social media, particularly on Facebook, throughout 2020. Due to interventions from Facebook, these groups are now much more difficult to find, and their audience is smaller than it was in 2020<sup>213</sup>.

### Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime

Hate speech continues to manifest in the online environment on websites, blogs, and social media. Topics on the public agenda (vaccination campaigns, studying the history of Jews and the Holocaust in schools, the outbreak of war in Ukraine) are used to promote antisemitic narratives.<sup>214</sup> Facebook remains the most popular social network, serving as a primary source of information and a major channel for public expression. In recent years, the platform’s improved mechanisms for removing content that violates the law or community standards have led to a migration of content to more permissive channels, such as Telegram or VK<sup>215</sup>.

The most common forms of hate speech witnessed by people in Romania are based on ethnicity (47%), followed by political orientation (40%), religion (33%), sexual orientation (31%), race (30%) and disabilities (30%)<sup>216</sup>. The incidents were most commonly witnessed on the street (53%), at work (24%), and among friends (19%).<sup>217</sup> 65% of respondents believe that hate speech has intensified in recent years.<sup>218</sup> Most antisemitic hate speech monitored online during the period 2020-2021 was collectively directed at Jews as a whole. Some individual targets appear recurrently (George Soros, Liviu Beris, etc.), but also newly falsely

<sup>208</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.28.

<sup>209</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.36

<sup>210</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>211</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 45., <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Raport-monitorizare-20-IULIE-2023.pdf>

<sup>212</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.28.

<sup>213</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.33.

<sup>214</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>215</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>216</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” 2018, p. 28, accessed 13 September 2023, [https://www.cncd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sondaj\\_de\\_opinie\\_NolntoHate\\_2018.pdf](https://www.cncd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sondaj_de_opinie_NolntoHate_2018.pdf)

<sup>217</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” 2018, p.30

<sup>218</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” 2018, p.31



identified targets (Dominic Fritz), who are referred to precisely because they symbolise Jewishness.<sup>219</sup> The articles that were monitored for antisemitic content during 2020-2021 do not overtly incite hatred against Jews but could potentially be associated with a “call for resistance”. There is often the use of aggressive language and personal attacks.<sup>220</sup>

It appears that the high levels of antisemitic attitudes rarely translate to antisemitic violence. In Romania, as well as in other countries, there is essentially no relationship between the number of violent acts and the degree of anti-Jewish prejudice.<sup>221</sup> There was an increase in the reported number of antisemitic incidents in Romania between 2009 and 2019, from four incidents in 2009, peaking with 22 incidents in 2017 and dropping to 16 in 2019.<sup>222</sup> From 2020 to 2023, the rate of antisemitic content online also increased.<sup>223</sup> At important events or dates (e.g. the election campaign, Jewish holidays), antisemitism shows up more frequently online and in speeches from public representatives.<sup>224</sup> The rhetoric of antisemitic messages has remained fairly consistent in the media but appears at an increased pace.<sup>225</sup> Messages circulating the themes of Judeo-Bolshevism, Holocaust denial, and conspiracy narratives about Jewish intervention in politics or the economy are widespread. Recently, many articles systematically use the war in Ukraine as a starting point to validate theories about how Jews rule the world.<sup>226</sup>

There have also been acts of hate crime, particularly in the form of vandalism, in recent years. On 12 September 2021, a memorial in the northern city of Bistrita was subjected to vandalism<sup>227</sup>, and at the beginning of 2023, there was an incident in a park in Deva, with Nazi symbols and slogans being left on the park's pathways.<sup>228</sup> In Iasi, newly installed panels remembering the events of the Iasi pogrom have been vandalised several times.<sup>229</sup> In March 2021, a social media statement by the Director of the Jewish State Theatre, Maia Morgenstern, about an encounter with antisemitic language was followed by death threats against her family and threats to set fire to the Jewish theatre.<sup>230</sup> The event instigated a criminal investigation and condemnation from the parliament, noting the rise of antisemitic incidents.<sup>231</sup>

Experts and practitioners interviewed expressed their own experiences of having been targets of hate speech due to their proximity to the topic. It was mentioned that people in Romania who work in the field of addressing these topics (Holocaust education, intercultural education, democracy and human rights) often become targets of hate speech and even death threats (IR5).

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<sup>219</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.31, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Raport-monitorizare-2021.pdf>

<sup>220</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.31.

<sup>221</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 81.

<sup>222</sup> Statista, “Number of incidents pertaining to antisemitism in Romania from 2009 to 2019,” 2023, accessed 17 September 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1173749/romania-incidents-pertaining-to-antisemitism/>

<sup>223</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023”, 2023, accessed 4 August 2023, , <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Raport-monitorizare-20-IULIE-2023.pdf>

<sup>224</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, 2021, p. 3.

<sup>225</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023”.

<sup>226</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 51.

<sup>227</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>228</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 6.

<sup>229</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.7.

<sup>230</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>231</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

## Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community

According to surveys conducted by INSHR-EW in 2023, 71% of Jews in Romania agree that antisemitism exists in society today; only 6% consider that it does not exist at all.<sup>232</sup> 41% of Jewish respondents believe that antisemitism has increased over the last five years, while 38% think that it has remained the same.<sup>233</sup> The main expressions of antisemitism as perceived by the Jewish community is the desecration of cemeteries, with 68% reporting it as a very big or big problem, followed by antisemitism on social media (53%), vandalism of Jewish institutions and monuments (52%), antisemitism on the political arena (51%), in mass-media (42%), and on the street or in public places (38%).<sup>234</sup> 24% of Jewish respondents report having been the targets of antisemitic remarks, and 14% had been targets of antisemitic actions in the last five years.<sup>235</sup> 27% of respondents report that they often or sometimes avoid wearing objects that could identify them as Jewish when they are in public, and 21% avoid posting content online that might reveal their Jewish identity.<sup>236</sup>

Jewish focus group respondents supported the findings, which indicate widespread and pervasive antisemitism in Romania (FG4). Experiences include overt opposition to interfaith marriage, negative vocabulary about Jewish people, reluctance to self-identify as Jewish due to fear of bias and prejudices, Holocaust denial, and more covert stereotypes that are expressed in trivial conversations and behaviour (FG4). One respondent gave the example of a situation where they had disclosed their Jewish heritage to an elderly Hungarian lady, who had responded with “flattering” comments about Jews being “smart” and “tricky”, not realising that her words were reflecting common and harmful stereotypes about Jewish people (FG4). Jewish respondents (FG4) also claimed to have noticed an increase in violent acts of antisemitism in recent years, some attributing it to a surge in nationalism and growing divisions between various groups within society. It was suggested that antisemitic sentiments have been exacerbated by the prevailing divisive and nationalist ideologies (FG4).

Jewish respondents characterised the belief that there is no antisemitism in Romania as “ideal thinking,” arising from innocence, ignorance, or a lack of awareness about what constitutes antisemitism. Some people may hold antisemitic beliefs without realising it, as these beliefs have been passed down through generations as “normal.” (FG4).

## Antisemitism on the political level

On the political level, antisemitism has been expressed mainly in the form of glorifying known antisemitic fascist leaders from the interwar period and war criminals from WWII, making them out to be patriots and

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<sup>232</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”, 2023, p.3, accessed 4 Dec 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Raport-de-cercetare-minoritatea-evreiasca.pdf>

<sup>233</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești” 2023, p. 4

<sup>234</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești” 2023, p. 5.

<sup>235</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”, 2023, p. 7-14

<sup>236</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”, 2023, p. 18-19

Romanian heroes.<sup>237</sup> Political figures typically use antisemitic rhetoric to promote a nationalist, anti-communist historical narrative.<sup>238</sup> Expressions of economic or religious antisemitism are less commonly observed.<sup>239</sup>

Antisemitic remarks have been made by political leaders from the right-wing liberal party, National Liberal Party (PNL), and the far-right nationalist party, Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR). Typically, the Judeo-Bolshevism narrative (associating Judaism with communism) is promoted as part of a right-wing nationalist narrative associating the Romanian national identity with anti-communism and aligning communism with Judaism, thereby painting Jews as “other” and not part of the Romanian national identity.<sup>240</sup> On 3 March 2021, Daniel Gheorghe, a parliamentarian from the PNL, delivered a speech in which he praised Mircea Vulcanescu, a convicted war criminal who endorsed antisemitic policies while serving under Antonescu’s WWII government.<sup>241</sup> A few days later, during a Senate session on 8 March 2021, Senator Lavric, a member of the AUR, spoke about Jewish involvement in initiating and promoting communism. Lavric’s comments were made in response to criticism from Silviu Vexler, a Jewish member of parliament, who had raised concerns about the antisemitic nature of statements made by some parliament members, including Lavric. It’s noteworthy that AUR shared Lavric’s speech on its official Facebook page, making it part of a broader effort to shape the country’s historical narrative.<sup>242</sup>

Increasingly, organisations that promote nationalist and extremist ideologies try to gain legitimacy by using public buildings as venues for their events.<sup>243</sup> For example, in October 2022, the “Reduta” Cultural Center, an institution under the Brasov City Council, partnered with the neo-Legionary Ogoranu Foundation to organise an event dedicated to Nicolae Purcărea, presenting him as an anti-communist fighter. Nicolae Purcărea was a member of the Legionary Movement who was arrested during the Antonescu regime and, after 1990, was among those who tried to re-establish the Legionary Movement through the “All for the Country” (Totul pentru Țară) party.<sup>244</sup> Similar incidents have occurred all across the country over the last year, lending legitimacy to organisations that glorify and attempt to rejuvenate the identity of the Legionary Movement.

### Antisemitism in the sporting sphere

INSHR-EW’s most recent monitoring report highlights antisemitic incidents within the realm of sports in Romania during the period of May 2022-April 2023<sup>245</sup>. These incidents primarily occurred in football stadiums. In Cluj in October 2022, at the football match between CFR Cluj and Slavia Prague, some Cluj-Napoca supporters displayed, in the Czech language, signs with the antisemitic message: “You are just some Jews, Slavia”. A few days later, the CFR supporters showed up at a meeting, showing a racist message targeting the Roma community.<sup>246</sup> In January 2023, the Sepsi Sfântu-Gheorghe-FC U Craiova football match

<sup>237</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Responsabil de Holocaustul din România: Hitler Sau Antonescu,” 2021, p.3.

<sup>238</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Responsabil de Holocaustul din România: Hitler Sau Antonescu,” 2021, p.3.

<sup>239</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.30.

<sup>240</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” 2023, p. 14.

<sup>241</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>242</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>243</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” 2023, p. 14.

<sup>244</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” 2023, p. 14.

<sup>245</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.11

<sup>246</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.11

was suspended due to xenophobic chants from the Craiova supporters. Similar chants have been used in recent years at several matches in which one of the teams is associated with the Hungarian community. At a football match in April 2023, the CSA Steaua team displayed a flag with the face of the leader of the Legionary Movement, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. At the Romania-Ukraine match on 24 June 2023, one of the messages in the stands praised the Legionary Movement.<sup>247</sup> These antisemitic and xenophobic incidents in recent years highlight the prevalence of hate speech, including antisemitism, in the sporting sphere.

### Enmity against other minority groups in the country

Besides the Jewish community, the minority groups that are most affected by group-focused hatred are the Roma, the LGBTQ+, and the Hungarian minority<sup>248</sup>. The main forms of expression of enmity against these groups, particularly the Roma, include discrimination, hate speech and prejudices. A survey from 2021 found that a majority of people are neutral in their attitudes towards ethnic minorities, the strongest negative perception being towards the Roma, a group which is considered a problem by a staggering 38% of the population.<sup>249</sup> Opinion polls from 2018<sup>250</sup> showed that the most distrusted groups in Romania are the Roma (72%), followed by religious minority groups (56%), and the Hungarian (53%) and Jewish (46%) minorities. The only group more distrusted than Roma are people who identify as homosexuals (74%), followed by immigrants (69%) and Muslims (68%). Although discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited under Romanian law, discrimination against LGBTQ+ is common. A 2020 survey by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency found that 15% of LGBTQ+ individuals had suffered physical or sexual attacks linked to their sexual orientation or gender identity in the past five years; only 4% reported them to authorities due to fear of discrimination.<sup>251</sup> Hate speech targeting any kind of minority, especially sexual and ethnic, is typically combined with Euroscepticism and anti-globalism.<sup>252</sup>

The field research indicated widespread agreement about the Roma being the main target of group-focused hatred and discrimination in Romania. The expert interviews (IR2) highlighted that anti-Roma and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments are both more prevalent and dangerous than antisemitism in their manifestations. A Jewish respondent (from FG4) pointed out that the groups most affected are the ones you can most clearly identify as “different” from the majority group, those who are easily identifiable by their look as “different”. In line with this, Hungarian (IR8) and Roma (IR1, IR4, IR7, FG3) respondents also emphasised that they attempt to hide their ethnic identity, citing fear of discrimination, hatred or loss of opportunity.

The field research found that Roma are commonly displayed as thieves, dirty, dangerous, and stupid (FG3). Jewish respondents (FG4) grew up hearing the use of derogatory language when mentioning the Roma (“gipsies”), ingraining in them from a young age the assumption that Roma are dangerous because they are different. The Roma youth (FG3) shared stories that exemplify discrimination, where their ethnicity led to unjust treatment. For example, a teacher refused to give a passing grade to a competent Roma student despite good results overall, preventing them from graduating high school (FG3). Another illustrative example was when an administrator made prejudiced assumptions about a Roma student, which led to them

<sup>247</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.12.

<sup>248</sup> Studio12, “Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania,” 2021, p.12.

<sup>249</sup> Studio12, “Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania,” 2021, p.3-6.

<sup>250</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” p. 12.

<sup>251</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>252</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.26.

being denied access to a course. The assumption was that the young girl had children, which was not the case. Roma youth believe that the corrective measures introduced by the Romanian state, such as special spots in schools, exacerbate divisions and tensions, further isolating and marginalising Roma youth (FG3). A Romanian youth mentioned an incident where a Roma individual was unjustly pulled off a bus. The respondent perceived it as an act of ethnic hatred and emphasised the unfairness in treatment based on ethnicity (FG3). A Roma community leader pointed to intersections with gender, highlighting that gender-based violence is a pervasive cross-cutting issue (IR4). These stories underscore the pervasive discrimination and hatred that the Roma face, both openly and through institutional biases. The stereotypes about the Hungarian minority typically focus on nationalist ideas, fears and questions about “why they are still here” (FG1). Jewish and Hungarian minorities have sometimes been perceived as intellectual threats or as having more societal power in Romania, whereas the Roma minority have a lower status and fewer rights (IR7).

## Antisemitism and education

### Jewry, antisemitism and the Holocaust in the official educational curricula

Until recently, the teaching of the Holocaust in schools has been optional and often lacking.<sup>253</sup> In 2021, the Romanian government passed legislation making Holocaust education, “History of Jews and the Holocaust in Romania” mandatory in schools.<sup>254</sup> In the updated curriculum from 2021, 9th-grade history students learn about the history of the Jews, among other groups.<sup>255</sup> From 2022, 10th-grade history students learn about political regimes in the interwar period and interwar international relations, including the Holocaust and Romania in the two world wars.<sup>256</sup> 10th-grade students in religion also learn about Judaism, Jewish culture and the Old Testament.<sup>257</sup> From 2023, 11th-grade history students learn about political ideas and regimes<sup>258</sup>; 11th-grade students of religion might study Judaism<sup>259</sup>, and the general term “discrimination” will be covered in the subject Sociology and Economy<sup>260</sup>. However, no clear guidelines regarding discussions on antisemitism are included in the curriculum.

<sup>253</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021”, p. 2-3.

<sup>254</sup> INSHR-EW, “Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie,” 2022.

<sup>255</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI la CLASA A IX-A în anul școlar 2021-2022 LIMBA ȘI LITERATURA ROMÂNĂ, învățământ liceal și profesional,” 2021, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>256</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a X-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2022-2023, Disciplina ISTORIE,” 2022, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>257</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a X-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2022-2023, Disciplina RELIGIE,” 2022, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>258</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina ISTORIE,” 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>259</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina RELIGIE,” 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>260</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina SOCIO-UMANE,” 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

Teachers often use lessons from Holocaust education and antisemitism to address other contemporary issues related to discrimination, xenophobia, and chauvinism (FG1). For example, while mandatory Holocaust education now exists for high school students, there's no equivalent for Roma history.

The first-line practitioners (FG1) reported that there is a divide among teachers, some considering the study of the Holocaust unnecessary and receiving too much attention. While respondents think that Holocaust education is improving, concerns are raised about the quality of textbooks and other educational materials on Jewish history and antisemitism. Some teachers are concerned about the violent imagery often used in classroom presentations, leading to a negative association between Jews and death, sadness, and victimhood (IR3). Teachers have a wide range of materials available to them for educating students about the Holocaust; however, there is a need for more and improved materials focusing on the historical local situation in Romania and connecting it to antisemitism and other current manifestations of intolerance (IR3). Teachers believe these materials should be better adapted to suit the needs of youth and argue that they should have been piloted before being introduced in classes (FG1).

### **Educational materials and activities addressing antisemitism**

The materials and activities provided in the official curriculum focus primarily on the Holocaust in historical terms, specifically the Holocaust, as it happened in other European countries (not in Romania). The resources primarily consist of documentaries, with learning mainly through storytelling and testimonies of survivors, but also on analysis of the movements in society which led to the rise of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. In the updated 10th-grade history curriculum, there are links to TedEd resources, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum<sup>261</sup>, and the online Anne Frank House Museum<sup>262</sup>. These materials and activities are easily available to teachers. However, most of them are in English, and language barriers might hinder many teachers from using and/or understanding the content.

Teachers often seek supplementary materials beyond the official curriculum to enhance learning experiences. For instance, INSHR-EW developed region-specific notebooks in Romania focusing on the Holocaust to help teachers connect historical events with local geography and adapted victim memoirs (IR2). While approved by the Ministry of Education, its utility in classrooms remains uncertain (IR2). Additionally, INSHR-EW introduced an outdoor comic book exhibition in 2023 to commemorate local Holocaust victims (IR1). Other resources include videos by the National Roma Culture Center, online information about the Roma community (IR7), interactive lessons at the Synagogue History Museum in Oradea, and initiatives by dedicated teachers to organise projects, activities, and excursions related to Holocaust education. However, concerns were raised that making Holocaust history mandatory without proper teacher training may compromise the quality of education on this subject (FG1). Despite the availability of numerous NGO-developed resources, teachers frequently lack awareness of their freedom to incorporate these materials to meet curriculum demands (IR5). Many teachers mistakenly believe they are restricted to official school textbooks, leading valuable resources to be underutilised in extracurricular activities despite their perfect alignment with the curriculum. While some educators grasp the potential and are open to using these

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<sup>261</sup> United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Online lectures: Studying Primary Sources from the Holocaust," accessed 13 September 2023, <https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online>

<sup>262</sup> Anne Frank House, "The Anne Frank House online," accessed 13 September 2023, <https://www.annefrank.org/en/museum/web-and-digital/>

resources to fulfil curriculum needs, resistance often arises from middle management roles within educational hierarchies (IR5).

### **Needs of FLPs in addressing antisemitism through education**

The field research highlighted several needs of FLPs in addressing antisemitism through education. Respondents highlighted the importance of connecting students with the history of the local community, offering glimpses into the surroundings and lifestyle of the Jewish community before the Holocaust (IR3). Experts emphasised the importance of using positive images and respecting the rights of victims when using pictures in pedagogical settings (IR3). Experts and first-line practitioners argued that many schools are not doing enough to tackle discrimination, hatred, and intolerance. Resistance or systemic barriers often hinder good efforts (IR1, IR5). For this reason, there is a need to adopt a whole-school approach, targeting not only teachers and students but also involving parents and other stakeholders (IR5). Teachers and educators (FG1) argued that there is a need for updated materials, textbooks and manuals that are pilot-tested, relevant and resonate with youth today (FG1). There is a need for resources that help deconstruct narratives and combat internalised prejudices (FG1). Extracurricular activities and collaborations with NGOs are valuable in creating spaces for addressing these issues outside the constraints of traditional school settings (IR5 & IR6).

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## 2. National report: Hungary

### Executive Summary

In general, the Jewish population in Hungary has a high level of education and is in a good position socially and financially, according to the available literature and our interviewees. Those who identify as Jews are mostly non-religious and consider themselves predominantly European citizens or equally Jewish and Hungarian.

According to research, the level of antisemitism in Hungary increased significantly around 2010, presumably due to the rise in popularity of the far-right Jobbik party. Since 2015, the available data show that the level of antisemitism has not changed significantly. At the same time, most interviewees reported a general increase in antisemitism in the country, citing the internet as the primary cause, as well as the family background, deficiencies of the education system, the polarisation of society, and the government's Soros campaign.

In Hungary, antisemitism is most often manifested in the form of conspiracy theories, but other forms are also present (e.g. emotional antisemitism, new antisemitism). According to the available data, the most common form of antisemitism is hate speech. The number of hate crimes is negligible.

At the political level, antisemitism emerged from the second half of the 2000s in connection with Jobbik and has been one of the tools of far-right parties (currently Mi Hazánk – Our Homeland) ever since, albeit in a less direct form than before, disguised by coded speech and appearing mainly as conspiracy theories. Although the Fidesz government announced zero tolerance towards antisemitism in 2013, it has focused its communication on several issues related to antisemitism in recent years. These include the campaign against George Soros, the glorification of antisemitic politicians (e.g. Miklós Horthy) and artists (e.g. Albert Wass) between the two world wars, the distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, and the fight against the global external enemy. Antisemitism is also present in the sports fan milieu, primarily in the football fan scene and especially in the ultra scene.

According to a 2017 survey, half of Hungarian Jews have experienced antisemitism in their lifetime, and all of our Jewish interviewees mentioned such experiences. Many of them highlighted the government's antisemitism-related double-talk's negative effects on their sense of security.

While antisemitism is undoubtedly present in Hungary, research and interviewees also suggest that society is much more prejudiced towards other minorities, especially the Roma, the LGBTQ+, and migrants.

According to first-line practitioners, the extent to which antisemitism is present among students depends on the school. When it appears among students, it is primarily present in verbal forms, and often, there are no real antisemitic sentiments in the background. Several interviewees identified education as one of the most important tools to reduce antisemitism.

### Introduction

#### The BOND Project and Research

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) project<sup>263</sup> will run from January 2023 to December 2024 in Poland, Hungary, Italy and Romania. Its main objective is to address

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<sup>263</sup> The BOND project website: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>.

deep-rooted prejudices, hate attitudes and behaviours in society, particularly towards European Jewry. It also aims to promote understanding, tolerance and dialogue. The project will place particular emphasis on raising young people's awareness of Judaism and antisemitism and on fostering intercultural and interreligious dialogue. This research was carried out as a first step of the BOND project. Both the project and the research use the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.<sup>264</sup> All phases of the research were completed in September 2023, so events after 7 October 2023 and their impact are no longer included.

The research aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitism in Hungary as a basis for further project activities. Consequently, the research had limitations: it was carried out within the timeframe and scope defined in the project and along sub-themes relevant to the project's further activities.

## Methodology

The research consisted of two parts.<sup>265</sup> Firstly, a desk research was conducted to summarise the literature available on antisemitism in Hungary over the last ten years or so, on the topics predefined in the project. We then conducted nine individual and five focus group interviews to complement the results of the desk research. Our individual interviewees included two first-line practitioners, five experts on antisemitism and/or minority issues, one NGO staff representative working on LGBTQ+ issues, and one Christian religious leader. Focus group interviews were conducted with the following groups: young people with a Jewish identity, young people with a non-Jewish identity, first-line practitioners, leaders and staff of Jewish NGOs and Jewish religious leaders.<sup>266</sup> Participants were selected within the defined target groups using both a targeted approach and a snowball method.<sup>267</sup>

## The situation of the Jewish population in Hungary

The estimated number of Jews in Hungary in 2015 was between 58 936 and 110 679, according to a 2017 survey.<sup>268</sup> In addition to available databases on the Jewish population, the research was conducted by

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<sup>264</sup> "Antisemitism is a view of Jews that can be expressed as an expression of hatred towards them. Verbal and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed at Jewish or non-Jewish persons and/or their property, Jewish communal institutions and religious institutions." IHRA, "IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>.

<sup>265</sup> All phases of the research were completed by September 2023.

<sup>266</sup> The main characteristics of the focus groups were: 1) young people with Jewish identity in the capital: aged 18-25, 8 persons - 5 boys, 3 girls; 2) young people with non-Jewish identity in the capital and in the countryside: 18 to 25 years old, 6 persons - 3 girls, 3 boys; 3) professionals working with young people in the capital and the countryside: 9 persons - 6 men, 3 women; 4) leaders and staff of Jewish NGOs in the capital: 7 persons - 4 men, 3 women; 5) Jewish religious leaders in the capital and the countryside: 4 persons - 3 men, 1 woman. The interviews were conducted between 30 May and 4 July 2023 and the focus groups between 31 May and 14 June 2023.

<sup>267</sup> A limitation of the research was that several of the people we wanted to interview individually or in focus groups could not be reached or appointments could not be made.

<sup>268</sup> Kovács András and Barna Ildikó, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei* (Budapest: Szombat, 2017), 12-15.

"In the estimation, the researchers projected the demographic characteristics of the Budapest population as a whole - the live birth and death rates of the age-grouped Budapest population - onto the Jewish population of the country, because two-thirds of the surviving Jews were Budapest residents, and the majority of rural Jews gradually moved to the capital. Estimates of population growth (in our case, decline) were based on female population figures, in accordance with the rules of demographic calculation. Available data on emigration were taken into account in the estimation."

interviewing subjects who identified themselves as Jewish and had at least one Jewish grandparent. The results showed that roughly 85% of Jews lived in Budapest, with an ongoing movement from smaller settlements to cities. Their educational level was higher, and their social and financial situation was better than the average in Budapest. While 78% of the Jewish population had a degree, the proportion was 32% for the population aged 18 and over in the capital. 52% of the Jewish population had an intellectual job, and 17% worked in a managerial position, while for the total Budapest population, the former rate was 20% and the latter 6%. Regarding identity, most Jews identified themselves as European citizens (30%) or as equally Jewish and Hungarian (29%).<sup>269</sup> According to the census, 10 965 people declared themselves Israelites in 2011 and 7 635 in 2022.<sup>270</sup>

These data were also confirmed by the interviewees. Most of them agreed that Jews are in a privileged position in Hungary compared to other minority groups. They highlighted that this was particularly true in Budapest. In the countryside, mainly because of the Holocaust, the Jewish presence is much smaller, and the circumstances are difficult. According to some, this presence is increasingly active, but some Jewish leaders believe that the Jewish population in the countryside is disappearing.

According to the 2017 survey, most of the Hungarian Jewish population is not religious. Although 70% of the respondents did not want Jews to assimilate fully, the majority supported mixed marriages. The vast majority (75%) felt a sense of belonging to Israel but were not seriously considering moving there. Hungarian Jews were more likely than the general population to be opposition voters and consumers of left-liberal-oriented media. In terms of worldview and political attitudes, they were also more accepting and open-minded compared to the rest of society.<sup>271</sup>

There are three recognised Jewish churches in Hungary: 1) the Association of Jewish Communities of Hungary (Mazsihisz) – the best known in 2017 among the population identifying themselves as Jews<sup>272</sup> – which represents the neologic faction<sup>273</sup>) the second best known, the Unified Hungarian Israelite Congregation (EMIH), which represents the status quo ante, i.e. the middle way faction<sup>274</sup>; and 3) the Hungarian Autonomous Orthodox Israelite Congregation (MAOIH), which represents the orthodox faction<sup>275</sup>. In addition, there are two smaller Jewish religious communities, the reform Beit Orim<sup>276</sup> and Sim Shalom<sup>277</sup>.

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<sup>269</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 64.

<sup>270</sup> Census data available on the website of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office ([www.ksh.hu](http://www.ksh.hu)).

<sup>271</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 156.

<sup>272</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 177.

<sup>273</sup> Mazsihisz, “Magyar zsidó történelem az ókortól napjainkig,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://mazsihisz.hu/azsidosagrol/tortenelem/magyar-zsido-tortenelem/magyar-zsido-tortenelem-az-okortol-napjainkig>.

<sup>274</sup> EMIH, “Bemutató: Az Egységes Magyarországi Izraelita Hitközség,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://zsido.com/emih/bemutakozas/>.

<sup>275</sup> MAOIH, “Bemutató: Az orthodoxia rövid története,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://maoih.hu/bemutakozas/orthodoxia-tortenete/>.

<sup>276</sup> Bét Orim, “A Bét Orim története,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://betorim.hu/kozosseg/dokumentumok/a-bet-orim-tortenete/>.

<sup>277</sup> Szim Salom, “Kik vagyunk?,” accessed December 19, 2023. <https://www.szimsalom.hu/bemutakozunk/kik-vagyunk/>.

The state supports several Jewish organisations but in an ideologically selective way that creates divisions among Jewish organisations.<sup>278</sup> According to interviewees with a Jewish identity, even large subsidies can increase antisemitism in society.

According to several interviewees, Jewry is present in Hungarian society primarily culturally but also religiously. Interviewees active in Jewish civil life emphasised that the Jewish civil and religious spheres in Hungary today are separated. Almost all interviewees mentioned that Jews are politically divided in Hungary and that Jewish churches are politically and economically dependent on the current political situation.

## Antisemitism in Hungary

### Level and types of antisemitism

In Hungary, after the fall of communism, antisemitism, which had been suppressed until then, resurfaced immediately. Nevertheless, its level did not increase significantly in the two decades that followed – around a quarter of the adult population of the country could be considered antisemitic.<sup>279</sup> The level of antisemitism increased significantly around 2010, which, by several studies, was linked to the rise in popularity of the far-right Jobbik party.<sup>280</sup> According to surveys conducted over several years using András Kovács' methodology – which can be called traditional in Hungary – the level of antisemitism did not change significantly between 2015 and 2019. In 2019, 36% of society was considered moderately or strongly antisemitic<sup>281</sup>; in 2021, according to research by the Action and Protection League covering 16 countries, 42%.<sup>282</sup> In Hungary, as in the Visegrad countries, antisemitism mostly appears in the form of conspiracy theories.<sup>283</sup>

Available research distinguishes the following forms of antisemitism:

- *Primary antisemitism*, or traditional antisemitism, covers three categories. *Cognitive antisemitism* – referring to negative misconceptions about Jews – was strongly present in 17% of Hungarians and moderately present in 42% of Hungarians in 2021. *Affective antisemitism* – referring to negative feelings about Jews – was strongly held by 25% of Hungarians and moderately held by 23% in 2021. *Conative antisemitism* – measuring the willingness to act or discriminate based on anti-Jewish prejudice – was strongly present in 15% and moderately present in 34% of respondents in 2021. Combining all categories, Action and Protection League's 16-country survey found that 24% were strongly and 18% moderately considered to be primarily antisemitic in 2021, for a total of 42% of the Hungarian population.<sup>284</sup>

<sup>278</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről (Brüsszel: NOA és CEJI, 2022), 10.

<sup>279</sup> Kovács, András, *Stranger at hand. Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

<sup>280</sup> Hann Endre and Róna Dániel, *Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban* (Budapest: TEV, Medián, 2015), 13; Barna, Ildikó and Félix Anikó, ed., *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrad Countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2017), 14; Félix Anikó, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020* (Budapest: Mazsihisz, 2020), 47.

<sup>281</sup> Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*.

<sup>282</sup> Kovács, András and Fischer György, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries* (Budapest: Action and Protection League, 2021), 58.

<sup>283</sup> Barna, Ildikó et al., *Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2022).

<sup>284</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 19-36.

- *Secondary antisemitism* refers to statements that deny, distort or relativise the Holocaust. According to the Action and Protection League's 2021 research, 17% of Hungarians were considered strongly and 46% moderately antisemitic.<sup>285</sup>
- The *new antisemitism*, in simple terms, refers to antisemitic criticism of Israel or anti-Israel sentiment, which is projected onto Israel, putting Israel at the centre of the antisemitic sentiment and allowing antisemitic statements to be made in a politically correct way.<sup>286</sup> This includes expressions that see the State of Israel as inherently evil - demonising it, applying double standards against it and denying Israel's right to exist.<sup>287</sup> In Hungary, according to the Action and Protection League's 2021 survey, 13% strongly and 40% moderately held antisemitic views against Israel.<sup>288</sup>
- *Latent antisemitism*: we call those who try to avoid giving antisemitic answers in surveys measuring antisemitism latent antisemites. In general, they succeed with it at questions measuring traditional antisemitism but not for questions measuring secondary and new antisemitism, which is not necessarily perceived as antisemitic by them.<sup>289</sup>

In addition, one of the interviewees in the field of antisemitism research distinguished three levels of antisemitism in society: 1) prejudice, negative stereotypes about Jews, 2) the presence of antisemitic language in social discourse and media, and 3) antisemitism for political purposes. These three levels are pyramidally related: a large proportion of those who use antisemitic language presumably are also prejudiced, while not all those who are prejudiced use antisemitic language.

The majority of interviewees defined antisemitism as a feeling of aversion, opposition, or negative expressions towards Jewry. Besides, a first-line practitioner described it as a worldview. As possible manifestations, emotional, verbal, non-verbal and physical antisemitism were mentioned. A distinction was also made between religion-based and 'race-based' antisemitism, and more interviewees highlighted that, in their experience, antisemitism often mixes interpretations of Jewishness as religion, people/ethnicity, and culture or tradition. Conspiracy theories were considered by many to be the most typical form of antisemitism in Hungary, and some highlighted that antisemitism most often appears in an economic context. Several interviewees referred to new antisemitism (antisemitic criticism of and opposition to Israel) as a complex area of antisemitism, where it is difficult to determine whether a particular statement is antisemitic and which is more prevalent in Western Europe, but also on the rise in Hungary, especially on the (radical) left. Researchers and members of the Jewish community have also emphasised antisemitism connected to the issue of the Hungarian responsibility in the Second World War and the Holocaust in Hungary.

Most interviewees agreed that antisemitism has increased to some extent over the past 10-15 years. The main reason given for this was the internet, which they said supports the rapid spread of antisemitic content and normalises its presence. Secondly, they mentioned family patterns brought from home, but several also mentioned the deficiencies of the Hungarian education system. According to several interviewees,

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<sup>285</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 47-49.

<sup>286</sup> Barna et al., *Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries*, 15.

<sup>287</sup> Natan Sharansky, "3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, no. 3-4 (2004).

<sup>288</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 54.

<sup>289</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 56.

Hungarian society is fundamentally receptive to prejudice, including antisemitism. Interviewees agreed that crises – including the COVID-19 pandemic – always have an impact on prejudice, as these subvert the current social order and often result in widespread financial insecurity. In such cases, many people look for scapegoats, which are usually found in minority groups by political actors. In many cases, the COVID-19 epidemic has led to loneliness among young people, which has also made them more open to conspiracy theories against minorities.

According to the experts in the field of antisemitism interviewed and a 2022 study<sup>290</sup>, gender is also fundamentally irrelevant to antisemitism. According to the latter research, the effect of gender is only significant in most cases when other attitudinal factors (e.g. prejudice against other groups, populism, nationalism) are not mediated. The study has also shown that gender may still have an effect on different types of antisemitism – for example, in the case of secondary antisemitism, men are more antisemitic.

### **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories**

Antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices in Hungarian society can be sorted into several categories. A 2022 cross-national research<sup>291</sup> surveyed beliefs in different types of antisemitic prejudice. One category studied was traditional, religious-based anti-Judaism. This includes, for example, the claim that the crucifixion of Jesus is an unforgivable sin of the Jews (16% agreed). Another category is conspiratorial antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices. These include, for example, that Jews have too much influence in Hungary (25% agreed), Jews aim to dominate the world (23% agreed) and seek to extend their influence on the global economy (40% agreed), that they are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals (18% agreed), and that they often operate in secret behind the scenes (17% agreed).<sup>292</sup> Antisemitic narratives about the Holocaust also appear in Hungary. Examples include that Jews try to take advantage of their persecution during the war and the Holocaust (28% agreed), Jews are to be blamed for their persecution (17% agreed), and they talk too much about the Holocaust (31% agreed).<sup>293</sup>

In addition to these categories, other antisemitic theories are also present. For example, Jews cannot be equal members of a country because they will always remain more loyal to Judaism or Israel than to the nation, with which 35% of the total population in Hungary agreed in 2019.<sup>294</sup> There are also antisemitic theories regarding the COVID-19 pandemic: the COVID-19 virus was created and/or spread by Jews for political or economic gain or to take revenge on their enemies and avenge their historical oppressors.<sup>295</sup> Among antisemitic topos on the far right, there is also a narrative that conflates communism and Jewry, blaming Jews for the crimes of the communist regimes against the Hungarian people.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 90.

<sup>291</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries.

<sup>292</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 27-32.

<sup>293</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 54-63

<sup>294</sup> Félix, Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020, 84.

<sup>295</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Knap Árpád, “An exploration of coronavirus-related online antisemitism in Hungary using quantitative topic model and qualitative discourse analysis,” *East European Journal of Society and Politics* 7, no. 3 (2021): 80-100.

<sup>296</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Knap Árpád, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary: Exploring Topics of Antisemitism in the Far-Right Media Using Natural Language Processing,” *Theo Web Academic Journal of Religious Education* 18, no. 1 (2019): 75-92.

In the intersection of different prejudicial narratives, Jews are often presented as the "secret power" responsible for the activities of other minority groups in Hungary. According to these narratives, they aim to undermine the Hungarian nation. Narratives from the far right, for example, suggest that Jews (e.g. George Soros) are organising Muslim immigration to weaken Christian Europe and nation-states.<sup>297</sup> Besides, Jews use the Roma as a "biological weapon" against Hungarians<sup>298</sup>, and as "homopropagandists", they work to spread homosexuality and deviance in opposition to Christianity and white people<sup>299</sup>.

Interviewees also mentioned that common stereotypes against Jews include the crooked nose, sideburns, and wearing a hat. Additional stereotypes are also present: Jews are left-wing, smart, influential, insatiable, consider themselves culturally superior, communist, and wealthy, occupy leadership positions, and help each other to get into these positions at the expense of Hungarians. In line with the above-presented research results, more interviewees mentioned the stereotypes that Jews talk too much about the Holocaust and that they always portray themselves as victims for financial gain. In the context of conspiratorial antisemitism, several people mentioned the blood libel of the 19th century, the stab-in-the-back myth of the 20th century holding Jews responsible for Trianon, the belief that they caused the Great Depression, and the post-COVID New World Order Theory, which holds that Jews aimed to use the pandemic and the following economic problems to expand their influence and power over people and countries.<sup>300</sup> Linked to new antisemitism, a common view is that Jews are killing Palestinians.

### Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes

In Hungary, state authorities do not publish official data on hate speech and hate crimes differentiated for minority groups. The available official statistics treat all cases of violence against members of minority groups as one and do not necessarily reflect reality.<sup>301</sup> Based on these, the number of hate crimes is negligible.<sup>302</sup> In Hungary, there is no systematic and comprehensive monitoring. Still, according to NGOs working on the issue, there are roughly 30-60 antisemitic incidents per year in the country – the most common being hate speech. At the same time, physical violence against persons or property is negligible.<sup>303</sup>

All interviewees agreed that antisemitism in Hungary is mainly verbal, but some also mentioned the vandalism of cemeteries and synagogues. According to the interviewees, antisemitism primarily appears in

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<sup>297</sup> Barna and Knap, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary", 75-92.

<sup>298</sup> Barna and Félix, ed. *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*, 67.

<sup>299</sup> Barna and Knap, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary", 75-92.

<sup>300</sup> Blood libels dating back to the Middle Ages claim that Jews killed Christian children for religious rituals and used their blood to make Passover unleavened bread. According to the 20th-century stab-in-the-back myth, one of the reasons for Germany's defeat in World War I was the Jews, who, as internal enemies, stabbed German troops in the back with their destructive behaviour. The theory also took root in Hungary, and it was part of the narrative between the two world wars that the loss of the war was not the fault of the troops but of the press. According to the 21st century New World Order theory, the global political and economic elite are planning to create a world government through shadow governments, whereby sovereign governments will be abolished and authoritarian world governance will emerge.

<sup>301</sup> Uszkiewicz, Erik, "Anomalies in the application of law related to hate crimes," *Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies* 61, no. 3 (2021): 325-41; FRA, *Antisemitism: Overview of antisemitic incidents in the European Union 2011-2021* (Bécs: FRA, 2022).

<sup>302</sup> Ministry of Interior, "Crime Statistics System," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://bsr.bm.hu/Document>.

<sup>303</sup> Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*, 10-16; TEV, *Antiszemita gyűlölet-bűncselekmények és incidensek Magyarországon: 2020. éves rövid jelentés* (Budapest: TEV, 2020); FRA, *Antisemitism*.



the form of conspiracy theories, but several emphasised that covert, hidden antisemitism appearing as allusions and antisemitic humour are also widespread.

### Antisemitism in politics

The presence of antisemitism in Hungarian politics in the years after 2010 is mainly related to the far-right Jobbik party (before its mainstreaming<sup>304</sup>). However, the increasing public appearances and growing popularity of the extremist party in the years before 2010 had already noticeably increased the presence and acceptance of antisemitism in public discourse and then had also demonstrably strengthened antisemitic attitudes.<sup>305</sup> Although in 2013, the Fidesz government proclaimed zero tolerance of antisemitism<sup>306</sup>, an integral part of the party's electoral and communication strategy is to borrow topics of the far right, which are then disseminated to the whole society through the government-controlled media<sup>307</sup>. Such antisemitism-linked topics include conspiracy theories about George Soros, glorification of Horthy, distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, and the constant rhetoric that Fidesz is protecting the nation from an external, global enemy.<sup>308</sup> In addition, since 2015, several public figures known for their extremist, antisemitic statements have received high state awards (e.g. Zsolt Bayer, Ernő Raffay).<sup>309</sup> Among political actors, the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk), which split from Jobbik in 2018, is the most prominent to use antisemitic elements, although instead of the previously typical for Jobbik, sometimes openly antisemitic statements, Our Homeland coded, covert, largely conspiratorial antisemitic language (e.g. attacking the Rothschilds, promoting the New World Order theory). The political presence of antisemitism is strongly connected to the kuruc.info portal linked to Előd Novák, formerly a prominent politician of Jobbik and now a prominent politician of Our Homeland.<sup>310</sup>

According to several interviewees, antisemitism in Hungary is a politicised topic. Many highlighted the Fidesz government's campaign against George Soros as having had an impact on antisemitism. Although the government did not consider the campaign to be antisemitic<sup>311</sup>, most interviewees perceived it as such, as the campaign portrayed George Soros with traditional antisemitic stereotypes. The impact of the campaign also reinforces the antisemitic interpretation: as many times antisemitic slogans and symbols (e.g. "stinking

<sup>304</sup> Bíró-Nagy, András and Boros, Tamás, "Jobbik going mainstream: Strategy shift of the far-right in Hungary," in *Extreme right in Europe*, ed. Jamin Jerome (Brussels: Bruylant, 2016): 243–63; Héjj, Dominik, "The rebranding of Jobbik," *New Eastern Europe* 29, no. 6 (2017): 83–90.

<sup>305</sup> Hann and Róna, *Antiszemita előítéleteesség a mai magyar társadalomban*, 2015, 13; Barna and Félix, *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*, 14; Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*, 47.

<sup>306</sup> Webpage of the Prime Minister, "Zéró tolerancia van az antiszemizmussal szemben," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/zero-tolerancia-van-az-antiszemizmussal-szemben/>.

<sup>307</sup> Bálint Kata et al., „Minél jobbra, minél jobban” – A magyar (szélső)jobb 100 évvel Trianon után (Budapest: Political Capital, 2020), 14.

<sup>308</sup> Berend, Nóra, "Renationalized History and Antisemitism in Hungary," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2022): 216–28.

<sup>309</sup> NOA, *Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemizmussal szembeni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről*, 10.

<sup>310</sup> Barna and Knap, "Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary," 75–92.

<sup>311</sup> HVG, "Így válaszolt Orbán a Mazsihisz-elnöknek, aki a Soros-kampány leállítására kérte," HVG, July 7, 2017. [https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170707\\_orban\\_mazsihisz\\_valasz](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170707_orban_mazsihisz_valasz); HVG, "Szijjártó a Jerusalem Postnak: Nem azért utáljuk Sorost, mert zsidó," HVG, February 21, 2019. [https://hvg.hu/vilag/20190221\\_Szijjarto\\_a\\_Jerusalem\\_Postnak\\_Nem\\_azert\\_utaljuk\\_Sorost\\_mert\\_zsido](https://hvg.hu/vilag/20190221_Szijjarto_a_Jerusalem_Postnak_Nem_azert_utaljuk_Sorost_mert_zsido); ATV, "Szijjártó Péter: azok az antiszemiták, akik azt állítják, Soros Györggyel a vallása miatt vitatkozik a kormány," ATV, July 23, 2020. <https://www.atv.hu/belfold/20200723/szijjarto-peter-azok-az-antiszemitak-akik-azt-allitjak-soros-gyorggyel-a-vallasa-miatt-vitatkozik-a-kormany>.

Jews", Star of David) were drawn on the anti-Soros posters,<sup>312</sup> the campaign undoubtedly mobilised antisemitic sentiments. According to several experts, those who have antisemitic feelings decoded the campaign as antisemitic, while for those who don't have such feelings, it did not carry antisemitic connotations. In addition, several mentioned that the Hungarian government's inadequate remembrance policy could also have an impact on antisemitism.

More interviewees with a Jewish identity highlighted that the government does a double-talk on antisemitism: while proclaiming zero tolerance for antisemitism and supporting Jewish organisations and causes with large amounts of money, albeit selectively, it also supports antisemitic individuals and collaborates with actors who promote antisemitic ideas.<sup>313</sup>

### Antisemitism in the sporting sphere

In the Hungarian sporting sphere, antisemitism is most prevalent in football. The discriminatory and racist behaviour of Hungarian football fans has caused problems several times: during the 2020 European Football Championship, it caused international repercussions, and in 2021, UEFA, among other things, fined the Hungarian Football Association (MLSZ) €100 000.<sup>314</sup> According to a survey, 57% of respondents found fine right, and only 38% thought it was too harsh.<sup>315</sup> In 2022, UEFA classified depicting Greater Hungary as a political symbol and banned banners and accessories picturing it at UEFA-organised competitions.<sup>316</sup>

According to the expert interviewed, there are three types of antisemitism appearing on the football stands: 1) open antisemitism (e.g. against Israeli athletes); 2) conspiratorial antisemitism (e.g. alleged Jewish interests behind punishments); 3) the use of the word "Jew" as a negative adjective without ideological or political content. In sporting games, the most common manifestation of racism is anti-Gypsyism; antisemitism is less frequent, but the content of racism is always heavily influenced by the current political discourse.

### The Jewish community's experiences and perceptions of antisemitism

According to a 2017 survey<sup>317</sup>, 48% of Hungarian Jews have experienced antisemitism during their lives, which is a significant decrease compared to the 1999 survey<sup>318</sup>, where this rate was 75%. In contrast,

<sup>312</sup> The then president of MAZSIHISZ, András Heisler, wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about the antisemitic messages on Soros posters. 444, "A Mazsihisz elnöke Orbánnak: Vonják vissza utcáinkról és tereinkről a plakátokat!," 444, July 6, 2017. <https://444.hu/2017/07/06/a-mazsihisz-elnoke-orbannak-vonjak-vissza-utcainkrol-es-tereinkrol-a-plakatokat>.

<sup>313</sup> 24.hu, "Állami támogatásból vett dobogókői telket a Kitörés túra szervezője, de senki sem árulja el, hol épül fel a turistaház," 24.hu, 2023. október 31. <https://24.hu/kozelet/2023/10/31/hazajaro-honismereti-es-turista-egylet-egyesulet-kitores-tura-allami-tamogatas-bethlen-gabor-alapkezeslo-moys-zoltan-dobogoko-turistahaz/>; Bálint et al, „Minél jobbra, minél jobban.

<sup>314</sup> Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség, "Közlemény az Euro 2020 három magyar mérkőzése kapcsán hozott fegyelmi döntés háttéréről," accessed December 19, 2023. <https://szovetseg.mlsz.hu/hir/kozlemeny-az-euro-2020-harom-magyar-merkozese-kapcsan-hozott-fegyelmi-dontes-hattererol>.

<sup>315</sup> Félix, Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020, 21;

<sup>316</sup> Telex, "UEFA: We have not permitted the use of Greater Hungary symbols at football matches," Telex, March 22, 2022. <https://telex.hu/english/2023/03/22/uefa-we-have-not-permitted-the-use-of-greater-hungary-symbols-at-football-matches>.

<sup>317</sup> Kovács and Barna, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben, 111.

<sup>318</sup> Kovács András, ed., Zsidók a mai Magyarországon. Az 1999-ben végzett szociológiai felmérés eredményei (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő Kiadó, 2002).

according to Hungarian Jews' perceptions, antisemitism in Hungary has increased since 1999: in the 2017 survey, respondents were more likely to perceive Hungarian society as antisemitic and considered more likely the persecution of Jews to happen than in 1999.<sup>319</sup> Although Jewish organisations believe that the government adequately guarantees the safety and physical integrity of the community, they think it does not do enough to combat prejudice in areas such as education, media and intercultural dialogue.<sup>320</sup>

All interviewees with Jewish identity had encountered antisemitic comments about them, either in verbal or written (online) form. Many of them mentioned that they hid their Jewish identity to avoid antisemitic incidents. Despite this, several interviewees with a Jewish identity considered the level of antisemitism in Hungary to be low and did not perceive it to have increased in the last 10-15 years. Besides believing that the country is safe for Jews, several of them also experience – due to the double-talk in politics – a constant sense of uncertainty that the current situation could change at any time. A Jewish religious leader highlighted that there are several antisemitic narratives among Christians rooted in religion, which churches could reduce by providing adequate information. According to several young interviewees with Jewish identity, Jewish communities and churches also tend to build their Jewish identity on the trauma of the Holocaust, which, in their opinion, does not help to reduce antisemitism in the country.

### Prejudice against other minorities

Hungarian society is quite exclusionary towards minority groups; prejudices and stereotypes are widespread against many of these. According to surveys, Jews are one of the least rejected groups. While until 2014, the highest level of rejection was the highest against Roma, later immigrants/migrants have become the most rejected group.<sup>321</sup>

According to several interviewees, prejudices generally have the same roots, such as insecurity (social, economic, existential), lack of information, education problems, political attitudes, bad experiences, and envy or lack of solidarity. All interviewees perceived rejection against minority groups in Hungary as the strongest towards Roma, migrants and the LGBTQ+ community. Many of them felt that anti-Gypsyism is a part of everyday conversations, and anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-migrant sentiments are also considered acceptable by society, which is not the case for antisemitism. A leader of an LGBTQ+ community emphasised that while the Hungarian government considers Jews and Roma as equal in political terms, it is not the case for the LGBTQ+ community and migrants.

Anti-Gypsyism sees Roma as a grassroots economic, cultural and physical threat; it appears primarily in dehumanisation and agreement with negative stereotypes.<sup>322</sup> A first-line practitioner explained that antisemitism and anti-Gypsyism position these groups both economically and socially: while antisemitism is motivated by envy of the perceived or real better position of Jews, anti-Gypsyism is motivated more by fear of being placed in the perceived or real worse position of the Roma.

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<sup>319</sup> Kovács and Barna, *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben*, 121.

<sup>320</sup> NOA, *Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről*, 24.

<sup>321</sup> Hann Endre and Róna Dániel, *Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban* (Budapest: TEV, 2019); Kende Anna et al., *Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon: Projektzáró tanulmány* (Budapest: Political Capital, 2018); Republikon, *Előítéletesség, antiszemitizmus: A ComAnCE projekt kutatási eredményei II* (Budapest: Republikon Intézet, 2019).

<sup>322</sup> Kende et al., *Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon*; Vanja Ljujic et al., "Romaphobia: A unique phenomenon?," *Romani Studies* 22, no. 2 (2012): 141-52.

Government communications on the 2015 refugee crisis portrayed refugees and migrants as a physical, security, health, social, labour market, and cultural/civilisational threat.<sup>323</sup> Since the mid-2010s, social attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ community have also been heavily influenced by government policies and communications that have framed LGBTQ+ and gender as a cultural, value system, and demographic threat.<sup>324</sup>

### **Hate speech and hate crimes against other minority groups**

Hungary's official number of hate crimes is negligible<sup>325</sup>, although the actual number certainly and probably significantly exceeds the statistics<sup>326</sup>. The Ministry of Interior does not allow these data to be differentiated by minority groups, but according to data and research sent to the OSCE, the vast majority of these are crimes against Roma, followed by homophobic incidents.<sup>327</sup> While there is no data on hate speech against Roma<sup>328</sup>, members of the LGBTQ+ community experience a large amount of hate speech<sup>329</sup>.

Discrimination against Roma is everyday and institutional: they face discrimination in everyday life in the labour market, housing, health, education, guardianship, and law enforcement. The lack of access to legal protection and representation compounds these.<sup>330</sup>

### **Antisemitism and education**

#### **Antisemitism and other prejudices in schools**

First-line practitioners and young people agree that the extent to which antisemitism is present in the educational environment is very school-specific. They also agreed that if antisemitism is present among students, teachers rarely become aware of it. In schools, antisemitism is most often verbal. According to many of the first-line practitioner interviewees, the root of this is superficial online content consumption and family patterns. In their opinion, behind most of the antisemitic statements of the students, there are no real antisemitic sentiments, but rather a rebellion against prohibitions, ignorance, or the use of "Jew" as a slur (the same applies to the words "gipsy" and "faggot"). Many have questioned the extent to which such statements can be considered antisemitic. Rarely, classical antisemitic narratives are also used by students who are more interested in and knowledgeable about Jewish history and traditions. Non-antisemitic students also often have misgivings about the Holocaust, not understanding what it has to do with them and

<sup>323</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Hunyadi Bulcsú, Report on Xenophobia, Discrimination, Religious Hatred and Aggressive Nationalism in Hungary in 2015 (Budapest: Political Capital, 2016); Sik Endre et al., "Az idegenellenesség alakulása és a bevándorlással kapcsolatos félelmek Magyarországon és a viseigrádi országokban," Régió 24, no. 2, (2016): 81-108.

<sup>324</sup> The Hátter Society's website provides a chronological list of government statements and actions: <https://hatter.hu/hirek/a-magyar-allam-nem-hogy-nem-vedi-aktiv-an-alaassa-az-lmbtqi-emberek-szabadsagat-es-jogait>; Political Capital, A comparison of the anti-gender and anti-LGBTQI mobilisation in Hungary and Poland (Budapest: Political Capital, 2022).

<sup>325</sup> Ministry of Interior, "Crime Statistics System,".

<sup>326</sup> FRA, Antisemitism.

<sup>327</sup> Information available on the website of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): <https://hatecrime.osce.org/hungary>.

<sup>328</sup> Kende et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon;

<sup>329</sup> Luke Hubbard, Speak Out: A Survey of Online Anti-LGBT+ Hate Speech and Hate Crime (online, 2019). Letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://en.hatter.hu/publications/speak-out-a-survey-of-online-anti-lgbt-hate-speech-and-hate-crime>.

<sup>330</sup> Király Júlia et al., Romák Magyarországon: A diszkrimináció kihívásai (Budapest: MRGE, 2021).

why they should learn about it. Young people highlighted that it is often unclear to them how to talk correctly about socially sensitive issues.

According to the interviewees, anti-Gypsyism is more prevalent in schools than antisemitism. Several first-line practitioners highlighted that politically motivated social polarization and government campaigns spreading hateful messages also have an impact on young people, as exemplified by the rise of anti-migrant sentiment among students in the wake of the 2015 anti-refugee campaign.

### Topics related to Judaism, antisemitism and the Holocaust in the official curriculum

In 2012, the government created a new National Core Curriculum and a unified textbook system.<sup>331</sup> In the process, it consulted the Jewish Community Roundtable<sup>332</sup>, which includes Jewish NGOs and congregations, on relevant curriculum changes. The curriculum was amended again in 2020, but the Roundtable was not involved. Although parts of Jewish history were not removed, antisemitic historical figures (e.g. Albert Wass or Joseph Nyírő)<sup>333</sup> were included in the curriculum. Teaching topics necessary to counter antisemitism, such as human rights, critical thinking, acceptance and intercultural dialogue, is inadequate, not only because of the deficiencies of the curriculum but also because of the lack of adequate support and guidance for teachers.<sup>334</sup>

Several interviewees criticised the National Core Curriculum for omitting authors who could be used to talk to students about the Holocaust and antisemitism effectively.

### The role and possibilities of education in combatting antisemitism and other forms of prejudices

Research has shown that in secondary school, students' prejudice is strongly influenced by whether they perceive prejudice or acceptance as the norm in their community. While, in general, the majority tends to be unprejudiced, if the community is perceived as prejudiced, it makes prejudice the norm.<sup>335</sup> Establishing intergroup and extra-group relations also helps to ensure that prejudice does not become the community norm in school.<sup>336</sup> Teachers and schools, therefore, have a crucial role in reducing prejudices. It can be assumed that if a teacher is able to support the development of inclusive community norms among students that reject prejudices, for example, by giving space to unprejudiced voices already existing in the community, it is likely to reduce prejudices among students.<sup>337</sup>

Several interviewees identified education as one of the most important tools to reduce prejudices, as it is a way to reach many young people in a targeted way. Foreign language teaching and human rights education were seen as important subjects in this regard, and young people highlighted critical thinking, the ability to

<sup>331</sup> Krausz Viktória, "Tájékep tankönyvviták közben," Szombat folyóirat, 2015. március 24. <https://www.szombat.org/politika/tajkep-tankonyvvitak-kozben>.

<sup>332</sup> Szunyogh Szabolcs, Áttekintés a Nemzeti alaptantervvel, a kerettantervekkel és a tankönyvekkel kapcsolatban (Budapest: TEV, 2015).

<sup>333</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 14.

<sup>334</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 24.

<sup>335</sup> Váradi, Luca, "Youths Trapped in Prejudice: Hungarian Adolescents' Attitudes Towards the Roma," *Politische Psychologie*, 2014: 61-83; Váradi, Luca et al., "Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice? The Dynamics of Perceived Group Norms and Prejudice in New Secondary School Classes," *Frontiers in Psychology* 11, (2021): 1-17.

<sup>336</sup> Váradi et al., *Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice?*.

<sup>337</sup> Váradi et al., *Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice?*.

recognise fake news, and self-awareness. They also emphasised the importance of training teachers to react appropriately to prejudice among students. According to several interviewees, NGO project days and cultural, artistic, and encounter-based programmes work well in sensitisation. Many interviewees stressed that reducing prejudice is a slow process, takes time and energy, is essentially achieved through face-to-face discussions, and it is important to involve the whole school staff.

According to several interviewees, experience has shown that antisemitism cannot be curbed by prohibition, as this way, prejudice is only eliminated, not suppressed, and leads to rebellion against prohibition. At the same time, direct sensitisation can be easily counterproductive if the wrong tool is chosen. Methods based on emotional empathy and personal contact are much more effective than fact-based information. According to many interviewees' experiences, sensitisation about the Holocaust works better with personal stories to which the student can relate than with dry facts and figures. A trauma-based narrative is very strong in Hungary, which is often ineffective for young people.

According to a first-line practitioner, the majority in a student community is usually not prejudiced or accepting but thinks nothing of these issues. Therefore, one of the aims of education should be to educate them to be people of feeling and solidarity.

According to several interviewees, the possibilities of education to reduce prejudice in Hungary are limited. The education system is in crisis with a shortage of teachers, large class sizes, centralised management, changes in the National Core Curriculum, and a general lack of time. Although some schools consider it important to tackle prejudice, these efforts are also hindered by a lack of appropriate knowledge and methods.

In addition to emphasising the importance of education, interviewees identified several possible ways to reduce prejudice, including antisemitism. Examples include community building, self-awareness and experiencing diversity. Giving people the chance to learn about Jewish religion and culture and to interact with Jewish people can also help to reduce antisemitism. Among young people, but also at the societal level, it is of utmost importance to counteract offensive and hateful narratives against minorities and ensure their proper representation in the media.

### **Educational materials and programmes**

Several NGOs have created educational materials to help reduce prejudice or have held regular school sessions for professionals working with young people. Regarding antisemitism, the examples include but are not limited to, the Zachor Foundation, the Haver Foundation, the Centropa Foundation, and the Action and Protection League. Regarding reducing prejudices against other minorities, some of the organisations are the UCCU Foundation, the Menedék Association, the Labrisz Association, the Symposium Association, the Foundation for Democratic Youth, the Network of Human Rights Educators, the Down Foundation, the Menhely Foundation, the Independent Theatre, and Amnesty International Hungary.<sup>338</sup>

In addition to textbooks, a range of digital teaching materials on Jewry and the Holocaust are available for teachers. However, teachers need to be provided with methodological training and familiarisation with digital teaching materials to use these materials properly. It is also necessary to provide schools with the

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<sup>338</sup> Euroguide, *Hogyan beszéljünk fiatalokkal érzékeny társadalmi kérdésekről? - Ötletgyűjtemény és módszertani segédanyag fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek számára kiadvány* (online, 2021). accessed December 19, 2023. <https://euroguide-toolkit.eu/language-select/hu/hu-kezikonyv-bevezeto/>.

appropriate technical background for using such teaching materials, to develop relevant curricula, teaching, and materials, and to provide enough time.<sup>339</sup> Creating an environment in education and public life that does not urge teachers and school administrators to self-censor, fearing the reaction of educational authorities, politicians or parents, but encourages and supports them to be active in reducing prejudice and raising awareness of minority groups.

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<sup>339</sup> Mezei Mónika, “Holokausztoktatás online. Közművelődési intézmények, közgyűjtemények és civil szervezetek online oktatási anyagai,” in *A Holokauszt, az iskola és a tanár*, szerk. Forrás-Bíró Aletta (Budapest: OKFI, 2016).

### 3. National report: Italy

#### **Executive summary**

This document was prepared based on the analysis of materials found through documentary research, in particular on materials and sources made available by the CDEC Foundation and the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI) portal, and on the analysis of data acquired through the responses of the interviewees intended to provide structured and documented information on the phenomenon of antisemitism in Italy today. In particular, the report focuses on the situation of Italian Jewish communities and Jewish life in its social, political, economic, cultural and religious dimensions.

The most substantial part of the report concerns the level of antisemitism in Italian society, its prevalent forms and the areas in which it manifests itself. With reference to the different manifestations of antisemitism, it's pointed out which stereotypes are present in society and which are the most prevalent. From this analysis, it's clear that the forms and areas in which antisemitism manifests itself differ according to the degree of schooling, cultural formation and socio-economic background of the perpetrators of antisemitic acts. Hence, it is difficult to identify the profile of the antisemite rigidly.

The areas where acts of hatred and hate crimes are most prevalent are social media and sports, particularly soccer. Still, even in the political debate, it is evident that more or less latent forms of antisemitism related to Nazi-fascist ideology are present for far-right movements and anti-Zionism for the extreme left wing.

The report also aims to highlight which other minorities are most discriminated against in Italy and what stereotypes and prejudices associated with them, as well as what are the intersections between antisemitism and other forms of racism and intolerance. Considerable space is, finally, devoted to the educational strategies implemented in schools to counter and prevent antisemitism as the direction of the Italian Ministry of Education and Merit (IMPE) points to the dissemination and implementation of the *Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism* (2019) in public schools and the promotion of a culture of dialogue and peace.



## 1. Introduction

### a) The project and the research

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) project<sup>340</sup> is being implemented between January 2023 and December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. It aims to address the deep-rooted prejudices, hate attitudes and behaviours of society, particularly towards European Jewry. The project also aims to promote understanding, tolerance and dialogue. Special emphasis is put on raising young people's awareness of Judaism and antisemitism and on fostering intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The research was carried out as one of the first steps of the BOND project. Both the project and the research use the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).<sup>341</sup> All phases of the research were completed until September 2023, so events after October 7, 2023, and their impact are not included.

The research aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitism in Italy as a basis for further project activities. The research had limitations: it was conducted within the timeframe and scope defined in the project and along with topics relevant to the further activities of the project.

### b) Methodology

The elaboration of this report is the result of two kinds of research: desk research and field research. In the desk research, we summarised sources from the past ten years available in Italy on the various topics and sub-topics indicated in the BOND project guidelines. We selected the most accredited and nationally recognised sites, and within these, we identified the most relevant and recent contributions. To complement the desk research, in the field research, we identified the different categories of people and interviewed them in accordance with the project guidelines. The research involved eight individual interviews and four focus group interviews. The individual interviews were conducted with two key experts (specialising in antisemitism and international relations), two FLPs (a sociologist and a Catholic priest), and four community leaders (Islamic community, Orthodox Church, LGBTQ+ community, community of asylum seekers). Focus group interviews were conducted with the following groups: Jewish youth, including four women and six men from Rome; Italian university students, consisting of three women and three men from various Italian cities; members of the Italian Islamic community, comprising eight men from various cities; and upper secondary school teachers, encompassing eight teachers (four women, four men).

## 2. Situation of Jewish communities in Italy

### a) General characteristics

Today, the Italian Jews registered in the country's 21 Jewish communities in 2018 were less than 30,000 out of a population of 57 million, half of whom live in Rome and less than 10,000 in Milan. The others are scattered in communities, defined as 'medium' – such as those in Turin, Florence, Trieste, Livorno, and Venice – or 'small'. The various communities are united in the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, which has its headquarters in Rome and represents Jews in relations with the government and public institutions. The Union coordinates the cultural needs of the Jewish Communities and supports the smaller communities.

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<sup>340</sup> Webpage of the BOND project: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>341</sup> IHRA: Working definition of antisemitism. <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

Despite its many problems, Italian Judaism remains alive and vibrant and represents an element of stimulation, reflection and confrontation within the surrounding society.<sup>342</sup>

For a more in-depth overview, it is interesting to note that the focus group conducted with the Union of Young Italian Jews revealed the presence of a strong ethnic, religious, and cultural identity and the desire to preserve it within Italian society, in fact, the Italian identity is perceived as second to Jewish identity. Despite this, there is a tendency among these young people to conceal their identity for various reasons, such as the shame of their Jewish affiliation and the avoidance of the attention and curiosity of others about their origins and their religious and cultural customs.

Another peculiarity of the Italian situation, as highlighted also by community leaders, as evident in the dossier “Ebrei d’Europa”<sup>343</sup> published on the Italian Jewish portal MOKED in May 2022, is the weakness of educational bodies and the complexity and conflictuality of community bodies. Nine out of ten respondents in the dossier mentioned above put at first place the problem of estrangement from community life, which in concrete terms means lack of participation, non-attendance at synagogues, community centers, community schools, and less interest in the role played by Jewish communities in national politics. This explains why, for the Jewish Italians, more than for other Jewish Europeans, it seems very relevant to improve dialogue and cooperation both at the Jewish community level and between the Jewish community and the Jews who are not inside the Jewish community. It is also important for them to create partnerships with other Jewish institutions, improve communication, and develop awareness-raising strategies for non-members.<sup>344</sup>

## **b) Social, political, economic, religious and cultural life**

In Italy, even though the Union of Italian Jews and the local community do a lot to combat antisemitism – as the field research revealed – according to a recent survey<sup>345</sup>, Jewish leaders prioritise finding solutions internal to the community. The primary concern of Jewish communities is the loss of the sense of belonging of the affiliates (but not the sense of Jewish identity), i.e. the distance and alienation from community life – as shown by the declining number of members of the Jewish community –, the lack of commitment to community activities, the declining knowledge about Judaism, the lack of renewal on the organisational level, and the lack of effective leadership.<sup>346</sup>

Content analysis of the interviews conducted with academic and professional experts in the field of antisemitism and other forms of intolerance was revealed. The high level of professional, cultural and social integration of the Jewish community into the Italian socio-economic system was highlighted by the fact that the strong ethnic-religious identity prevents a fertile and constructive exchange. The cultural initiatives of Jewish communities are, in fact, scarcely publicised, and they receive just modest attention from a small number of non-Jews.

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<sup>342</sup> Unione delle comunità ebraiche italiane, “Gli ebrei in Italia.”

<sup>343</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>344</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>345</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

<sup>346</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Ebrei d’Europa.”

### 3. Antisemitism in Italy

#### a) Level of antisemitism in society

Research from 2021<sup>347</sup> found that 19% of Italians can be considered antisemitic in terms of primary antisemitism<sup>348</sup>, 35% in terms of secondary antisemitism<sup>349</sup>, and 45% in terms of new antisemitism<sup>350</sup>.

According to research commissioned by Solomon Observatory on Discrimination and conducted by Alessandra Ghisleri's Euromedia Research in 2019<sup>351</sup>, 1.3% of Italians believe that the Holocaust is a legend, 10.5% think that the final figure of the victims (6 million Jews) is actually much less and 49% say Jews are a financial powerhouse. The Annual Report on Antisemitism in Italy 'also shows an important decline with respect to the perception of the prevalence of antisemitism in Italy: whereas in 2021, 55% considered it to be fairly widespread, by January 2023, the percentage had dropped to 42%. It can be assumed that priorities such as COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have decreased sensitivity to antisemitism'.<sup>352</sup>

A specific trait of the country seems to be “Italian unawareness”, which brings a lack of public debate and collective historical reflection on the issue of racism and antisemitism. Not being aware of its own racism (indeed wanting to build a collective image on the idea of openness and tolerance), Italy tends to legitimise and downplay the seriousness of forms of antisemitism and racism, thus contributing to their spread.<sup>353</sup> The average Italian suffers from a chronic form of ignorance due to the reductions<sup>354</sup> regarding their responsibility in spreading antisemitic sentiment in Italy and Europe.

The antisemitism that characterises Italy could be defined as “low-intensity”, which, even if it does not give rise to urgent problems, means dealing with a pervasive and creeping phenomenon, and for this very reason, it is more dangerous because it easily ends up de-rubricated acts of antisemitism and racism for “normal” and harmless “things”.<sup>355</sup> Exponents of Italian politics, especially on the right side, think antisemitism is less widespread in Italy than in other European countries<sup>356</sup>.

According to a survey carried out by Solomon Observatory on Discrimination in 2019, 53.5% of Italians believe that antisemitism is not widespread in Italy, and 52.7% believe that anti-Zionism, i.e. the opposition to the State of Israel, is little or not widespread. However, the opinion of the experts in this field is that antisemitism is on the rise, even though the semantic space of the term is very wide and ranges from the expression of prejudices, stereotypes, and opinions to more or less serious concrete actions.<sup>357</sup>

The interviews with academic experts showed that antisemitism is different from other forms of discrimination, as it's also evident from the data collected through desk research, because the Jewish

<sup>347</sup> Kovács A. e Fischer G., “Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries.”

<sup>348</sup> Primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>349</sup> Secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

<sup>350</sup> New antisemitism is anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

<sup>351</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni. “Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani”. Euromedia Research. 2019.

<sup>352</sup> CDEC, “Relazione annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia 2022”.

<sup>353</sup> Pagine ebraiche, “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>354</sup> Idem.

<sup>355</sup> Rete nazionale per il contrasto ai discorsi e ai fenomeni d’odio, “Antisemitismo italiano a bassa intensità.”

<sup>356</sup> Cit., “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>357</sup> Cit. “Dossier/Antisemitismo”

minority, unlike other minorities, is not excluded because it is considered weak, but based on its presumed superiority as politically and economically powerful. Interviews with leaders of ethnic and religious minorities and leaders of minority communities such as LGBTQ+ and political refugees revealed the absence of their direct experience of antisemitic acts; these people have never witnessed any episodes of antisemitism.

The Union of Young Italian Jews highlighted the need to distinguish contemporary antisemitism, as a feeling of aversion towards the Jewish people, from antisemitism of Nazi-fascist origin. The former appears more insidious and dangerous today as it includes antisemites who despise Jews because of their alleged socio-economic power and because they are critical of Israel.

The field research showed that young Italians know how to define antisemitism by identifying its historical reasons; they are able to recognise the main stereotypes linked to the Jewish people (e.g. deicide, usury, economic power). They have the awareness that in many people, there are latent antisemitic feelings and attitudes that act at a subconscious level as a cultural heritage and that, in most cases, are not explicitly connoted at an ideological-political level. These attitudes leak out mainly in the language of football supporters, in the language of young people with lower-middle-class culture, in the presence of peers or more on social networks because they can do it anonymously.

## **b) Profile of antisemites**

Today's antisemitism is related to economic, sociocultural, psychological, political and religious variables, i.e. the profile of antisemitism is not unique and, therefore, not easy to trace. The elements often combined in antisemitic statements are social frustration due to economic hardship that leads to feelings of anger and resentment, information and media bewilderment, ignorance, aversion to Israel, racism, populism, conspiracy, and religious hatred. Moreover, while one agrees with the idea of antisemitism linked to right-wing populism, it's equally evident that there is antisemitism also linked to the fringes of the extreme left, as explained in the next section of this report.<sup>358</sup>

The obvious fact that emerged from both the individual interviews and the focus groups is the idea that the profile of the antisemites, in any case, is generally associated with the male gender and adulthood, as well as with political connotations of two different types, that are linked to extreme right-wing parties, which have inherited the antisemitic and racist prejudice of totalitarian regimes, and that linked to extreme left-wing parties, which connotes itself as antisemitic on the basis of criticism of the policy adopted by the state of Israel with regard to the Palestinian question.

## **c) Most prevalent forms of antisemitism**

The most widespread form of antisemitism is the conspiracy theory that uses the social media channel; as per "Today, antisemitism passes through conspiracy theories of which the internet is full. Conspiracy theories are all reducible to antisemitism, more or less, and to the matrix of the Protocols of the Elder Saviours of Zion. And so there is really a clear and obvious matrix there, which is a form of antisemitism."<sup>359</sup>

The most archaic form of antisemitism is linked to Nazi-fascist ideology in which ethnic, religious, and conspiratorial elements are mixed. This type of antisemitism persists in some fanatical individuals who

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<sup>358</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>359</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo", p. 15.

profess to belong to extreme right-wing political movements that expressly refer to fascism, such as Lega, Fratelli d'Italia, Ordine Nuovo and Casa Pound.<sup>360</sup> The form of antisemitism centered on Israel, on the other hand, is anti-Israel bias, i.e. the aversion to the Jewish state, regarded as the root of all evil, or a country that, as a historical ally of the USA, is held responsible for the devastating geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East. Some people in Italy think that antisemitism as anti-Israel bias is a left-wing identity trait and that this can be significantly fueled by the Muslim minority in Italian cities and sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.<sup>361</sup> Another form of antisemitism, less mentioned, is Holocaust denialism and distortion. This issue is at the heart of the efforts of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).<sup>362</sup>, the intergovernmental organisation founded in 1998 that unites governments and experts to strengthen, promote and disseminate Holocaust education. According to the IHRA, the goals of denialism are often the rehabilitation of overt antisemitism.

### **I. Antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices present in society**

Antisemitism is an ancient, heterogeneous and persistent phenomenon as it's underpinned by a series of stereotypes and prejudices that are present in civil society across the board. Antisemitism is nurtured on a psychological level by the reduction of the real Jew to the imaginary one in which the Jew subsumes certain characteristics and alleged goals. Then there is the emotional dimension of those who experience the economic crisis, uncertainty, the fragility of the systems of representation, and globalisation as a threat to identity, all of which contribute to antisemitic urges. The most important factors are those historically and socially rooted prejudices and stereotypes that produce distrust of diversity and widespread conspiracy thinking. Studies show that both Christianity and Islam have embedded antisemitic prejudice in their cultural and religious memories and have been important in the dissemination of antisemitism around the world. According to the most accepted historical perspective, in fact, the roots of antisemitism can be traced back to the ancient anti-Judaism of the Catholic matrix, which persists in certain stereotypes and prejudices, such as that of deicide (Jews killed Jesus), Jews are conspirators, or Jews are the carriers of evil.<sup>363</sup>

The DOSSIER/Antisemitism<sup>364</sup> published on Pagine Ebraiche in January 2022 shows that among the most shared prejudices in the Italian population that contribute to resentment and hatred are the wealth and economic power of Jews, membership of financial and cultural lobbies and strong social cohesion. The figure of the Jew is classified as a figure of power, and this does not happen to any other discriminated race or minority in Italy. The adjectives associated with the Jew are 'different' and 'dangerous' because they are morally perverse: greedy, individualistic, selfish, ready to exploit the weakest, scheming and treacherous. In addition, Jews are often seen as a distinct and separate group from the rest of society, very cohesive and inaccessible, almost a sect convinced it possesses the truth, and this arouses mistrust and antipathy.

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<sup>360</sup> Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Technical working Group for the recognition of the definition of antisemitism approved by the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) Final report. "National strategy for combating antisemitism."

<sup>361</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>362</sup> International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). <https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/ihra>

<sup>363</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "L'antisaemitismo."

<sup>364</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

According to research conducted by Euromedia Research<sup>365</sup>, the most common clichés are in percentage order:

1. Jews have too much power in the international financial-economic world
2. Jews think they are superior to others
3. Jews do not care what happens to others but only what happens to themselves
4. Jews are much more loyal to Israel than to Italy
5. Palestinians are victims of genocide by Jews
6. Jews still talk too much about what happened during the Holocaust.

- [Antisemitic conspiracy theories and antisemitism linked to the Coronavirus](#)

Current antisemitism, by consensus, travels with conspiracy, which has been reinvigorated by the economic crisis of the last decade and then by the pandemic. In a phase like this, the stylistic features of historical anti-Jewish propaganda may come to the fore again. Indeed, it seems that antisemitism is always ready to re-emerge in certain crucial periods, such as the economic crisis or the recent pandemic. The old lies have been joined by "new antisemitic myths and conspiracy theories that blame Jews for the pandemic", as denounced by the European Agency's report<sup>366</sup>, a document that notes an increase in antisemitic incidents in EU member states even if, as far as Italy is concerned. In Europe, the COVID-19 pandemic 'revived' antisemitic rhetoric and gave rise to 'new myths and conspiracy theories blaming Jews' for the current health crisis. This has resulted in an increase in "incidents" against people of the Jewish religion in several EU countries in 2020. Even in Italy, which recorded 101 incidents of antisemitism, the highest number recorded in the last ten years. This is what emerges from a study by FRA, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights.<sup>367</sup>

- [Antisemitism in the sporting sphere](#)

Antisemitism in the world of sports, especially football is not only a phenomenon in Italy but in many countries around the world, especially in Europe, particularly in Belgium, England and Germany. During 2022, numerous antisemitic incidents occurred in these countries. Even in Italian football, the phenomenon is widespread in some supporters' clubs.<sup>368</sup> One example is the Lazio-Roma derby, held in the Italian capital on Sunday, 19 March 2023, where a Lazio<sup>369</sup> ultras of German origin entered the stand of the Olympic Stadium wearing a shirt glorifying and praising Adolf Hitler. Antisemitic chants are a 30-year problem of the Lazio supporters, according to the team itself, but this time, the ethical code against antisemitic discrimination has been applied, which is a turning point in the history of Italian football. Despite the fact that fines and revocations do not have the intended effect of removing antisemitism from the stadiums, many countries have realised that to eradicate this behaviour, a re-education of the perpetrators is needed to make them understand the seriousness of these acts. The publication "Combating Antisemitism in Sport" is based on these values of re-education and cooperation, creating an international network that brings

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<sup>365</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni, "Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani".

<sup>366</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Nuovo rapporto sull'antisemitismo dell'Agenzia dell'Unione Europea per i Diritti Fondamentali (FRA): pandemia e antisemitismo cresce l'allarme".

<sup>367</sup> Moked. Il portale dell'ebraismo italiano, "Pandemia e antisemitismo in Europa. Pericoloso aumento degli incidenti."

<sup>368</sup> Il portale dell'ebraismo italiano, "Un calcio all'antisemitismo".

<sup>369</sup> Il fatto quotidiano, "La lotta all'antisemitismo nel calcio fra i provvedimenti anche il divieto della maglia numero 88".

these activities together with the view that sport can be a useful means of promoting peace, tolerance and respect for human rights.<sup>370</sup>

#### **d) Antisemitic hate speech and hate crimes**

The Annual Report on Antisemitism in Italy for the year 2022<sup>371</sup> shows that the Antisemitism Observatory of the CDEC Foundation received 327 reports, 241 of which were classified as acts against Jews: “The data for 2022 show an increase compared to 2021 (226 episodes). 164 relate to antisemitism on the Internet, while 77 concern incidents that occurred physically, including two assaults, ten cases of threats and a serious act of vandalism against the synagogue in Trieste”.<sup>372</sup> The danger of the web as a place for disseminating hatred and antisemitism is now well established, also because the speed of the web leaves no space for ethical reflection. With the web, the space for the expression of antisemitism and the visibility of antisemitic feelings have grown enormously because people with the same ideology can easily come into contact through specific social media algorithms, which makes the transition from the virtual to the real and thus the possibility of impact on real life more dangerous. The internet provides antisemites of all kinds with a means to spread their narrative either through explicit hate speech or coded manifestations in implicit or indirect speech.<sup>373</sup> According to the dossier “When the Poison is Social”, the net favours antisemitism because of three phenomena: anonymity, the speed of the tool with which one can spread one's thoughts, and the consensus one receives that one is right. Therefore, there is a clear need for legal and criminal measures to discourage hate speech, antisemitic speech and actions.<sup>374</sup>

#### **e) Antisemitism on the political level**

Research has shown that there are two types of political narratives: that of the xenophobic extreme right-wing parties in Europe, which to a marginal extent is also present in Italy (the two main openly neo-fascist groups still present in Italy are Casapound and Forza Nuova), and that of the extreme left-wing parties (in particular some members of the Democratic Party), which are critical of the policy of the state of Israel with regard to the handling of the conflict with Palestine.<sup>375</sup>

### **4. Enmity against other minority groups in the country**

There are minority groups in Italy that are more discriminated against than the Jewish minority (for reasons other than those that explain the aversion to Jews)<sup>376</sup>. The dominant perception in Italian society is that other forms of discrimination are more evident than antisemitism, which is perceived in Italy as a marginal problem, existing as an attitude of offence and insult that is not always intentional and semantically grounded. According to the sources consulted,<sup>377</sup> the most discriminated minorities, in order of priority, are:

- a. ethnic minorities related to migrant flows from Africa and the Middle East

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<sup>370</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “Combattere l’antisemitismo’nello’sport’la nuova’iniziativa’del wjc per ridurre fan e atleti.”

<sup>371</sup> CDEC, “Relazione annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia 2022”, a cura dell’Osservatorio antisemitismo, pag. 10.

<sup>372</sup> Idem.

<sup>373</sup> Cit., “Dossier/Antisemitismo.”

<sup>374</sup> Idem.

<sup>375</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “Forza nuova e casa pound le maggiori organizzazioni del radicalismo di destra in italia.”

<sup>376</sup> Liberties-Monitoraggio UE, “La discriminazione su base etnica continua in Italia e in tutta Europa.”

<sup>377</sup> Post.Quotidiano online, “Minoranze in Italia”.

- b. Muslim minority
- c. Roma and Sinti minority
- d. LGBTQ+ minority

Data from Italy shows that 37% of respondents from sub-Saharan Africa and 20% of North Africans have felt discriminated against because of their skin colour over the past five years, and 32% of those from Asia from the South felt discriminated against because of their ethnic origin. About 10% of sub-Saharan Africans have felt discriminated against because of religion. Discrimination also involves second generations of foreign origin; in fact, 29% of women and 19% of men of sub-Saharan origin, 37% of women and 31% of men with North African origins and 21% of groups of South Asian origin have suffered some form of discrimination. The report refers to these findings as “relatively high rates of discrimination.” Regarding discrimination in access to work, the report highlights that 23% of people interviewed of North African origin reported some form of discrimination during their job search<sup>378</sup>.

Specific stereotypes of lesser or greater severity are linked to each of these minorities, such as group a. delinquents, drug dealers, people who take jobs away from Italians, group b. terrorists, untrustworthy people, people who restrict women's freedom and do not respect their rights, people who want to impose their faith, group c. people who steal, group d. people with illnesses, and people who do not respect Catholic morals and socially accepted customs. The presence of these prejudices and the construction of these stereotypes are mainly due to nationalist and anti-European-oriented media narratives, which manipulate and direct public opinion, as well as to the publication of content and comments by individual citizens on social networks that inflame the debate and reinforce prejudice. Discriminatory attitudes, behaviours or acts of hatred towards minorities, in general, occur mainly online in the form of insults or accusations and, only in rare cases, reach levels of extreme violence. The people responsible for these acts share a low cultural level and, sometimes, a precarious economic situation. The prejudices associated with different categories of minorities are structured and sedimented in the civic consciousness due to media and partly political narratives<sup>379</sup>.

These latter narratives influence public opinion by manipulating democratic instruments through propaganda that can be described as 'fascist' even if it does not present itself as such in content but in method.

Although things such as “the superiority of a race”, or “the uselessness of the memory of the partisan Resistance”, or “the uselessness of Remembrance Day” cannot be openly declared, the message passes in other forms in a non-explicit manner, i.e. through socially accepted language in all discourses, free of right-wing or left-wing labels.

Discourses that are potentially very dangerous are those that are inherently fascist but in which the nationalist ideology is not overtly recognisable. In order to feed their ideology, these discourses need to 'construct' an enemy. The process of constructing the enemy category involves several steps: naming enemies with an undefinable identity, not with a name and surname, which means that the enemy can be embodied by generic categories, e.g. “immigrants” or “Muslims”.

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<sup>378</sup> Liberties-Monitoraggio UE, “La discriminazione su base etnica continua in Italia e in tutta Europa,” 1.

<sup>379</sup> Osservatorio di politica internazionale, “Nuove forme di antisemitismo e mezzi di contrasto”, a cura di Andrea Spagnolo



In a second moment, the enemy is annihilated by passing the message that he's not respectable. Annihilation and dehumanisation are possible through the identification of the enemy with animals e.g. goat, cockroach, pig, rat, or through the use of nicknames that distort his name or focus on a physical defect (if he is short he is called "dwar"). If one points out the offensive and inappropriate use of such vocabulary, one can always retort that the tone was joking and that one had no intention of offending, but in the meantime, one will have achieved the objective of getting that deformed name into everyone's head, with the result that in the long term this results in the reduction of a "man" to an object of denigration and hatred.

In Italian television debates, particularly on private, non-national channels or in newspapers, we see this kind of narrative where the category elected as the enemy is portrayed as not respectable and also "guilty" and "threatening". The "victim" is delegitimised, and the guilt of an individual is attributed to the category to which he or she belongs, e.g. all Muslims are considered terrorists and all Roma/sinti are considered thieves, constructing imaginary equivalences on the basis of a mechanism of identification, transfer and projection of the part to the whole. The enemy thus described becomes someone with whom it is impossible to converse, someone who can be assimilated to a strong power, who always has ulterior motives that would harm us and with respect to whom we must protect ourselves and therefore distance ourselves, reject him. On this ground, conspiracy is implanted.

The political narratives we have described use the media in an "ostensibly democratic" manner, which means giving the final word to the last person who should be able to speak, using the supposed democratic principle of giving everyone a voice. In this "speaking of the people to the people", there is a total annihilation of competences, mystification, trivialisation and the systematic and endless repetition of simple slogans that become hammered buzzwords, which get into people's heads and implant prejudice. The process of sedimentation of prejudice then gives rise to stereotypes that serve to fuel the leadership of potentially dangerous political figures<sup>380</sup>.

As the interviews revealed, a judgment shared especially by young students and university students is that the state should take charge of these minorities by guaranteeing the application of the rights enshrined in the Italian constitution as well as launching new measures to combat discrimination because the existing ones have not proved effective. Even the educating community, such as schools and the associations' sector, should and could do more to build a society in which the new generations are open to confrontation and free of prejudice.

Nevertheless, they themselves have been subjected to acts of discrimination linked, on the one hand, to traditionalism and cultural conservatism of a Catholic matrix, for example, concerning different sexual orientations. On the other hand, it is linked to the racism of some Italian citizens, hostile to the reception of migrants and refugees, for reasons related to identity nationalism and the Italian socio-economic situation, which only constitutionally but not de facto, guarantees all citizens the same rights relating to work and dignified life.

## **5. Intersections of antisemitism with other forms of racism and intolerance**

The history of Nazi-fascism shows a relationship between various forms of racism and antisemitism. The persecutions during the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century affected various minorities for ethnic,

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<sup>380</sup> Murgia, Istruzioni per diventare fascisti.

religious, political and sexual orientation reasons, such as the extermination of Roma and Sinti between 1939 and 1945 or the 'homocaust', i.e. the extermination of German homosexuals or even the extermination of disabled people of the 'Aryan race', according to the eugenic programme<sup>381</sup>. The presence of an intersection between antisemitic sentiments and other forms of discrimination in Italy today is attested by the research conducted by the Antisemitism Observatory and reported in the article "Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homobiphobia in the Italian context"<sup>382</sup>. Data show that social platforms are a receptacle for hate speech and an active space for discrimination. It is easy to find offensive posts and hate speech on the main social networks that adhere to the EU Code of Conduct, and the situation is even more extreme on platforms that do not adhere to the EU Code of Conduct, so two urgent needs are brought to attention: firstly, that of extending the Code of Conduct on Countering Unlawful Incitement to Hate Online to those social media platforms that have yet to adhere to it, and secondly, the need for "civil society organisations, researchers, activists and politicians to adopt an intersectionally informed approach to anti-discrimination policies"<sup>383</sup>.

Amnesty International Italy's 2021 report<sup>384</sup> focused on hate narratives during the pandemic. The analysis of 36,269 Facebook and Twitter contents showed that one in ten posts and tweets were offensive, discriminatory or inciting to hatred: 'According to the report, online hate speech in Italy increased by 40 per cent compared to the previous year. 55.6 per cent of content focused on anti-religious narratives about minorities, followed by anti-ziganism (47.6 per cent) and anti-immigrant (42.1 per cent) narratives. The LGBTQ+ community was the most targeted group with 98.2% of hate speech content, followed by Muslims with 46% and NGOs and individuals working in human rights related activities more generally with 25.9%.'<sup>385</sup>. Incitement to hatred is not specifically regulated by the Italian penal code, but the Mancino law of 1993 (Article 604bis of the penal code), later amended in 2006, establishes penalties of up to one year and six months imprisonment for persons found guilty of incitement or racist propaganda on ethnic, national or religious grounds. However, the important fact that highlights the need for a holistic and intersectional approach and also contributes to a better understanding of the profile of the antisemite is that the accounts that spread antisemitic hatred are often the same ones that spread homophobic, transphobic, anti-ziganism, xenophobia and racism. In the article 'Discussions about antisemitism need to include gender and sexuality' published on 9 January 2023, the focus is on the important role that gender and sexuality play in antisemitism. Jewish men are more discriminated against than Jewish women, and the reason lies in the fact that they are more identifiable in public. Orthodox Jews, for example, are more exposed to the risk of discrimination because they wear obvious identifying marks such as the kippah (skullcap) or shtreimel (fur hat), wear visible tzitzit (fringes) or wear a tallis (prayer shawl) and style their hair with payot (side curls). In fact, the article states that: "Men were 1.8 times more likely to experience a physical attack, 1.4 times more likely to be subjected to offensive or threatening comments, 2.3 times more likely to experience offensive gestures and staring stares. They were also 1.5 times more likely to experience

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<sup>381</sup> Conoscere la Shoah "Eugenetica nazista e sterminio dei disabili"

<https://www.scuolaememoria.it/site/it/2020/07/07/eugenetica-nazista-e-sterminio-dei-disabili/>

<sup>382</sup> Cambruzzi, "Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homobiphobia in the Italian context".

<sup>383</sup> Cambruzzi, "Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homobiphobia in the Italian context".

<sup>384</sup> Amnesty International, "Barometro dell'odio: intolleranza pandemica".

<sup>385</sup> Amnesty International, "Barometro dell'odio: intolleranza pandemica".

antisemitism online.<sup>386</sup> This gender difference in antisemitism is also corroborated by iconography because most antisemitic drawings or pictures depict men, not women. Another relevant aspect is the correlation between antisemitism and sexual orientation, a fact often absent from discussions on antisemitism and yet, on closer inspection, already identified by the German Jewish historian G. Mosse in *Nationalism and Sexuality* (1984). In this work, Mosse argued that a typical feature of racist ideology was to link excessive libido to the so-called 'inferior races', so much so that the rise of nationalism used a narrative linking 'race' to sexuality. Jews, in fact, were considered libidinous and perverted. Even today, this intersection exists and is realised in the fact that some people, for example, non-heterosexual Jewish women, suffer 'double discrimination' as Jewish and as transgender. It is evident, therefore, that "many extremists are both antisemitic and anti-LGBTQ+ [...] Properly addressing antisemitism means considering how other aspects of identity might affect people's experiences of anti-Jewish discrimination or hatred"<sup>387</sup>.

## 6. Prevention of antisemitism in education

The field research showed that young students in Italian schools and universities have little knowledge of Judaism due to a lack of experience and direct contact with the Italian Jewish community, weak historical and religious knowledge because of the lack of accurate education on the subject, but also due to the lack of dialogue with the Italian Jewish community and the lack of involvement of the population in Jewish cultural initiatives and events. As shown by the important collection of articles concerning incidents of antisemitism in schools from 2013 to the present, produced by the Observatory of Antisemitism<sup>388</sup>, the phenomena of antisemitism in schools have increased significantly in recent years.

To contain and prevent these phenomena, there are some important educational actions:

- Extend the public debate on antisemitism and racism in general and be strong in condemning all acts of intolerance and hatred;
- Foster dialogue between cultures;
- Get to know the Jewish world as a whole;
- Put antisemitism in relation to other forms of intolerance;
- Create alliances and opportunities to meet in the world of sport, especially football, where episodes of antisemitism and/or Holocaust trivialisation are often encountered;
- Prosecuting hate speech and actions;
- Responding, i.e. on the web and social media;
- Bringing the Jewish story up to date by placing it within contemporary issues.

In November 2021, *The Guidelines on Countering Antisemitism in Schools*<sup>389</sup> were published in Italy containing important tools for institutions, schools, universities, and the world of communication. Through this instrument, Italy has shown that it aims to develop the work of educating and training youth in schools to enhance the history of the Jewish people, to try to decouple the work on antisemitism from the Shoah, taking into account that online new media education and digital literacy are also decisive. The Ministry of

<sup>386</sup> Cambruzzi M. "Discussions about antisemitism need to include gender and sexuality". The conversation. 9 January 2023. <https://theconversation.com/discussions-about-antisemitism-need-to-include-gender-and-sexuality-196997>

<sup>387</sup> Cambruzzi M. "Discussions about antisemitism need to include gender and sexuality". The conversation. 9 January 2023. <https://theconversation.com/discussions-about-antisemitism-need-to-include-gender-and-sexuality-196997>

<sup>388</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "L'antisemitismo nella scuola."

<sup>389</sup> <https://www.miur.gov.it/scuola-e-shoah>

Education promotes the preservation of the memory of the Shoah and the education to respect differences against all forms of violence and discrimination. With this objective, it has established a series of collaborations with the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI), the National Museum of Italian Judaism and the Shoah (MEIS) and the Shoah Memorial.

Since 2001, the Ministry, in cooperation with the UCEI, has annually launched the national competition *Young people remember the Shoah*, dedicated to all school students of all levels and organises several remembrance trips for students, teachers and institutions each year.<sup>390</sup> With the aim of providing Italian teachers and students with a training tool on the themes of the Shoah, antisemitism and indifference to discrimination, the Ministry, in cooperation with the UCEI, has created the portal School and Remembrance<sup>391</sup>, which offers a platform for the exchange of best practices in the teaching of the Shoah among schools throughout the country.

There is also 'The Italian Network of Remembrance', which was born from the collaboration between Museums and Holocaust Memorials in Italy.<sup>392</sup> With law no. 211 of 20 July 2000, the Italian Parliament recognised 27 January, the date on which the gates of Auschwitz were torn down, as the 'Day of Remembrance in remembrance of the extermination and persecution of the Jewish people and Italian military and political deportees to Nazi camps', specifying in art. 2, that on the occasion of that day 'ceremonies, initiatives, meetings and common moments of narration of the facts and reflection shall be organised, particularly in schools of all levels, on what happened to the Jewish people and the Italian military and political deportees to the Nazi camps to preserve in the future of Italy the memory of a tragic and dark period of history in Italy and Europe, and so that similar events may never happen again.'<sup>393</sup>

According to the survey reported in the CDEC Foundation's Annual Report on Antisemitism in Italy 2022, "nine out of ten students think it's important that the Shoah be remembered, and more than seven out of ten think it's very important. This is an extremely positive and encouraging result with respect to the work done so far by governments, institutions and schools on the value of remembering the Shoah."<sup>394</sup> Despite the strengths, there is a need for more knowledge about Jews and Jewish identity in schools.

In 2017, to coincide with the Holocaust Memorial Day celebrations, the Ministry sent a letter to schools of all levels containing the "National Guidelines for Holocaust Education at School"<sup>395</sup>. It is also worth mentioning that educational materials and activities dealing with the themes of Judaism and antisemitism are available on many sites, reported in the research, including the website of the Antisemitism Observatory, which makes brochures, films, documentaries and lessons available to teachers and trainers.<sup>396</sup>

The field research revealed a number of critical issues in the world of school and education, such as:

1. The lack of Jewish experts in schools;

<sup>390</sup> <https://www.miur.gov.it/-/i-giovani-ricordano-la-shoah-xxii-edizione-del-concorso-per-l-anno-scolastico-2023-24>

<sup>391</sup> Materiali e fonti consultate [www.scuolaememoria.it](http://www.scuolaememoria.it)

<sup>392</sup> <https://www.miur.gov.it/scuola-e-shoah>

<sup>393</sup> [www.scuolaememoria.it](http://www.scuolaememoria.it)

<sup>394</sup> CDEC, "Relazione annuale dell'antisemitismo in Italia, 2022".

<sup>395</sup> Ministero dell'istruzione e del merito, "Linee guida nazionali per una didattica della Shoah a scuola" *Giorno della Memoria*, 27 gennaio 2018.

<sup>396</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Materiale per il contrasto all'antisemitismo".

2. The need to programmatically include the history of the Jewish people, culture and religion in the three years of high school also through specific projects;
3. Partial use of available digital resources;
4. Lack of activities and projects related to knowledge, dialogue and social inclusion of discriminated minorities;
5. The need to increase the number of materials, experiences, and human resources available to the school, such as expert trainers, scholars, and researchers.

The topics on which we propose to work and reflect are:

- improving knowledge of Jewry and Judaism with reference to history, culture and religion, explaining, for example, the due differences between Orthodox Judaism and Reform Judaism, also referred to as liberal and progressive;
- disassociate the discussion of Judaism from antisemitism;
- identify unconscious prejudices that underlie individual and collective thinking and acting;
- uncover conspiracy theories and deconstruct the stereotypes and prejudices that support them with reference to antisemitism and other forms of discrimination present in Italian society;
- address the negation, distortion and trivialisation of the Shoah;
- dealing with antisemitism online;
- improving knowledge of the situation in the Middle East to make young people aware of the differences between Jews and the state of Israel.

Trainers' strategies for educating young people about diversity should include analysing topics or conducting research and activities that aim to develop feelings of solidarity, inclusion and support for discriminated minorities through:

- The use of personal narratives to emphasise the diversity within the Jewish world to show that Jews, like people of other traditions, have many different religious beliefs and practices or none at all; the commonalities between Jews and others, such as cultural, socio-economic, geographical, linguistic and other characteristics; the positive impact that Jews, or other people from different religious or cultural communities, have on local, national and/or international contexts.
- The use of history lessons - at school, teach the history of Jews as part of local, national or international history, including the history of the State of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian situation and using a multi-viewpoint approach; personalise history and tell the personal stories of Jews (common and well-known people who have contributed to the development of science, the arts, philosophy, etc.); consider how Jews, or other people from different religious or cultural communities, have contributed to the development of science, the arts, philosophy, etc.; consider how they have contributed to the development of the world. Take into account how various socially accepted stereotypes have had and have negative consequences regarding the rights enjoyed by men, women and members of certain groups or communities, including Jews, at various times in history and in the present; teach the origins and causes of antisemitism before and after the Holocaust, reaching out to the world today and taking care not to replace these lessons with specific lessons on the Holocaust.
- The use of personal narrative to emphasise the diversity within the Jewish world to show that Jews, like people of other traditions, have many different religious beliefs and practices or none at all; the

commonalities between Jews and others, such as in terms of cultural, socio-economic, geographical, linguistic and other characteristics; the positive impact that Jews, or other people from different religious or cultural communities, have on local, national and/or international contexts.

- The use of students' various identities to create their own self-portrait (in written, graphic or poetic form); working on individual ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural diversity, sexual orientation, hobbies, interests, and ideals; guide the students towards identifying certain aspects of their own self-portrait that may reveal or generate a stereotype based on factors, such as inner choices and external pressures, that influence thoughts and actions, to demonstrate how social narratives are constructed, analyse the relationship between a student's perception of some particular traits of themselves and others perceive these.

The work of educators must aim to achieve better results than in recent years with regard to combating ignorance, raising the cultural level of young people, including those who do not go to university studies, and refining critical thinking. In this perspective, it will also be possible to counter young people's precocious tendency to stereotyping and prejudice categorisation caused by media overexposure, leading to pseudo-learning of a vast amount of information adolescents cannot handle. It would be necessary as well as desirable that, among the skills that a young person must develop at the end of secondary and university schooling, there be inclusive social-relational skills to build a peaceful and supportive multi-ethnic European society capable of breaking down physical and mental walls and barriers between its citizens.

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#### 4. National report Poland

### Executive summary

Antisemitism is still a significant problem in Polish society. This is the conclusion that emerges from the quantitative data from previous years and the statements of our interviewees.

Within the Jewish community, members often report encountering antisemitism in the form of unsavoury jokes and stereotypes rather than overt discrimination. However, conversations around the Holocaust and Polish-Jewish history frequently lead to antisemitic stereotypes and hate speech. Interestingly, the Holocaust is often the subject of jokes. This may be attributable to the perception of Jews as a historical minority who once lived in Poland.

In educational settings, courses on the Jewish community are overwhelmingly historical, primarily focusing on World War II. Almost all respondents, except non-Jewish youth, agree that contemporary Jewish topics are seldom covered in schools. This gap in multicultural education has led to a lack of understanding about non-discrimination and minority-related issues across various age groups in Polish society.

While younger generations appear to be more tolerant toward minorities and more open to learning about them, the term "Jew" is still reportedly used as an insult among them. Discrimination is not limited to the Jewish community; focus group respondents also identified Ukrainians, Roma, people of colour, and the LGBTQ+ community as other discriminated groups. Despite the majority of focus group participants being women, only one person in each group cited women as a discriminated-against minority.

### Introduction

#### The project and the research

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) project<sup>397</sup> is being implemented between January 2023 and December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. It aims to address the deep-rooted prejudices, hate attitudes and behaviours of society, particularly towards European Jewry. The project also aims to promote understanding, tolerance, and dialogue. Particular emphasis is put on raising young people's awareness of Judaism and antisemitism and on fostering intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The research was carried out as one of the first steps of the BOND project. Both the project and the research use the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).<sup>398</sup> All phases of the research were completed until September 2023, so events after October 7, 2023, and their impact are not included.

The research aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitism in Poland as a basis for further project activities. The research had limitations: it was conducted within the timeframe and scope defined in the project and with topics relevant to the project's further activities.

### Methodology

We employed a multi-method approach that included two parts: desk research and field research. The desk research summarised available literature on the topics identified in the project concerning Poland published in the last ten years. In the field research, we aimed to complement the desk research results by conducting

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<sup>397</sup> <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>398</sup> <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

individual and focus group interviews with representatives of previously defined target groups. In June 2023, five focus groups were conducted with the following groups: Jewish leaders, including five women and one representative from various organisations; Jewish secondary school-aged youth, consisting of two women and two men; national and ethnic minority leaders, comprising five women from minority groups and one representative from various organisations; educators, encompassing five teachers – four women, one man – from small towns in Lubelskie Voivodeship; non-Jewish secondary school-aged youth from small towns in Lubelskie Voivodeship, comprising three women and two men. In total, 20 women and five men participated in the focus groups. In July 2023, four individual interviews were conducted with key experts with specialized knowledge in antisemitism and other forms of intolerance, including one woman and three men. These interviewees ranged from academics and practitioners to a participant in the Future Leaders Program, a religious leader from a non-Jewish community, and a minority community leader. On average, these individual interviews lasted 87 minutes.

### **The situation of the Jewish communities in Poland**

Historically, Poland had a significant Jewish population dating back to the tenth century, contributing to the country's cultural, economic, and political life. Jewish autonomy was established in the thirteenth century. However, their emancipation varied under different occupying powers after 1795. In the interwar period, Polish Jews were officially citizens but often faced discrimination. Before World War II, Polish Jews comprised around 10% of the population, but the Holocaust tragically reduced their numbers by around three million. Post-WWII emigration further decreased size of the community.<sup>399</sup> According to the 2011 census<sup>400</sup> about 8,000 people identified as Jewish in Poland, a small fraction of the total population of 38.5 million. According to the 2021 census<sup>401</sup>, this number has significantly increased, with 17,000 people identifying as Jewish. This increase may be attributed to the option of selecting more than one national identification in the latest census.

Data on the socio-economic status of Polish Jews is limited, but they are primarily urban, secular, and assimilated into mainstream Polish culture.<sup>402</sup> According to the interviewees, the Jewish community does not stand out from Polish society in terms of social, political, and economic status. During the interviews, an expert specialising in the study of antisemitism and other forms of intolerance mentioned, based on his observations, that there is a notable presence of Jews in the IT department. In terms of education level, Jews were said to be no different from the Polish society in general. The results of the field research showed that Jews do not stand out from society in appearance either. Sometimes, they even hide signs suggesting they belong to the Jewish community. Consequently, their belonging to the community is only revealed in conversation if someone asks.

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<sup>399</sup> Barna Ildikó. "Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries, historical/discourse analysis. Accessed September 28, 2023. [https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern\\_Antisemitism\\_in\\_the\\_Visegr%C3%A1d\\_Countries](https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern_Antisemitism_in_the_Visegr%C3%A1d_Countries)

<sup>400</sup> Nowak, L., & Adach-Stankiewicz, E. (2012). Raport z wyników Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011. Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, Warszawa.

<sup>401</sup> Gus (2023) Tablice Z Ostatecznymi Danymi W Zakresie Przynależności Narodowo-etnicznej, Języka używanego W Domu Orz Przynależności do Wyznania Religijnego, stat.gov.pl. Accessed: 04 December 2023: <https://stat.gov.pl/spisy-powszechne/nsp-2021/nsp-2021-wyniki-ostateczne/tablice-z-ostatecznymi-danymi-w-zakresie-przynaloznosci-narodowo-etnicznej-jezyka-uzywanego-w-domu-oraz-przynaloznosci-do-wyznania-religijnego,10,1.html>.

<sup>402</sup> Barna Ildikó. "Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries, historical/discourse analysis. Accessed September 28, 2023. [https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern\\_Antisemitism\\_in\\_the\\_Visegr%C3%A1d\\_Countries](https://www.academia.edu/82257051/Modern_Antisemitism_in_the_Visegr%C3%A1d_Countries)

## Antisemitism in Poland

### Level and trend of antisemitism in Poland

Antisemitism is still a significant problem in Polish society. This is the conclusion that emerges from the quantitative data from previous years and the statements of our interviewees. According to a study from 2012<sup>403</sup>, antisemitism is a complex issue consisting of three elements: traditional prejudice, secondary prejudice, and belief in a Jewish conspiracy. Traditional prejudice, rooted in historical religious motives, involves beliefs such as Jews using Christian blood ritually or bearing responsibility for Christ's death. Secondary antisemitism is subtler, it includes denying one's anti-Jewish biases, downplaying the Holocaust, and sometimes holding Jews accountable for it while viewing the Holocaust as a tool for Jewish advantage. Holocaust denial and distortion play a significant role in this form of antisemitism, justifying antisemitic beliefs by accusing Jews of fabricating history. This denial can be both "hard" (rejecting the historical truth of the Holocaust) and "soft" (covertly questioning aspects of it). Essentially, the legacy of the Holocaust, which includes those forms of denial and distortion, is used to perpetuate antisemitism.<sup>404</sup> Belief in a Jewish conspiracy is associated with the view that Jews secretly try to control the world order.<sup>405</sup> It is a form of modern antisemitism centering around the idea that Jews seek power. It attributes unity and secrecy to them.<sup>406</sup> In Poland, secondary antisemitism and conspiracy antisemitism were relatively widespread in 2021. This is evidenced by high averages on scales measuring these attitudes, while traditional antisemitism was less present. On a scale where the maximum value was seven, the average score for secondary antisemitism was 3.39, suggesting a moderate level of secondary antisemitic beliefs among the study participants. Similarly, the average score for conspiracy antisemitism was also 3.39, indicating a moderate level of belief in antisemitic conspiracy theories. In contrast, the mean score for traditional antisemitic beliefs was lower at 1.96. This suggests that participants showed, on average, a lower level of belief in traditional antisemitic ideas compared to secondary and conspiracy antisemitism.<sup>407</sup> Antisemitic attitudes in Poland are, to some extent, also linked to criticism of Israel. Anti-Israel attitudes are most correlated with conspiracy antisemitism. However, survey results indicate that even a traditional form of prejudice can reinforce resentment toward Israel.<sup>408</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antisemitism in current Poland: economic, religious and historical aspects. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kořta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>404</sup> Barna, Ildikó, Tamás Kohut, Michał Bilewicz, Olga Gyarfášová, Jiří Kocián, Grigorij Mesežnikov, and Maria Babińska. "Survey on Antisemitic Prejudice in the Visegrád Countries: Research Report." Tom Lantos Institute, 2022. Accessed September 28, 2023.

<sup>405</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antisemitism in current Poland: economic, religious and historical aspects. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kořta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>406</sup> Bulska, Dominika., Winiewski, Mikołaj. "Diagnosis and consequences of antisemitism in Poland" in *Polish Prejudices Survey 2017- Faces of intergroup violence* edited by Anna Stefaniak, Mikołaj Winiewski, 221-252. Warsaw: LiberiLibri, 2018.

<sup>407</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in *Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology* edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>408</sup> Bulska Dominika., Winiewski Mikołaj. "Anti-Israel attitudes and anti-Semitism in Poland. A report based on the 2013 Polish Prejudice Survey." Prejudice Research Center. Accessed October 8, 2023

In 2021, researchers observed a general decrease in the level of antisemitism in Poland, but this change varied across different types of antisemitic attitudes. While acceptance of traditional antisemitic views increased significantly in 2017 compared to 2014, there was a substantial decline in these attitudes by 2021. The changes in antisemitic sentiment appear to be primarily linked to the socio-political climate within the nation. Secondary antisemitism, on the other hand, remained relatively stable from 2009 to 2021, indicating that modern forms of antisemitism appear to be resistant to socio-political changes. As for the belief in a Jewish conspiracy, the trend declined until 2014 but experienced an uptick in 2017 before declining again in 2021.<sup>409</sup> It seems interesting that most respondents (80%) of the Polish Prejudice Survey from 2021 declared that they did not personally know any Jews. Over the period 2009-2021, the level of declared contact did not change much. This context is noteworthy because it highlights the presence of strongly negative attitudes toward a group whose members Poles rarely experience personally.<sup>410</sup> This phenomenon is referred to in research on antisemitism as ‘antisemitism without Jews.’<sup>411</sup>

Limited data exists on the correlation between the COVID-19 pandemic and antisemitism in Poland. The topic of the significance of the pandemic for antisemitic attitudes practically did not appear in the interviews. However, a report on social trends among Poles during the pandemic revealed heightened emotions toward minority groups and increased levels of disgust directed at these groups. According to a study published in 2021, in terms of positive sentiments towards outgroups, Jews did not receive high rankings among Polish individuals. They were situated in the middle of the scale regarding being associated with feelings of disgust. Hence, the survey implies a need for improvement in expressing positive emotions towards Jews.<sup>412</sup> On a global scale, antisemitic incidents during the COVID-19 pandemic have been notably prevalent in Europe – and thus presumably also in Poland –accounting for nearly 50% of incidents against minority groups in 2021. Since the onset of the pandemic in 2020, conspiracy theories have emerged linking Jews or the State of Israel to COVID-19, suggesting they benefit from global suffering. Antisemitism and hate speech have notably surged on social media platforms. There has been an alarming increase in the trivialisation of the Holocaust, with Holocaust symbols used in protests against COVID-19 measures, accompanied by inappropriate comparisons of pandemic restrictions to the persecution of Jews.<sup>413</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. “Poles’ attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021” in *Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology* edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>410</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. “Poles’ attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021” in *Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology* edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>411</sup> Cooper, Leo. “Anti-Semitism without Jews.” In *The Shadow of the Polish Eagle*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000.

<sup>412</sup> Molenda Zuzanna., Marchlewska Marta., Górka Paulina., Michalski Piotr, Szczepańska Dagmara., Furman Aleksandra., Malinowska Katarzyna. “Coronavirus in Poland: A social psychology perspective. Results of the first wave of longitudinal study conducted on a representative sample of Poles.” Accessed September 28, 2023. <http://cbu.psychologia.pl/2021/02/20/koronawirus-w-polsce-perspektywa-psychologii-spoecznej/>

<sup>413</sup> Raheli Baratz-Rix. “The State of Antisemitism in 2021.” Department for Combatting Antisemitism & Enhancing Resilience. Accessed September 28, 2023. [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/wzo24012022/en/file\\_2021%20report-final.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/wzo24012022/en/file_2021%20report-final.pdf)

In reports listing which demographic characteristics are relevant to the expression of antisemitism, gender is one of the significant factors.<sup>414</sup> The results show that men express antisemitic attitudes more often than women. Factors such as age, level of education, and income also, to some degree, contribute to holding antisemitic beliefs. Antisemitism is more often expressed by older people, those with lower levels of education, and people with lower incomes.

In our field research, participants expressed concern about overtly problematic actions, such as cemetery vandalism and the appearance of swastikas. They underscored the absolute inappropriateness of such acts and the necessity to confront them. Nevertheless, the interviewees highlighted a deeper unease stemming from ambiguous remarks, often beginning with 'I don't have anything against Jews, but...' and expressions of nostalgia for the pre-war Jewish community that do not translate into active support for today's Jewish population. The participants cited statements where Poles professed acceptance of Jews only if they remained inconspicuous in public spaces. To summarise, there seems to be an affection for Jews as long as they are out of sight, not encountered face-to-face. This reveals a stark lack of interaction with the Jewish community. Antisemitic attitudes, it appears, are rooted in fantasy, myths, and perhaps a fear of real-life contact.

### **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories**

A study conducted by The POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews revealed dominant narratives and language used to discuss Jews in contemporary Poland.<sup>415</sup> The research involved the analysis of a wide range of materials, including newspaper articles, tweets, books, films, television series, covers and graphics from 1950 to 2022. The study identified ten main themes in these narratives. One major theme was the belief in the existence of a 'Jewish lobby', closely linked to the actions of the State of Israel and the global Jewish diaspora, particularly in relation to their claims to pre-war property. Other common narratives included the belief that Jews contributed to a negative image of Poland, a belief that Jews refused to acknowledge the hospitality of Poles and their shared victimhood during the war. There were also conspiracy narratives that portrayed Jews as secret agents linked to Freemasonry, global conspiracies, and the global leftist movement. Finally, some narratives blamed Jews for all negative world events, associating them with concepts such as disease, corruption, and danger.

The findings from the field research confirmed the existence of the prejudices mentioned above and stereotypes about Jews that are prevalent in Poland. The respondents' examples were consistent with the desk research outcomes, illustrating several prevalent misconceptions. Firstly, according to the interviewees, there is a persistent stereotype associating modern Jews with the death of Jesus Christ. Additionally, there are beliefs attributing exceptional intelligence and an ability to navigate life successfully to Jews, which can be a veiled form of conspiratorial antisemitism. Common stereotypes also encapsulate the notion that Jews are somehow not genuine Poles and the idea that they are inherently smarter and wealthier. A common

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<sup>414</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>415</sup> Damaszkó, Joanna., Napiórkowski, Marcin., Polak, Krzysztof., Żurawicka, Marzena., Bierca, Marta., Wiszejko-Wierzbicka, Dorota. "Kogo widzą Polacy, kiedy widzą Żyda. Raport z badań realizowanych przez Muzeum Żydów Polskich POLIN" edited by Marcin Napiórkowski. Warsaw, 2023

erroneous assumption is that all Jews adhere to Orthodox traditions, which leads to the misconception of the Jewish community as a strictly Orthodox sect.

The interviewees suggested that there is a form of cultural antisemitism in Poland, particularly related to stereotypes associating Jews with wealth (e.g. the belief that Jews always have money, unjustly but cunningly earned). These stereotypes have been deeply rooted in Polish culture for many years. Some people may not even recognise these cultural codes as antisemitic, further illustrating the normalisation of these beliefs in society. The stereotype of Jews having money is so vivid in Poland that some people do not consider it antisemitic.

The most common conspiratorial antisemitic narratives center around claims that Jews pursue domination over financial institutions, the global economy, and even the entire world and that they act secretly.<sup>416</sup> Jewish interviewees faced similar conspiracy theories in our field research. The belief they most commonly mentioned is that influential global corporations and economic dynamics are invariably under the control of Jews or other mystical forces, with the presumption of a Jewish presence coordinating these movements extending into political and economic spheres since 1989. It was also an interesting observation that some conspiracy theories contradict perceptions of Jews in other countries, such as the US. Interviewees explained that in Poland, the stereotype of Jews secretly ruling the country has been combined with the same content regarding Freemasonry, while the two groups in the USA are their opposites. These findings align with the results of the POLIN's research. Their analyses also repeated narratives showing Jews as members of influential groups such as Freemasonry or simply as the elite of society.<sup>417</sup>

Beliefs based on historical context were also mentioned during the field research. One of these is the belief that Jews, as police officers, collaborated with the communist authorities and arrested Poles. It was clarified that the majority of police officers were Poles, and a small percentage were Jews. Nonetheless, there is an association of Jews with the security forces. Another conspiracy theory holds that the Holocaust either did not occur or that it was the responsibility of Jews. The last example brought up during the interviews stems from a myth propagated within the Catholic community, which is the baseless narrative that Jews abduct Christian girls to use their blood for ritual purposes.

### **Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime**

According to a survey from 2016<sup>418</sup>, Jews are one of the most disliked groups in Poland. In 2017, a survey on hate speech<sup>419</sup> found that approximately two-thirds of respondents had experienced hate speech directed towards Jews. Surprisingly, comments directed at Jews were considered the least insulting compared to hate speech against Ukrainians and refugees.

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<sup>416</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antisemitism in current Poland: economic, religious and historical aspects. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>417</sup> Damaszkó, Joanna., Napiórkowski, Marcin., Polak, Krzysztof., Żurawicka, Marzena., Bierca, Marta., Wiszejko-Wierzbicka, Dorota. "Kogo widzą Polacy, kiedy widzą Żyda. Raport z badań realizowanych przez Muzeum Żydów Polskich POLIN" edited by Marcin Napiórkowski. Warsaw, 2023

<sup>418</sup> Center for Public Opinion Research. "Attitudes toward other nations. Research announcement." Accessed September 28, 2023. [http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K\\_053\\_16.PDF](http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_053_16.PDF)

<sup>419</sup> Hansen Karolina. "Hate speech: Report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 3." Prejudice Research Center. Accessed September 28, 2023. [http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/PPS3\\_MowaNienawisci\\_Hansen\\_fin.pdf](http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/PPS3_MowaNienawisci_Hansen_fin.pdf)

The research from 2021<sup>420</sup> indicates a slight correlation between all forms of antisemitism and respondents' education level, age, and political preferences. Specifically, individuals with lower education levels, older respondents, and those identifying as 'right-wing' politically tend to exhibit a higher propensity for expressing antisemitic views. People who are more educated and from large cities have more contact with hate speech and are more sensitive to it and perceive it as more offensive.

### Antisemitism on the political level

For the last eight years, right-wing parties, particularly Law and Justice (PiS), have dominated Polish politics in terms of antisemitic narratives, with a focus on maintaining Poland's and the Polish people's reputation. These narratives tend to be protective, centered around the Holocaust, World War II, and relations between Poles and Jews. Right-wing politicians highlight the mutual victimisation of Poles and Jews during the Second World War and blame the Germans for this victimisation. While acknowledging Polish involvement in the Holocaust, some politicians of Law and Justice view instances of Poles killing Jews as the actions of a demoralised social minority. In addition, certain narratives allege that Jews were complicit in their tragic fate by collaborating with the perpetrators.<sup>421</sup> The last debate on this topic in Poland in 2018 came with a proposed amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance. In this debate, besides the arguments mentioned above, appeared a narrative that Jews were responsible for crimes committed against Poles in the period after World War II.<sup>422</sup>

Right-wing parties are particularly characterised by expressions of prejudice and the use of hate speech. However, our interviewees pointed out that all political parties, to a comparable degree, insinuate the Jewish origin of their opponents to deprive them of the trust of voters. One expert explained that the significant aspect of this narrative is that both the political right and left employ the term "Jew" as an insulting epithet. This suggests that individuals engaged in politics, when faced with disagreement, are derogatorily labelled as Jewish. This is an example of antisemitism that relies on creating a connotation between a sense of untrustworthiness, Jewish origin, and a particular politician.

Results of the field research showed that politicians use prejudice and hate speech against minority groups in political discourse as a strategy to gain the support of citizens. Therefore, hateful narratives by politicians are particularly common during election periods. These statements align with the findings of a study conducted in August and September 2023, which monitored the prevalence of hateful content on public television during the pre-election period. The study revealed that content relating to Jews ranked fourth in terms of frequency amongst hateful content relating to all the examined minorities.<sup>423</sup> Some politicians exploit these prejudices to gauge public reactions and gain attention from citizens. Antisemitism frequently

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<sup>420</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021" in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

<sup>421</sup> Babińska Maria. "Individual and intergroup determinants of social representations of attitudes towards Jews during World War II", 48-50, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2023. <https://uwedupl.bip.gov.pl/doktoraty-udostepnione-na-stronie-bip-zgodnie-z-art-188-ust-1-i-2-ustawy-z-dnia-3-lipca-2018-r-prawo-o-szkolnictwie-wyzszym/maria-babinska.html>

<sup>422</sup> Babińska Maria, Bilewicz Michał, Bulska Dominika, Haska Agnieszka, Winiewski Mikołaj. "Attitudes towards Jews and their history after the introduction of the IPN law" Prejudice Research Center. Accessed October 8, 2023. [http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/Analiza\\_Skutki\\_ustawy\\_o\\_IPN.pdf](http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/Analiza_Skutki_ustawy_o_IPN.pdf)

<sup>423</sup> "Monitoring Treści Nienawistnych W TVP: 05.09 – 24.09.2023 " Otwarta Rzeczpospolita." Otwarta Rzeczpospolita RSS, September 25, 2023. <https://www.otwarta.org/monitoring-tresci-nienawistnych-w-tvp-05-09-24-09-2023/>.



ranks among the top three or four issues in public discussions, often coinciding with anti-LGBTQ+, anti-refugee, or anti-immigrant narratives. Notably, there is an overlap between antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiments. Often, multiple biases against different groups, most commonly antisemitism, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-refugee sentiments, are publicly highlighted simultaneously.

### **Antisemitism in the sporting sphere**

Despite the small size of the Jewish minority in Poland, a significant portion of the population still displays antisemitic attitudes, which is particularly evident in football stadiums where the term 'Jew' is frequently used in a derogatory sense. Research on antisemitism in Polish football culture classifies and analyses information related to this problem, revealing that it often occurs in cities with a history of Polish-Jewish coexistence and lingering tensions. Various forms of antisemitism are identified within football, with a notable focus on the intense relationship between fans and the figure of the "Jew" as a means of expressing contempt and hatred. This phenomenon stands as a striking example of antisemitism in an environment devoid of Jewish individuals.<sup>424</sup>

The interviewees also mentioned so-called soccer fan antisemitism. In Poland, a distinction is made between soccer fans who are interested in sports and those who exhibit aggressive behaviour and treat the context of a match as a battlefield or an excuse to lash out. In these fan communities, popular chants and shouts often include antisemitic hate speech. The popularity of these antisemitic phrases, particularly evident on the internet, was also pointed out during our interviews.

### **Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community**

When answering the questions on personal experiences with antisemitism and other forms of intolerance against minority groups, Jewish participants of our field research recalled their first experiences. They stated that when experiencing antisemitism, they were unaware of what they faced and only felt internal objections without knowing why or how to react. Those encounters took place in school or at the university. Presently, the respondents are mostly faced with antisemitism online. Holocaust distortion was the most common example of antisemitism among respondents' non-Jewish friends. A widespread form of antisemitism was anti-Israeli attitudes expressed both by the right and the left side of the Political sphere and predominantly by younger people prone to misinformation and fake news. However, the fear of antisemitic attacks was not very high among all the Jewish respondents, even though only 20% have experienced it in recent years. All the attacks they have experienced in recent years were verbal and carried out by random strangers and as a result of "going public" The experiences described include an instance where a respondent's Jewish identity was revealed online, leading to an online hate attack. Another respondent encountered a passerby who bumped into her and expressed frustration by hostile shouting. Additionally, an intoxicated man yelled while passing by a synagogue on a Saturday night. These incidents illustrate various forms of discrimination and hostility faced by individuals due to their Jewish identity.

Interestingly, respondents indicated that Poles react to someone being Jewish with surprise and confusion highlighting a significant lack of awareness about interacting with members of minority groups in Poland. Verbal forms of antisemitic attacks resulted in feelings of surprise, fear, and anger in the victims. To cope, they sometimes resort to humor as a defense mechanism to lessen the sting of such encounters,

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<sup>424</sup> Kucia, Marek, and Bogna Wilczyńska. "Antysemityzm stadionowy: analiza i interpretacja zjawiska." *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 58.4 (2014): 171-200.

paradoxically giving their aggressors an opportunity for self-reflection and potentially a path to redemption. However, this leaves the victims burdened with feelings of distress and desolation. Moreover, respondents noted an increased sense of alertness following such incidents, which is further intensified by media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Antisemitic slurs, slogans, and tropes about Jews are popular and firmly embedded in the Polish language. As a result, many antisemitic sayings and expressions are present. According to the interviews, the most common are: “Jews have money and influence.”, “Jews all know each other.”, “They are always behind political events.”, and the accusations of Israel being a terrorist country and occupier.

According to respondents participating in the field research, talking about the Holocaust in Poland and the Polish-Jewish history always results in mentioning antisemitic stereotypes and hate speech. The interviewees also spoke about the handling of antisemitism by the Jewish community and its leaders. Interviewees noted that some Jews do not read certain attitudes as discrimination (e.g. football chants or everyday catchphrases with antisemitic content). The reason may be that they have experienced such attitudes too often and are used to them. This process of getting used to antisemitism can sometimes also play the role of managing the fear of being harassed. That is, when experiencing hate speech or antisemitic behaviour, members of the Jewish community explain it to themselves as being common. To cope with antisemitic harassment, some members of the Jewish community attempt to normalize these encounters and emotionally distance themselves from the attacks. Additionally, there are efforts within the Jewish community to mitigate future harassment by engaging with local residents. They are establishing inclusive environments aimed at fostering familiarity and positive interactions. Some synagogues have opened up their spaces to the neighbourhood, organizing social and cultural events, as well as various activities, to promote community and understanding.

### **Enmity against other minority groups in the country**

Poles' attitudes toward various minority groups have fluctuated over time. Until 2013, they were becoming more open toward Jews, Romas, and Ukrainians, but from 2014 to 2017, there was a decrease in acceptance. In 2021, positive attitudes toward these minority groups increased again. Meanwhile, from 2016 to 2021, acceptance of refugees and homosexuals also changed, with the largest increase in acceptance in 2021. Still, the most rejected in 2021 were refugees, Roma, and homosexuals.<sup>425</sup>

Field research identified Ukrainians as the minority group most frequently affected by discrimination, with Russians, Belarusians, and ethnic and religious minorities such as Roma and Muslims also significantly impacted. LGBTQ+ individuals, women, and people of colour were mentioned with comparable frequency. Additionally, several responses highlighted discrimination faced by people with disabilities and those who are non-neurotypical. The respondents attributed the decline in minority conditions after 2015 to a political crisis and the use of propaganda characterised by hateful and divisive rhetoric. The situation deteriorated with the arrival of Syrian refugees at the Belarusian border and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, leading to increased hostility towards the Russian minority in Poland. This hostility has expanded to include prejudices against other groups, with narratives falsely accusing Chechens and Belarusians of supporting Russia,

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<sup>425</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. “Poles' attitudes toward minorities: report from the Polish Prejudice Survey 2021” in Polish Prejudice Survey 2021- attitudes vs. political ideology edited by Dominika Bulska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz. Warsaw: Liberi Libri, in press.

contributing to civilian attacks on these communities and escalating discrimination against refugees, Ukrainian Roma, and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Summarising the field research findings, the most prevalent prejudices and stereotypes depict minorities as a nuisance and as entitled to special treatment. This results in feelings ranging from annoyance to outright hostility. Ukrainian men are often told to go home and fight in war. Ukrainian women are accused of taking social benefits from Poles and destroying Polish marriages. Roma are called Gypsies and portrayed as thieves who dishonestly make money. Representatives of the LGBTQ+ community are dehumanised; for example, gay men are accused of harming children. Similar accusations are directed at people of colour. The last group, women, are considered unstable, hysterical, unprofessional, and assigned to the role of mother.

Field research has led to the conclusion that the most prevalent form of prejudice manifestation is the use of hate speech on social media. The frequency of different types of prejudice reported was fairly uniform across the focus groups, with each group identifying a distinct type of prejudice as most prevalent. This variance could be attributed to the groups' more frequent exposure to certain types of prejudice. The most frequently observed form of prejudice was identified as everyday, casual antisemitism, characterised by telling antisemitic jokes and using offensive language. Respondents noted that while any minority could be subjected to attack, the absence of discourse about a minority is also perceived as discriminatory. This neglect is rooted in a tendency among the Polish majority to perceive society as homogenous, with a mindset that 'others' are viewed negatively and 'their problems are not ours to solve'. This marginalisation extends beyond religious or ethnic minorities to include individuals with disabilities, who face exclusion at educational, social, and political levels. Respondents also reported that hate speech is widely accepted in society and that prejudices exist throughout the population. According to them, biases and a lack of anti-discrimination sensibility are prevalent among teachers, who are unwilling to open up and learn.

## **Antisemitism and education**

### **Topics related to Jewry, antisemitism, and the Holocaust in the official educational curricula**

Before the collapse of Communism, Polish students lacked awareness of Jews' prevalence in various Polish towns; however, the existence of death camps for Jews on Polish land was largely present in school curricula. Since 1989, Holocaust education has been mandatory in Poland but not as a standalone subject. Recently, there has been a trend towards historical denial and revisionism, attempting to diminish the historical involvement of Polish citizens in antisemitic pogroms. Legal restrictions and international criticism have prompted concerns regarding the quality and accuracy of Holocaust education in Poland, particularly under the Law and Justice government which is perceived as conservative and nationalist.<sup>426</sup>

Drawing from our field research, in Polish schools, the topics of Jews, antisemitism, and the Holocaust are introduced, primarily within history and Polish language classes. Mandatory readings cover subjects like pogroms in Poland and the Holocaust. However, the depth of discussion and explanation of these topics to students largely depends on individual teachers. Personal experiences with compulsory readings in school, such as "Mendel Gdański" by Maria Konopnicka and "Medaliony" by Nałkowska, provided the first exposure to the concept of pogroms during education and were recalled in the field research as quite shocking.

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<sup>426</sup> Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Jolanta. 2019. "The Uses and the Abuses of Education about the Holocaust in Poland after 1989." *Holocaust Studies* 25 (3): 329–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17504902.2019.1567668>.

## **Educational materials and activities addressing antisemitism**

According to the interviewees' experience, numerous academics, researchers, educators, and leaders within the Jewish community are actively engaged in combating antisemitism. They create and utilise various resources, including reports on antisemitism in Poland as well as educational materials about Israel.

The interviewees emphasised the importance of countering antisemitism through improved education that offers accurate information about Jews and their history. They also recommended organising events that facilitate interactions between Poles and members of minority groups. Another effective approach would be to invite Israeli experts to participate in university conferences to foster closer connections and dispel hostility. Additionally, creating materials to help identify hate speech and prejudice is essential. Notably, there is a need for specific Polish examples of Holocaust denialism tailored to the linguistic and social context and aligned with the statements of public figures. This localised approach would address the unique aspects of the issue within the Polish context.

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## 5. National report: Romania

### Executive summary

This research report presents the findings of an extensive study conducted in Romania between March and September 2023, focusing on the multifaceted issue of antisemitism in the country. The study provides an analysis of the contemporary situation of Jewish communities in Romania, the prevalence and perceptions of antisemitism, and its intersection with other forms of intolerance. Additionally, the report examines efforts to prevent antisemitism through educational initiatives. The research reveals that antisemitism in Romania has deep historical roots, and it is still pervasive and widespread. It typically takes the form of latent stereotypes and prejudices, manifested in narratives that are deeply intertwined with complex conspiracy theories and nationalist interpretations of Romanian history. Many individuals are unaware of the current-day expressions and manifestations of antisemitism, and this lack of awareness further exacerbates the problem. Although Romania has introduced legislation in recent years to combat antisemitism and other forms of discrimination and intolerance, the enforcement and implementation of these laws are inconsistent and sporadic. A positive development is the introduction of Holocaust education as a mandatory subject in high schools, starting in 2023. However, there are challenges in the effective implementation of this curriculum. Teachers call for clearer guidelines, training, and updated educational materials to ensure the new curriculum fulfils its goals.

The research underscores the pressing need for efforts to acknowledge and address antisemitism in Romania. These efforts should include increasing awareness about contemporary manifestations of antisemitism, consistent enforcement of existing legislation, and working collaboratively across sectors to strengthen Holocaust education initiatives. These steps are essential in combating the deeply entrenched antisemitism in the country and promoting a more inclusive and tolerant society for all.

### Introduction

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) project<sup>427</sup> is being implemented between January 2023 and December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. It aims to address the deep-rooted prejudices, hate attitudes and behaviours of society, particularly towards European Jewry. The project also aims to promote understanding, tolerance and dialogue. Special emphasis is put on raising young people's awareness of Judaism and antisemitism and on fostering intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The research was carried out as one of the first steps of the BOND project. Both the project and the research use the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).<sup>428</sup> All phases of the research were completed until September 2023, so events after October 7, 2023, and their impact are not included.

The research aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitism in Romania as a basis for further project activities. The research had limitations: it was conducted within the timeframe and scope defined in the project and along with topics relevant to the project's further activities.

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<sup>427</sup> <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>428</sup> <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

## Methodology

The report is based on a combination of desk and field research using data from various sources. The desk research summarised available literature concerning Romania on the topics identified in the project from the past ten years. The results of the field research were compiled with findings from qualitative field research (eight interviews and four focus groups). The interviews included three experts, three practitioners (teachers and educators), and two community leaders (Roma and Hungarian minorities). The four focus groups (FGs) were conducted with the following stakeholders: FG1: first-line practitioners (teachers and educators); FG2: leaders of religious minorities; FG3: youth from majority and minority communities, and FG4: leaders and members of the Jewish communities. Thematic analysis, guided by the literature review, was used to structure and analyse the data from the field research.

## Limitations

The researchers encountered a major obstacle in identifying Jewish individuals willing to participate in the research. Through conversations with experts and representatives of the Jewish community, it became evident that there is a strong reluctance to be identified and conversing with outsiders about their experiences as Jews in Romania. Due to these challenges, the research phase was prolonged, and the Focus Group with members of the Jewish community was restructured into three separate interviews.

## The situation of the Jewish communities in Romania

Before WWII, Romania was the home of around 800,000 Jews<sup>429</sup>. Currently, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) estimates a core Jewish population of about 8,700<sup>430</sup>, but the latest census from 2021 reveals a much lower number: 2378<sup>431</sup>. According to the 2021 census, the majority of Romania's core Jewish population (906) reside in Bucharest. Smaller groups reside in Timis (144), Cluj (139), Bihor (135), and Iasi (133), and are spread across the country.<sup>432</sup> Most of the Jewish population are over the age of 70, and very few youth (under the age of twenty-five) currently live in Romania.<sup>433</sup>

Despite the Communist regime prohibiting all Zionist activity, organised Jewish life, including religion, culture and education, was active after WWII.<sup>434</sup> After 1989, the Jewish communal property was returned to the Federation of Jewish Communities. Remnants of 'shtetl' (Jewish village) life still remain present in some parts of Romania.<sup>435</sup> Synagogues and religious infrastructure are maintained, although less and less are

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<sup>429</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC European Jewish Congress, 2022, accessed 13 September 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>430</sup> "Romania," JPR Institute for Jewish Policy Research, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://www.jpr.org.uk/countries/how-many-jews-in-romania>

<sup>431</sup> "Rezultate definitive: Caracteristici etno-culturale demografice". Populația după etnie la recensămintele din perioada 1930-2021 (Etnii, Județe). Recensământul populației și locuințelor 2021, accessed 1 December 2023: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-definitive/>

<sup>432</sup> "Rezultate definitive: Caracteristici etno-culturale demografice". Populația după etnie la recensămintele din perioada 1930-2021 (Etnii, Județe). Recensământul populației și locuințelor 2021, accessed 1 December 2023: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-definitive/>

<sup>433</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 13 September 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>434</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>435</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>



operational. In Bucharest, three Synagogues<sup>436</sup> still hold weekly services. There are kosher cafeterias in some cities, and all Jewish children receive basic Jewish education<sup>437</sup>. Following the transition to democracy, a Jewish publishing house called *Hasefer* was established, and the *Center of Jewish History in Romania*, founded in 1976, gained legal status. In Bucharest, a department dedicated to Jewish studies was established. The Jewish community in Bucharest also operates an elderly retirement facility, a Jewish hospital, a clinic, and a pharmacy.<sup>438</sup>

The interviews confirmed that the Jewish community is small and inconspicuous compared to other minority groups (IR1). According to an interviewee, the Federation of Jewish Communities (JCC) in Romania reports 7,000 to 8,000 members, which is much higher than the 2021 census records (IR2). Some expatriates have returned from Israel but are not actively participating in the Jewish community (IR2). The lack of visible identification, such as wearing a *yarmulke*, makes it difficult for others to discern their Jewish background (FG4). The shrinking of the Jewish community is accompanied by challenges related to assimilation and an ageing population (IR3). According to the interviews, Jewish community members are perceived as being well-integrated and well-adjusted, with high social status and respectable professions (IR1). There are religious Jews within the Jewish community, and despite the general perception of Jewish affluence, many lead humble lifestyles (IR3). Interview respondents confirmed that the Jewish community in Romania is ageing; many of the younger generation, particularly those who have returned from Israel, no longer identify themselves as part of the Jewish community (IR3). Efforts are made by organisations like the JCC to preserve traditions, language and other aspects of the Jewish heritage. There are still significant places of remembrance, such as graveyards and synagogues, although the latter often serve multiple functions unrelated to their original purpose (IR3). Many Romanians have had little or no interaction with Jewish people (IR6, FG3), contributing to the overall perception that there are very few Jews in Romania today (IR7).

## Antisemitism in Romania

### Level and trend of antisemitism in society

The results of research by the Action and Protection League from 2021<sup>439</sup> found that Romania's combined proportion of latent and manifest antisemitism was above average (53%), and 16% of respondents in Romania answered that they "rather have negative feelings" about Jews. According to the same research, 28% of Romanians can be considered antisemitic in terms of primary antisemitism<sup>440</sup>, 63% in terms of secondary antisemitism<sup>441</sup>, and 49% in terms of new antisemitism<sup>442</sup>. Religious antisemitic beliefs were particularly high (second only to Greece in the same study of 16 European countries), with 30% agreeing with the statement: "Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews".<sup>443</sup>

<sup>436</sup> The Yivo Encyclopedia for Jews in Eastern Europe: Bucharest. <https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Bucharest>

<sup>437</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>438</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>439</sup> Kovács, András, Fischer, Gyorgy, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries". Action and Protection League. 2021, p. 33, accessed 3 November 2023, <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-2408>

<sup>440</sup> Primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>441</sup> Secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

<sup>442</sup> New antisemitism is anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

<sup>443</sup> Kovács and Fischer, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe". 2021, p. 27.

Interestingly, while the proportion of antisemites in Romania was high, the report also found a high proportion of Israel sympathisers (44%).<sup>444</sup> Like in most other post-communist countries, when measuring both indicators for “philosemitism”, the report shows that support for Israel is much higher than support for Jews in Romania.<sup>445</sup>

Likely because of the small size of the Jewish population in Romania, antisemitism expresses itself mainly as historical revisionism, Holocaust denial and/or trivialisation, and global antisemitic conspiracy narratives.<sup>446</sup> It is mainly oriented around issues of memory and history – on a nationalist interpretation of Romanian history, especially the discussions of communism vs fascism, rather than immediate current events.<sup>447</sup> The lack of education about the Holocaust is illustrated by the fact that only 32% of respondents in Romania believed that the Holocaust happened in Romania, according to the results of research from 2021.<sup>448</sup> It mainly involves acts of vandalism, sabotage or harmful incidents, extremism in public institutions, trade-in fascist literature and objects, ceremonies and commemorations of militant neo-nazi groups, antisemitism and trivialisation of the Holocaust in the parliament, and antisemitism and Holocaust denial online.<sup>449</sup>

The field research indicated that most people are unaware or unable to identify manifestations of antisemitism. When asked directly, many respondents could not come up with examples of antisemitism; however, through conversations, they often present unconscious biases, prejudices or historical interpretations that place Jews in a negative light. Confirming what has been mentioned in the literature, antisemitism in Romania is expressed through history revisionism, nationalist rhetoric, failure to mention the Holocaust, or making it seem like what happened at that time was not Romania’s responsibility (FG3).

The COVID-19 pandemic had affected antisemitism in Romania: anti-restriction protests during the pandemic brought antisemitic rhetoric onto the streets.<sup>450</sup> In May 2020, a group of protesters put a protective mask on the statue of Elie Wiesel in Bucharest, explaining that “this personality transmitted a virus which is much more dangerous than the Wuhan virus [...]”.<sup>451</sup> The protesters were promoting a narrative presenting the fight against antisemitism and the ideas that accompany it as a virus more dangerous than COVID-19.<sup>452</sup> In March 2021, protesters continued promoting Holocaust-trivialising messages, comparing Romania with a Nazi camp and likening mandatory vaccinations to the medical experiments that were performed on victims of the Holocaust.<sup>453</sup>

In May 2021, the Romanian Government adopted the first National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Antisemitism, Xenophobia, Radicalization and Hate speech and appointed a special representative for the promotion of memorial policies and the fight against antisemitism and xenophobia.<sup>454</sup> Nonetheless,

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<sup>444</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 68.

<sup>445</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 68.

<sup>446</sup> Carstocea, “Between Europeanisation and Local Legacies,” p. 318.

<sup>447</sup> INSHR-EW and Studio12, “Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania”, p.12.

<sup>448</sup> Studio12, “Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania”, p.15.

<sup>449</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023”.

<sup>450</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 51.

<sup>451</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.20.

<sup>452</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.20.

<sup>453</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.21.

<sup>454</sup> Guvernul Romaniei, “Fresh news: The Romanian government officially starts the implementation of the 2021-2023 National Strategy for preventing and combating anti-Semitism, xenophobia, radicalisation and hate speech, Press Release,” Tuesday 22 March 2022, accessed 7 August 2023, <https://gov.ro/en/news/the-romanian-government->

at the local level, there is poor understanding and a lack of awareness and responsibility, which hinders the practical implementation of the legislation.<sup>455</sup> Despite improved legislation, however, streets, statutes and other institutions are still named after known antisemitic war criminals.<sup>456</sup> The sporadic enforcement and lack of response from the authorities have emboldened a segment of society with extremist attitudes and behaviours.<sup>457</sup>

Expressions of antisemitism appear to be somewhat more prevalent among people who identify as politically conservative or right-wing.<sup>458</sup> A survey from 2021 found that 22% of Romanians believe that Jews act to destabilise the society.<sup>460</sup> The minority holding this view is over-represented by youth (18-29) without higher education, people who adhere to populist political views, who rarely, if ever, watch news on the TV, and who often comment on online articles (daily or several times per week).<sup>461</sup>

Gender does not appear to play a significant role in antisemitism in Romania. Research by ADL in 2014-2015 found that 47% of Romanians hold antisemitic attitudes, with a higher prevalence among males (54%) compared to females (40%).<sup>462</sup> However, experts suggest that, while men might be more loud or visible in expressing antisemitism, gender is not a determining factor in antisemitic behaviour and attitudes (IR2). Rather, experts argue that antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices are pervasive in society, with no noticeable gender differences (IR2).

Practitioners (FG1) express concerns about young people's growing fascination with nationalist historical narratives, such as the Legionary Movement. Such content is circulating on social media (TikTok) and could lead to the adoption of corresponding ideologies, including antisemitism (FG1). Jewish respondents (FG4) and experts (IR5) argue that antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices are deeply ingrained in people's subconscious and not recognised as antisemitic by those who hold them. Some might even interpret certain stereotypes, like the notion that Jews are financially savvy, as compliments rather than harmful stereotypes (FG4).

### **Antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, conspiracy theories**

ADL's report from 2015<sup>463</sup> identified that the most commonly held antisemitic stereotypes in Romania include "Jews talk too much about what happened to them during the Holocaust" (63%), "Jews have too much power in the business world... in international financial markets" (61% and 59%, respectively), and

[officially-starts-the-implementation-of-the-2021-2023-national-strategy-for-preventing-and-combating-anti-semitism-xenophobia-radicalization-and-hate-speech](#)

<sup>455</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>456</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021", p. 2-3.

<sup>457</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie: RAPORT 2021-2022," July 2022, accessed 16 August 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/monitorizarea-antisemitismului-in-romania-raport-2022/>

<sup>458</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie: RAPORT 2021-2022," July 2022, p. 3.

<sup>459</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.22, accessed 7 August 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Raport-monitorizare-2021.pdf>

<sup>460</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

<sup>461</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

<sup>462</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015, Accessed 7 August 2023, <https://global100.adl.org/country/romania/2014>

<sup>463</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015.

“Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country in which they live” (58%)<sup>464</sup>. INSHR-EW’s monitoring report (2021)<sup>465</sup> categorised the online manifestations of antisemitism into the following categories:

5. “Jews run the world or Romania” (increased from 70% to 73% in the sources monitored from 2020 to 2021),
6. “Judeo-Bolshevism”, equating Jewishness with communism (decreased from 25% in 2020 to 11% in 2021),
7. Holocaust-denial or trivialisation/relativising,
8. Economic and religious antisemitism (to a lesser extent).

Antisemitic discourse on social media is often context-driven and can, therefore, be difficult to identify by artificial intelligence or people not specifically trained for it.<sup>466</sup> Usually, links to news stories about the Israel-Palestine conflict or current events involving Jews are antisemitic because of how they are connected to a narrative that incites hatred.<sup>467</sup> Most commonly, these messages target the entire Jewish population (rather than particular individuals). About 65-70% of antisemitic messages on Facebook promote the narrative that “Jews rule the world or Romania”. Many other messages don’t fit the typical antisemitic rhetoric but are generally insulting, disapproving or resisting anything related to Judaism or the Jewish identity.<sup>468</sup>

The most prevalent stereotypes that emerged in the field research include Jews being affluent and possessing business acumen, Jews wielding significant power and influence, and Jews being highly intelligent and remarkably capable and productive. Members of the Jewish community in Romania report being perceived as exclusively prioritising their own community or being frugal and self-centred (FG4). The field research brought up occurrences of the use of the derogatory Romanian term “jidani”, which has Slavic origins (IR1). Jews are often associated with power and negative symbols, such as George Soros being a symbol of evil and attributing societal problems to him (IR5). Others described passive antisemitism, where Jews are portrayed as culprits responsible for conspiracies and legends (IR2).

Conspiratorial antisemitism is also present in Romania. A majority of antisemitism on social media revolves around conspiracy theories<sup>469</sup>, most of which circulate the themes of Judeo-Bolshevism, Holocaust denial, and narratives about Jewish intervention in politics or the economy<sup>470</sup>. INSHR-EW’s report from 2021 showed a slight increase (3%) between 2020-2021 of antisemitic conspiracy-type content online, specifically on the topic of “Jews rule the world or Romania”<sup>471</sup>. In recent years, many of the articles published systematically use the war in Ukraine as a starting point to validate the antisemitic theories about how Jews rule the world.<sup>472</sup> Throughout 2021, there was a resurfacing of online content endorsing antisemitic ideologies and celebrating the Legionary Movement<sup>473,474</sup>. Presently, the discourse is intricately connected to

<sup>464</sup> ADL, “ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015,” 2015.

<sup>465</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street,” 2021, p.35.

<sup>466</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street,” 2021, p.35.

<sup>467</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street,” 2021, p.35.

<sup>468</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street,” 2021, p. 36-37

<sup>469</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>470</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023” p. 51

<sup>471</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.28.

<sup>472</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.28.

<sup>473</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.36

<sup>474</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In various conspiracy narratives, Jews are portrayed as individuals who profit from or have vested interests in the war<sup>475</sup>.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought up new conspiratorial antisemitic narratives. Much of the antisemitic content that was found online at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020 blamed Jews for the medical crisis. Some of the related messages developed and shared between 2020-2021 include: “Jews fund companies that produce the serum and encourage vaccination to gain control, as well as for economic gain; Jews encourage vaccination, but the serum administered to them and that given to non-Jews is different, the latter having harmful effects; Jews encourage discrimination and segregation of the ones who refuse vaccination”. 13% of the articles monitored in relation to the COVID-19 vaccines were linked to this topic, supporting the idea that the global systems are controlled by Jews.<sup>476</sup> There was a surge in popularity around the QAnon movement on social media, particularly on Facebook, throughout 2020. Due to interventions from Facebook, these groups are now much more difficult to find, and their audience is smaller than it was in 2020<sup>477</sup>.

### Antisemitic hate speech and hate crime

Hate speech continues to manifest in the online environment on websites, blogs, and social media. Topics on the public agenda (vaccination campaigns, studying the history of Jews and the Holocaust in schools, the outbreak of war in Ukraine) are used to promote antisemitic narratives.<sup>478</sup> Facebook remains the most popular social network, serving as a primary source of information and a major channel for public expression. In recent years, the platform’s improved mechanisms for removing content that violates the law or community standards have led to a migration of content to more permissive channels, such as Telegram or VK<sup>479</sup>.

The most common forms of hate speech witnessed by people in Romania are based on ethnicity (47%), followed by political orientation (40%), religion (33%), sexual orientation (31%), race (30%) and disabilities (30%)<sup>480</sup>. The incidents were most commonly witnessed on the street (53%), at work (24%), and among friends (19%).<sup>481</sup> 65% of respondents believe that hate speech has intensified in recent years.<sup>482</sup> Most antisemitic hate speech monitored online during the period 2020-2021 was collectively directed at Jews as a whole. Some individual targets appear recurrently (George Soros, Liviu Beris, etc.), but also newly falsely identified targets (Dominic Fritz), who are referred to precisely because they symbolise Jewishness.<sup>483</sup> The articles that were monitored for antisemitic content during 2020-2021 do not overtly incite hatred against

<sup>475</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 45., <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Raport-monitorizare-20-IULIE-2023.pdf>

<sup>476</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.28.

<sup>477</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.33.

<sup>478</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>479</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>480</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” 2018, p. 28, accessed 13 September 2023, [https://www.cncd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sondaj\\_de\\_opinie\\_NoIntoHate\\_2018.pdf](https://www.cncd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sondaj_de_opinie_NoIntoHate_2018.pdf)

<sup>481</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” 2018, p.30

<sup>482</sup> CNCD and IRES, “Sondaj de opinie 2018,” 2018, p.31

<sup>483</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.31, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Raport-monitorizare-2021.pdf>

Jews but could potentially be associated with a “call for resistance”. There is often the use of aggressive language and personal attacks.<sup>484</sup>

It appears that the high levels of antisemitic attitudes rarely translate to antisemitic violence. In Romania, as well as in other countries, there is essentially no relationship between the number of violent acts and the degree of anti-Jewish prejudice.<sup>485</sup> There was an increase in the reported number of antisemitic incidents in Romania between 2009 and 2019, from four incidents in 2009, peaking with 22 incidents in 2017 and dropping to 16 in 2019.<sup>486</sup> From 2020 to 2023, the rate of antisemitic content online also increased.<sup>487</sup> At important events or dates (e.g. the election campaign, Jewish holidays), antisemitism shows up more frequently online and in speeches from public representatives.<sup>488</sup> The rhetoric of antisemitic messages has remained fairly consistent in the media but appears at an increased pace.<sup>489</sup> Messages circulating the themes of Judeo-Bolshevism, Holocaust denial, and conspiracy narratives about Jewish intervention in politics or the economy are widespread. Recently, many articles systematically use the war in Ukraine as a starting point to validate theories about how Jews rule the world.<sup>490</sup>

There have also been acts of hate crime, particularly in the form of vandalism, in recent years. On 12 September 2021, a memorial in the northern city of Bistrita was subjected to vandalism<sup>491</sup>, and at the beginning of 2023, there was an incident in a park in Deva, with Nazi symbols and slogans being left on the park's pathways.<sup>492</sup> In Iasi, newly installed panels remembering the events of the Iasi pogrom have been vandalised several times.<sup>493</sup> In March 2021, a social media statement by the Director of the Jewish State Theatre, Maia Morgenstern, about an encounter with antisemitic language was followed by death threats against her family and threats to set fire to the Jewish theatre.<sup>494</sup> The event instigated a criminal investigation and condemnation from the parliament, noting the rise of antisemitic incidents.<sup>495</sup>

Experts and practitioners interviewed expressed their own experiences of having been targets of hate speech due to their proximity to the topic. It was mentioned that people in Romania who work in the field of addressing these topics (Holocaust education, intercultural education, democracy and human rights) often become targets of hate speech and even death threats (IR5).

### Antisemitism on the political level

On the political level, antisemitism has been expressed mainly in the form of glorifying known antisemitic fascist leaders from the interwar period and war criminals from WWII, making them out to be patriots and

<sup>484</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.31.

<sup>485</sup> Kovács and Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”. 2021, p. 81.

<sup>486</sup> Statista, “Number of incidents pertaining to antisemitism in Romania from 2009 to 2019,” 2023, accessed 17 September 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1173749/romania-incidents-pertaining-to-antisemitism/>

<sup>487</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023”, 2023, accessed 4 August 2023, , <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Raport-monitorizare-20-IULIE-2023.pdf>

<sup>488</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, 2021, p. 3.

<sup>489</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023”.

<sup>490</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 51.

<sup>491</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>492</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p. 6.

<sup>493</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.7.

<sup>494</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>495</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

Romanian heroes.<sup>496</sup> Political figures typically use antisemitic rhetoric to promote a nationalist, anti-communist historical narrative.<sup>497</sup> Expressions of economic or religious antisemitism are less commonly observed.<sup>498</sup>

Antisemitic remarks have been made by political leaders from the right-wing liberal party, National Liberal Party (PNL), and the far-right nationalist party, Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR). Typically, the Judeo-Bolshevism narrative (associating Judaism with communism) is promoted as part of a right-wing nationalist narrative associating the Romanian national identity with anti-communism and aligning communism with Judaism, thereby painting Jews as “other” and not part of the Romanian national identity.<sup>499</sup> On 3 March 2021, Daniel Gheorghe, a parliamentarian from the PNL, delivered a speech in which he praised Mircea Vulcanescu, a convicted war criminal who endorsed antisemitic policies while serving under Antonescu’s WWII government.<sup>500</sup> A few days later, during a Senate session on 8 March 2021, Senator Lavric, a member of the AUR, spoke about Jewish involvement in initiating and promoting communism. Lavric’s comments were made in response to criticism from Silviu Vexler, a Jewish member of parliament, who had raised concerns about the antisemitic nature of statements made by some parliament members, including Lavric. It’s noteworthy that AUR shared Lavric’s speech on its official Facebook page, making it part of a broader effort to shape the country’s historical narrative.<sup>501</sup>

Increasingly, organisations that promote nationalist and extremist ideologies try to gain legitimacy by using public buildings as venues for their events.<sup>502</sup> For example, in October 2022, the “Reduta” Cultural Center, an institution under the Brasov City Council, partnered with the neo-Legionary Ogoranu Foundation to organise an event dedicated to Nicolae Purcărea, presenting him as an anti-communist fighter. Nicolae Purcărea was a member of the Legionary Movement who was arrested during the Antonescu regime and, after 1990, was among those who tried to re-establish the Legionary Movement through the “All for the Country” (Totul pentru Țară) party.<sup>503</sup> Similar incidents have occurred all across the country over the last year, lending legitimacy to organisations that glorify and attempt to rejuvenate the identity of the Legionary Movement.

### Antisemitism in the sporting sphere

INSHR-EW’s most recent monitoring report highlights antisemitic incidents within the realm of sports in Romania during the period of May 2022-April 2023<sup>504</sup>. These incidents primarily occurred in football stadiums. In Cluj in October 2022, at the football match between CFR Cluj and Slavia Prague, some Cluj-Napoca supporters displayed, in the Czech language, signs with the antisemitic message: “You are just some Jews, Slavia”. A few days later, the CFR supporters showed up at a meeting, showing a racist message targeting the Roma community.<sup>505</sup> In January 2023, the Sepsi Sfântu-Gheorghe-FC U Craiova football match

<sup>496</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Responsabil de Holocaustul din România: Hitler Sau Antonescu,” 2021, p.3.

<sup>497</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Responsabil de Holocaustul din România: Hitler Sau Antonescu,” 2021, p.3.

<sup>498</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021,” p.30.

<sup>499</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” 2023, p. 14.

<sup>500</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”, accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>501</sup> US Department of State, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania”.

<sup>502</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” 2023, p. 14.

<sup>503</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” 2023, p. 14.

<sup>504</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.11

<sup>505</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.11

was suspended due to xenophobic chants from the Craiova supporters. Similar chants have been used in recent years at several matches in which one of the teams is associated with the Hungarian community. At a football match in April 2023, the CSA Steaua team displayed a flag with the face of the leader of the Legionary Movement, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. At the Romania-Ukraine match on 24 June 2023, one of the messages in the stands praised the Legionary Movement.<sup>506</sup> These antisemitic and xenophobic incidents in recent years highlight the prevalence of hate speech, including antisemitism, in the sporting sphere.

### Perception of antisemitism in the Jewish community

According to surveys conducted by INSHR-EW in 2023, 71% of Jews in Romania agree that antisemitism exists in society today; only 6% consider that it does not exist at all.<sup>507</sup> 41% of Jewish respondents believe that antisemitism has increased over the last five years, while 38% think that it has remained the same.<sup>508</sup> The main expressions of antisemitism as perceived by the Jewish community is the desecration of cemeteries, with 68% reporting it as a very big or big problem, followed by antisemitism on social media (53%), vandalism of Jewish institutions and monuments (52%), antisemitism on the political arena (51%), in mass-media (42%), and on the street or in public places (38%).<sup>509</sup> 24% of Jewish respondents report having been the targets of antisemitic remarks, and 14% had been targets of antisemitic actions in the last five years.<sup>510</sup> 27% of respondents report that they often or sometimes avoid wearing objects that could identify them as Jewish when they are in public, and 21% avoid posting content online that might reveal their Jewish identity.<sup>511</sup>

Jewish focus group respondents supported the findings, which indicate widespread and pervasive antisemitism in Romania (FG4). Experiences include overt opposition to interfaith marriage, negative vocabulary about Jewish people, reluctance to self-identify as Jewish due to fear of bias and prejudices, Holocaust denial, and more covert stereotypes that are expressed in trivial conversations and behaviour (FG4). One respondent gave the example of a situation where they had disclosed their Jewish heritage to an elderly Hungarian lady, who had responded with “flattering” comments about Jews being “smart” and “tricky”, not realising that her words were reflecting common and harmful stereotypes about Jewish people (FG4). Jewish respondents (FG4) also claimed to have noticed an increase in violent acts of antisemitism in recent years, some attributing it to a surge in nationalism and growing divisions between various groups within society. It was suggested that antisemitic sentiments have been exacerbated by the prevailing divisive and nationalist ideologies (FG4).

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<sup>506</sup> INSHR-EW, “Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023,” p.12.

<sup>507</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”, 2023, p.3, accessed 4 Dec 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Raport-de-cercetare-minoritatea-evreiasca.pdf>

<sup>508</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”2023, p. 4

<sup>509</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”2023, p. 5.

<sup>510</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”, 2023, p. 7-14

<sup>511</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, “Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești”, 2023, p. 18-19



Jewish respondents characterised the belief that there is no antisemitism in Romania as "ideal thinking," arising from innocence, ignorance, or a lack of awareness about what constitutes antisemitism. Some people may hold antisemitic beliefs without realising it, as these beliefs have been passed down through generations as "normal." (FG4).

### **Enmity against other minority groups in the country**

Besides the Jewish community, the minority groups that are most affected by group-focused hatred are the Roma, the LGBTQ+, and the Hungarian minority<sup>512</sup>. The main forms of expression of enmity against these groups, particularly the Roma, include discrimination, hate speech and prejudices. A survey from 2021 found that a majority of people are neutral in their attitudes towards ethnic minorities, the strongest negative perception being towards the Roma, a group which is considered a problem by a staggering 38% of the population.<sup>513</sup> Opinion polls from 2018<sup>514</sup> showed that the most distrusted groups in Romania are the Roma (72%), followed by religious minority groups (56%), and the Hungarian (53%) and Jewish (46%) minorities. The only group more distrusted than Roma are people who identify as homosexuals (74%), followed by immigrants (69%) and Muslims (68%). Although discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited under Romanian law, discrimination against LGBTQ+ is common. A 2020 survey by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency found that 15% of LGBTQ+ individuals had suffered physical or sexual attacks linked to their sexual orientation or gender identity in the past five years; only 4% reported them to authorities due to fear of discrimination.<sup>515</sup> Hate speech targeting any kind of minority, especially sexual and ethnic, is typically combined with Euroscepticism and anti-globalism.<sup>516</sup>

The field research indicated widespread agreement about the Roma being the main target of group-focused hatred and discrimination in Romania. The expert interviews (IR2) highlighted that anti-Roma and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments are both more prevalent and dangerous than antisemitism in their manifestations. A Jewish respondent (from FG4) pointed out that the groups most affected are the ones you can most clearly identify as "different" from the majority group, those who are easily identifiable by their look as "different". In line with this, Hungarian (IR8) and Roma (IR1, IR4, IR7, FG3) respondents also emphasised that they attempt to hide their ethnic identity, citing fear of discrimination, hatred or loss of opportunity.

The field research found that Roma are commonly displayed as thieves, dirty, dangerous, and stupid (FG3). Jewish respondents (FG4) grew up hearing the use of derogatory language when mentioning the Roma ("gypsies"), ingraining in them from a young age the assumption that Roma are dangerous because they are different. The Roma youth (FG3) shared stories that exemplify discrimination, where their ethnicity led to unjust treatment. For example, a teacher refused to give a passing grade to a competent Roma student despite good results overall, preventing them from graduating high school (FG3). Another illustrative example was when an administrator made prejudiced assumptions about a Roma student, which led to them being denied access to a course. The assumption was that the young girl had children, which was not the case. Roma youth believe that the corrective measures introduced by the Romanian state, such as special

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<sup>512</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

<sup>513</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.3-6.

<sup>514</sup> CNCD and IRES, "Sondaj de opinie 2018," p. 12.

<sup>515</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>516</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.26.

spots in schools, exacerbate divisions and tensions, further isolating and marginalising Roma youth (FG3). A Romanian youth mentioned an incident where a Roma individual was unjustly pulled off a bus. The respondent perceived it as an act of ethnic hatred and emphasised the unfairness in treatment based on ethnicity (FG3). A Roma community leader pointed to intersections with gender, highlighting that gender-based violence is a pervasive cross-cutting issue (IR4). These stories underscore the pervasive discrimination and hatred that the Roma face, both openly and through institutional biases. The stereotypes about the Hungarian minority typically focus on nationalist ideas, fears and questions about “why they are still here” (FG1). Jewish and Hungarian minorities have sometimes been perceived as intellectual threats or as having more societal power in Romania, whereas the Roma minority have a lower status and fewer rights (IR7).

## Antisemitism prevention in education

### Jewry, antisemitism and the Holocaust in the official educational curricula

Until recently, the teaching of the Holocaust in schools has been optional and often lacking.<sup>517</sup> In 2021, the Romanian government passed legislation making Holocaust education, “History of Jews and the Holocaust in Romania” mandatory in schools.<sup>518</sup> In the updated curriculum from 2021, 9th-grade history students learn about the history of the Jews, among other groups.<sup>519</sup> From 2022, 10th-grade history students learn about political regimes in the interwar period and interwar international relations, including the Holocaust and Romania in the two world wars.<sup>520</sup> 10th-grade students in religion also learn about Judaism, Jewish culture and the Old Testament.<sup>521</sup> From 2023, 11th-grade history students learn about political ideas and regimes<sup>522</sup>; 11th-grade students of religion might study Judaism<sup>523</sup>, and the general term “discrimination” will be covered in the subject Sociology and Economy<sup>524</sup>. However, no clear guidelines regarding discussions on antisemitism are included in the curriculum.

Teachers often use lessons from Holocaust education and antisemitism to address other contemporary issues related to discrimination, xenophobia, and chauvinism (FG1). For example, while mandatory Holocaust education now exists for high school students, there's no equivalent for Roma history.

<sup>517</sup> INSHR-EW, “Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021”, p. 2-3.

<sup>518</sup> INSHR-EW, “Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie,” 2022.

<sup>519</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI la CLASA A IX-A în anul școlar 2021-2022 LIMBA ȘI LITERATURA ROMÂNĂ, învățământ liceal și profesional,” 2021, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>520</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a X-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2022-2023, Disciplina ISTORIE,” 2022, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>521</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a X-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2022-2023, Disciplina RELIGIE,” 2022, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>522</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina ISTORIE,” 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>523</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina RELIGIE,” 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>524</sup> Ministerul Educației, “REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina SOCIO-UMANE,” 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

The first-line practitioners (FG1) reported that there is a divide among teachers, some considering the study of the Holocaust unnecessary and receiving too much attention. While respondents think that Holocaust education is improving, concerns are raised about the quality of textbooks and other educational materials on Jewish history and antisemitism. Some teachers are concerned about the violent imagery often used in classroom presentations, leading to a negative association between Jews and death, sadness, and victimhood (IR3). Teachers have a wide range of materials available to them for educating students about the Holocaust; however, there is a need for more and improved materials focusing on the historical local situation in Romania and connecting it to antisemitism and other current manifestations of intolerance (IR3). Teachers believe these materials should be better adapted to suit the needs of youth and argue that they should have been piloted before being introduced in classes (FG1).

### **Educational materials and activities addressing antisemitism**

The materials and activities provided in the official curriculum focus primarily on the Holocaust in historical terms, specifically the Holocaust, as it happened in other European countries (not in Romania). The resources primarily consist of documentaries, with learning mainly through storytelling and testimonies of survivors, but also on analysis of the movements in society which led to the rise of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. In the updated 10th-grade history curriculum, there are links to TedEd resources, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum<sup>525</sup>, and the online Anne Frank House Museum<sup>526</sup>. These materials and activities are easily available to teachers. However, most of them are in English, and language barriers might hinder many teachers from using and/or understanding the content.

Teachers often seek supplementary materials beyond the official curriculum to enhance learning experiences. For instance, INSHR-EW developed region-specific notebooks in Romania focusing on the Holocaust to help teachers connect historical events with local geography and adapted victim memoirs (IR2). While approved by the Ministry of Education, its utility in classrooms remains uncertain (IR2). Additionally, INSHR-EW introduced an outdoor comic book exhibition in 2023 to commemorate local Holocaust victims (IR1). Other resources include videos by the National Roma Culture Center, online information about the Roma community (IR7), interactive lessons at the Synagogue History Museum in Oradea, and initiatives by dedicated teachers to organise projects, activities, and excursions related to Holocaust education. However, concerns were raised that making Holocaust history mandatory without proper teacher training may compromise the quality of education on this subject (FG1). Despite the availability of numerous NGO-developed resources, teachers frequently lack awareness of their freedom to incorporate these materials to meet curriculum demands (IR5). Many teachers mistakenly believe they are restricted to official school textbooks, leading valuable resources to be underutilised in extracurricular activities despite their perfect alignment with the curriculum. While some educators grasp the potential and are open to using these resources to fulfil curriculum needs, resistance often arises from middle management roles within educational hierarchies (IR5).

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<sup>525</sup> United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Online lectures: Studying Primary Sources from the Holocaust," accessed 13 September 2023, <https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online>

<sup>526</sup> Anne Frank House, "The Anne Frank House online," accessed 13 September 2023, <https://www.annefrank.org/en/museum/web-and-digital/>

## **Needs of FLPs in addressing antisemitism through education**

The field research highlighted several needs of FLPs in addressing antisemitism through education. Respondents highlighted the importance of connecting students with the history of the local community, offering glimpses into the surroundings and lifestyle of the Jewish community before the Holocaust (IR3). Experts emphasised the importance of using positive images and respecting the rights of victims when using pictures in pedagogical settings (IR3). Experts and first-line practitioners argued that many schools are not doing enough to tackle discrimination, hatred, and intolerance. Resistance or systemic barriers often hinder good efforts (IR1, IR5). For this reason, there is a need to adopt a whole-school approach, targeting not only teachers and students but also involving parents and other stakeholders (IR5). Teachers and educators (FG1) argued that there is a need for updated materials, textbooks and manuals that are pilot-tested, relevant and resonate with youth today (FG1). There is a need for resources that help deconstruct narratives and combat internalised prejudices (FG1). Extracurricular activities and collaborations with NGOs are valuable in creating spaces for addressing these issues outside the constraints of traditional school settings (IR5 & IR6).

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## Annexes

## ANNEX 1: Hungarian national report in the local language

### Bevezetés

#### A BOND projekt és a kutatás bemutatása

A BOND (Building tOLerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) projekt<sup>527</sup> 2023. január és 2024. december között zajlik Lengyelországban, Magyarországon, Olaszországban és Romániában. Fő célja a mélyen gyökerező – különösen az európai zsidósággal szemben jelen levő – előítéletek, gyűlöletkeltő attitűdök és viselkedésmódok kezelése a társadalomban. Célja emellett a megértés, a tolerancia és a párbeszéd elősegítése. A projekt kiemelt hangsúlyt helyez a fiatalok zsidósággal és antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatos ismereteinek bővítésére, valamint a kultúrák és vallások közötti párbeszéd erősítésére. Jelen kutatás a BOND projekt keretében készült, a projekt egyik első lépéseként. A projekt és a kutatás is a Nemzetközi Holokauszt Emlékezési Szövetség (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) által elfogadott antiszemitizmus definíciót használja.<sup>528</sup> A kutatás minden fázisa 2023 szeptemberében lezárult, így a 2023. október 7-e után történt események és annak hatásai már nem képezik részét.

A kutatás célja az volt, hogy átfogó képet adjon a magyarországi antiszemitizmusról, a projekt további tevékenységeinek megalapozásaként. A kutatásnak ennek folytán voltak korlátai: a projektben meghatározott időtartam alatt, a projektben meghatározott terjedelemben és a projekt további tevékenységeihez fontos altémák mentén készült.

#### Módszertan

A kutatás két részből állt.<sup>529</sup> Elsőként asztali kutatást végeztünk, hogy összegezzük a magyarországi antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatos, az elmúlt nagyjából tíz évből elérhető szakmai irodalmat a projekt keretében előre meghatározott témákban. Ezt követően kilenc egyéni és öt fókuszcsoportos interjút készítettünk, hogy kiegészítsük az asztali kutatás eredményeit. Egyéni interjúalanyaink voltak: két fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakember, öt antiszemitizmussal és/vagy kisebbségi kérdéssel foglalkozó szakértő, egy LMBTQ+ témájú civil szervezet munkatársa és egy keresztény vallási vezető. Fókuszcsoportos beszélgetést pedig az alábbi csoportokkal folytattunk: zsidó identitású fiatalok, nem zsidó identitású fiatalok, fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek, zsidó civil szervezetek vezetői és munkatársai, valamint zsidó vallási vezetők.<sup>530</sup> A résztvevők

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527 A BOND projekt honlapja: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

528 „Az antiszemitizmus a zsidók olyan megítélése, amely a velük szembeni gyűlölet kifejezéseként nyilvánulhat meg. Az antiszemitizmus verbális és fizikai megnyilvánulásai zsidó vagy nem zsidó személyekre és/vagy e személyek vagyonára, a zsidó közösségi intézményekre és vallási létesítményekre irányulnak.” IHRA, „Az antiszemitizmus IHRA által elfogadott munkadefiníciója”, letöltés dátuma: 2023. december. 19. <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/hu/resources/working-definitions-charters/az-antiszemitizmus-ihra-által-elfogadott-munkadefinicioja>.

529 A kutatás minden fázisa 2023 szeptemberéig lezárult.

530 A fókuszcsoportok főbb jellemzői: 1) fővárosi zsidó identitású fiatalok: 18 és 25 év közöttiek, 8 fő - 5 fiú, 3 lány; 2) fővárosi és vidéki nem zsidó identitású fiatalok: 18 és 25 év közöttiek, 6 fő - 3 lány, 3 fiú; 3) fővárosi és vidéki fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek: 9 fő - 6 férfi, 3 nő; 4) fővárosi zsidó civil szervezetek vezetői és munkatársai: 7 fő - 4 férfi, 3 nő; 5) fővárosi és vidéki zsidó vallási vezetők: 4 fő - 3 férfi 1 nő. Az interjúk 2023 május 30 és július 4. között, a fókuszcsoportok pedig 2023 május 31. és június 14. között készültek.



kiválasztása a meghatározott célcsoportokon belül egyrészt célzott megkereséssel, másrészt hólabda módszerrel történt.<sup>531</sup>

## Vezetői összefoglaló

Általánosságban véve Magyarországon a zsidóság magas iskolai végzettséggel rendelkezik, és szociálisan és anyagilag is jó helyzetben van mind a felmérések, mind az interjúalanyaink véleménye szerint. A magukat eleve zsidóként identifikálók többnyire nem vallásosak, identitásukban leginkább európai polgárnak, vagy egyenlően zsidónak és magyarnak tartják magukat.

A kutatások szerint az antiszemitizmus szintje Magyarországon utoljára 2010 körül nőtt meg jelentősen, feltehetően a szélsőjobboldali Jobbik népszerűsödéséhez köthetően. 2015 óta az elérhető adatok szerint az antiszemitizmus szintje érdemileg nem változott. Ugyanakkor az interjúalanyok többsége szerint általánosságban növekszik az antiszemitizmus az országban, melynek okaként elsősorban az internetet, emellett az otthoni mintákat, az oktatási rendszer hiányosságait, a társadalom polarizáltságát és a kormányzati Soros-kampányt nevezték meg.

Az antiszemitizmus Magyarországon leginkább összeesküvés-elméletek formájában jelenik meg, de más formái is jelen vannak (pl. érzelmi antiszemitizmus, új antiszemitizmus). Az elérhető adatok alapján az antiszemitizmus leggyakoribb megjelenési formája a gyűlöletbeszéd. A gyűlölet-bűncselekmények száma elenyésző.

Politikai szinten az antiszemitizmus a 2000-es évek második felétől a Jobbikhoz kötődően jelent meg, és a szélsőjobboldali pártok (jelenleg a Mi Hazánk) eszközkészletében azóta is jelen van, bár a korábbiakhoz képest kevésbé direkt formában, kódolt beszéddel palástolva és elsősorban összeesküvés-elméletek formájában. Bár a Fidesz-kormány 2013-ban zéró toleranciát hirdetett az antiszemitizmussal szemben, több olyan témát is a kommunikációja középpontjába állított az elmúlt években, amelyek összefüggnek az antiszemitizmussal. Ilyenek a Soros György elleni kampány, a két világháború közti antiszemita politikusok (pl. Horthy) és művészek (pl. Wass Albert) dicsőítése, a holokauszt emlékezetének torzítása vagy a globális külső ellenség elleni harc. Az antiszemitizmus a sportszurkolói miliőben is megjelenik, elsősorban a focidrukker- és főleg az ultraszcénában.

Egy 2017-es felmérés alapján a zsidók fele tapasztalt élete során antiszemitizmust, a jelen kutatás során megkérdezett zsidó identitású interjúalanyok közül mindenki. Közülük többen kiemelték, hogy a kormány antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatos kettős beszéde negatív hatással van biztonságérzetükre.

Bár az antiszemitizmus kétségkívül jelen van Magyarországon, más kisebbségekkel – elsősorban a romákkal, az LMBTQ+-közösséggel, illetve a migránsokkal – szemben a kutatások és az interjúalanyok szerint is sokkal előítéletesebb a társadalom.

A fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek szerint iskolafüggő, hogy milyen mértékben jelenik meg az antiszemitizmus a diákok között. Ha megjelenik, akkor leginkább verbális formában, és a diákok részéről sokszor nem áll mögötte valódi antiszemita érzélem. Több interjúalany az oktatást az antiszemitizmus csökkentésének egyik legfontosabb eszközeként határozta meg.

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<sup>531</sup> A kutatás során korlátot jelentett, hogy több szereplőt, akivel egyéni vagy fókuszcsoportos interjút szerettünk volna készíteni, nem sikerült elérni, vagy nem sikerült időpontot egyeztetni.

## 1. A magyar zsidóság helyzete

Magyarországon a zsidóság becsült száma 2015-ben 58 936 és 110 679 fő között volt egy 2017-es kutatás szerint.<sup>532</sup> A kutatás az elérhető adatbázisok mellett magukat zsidóként meghatározó és legalább egy zsidó nagyszülővel rendelkező alanyok megkérdezésével készült. Az eredmények szerint a zsidók nagyjából 85%-a Budapesten élt, és a kisebb településekről a városok felé irányuló mozgás volt megfigyelhető. Képzettségük magasabb, szociális és anyagi helyzetük jobb volt, mint a budapesti átlag. Míg a zsidóság 78%-a volt diplomás, a 18 éven felüli fővárosi népesség esetében ez az arány 32%. A zsidóság 52%-a értelmiségi munkát végzett, 17%-uk vezető pozícióban dolgozott, míg a teljes budapesti népesség esetében az előbbi arány 20%, az utóbbi 6% volt. Identitását tekintve a zsidóság többsége európai polgárnak (30%) vagy egyenlően zsidónak és magyarnak (29%) mondta magát.<sup>533</sup> A népszámlálás szerint 2011-ben 10 965 fő, 2022-ben pedig 7 635 fő vallotta magát Izraelita vallásúnak.<sup>534</sup>

Ezeket az adatokat az interjúalanyok is megerősítették. Legtöbbjük egyetértett abban, hogy a zsidóság a többi kisebbségi csoporthoz képest privilegizált helyzetben van Magyarországon. Kiemelték, hogy ez fokozottan igaz Budapestre. Vidéken a zsidóság, elsősorban a holokauszt következtében, sokkal kisebb létszámban és neheztelt körülmények között van jelen – többek szerint egyre aktívabban, de volt olyan zsidó vezető, aki szerint vidékről eltűnőben van a zsidóság.

Az említett 2017-es kutatás szerint a magyar zsidóság nagy része nem vallásos. Bár 70%-uk nem akarta, hogy a zsidóság teljes mértékben asszimilálódjon, a többség támogatta a kevert házasságot. A túlnyomó többségük (75%) összetartozást érzett Izraellel, azonban nem gondolkodott komolyan az Izraelbe költözésen. A magyar zsidók a teljes népességhez képest nagyobb arányban voltak ellenzéki szavazók és baloldali-liberális irányultságú média fogyasztói. Világnézeti és politikai attitűdök tekintetében is inkább elfogadónak, nyitottnak voltak mondhatóak a társadalomhoz képest.<sup>535</sup>

Magyarországon három elismert zsidó egyház van: a magát zsidóként identifikáló népesség körében 2017-ben legismertebb<sup>536</sup> Magyarországi Zsidó Hitközségek Szövetsége (Mazsihisz), mely a neológ irányzatot képviseli<sup>537</sup>, a második legismertebb Egységes Magyarországi Izraelita Hitközség (EMIH), mely a status quo ante, azaz középutas irányzatot képviseli<sup>538</sup>, és a Magyarországi Autonóm Orthodox Izraelita Hitközség

<sup>532</sup> Kovács András és Barna Ildikó, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei (Budapest: Szombat, 2017), 12-15.

„A becslés során a kutatók a budapesti összlakosság demográfiai sajátosságait – a korcsoportos bontású budapesti lakosság élveszületési és halálozási arányszámait – vetítették az ország zsidó népességére, mert a túlélő zsidóság kétharmad része budapesti volt, és a vidéki zsidóság túlnyomó része is fokozatosan a fővárosba költözött. A népességnövekedés (esetünkben csökkenés) becslését a demográfiai számítások szabályainak megfelelően a nő népességszámok alapján végezték. A becslés során számításba vették a kivándorlásról rendelkezésre álló adatokat.”

<sup>533</sup> Kovács és Barna, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben, 64.

<sup>534</sup> Központi Statisztikai Hivatal oldalán ([ksh.hu](http://ksh.hu)) elérhető népszámlálási adatok.

<sup>535</sup> Kovács és Barna, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben, 156.

<sup>536</sup> Kovács és Barna, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben, 177.

<sup>537</sup> Mazsihisz, „Magyar zsidó történelem az ókortól napjainkig,” letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://mazsihisz.hu/a-zsidosagrol/tortenelem/magyar-zsido-tortenelem/magyar-zsido-tortenelem-az-okortol-napjainkig>.

<sup>538</sup> EMIH, „Bemutakozás: Az Egységes Magyarországi Izraelita Hitközség,” letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://zsido.com/emih/bemutakozas/>.

(MAOIH), mely az ortodox irányzatot<sup>539</sup>. Ezeken kívül van két kisebb zsidó vallásos közösség, a reform Bét Orim<sup>540</sup> és Szim Salom<sup>541</sup>.

Az állam számos zsidó szervezetet támogat, ezt ideológiai alapon, szelektíven teszi, amely megosztottságot teremt a zsidó szervezetek között.<sup>542</sup> Zsidó identitású interjúalanyok szerint a nagymértékű támogatások is növelhetik a társadalomban az antiszemitizmust.

Több interjúalany szerint a zsidóság elsősorban kulturálisan, emellett vallásilag jelenik meg a magyar társadalomban. A zsidó civil életben aktív interjúalanyok kiemelték, hogy a zsidó civil és vallási szféra ma Magyarországon elválík egymástól. Szinte minden interjúalany felhozta, hogy a zsidóság politikailag megosztott, és a zsidó egyházak politikai és gazdasági értelemben is függenek az aktuális politikai helyzettől.

## 2, Antiszemitizmus Magyarországon

### 2.1. Az antiszemitizmus szintje és típusai

Magyarországon a rendszerváltás után azonnal újra felszínre került az addig elfojtott antiszemitizmus, szintje azonban azt ezt követő két évtizedben nem nőtt számottevően. A társadalom felnőtt lakosságának mintegy negyede volt antiszemitának tekinthető.<sup>543</sup> Az antiszemitizmus szintje 2010 körül nőtt meg jelentősen, amit több kutatás is a szélsőjobboldali Jobbik népszerűsödéséhez köt.<sup>544</sup> A Kovács András hagyományosnak számító módszertanával, éveken át készített felmérések szerint 2015 és 2019 között érdemben nem változott az antiszemitizmus szintje. 2019-ben a társadalom 36%-a volt mérsékeltten vagy erősen antiszemitának tekinthető<sup>545</sup>, 2021-ben az Action and Protection League 16 országra kiterjedő kutatása szerint 42%-a.<sup>546</sup> Magyarországon, ahogy a visegrádi országokban is, az antiszemitizmus leginkább összeesküvés-elméletek formájában jelenik meg.<sup>547</sup>

Az elérhető kutatások az antiszemitizmus alábbi formáit különböztetik meg:

- Az *elsődleges antiszemitizmus*, vagyis a hagyományos zsidóellenesség három kategóriát takar. A *kognitív antiszemitizmus*, mely a zsidókkal kapcsolatos negatív tévképzeteket jelenti, 2021-ben a magyarok 17%-ánál erősen, és 42%-ánál mérsékeltten volt jelen. Az *affektív antiszemitizmus* a zsidókkal kapcsolatos negatív érzelmeket jelenti, és a magyarok 25%-ára erősen, 23%-a mérsékeltten volt jellemző 2021-ben. A *konatív antiszemitizmus* a zsidóellenes előítéleten alapuló cselekedetre,

<sup>539</sup> MAOIH, "Bemutatók: Az orthodoxia rövid története," letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://maoih.hu/bemutatok/orthodoxia-tortenete/>.

<sup>540</sup> Bét Orim, "A Bét Orim története," letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://betorim.hu/kozosseg/dokumentumok/a-bet-orim-tortenete/>.

<sup>541</sup> Szim Salom, "Kik vagyunk?," letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://www.szimsalom.hu/bemutakozunk/kik-vagyunk/>.

<sup>542</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről (Brüsszel: NOA és CEJI, 2022), 10.

<sup>543</sup> Kovács, András, *Stranger at hand. Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

<sup>544</sup> Hann Endre és Róna Dániel, *Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban* (Budapest: TEV, Medián, 2015), 13; Barna, Ildikó and Félix Anikó, ed., *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2017), 14; Félix Anikó, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020* (Budapest: Mazsihisz, 2020), 47.

<sup>545</sup> Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*.

<sup>546</sup> Kovács, András and Fischer György, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries* (Budapest: Action and Protection League, 2021), 58.

<sup>547</sup> Barna, Ildikó et al., *Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2022).

diszkriminációra való hajlandóságot méri. Ez 2021-ben 15%-ban erősen, és 34%-ban mérsékelten volt jelen a válaszadóknaál. Minden kategóriát összesítve, az Action and Protection League 16 országra kiterjedő kutatása szerint 2021-ben 24% volt erősen és 18% mérsékelten elsődleges antiszemitanak tekinthető, összesen tehát a magyarországi lakosság 42%-a.<sup>548</sup>

- A *másodlagos antiszemitizmus* a holokausztot tagadó, torzító vagy relativizáló kijelentéseket takar. Az Action and Protection League 2021-es felmérése szerint a magyarok 17%-a erősen, és 46%-a mérsékelten volt másodlagosan antiszemitanak tekinthető.<sup>549</sup>
- Az *új antiszemitizmus* leegyszerűsítve az antiszemita alapú Izrael-kritikát vagy Izrael-ellenességet jelenti. Arra vonatkozik, amikor a zsidóellenes érzelmek Izraelre vetítődnek ki, Izrael kerül a középpontjukba, lehetővé téve ezzel az antiszemita kijelentések megfogalmazását politikailag korrekt módon.<sup>550</sup> Olyan kifejezések tartoznak ide, amelyek Izrael államát természeténél fogva gonosznak tekintik – démonizálják, kettős mércét alkalmaznak ellene, és tagadják Izrael létezésének jogát.<sup>551</sup> Magyarországon az Action and Protection League 2021-es felmérése szerint 13% erősen és 40% mérsékelten vallott antiszemita nézeteket Izrael ellen.<sup>552</sup>
- *Látens antiszemitizmus*: azokat nevezzük látens antiszemitanak, akik az antiszemitizmust mérő kutatások során igyekeznek elkerülni, hogy antiszemita válaszokat adjanak. Ez általában a hagyományos zsidóellenességet vizsgáló kérdéseknél sikerül, a másodlagos és az új antiszemitizmust vizsgáló kérdéseknél viszont nem, mivel azt nem feltétlenül érzékelik antiszemitanak.<sup>553</sup>

Az egyik antiszemitizmus-kutatással foglalkozó interjúalany ezek mellett az antiszemitizmus jelenlétének három szintjét különböztette meg a társadalomban: 1) előítéletesség, negatív sztereotípiák a zsidókról, 2) antiszemita nyelvezet jelenléte a társadalmi diskurzusokban és a médiában, 3) politikai céllal megjelenő antiszemitizmus. Ez a három szint piramidális összefüggésben van egymással: azok nagy része, akik az antiszemita nyelvezetet használják, feltételezhetően előítéletesek is, míg nem mindenki használ antiszemita nyelvezetet, akinek vannak előítéletei.

Az interjúalanyok többsége az antiszemitizmust a zsidósággal kapcsolatos ellenérzéseként, szembenállásként, negatív megnyilvánulásként definiálta, illetve egy fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakember egyfajta világmagyarázatként határozta meg. Lehetséges megnyilvánulási formáiként az érzelmi, verbális, nonverbális és fizikai antiszemitizmust említették. Megjelent a vallási alapú és a „faji” alapú antiszemitizmus megkülönböztetése, illetve többen kiemelték, hogy tapasztalataik szerint az antiszemitizmusban gyakran keveredik a zsidóság vallásként, népként/etnikumként, kultúraként vagy hagyományként való értelmezése. Sokan a magyarországi antiszemitizmus legjellemzőbb formájának az összeesküvés-elméleteket tartják, illetve volt, aki kiemelte, hogy az antiszemitizmus leginkább gazdasági kontextusban jelenik meg. Többen kitértek az új antiszemitizmusra (antiszemita Izrael-kritikára és -ellenességre), mint az antiszemitizmus egyik komplex területére, ahol nagyon nehéz eldönteni, hogy egy adott kijelentés antiszemitanak tekinthető-e, és amely többen szerint inkább Nyugat-Európában jellemző, de egyre erősödik Magyarországon is, különösen a

<sup>548</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 19-36.

<sup>549</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 47-49.

<sup>550</sup> Barna et al., *Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries*, 15.

<sup>551</sup> Natan Sharansky, “3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, no. 3-4 (2004).

<sup>552</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 54.

<sup>553</sup> Kovács and Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*, 56.

(radikális) baloldalon. Kutatók és a zsidó közösség tagjai emellett még kiemelték a második világháborúban és a magyarországi holokausztban viselt magyar felelősség kérdésében megnyilvánuló antiszemitizmust.

Az interjúalanyok többsége egyetértett abban, hogy az antiszemitizmus az elmúlt 10-15 évben nőtt valamilyen mértékben. Ennek okaként elsősorban az internetet jelölték meg, amely megfogalmazásukban elősegíti az antiszemita tartalmak gyors terjedését, valamint normalizálja azok jelenlétét. Másodsorban az otthonról hozott mintákat említették, de többen felhozták a magyar oktatási rendszer hiányosságait is. Több interjúalany szerint a magyar társadalom alapvetően fogékony az előítéletekre, így az antiszemitizmusra is. Az interjúalanyok egyetértettek abban, hogy a válságok – beleértve a COVID-19 járványt is – mindig hatnak az előítéletekre, mivel felborítják az éppen aktuális társadalmi rendet, és gyakran eredményeznek széles körben anyagilag bizonytalan helyzetet. Ilyenkor sokan keresnek bűnbakot, amit gyakran a politikai szereplők is a kisebbségi csoportokban találnak meg. A COVID-19 járvány a fiataloknál sok esetben elmagányosodáshoz vezetett, amitől nyitottabbá váltak a kisebbségek ellen irányuló összeesküvés-elméletekre is.

Az antiszemitizmus-kutatással foglalkozó megkérdezett szakemberek és egy 2022-es kutatás<sup>554</sup> szerint is a nem alapvetően irreleváns az antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatban. Ez utóbbi kutatás szerint a nem hatása a legtöbb esetben csak akkor szignifikáns, ha más attitűdinális változókat (pl. más csoportokkal szembeni előítéletek, populizmus, nacionalizmus) nem tartunk kontroll alatt. A kutatás továbbá kimutatta, hogy a különböző típusú antiszemitizmusoknál lehet még a nemnek hatása – például a másodlagos antiszemitizmus esetében a férfiak antiszemitábbak.

## 2.2. Antiszemita sztereotípiák, előítéletek, összeesküvés-elméletek

A magyar társadalomban jelen levő antiszemita sztereotípiák és előítéletek több kategóriába sorolhatóak. Egy 2022-es, több országra kiterjedő kutatás<sup>555</sup> felmérte a különböző típusú antiszemita előítéletekben való hitet. Az egyik vizsgált kategória a tradicionális, vallási alapú antijudaizmus volt. Ebbe tartozik például az a kijelentés, hogy Jézus megfeszítése a zsidók megbocsáthatatlan bűne (ezzel 16% értett egyet). Egy másik kategória az összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemita sztereotípiák, előítéletek. Ide tartozik például, hogy a zsidóknak túl nagy befolyása van Magyarországon (25% értett egyet), a zsidók uralni akarják a világot (23% értett egyet) és ki akarják terjeszteni befolyásukat a globális gazdaságra (40% értett egyet), céljaik elérése érdekében másoknál gyakrabban használnak kétes gyakorlatokat (18% értett egyet), és gyakran ők tevékenykednek titokban a színpalak mögött (17% értett egyet).<sup>556</sup> Megjelennek Magyarországon a holokauszttal kapcsolatos antiszemita narratívák is. Ilyen például, hogy a zsidók előnyöket próbálnak kovácsolni a háború és a holokauszt alatti üldöztetésükből (28% értett egyet), ők is hibásak az őket ért üldöztetésért (17% értett egyet), és túl sokat beszélnek a holokausztról (31% értett egyet).<sup>557</sup>

Ezen kategóriákon kívül jelen vannak más antiszemita elméletek is. Ilyen például, hogy zsidók nem lehetnek egy ország egyenrangú tagjai, mert mindig hűségesebbek maradnak a zsidósághoz vagy Izraelhez, mint a nemzethez, amellyel Magyarországon a teljes népesség 35%-a egyetértett 2019-ben.<sup>558</sup> Valamint a COVID-19 járvánnyal kapcsolatban is megjelentek antiszemita elméletek: a COVID-19 vírust a zsidók hozták létre

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<sup>554</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 90.

<sup>555</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries.

<sup>556</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 27-32.

<sup>557</sup> Barna et al., Survey on antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrad countries, 54-63.

<sup>558</sup> Félix, Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020, 84.

és/vagy terjesztik, politikai vagy gazdasági előny szerzés céljából, vagy azért, hogy leszámoljanak ellenségeikkel és bosszút álljanak történelmi elnyomóikon.<sup>559</sup> Az antiszemita toposzok közül a szélsőjobboldalon megjelenik még a kommunizmust és zsidóságot egybemosó narratíva is, amely a zsidókat teszi felelőssé a kommunista rendszerek bűneiért a magyar nép ellen.<sup>560</sup>

A zsidók a különböző előítéletes narratívák interszekciójában „háttérhatalom”-ként gyakran úgy jelennek meg, mint akik felelősek különböző kisebbségi csoportok magyarországi megjelenéséért. A narratívák szerint ezzel céljuk, hogy aláássák a magyar nemzetet. Szélsőjobboldali narratívák szerint például a zsidók (pl. Soros György) szervezik a muszlim bevándorlást, hogy így gyengítsék meg a keresztény Európát és a nemzetállamokat.<sup>561</sup> Hasonlóképp, a zsidók a romákat „biológiai fegyverként” használják a magyarok ellen<sup>562</sup>, „homopropagandistaként” pedig a homoszexualitás és a deviancia terjesztésén dolgoznak a kereszténységgel és a fehér emberekkel szemben<sup>563</sup>.

Az interjúalanyok ezek mellett megemlítették még, hogy gyakori sztereotípiák a zsidókkal szemben a görbe orr, a pajesz és a kalap viselete, ezek mellett pedig, hogy baloldaliak, okosak, befolyásosak, telhetetlenek, kulturálisan felsőbbrendűnek tartják magukat, kommunisták, vagyonosak, vezető pozíciókat foglalnak el, és egymást segítik ezekben a pozíciókba jutni a magyarok kárára. A kutatások eredményeivel egybevágóan többen elterjedt véleménynek látják, hogy a zsidók túl sokat beszélnek a holokausztról, illetve, hogy anyagi haszonszerzés céljából más szituációkban is mindig áldozatként állítják be magukat. Az összeesküvés-elméleti antisemitizmushoz kapcsolódóan többen említették a 19. századi vérvádat, a 20. századi tórdőféselméletet, amely a zsidókat teszi felelőssé Trianonért, azt a hitet, hogy ők okozták a világválságot, valamint a COVID-járvány utáni újvilágrend-elméletet, amely szerint a járványt és az azt követő gazdasági problémákat zsidó hatalmasok arra akarják kihasználni, hogy kiterjessék befolyásukat és hatalmukat az emberek és az országok felett.<sup>564</sup> Az új antisemitizmushoz kapcsolódóan pedig gyakori véleménynek tartják, hogy a zsidók gyilkolják a palesztinokat.

### 2.3. Antiszemita gyűlöletbeszéd és gyűlölet-bűncselekmények

Magyarországon az állami szervek nem publikálnak hivatalos adatokat az egyes kisebbségi csoportokkal szembeni gyűlöletbeszédéről és gyűlölet-bűncselekményekről. Az elérhető hivatalos statisztikai adatok

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<sup>559</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Knap Árpád, “An exploration of coronavirus-related online antisemitism in Hungary using quantitative topic model and qualitative discourse analysis,” *East European Journal of Society and Politics* 7, no. 3 (2021): 80-100.

<sup>560</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Knap Árpád, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary: Exploring Topics of Antisemitism in the Far-Right Media Using Natural Language Processing,” *Theo Web Academic Journal of Religious Education* 18, no. 1 (2019): 75-92.

<sup>561</sup> Barna and Knap, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary”, 75-92.

<sup>562</sup> Barna, Félix, ed. *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*, 67.

<sup>563</sup> Barna and Knap, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary”, 75-92.

<sup>564</sup> A középkorból származó **vérvádak** szerint a zsidók a vallási rituálékhoz keresztény gyermekeket ölnek és vérüket felhasználják a peszáchi kovásztalan kenyér elkészítéséhez. A 20. századi **tórdőfés-elmélet** szerint Németország első világháborús vereségének egyik oka a zsidóság volt, akik belső ellenségként a destruktív viselkedésükkel háttasúrták a német csapatokat. Az elmélet Magyarországon is meghonosodott, a két világháború közötti narratívák része volt, hogy a háború elvesztése nem a csapatokon múlt, hanem a sajtón. A 21. századi **újvilágrend-elmélet** szerint a globális politikai és gazdasági elit árnyékkormányok segítségével egy világkormány létrehozását tervezi, amellyel megszüntetik a szuverén kormányokat és autoriter világvezetés fog kialakulni.

minden kisebbségi csoport tagja elleni erőszakot egyben kezelnek, és nem feltétlenül fedik a valóságot.<sup>565</sup> Ezek alapján a gyűlölet-bűncselekmények száma elenyésző.<sup>566</sup> Magyarországon nincsen szisztematikus és mindenre kiterjedő monitoring, de a témát vizsgáló civil szervezetek szerint az országban évente nagyjából 30-60 antiszemita incidens történik – leggyakoribb a gyűlöletbeszéd, a személy vagy vagyon elleni fizikai erőszak elenyésző.<sup>567</sup>

Minden interjúalany egyetértett abban, hogy Magyarországon az antiszemitizmus elsősorban verbálisan jelenik meg, de emellett említették néhányan a temetők, zsinagógák megrongálását is. A megkérdezettek szerint leginkább összeesküvés-elméletek formájában jelenik meg az antiszemitizmus, de többen hangsúlyozták, hogy elterjedt a burkoltan, rejtetten, utalgatások formájában megjelenő antiszemitizmus („szalonzsídózás”) és az antiszemita humor is.

## 2.4. Antiszemitizmus a politikában

A magyar politikában a 2010 utáni években jelen lévő antiszemitizmus elsősorban a (néppártosodás<sup>568</sup> előtti) Jobbikhoz köthető, bár a szélsőséges párt egyre gyakoribb közéleti szereplései és népszerűvé válása már a 2010 előtti években érzékelhetően megnövelte az antiszemitizmus jelenlétét és elfogadottságát a közbeszédben, majd kimutathatóan megerősítette az antiszemita attitűdöket is.<sup>569</sup> Bár a Fidesz-kormány 2013-ban zéró toleranciát hirdetett az antiszemitizmussal szemben<sup>570</sup>, a párt választási és kommunikációs stratégiájának szerves része elsajátítani témákat a szélsőjobbtól, melyeket aztán a teljes társadalomnak terjeszt a hozzá köthető médián keresztül<sup>571</sup>. Az antiszemitizmushoz kapcsolható ilyen témák a Soros Györggyel kapcsolatos összeesküvés-elméletek, Horthy dicsőítése, a holokauszt emlékezetének eltorzítása, és az állandó retorika, miszerint a Fidesz a nemzetet védi egy külső, globális ellenségtől.<sup>572</sup> Ezek mellett 2015 óta több, szélsőséges, antiszemita kijelentéseiről ismert közéleti szereplő kapott magas állami kitüntetést (pl. Bayer Zsolt, Raffay Ernő).<sup>573</sup> A politikai szereplők közül leginkább a Jobbikból 2018-ban kivált, szélsőjobboldali Mi Hazánk alkalmaz antiszemita elemeket, bár a Jobbikra korábban jellemző, akár nyílt antiszemita megnyilvánulások helyett már „csak” kódolt, burkolt, jórészt összeesküvés-elméletes „csomagolásban” (pl. a Rotschildeket támadva, az új világtrend elméletet propagálva). Az antiszemitizmus politikai jelenléte erősen

<sup>565</sup> Uszkiewicz, Erik, “Anomalies in the application of law related to hate crimes,” *Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies* 61, no. 3 (2021): 325-41; FRA, *Antisemitism: Overview of antisemitic incidents in the European Union 2011-2021* (Bécs: FRA, 2022).

<sup>566</sup> Belügyminisztérium, “Bűnügyi Statisztikai Rendszer,” letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://bsr.bm.hu/Document>.

<sup>567</sup> Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*, 10-16; TEV, *Antiszemita gyűlölet-bűncselekmények és incidensek Magyarországon: 2020. éves rövid jelentés* (Budapest: TEV, 2020); FRA, *Antisemitism*.

<sup>568</sup> Bíró-Nagy, András and Boros, Tamás, “Jobbik going mainstream: Strategy shift of the far-right in Hungary,” in *Extreme right in Europe*, ed. Jamin Jerome (Brüsszel: Bruylant, 2016): 243-63; Héjj, Dominik, “The rebranding of Jobbik,” *New Eastern Europe* 29, no. 6 (2017): 83-90.

<sup>569</sup> Hann és Róna, *Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban*, 2015, 13; Barna and Félix, *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*, 14; Félix, *Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020*, 47.

<sup>570</sup> Miniszterelnöki honlap, “Zéró tolerancia van az antiszemitizmussal szemben,” letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/zero-tolerancia-van-az-antiszemitizmussal-szemben/>.

<sup>571</sup> Bálint Kata et al., *„Minél jobbra, minél jobban” – A magyar (szélső)jobb 100 évvel Trianon után* (Budapest: Political Capital, 2020), 14.

<sup>572</sup> Berend, Nóra, “Renationalized History and Antisemitism in Hungary,” *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2022): 216-28.

<sup>573</sup> NOA, *Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről*, 10.

kötődik a Novák Elődhez köthető kuruc.info portálhoz, aki korábban a Jobbik, ma pedig a Mi Hazánk prominens politikusa.<sup>574</sup>

Több interjúalany szerint Magyarországon az antiszemitizmus átpolitizált téma. Sokan kiemelték a Fidesz-kormány Soros György elleni kampányát, mint ami hatott az antiszemitizmusra. Bár a kormány szerint a kampány nem volt antiszemita<sup>575</sup>, az interjúalanyok többsége annak érzékelt, mivel a kampány Soros Györgyöt a hagyományos antiszemita sztereotípiák mentén ábrázolta. A kampány hatása is az antiszemita értelmezést erősíti: mivel a Soros-ellenes plakátokon gyakran jelentek meg antiszemita feliratok és jelképek (pl. „bűdös zsidók”, Dávid-csillag),<sup>576</sup> a kampány kétségkívül mozgósított antiszemita érzelmeket. Több szakember szerint azok, akiknek vannak antiszemita érzelmeik, antiszemitaként dekódolták a kampányt, azok számára viszont, akiknek nincsenek, nem hordozott antiszemita konnotációt. Emellett többen megemlítették, hogy a magyar kormány nem megfelelő emlékezetpolitikája is hatással lehet az antiszemitizmusra.

Több zsidó identitású interjúalany kiemelte, hogy a kormány részéről az antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatban kettősbeszéd figyelhető meg: miközben zéró toleranciát hirdetett az antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatban, és nagy összegekkel – bár szelektíven – támogat zsidó szervezeteket és ügyeket, antiszemita személyeket támogat, és együttműködik antiszemita eszméket is terjesztő szereplőkkel.<sup>577</sup>

## 2.5. Antiszemitizmus a sportban

A sportágak közül leginkább a labdarúgásban jelenik meg Magyarországon az antiszemitizmus. A magyar futballszurkolók diszkriminatív és rasszista viselkedése többször okozott problémát: a 2020-as labdarúgó Európa Bajnokság ideje alatt nemzetközi visszhangja lett, 2021-ben pedig az UEFA megbüntette a Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetséget (MLSZ) több más mellett 100 000 eurós pénzbüntetésre is.<sup>578</sup> Egy felmérés szerint a büntetést a megkérdezettek 57%-a helyeselte, és csak 38%-a találta túl szigorúnak.<sup>579</sup> 2022-ben az UEFA

<sup>574</sup> Barna and Knap, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Hungary,” 75-92.

<sup>575</sup> HVG, “Így válaszolt Orbán a Mazsihisz-elnöknek, aki a Soros-kampány leállítására kérte,” HVG, 2017. július 7. [https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170707\\_orban\\_mazsihisz\\_valasz](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170707_orban_mazsihisz_valasz); HVG, “Szijjártó a Jerusalem Postnak: Nem azért utáljuk Sorost, mert zsidó,” HVG, 2019. február 21. [https://hvg.hu/vilag/20190221\\_Szijjarto\\_a\\_Jerusalem\\_Postnak\\_Nem\\_azert\\_utaljuk\\_Sorost\\_mert\\_zsido](https://hvg.hu/vilag/20190221_Szijjarto_a_Jerusalem_Postnak_Nem_azert_utaljuk_Sorost_mert_zsido); ATV, “Szijjártó Péter: azok az antiszemiták, akik azt állítják, Soros Györggyel a vallása miatt vitatkozik a kormány,” ATV, 2020. július 23. <https://www.atv.hu/belfold/20200723/szijjarto-peter-azok-az-antiszemitak-akik-azt-allitjak-soros-gyorggyel-a-vallasa-miatt-vitatkozik-a-kormany>.

<sup>576</sup> A Soros-plakátokon megjelenő antiszemita üzenetekkel kapcsolatban a MAZSIHISZ akkori elnöke, Heisler András nyílt levelet írt Orbán Viktor miniszterelnöknek. 444, “A Mazsihisz elnöke Orbánnak: Vonják vissza utcáinkról és tereinkről a plakátokat!,” 444, 2017. július 6. <https://444.hu/2017/07/06/a-mazsihisz-elnoke-orbannak-vonjak-vissza-utcainkrol-es-tereinkrol-a-plakatokat>.

<sup>577</sup> 24.hu, “Állami támogatásból vett dobogókői telket a Kitörés túra szervezője, de senki sem árulja el, hol épül fel a turistaház,” 24.hu, 2023. október 31. <https://24.hu/kozelet/2023/10/31/hazajaro-honismereti-es-turista-egylet-egyesulet-kitores-tura-allami-tamogatas-bethlen-gabor-alapkezeslo-moys-zoltan-dobogoko-turistahaz/>; Bálint et al, „Minél jobbra, minél jobban.

<sup>578</sup> Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség, “Közlemény az Euro 2020 három magyar mérkőzése kapcsán hozott fegyelmi döntés háttéréről,” letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://szovetseg.mlsz.hu/hir/kozlemeny-az-euro-2020-harom-magyar-merkozese-kapcsan-hozott-fegyelmi-dontes-hattererol>.

<sup>579</sup> Félix, Antiszemita incidensek jelentés 2019-2020, 21;



politikai szimbólumnak minősítette és betiltotta az UEFA által szervezett versenyeken a Nagy-Magyarországot ábrázoló molinókat és kiegészítőket.<sup>580</sup>

A megkérdezett szakértő szerint a lelátókon megjelenő antiszemitizmusnak három típusa van: 1) nyílt antiszemita megnyilvánulások (pl. izraeli sportolókkal szemben); 2) összeesküvés-elméletek (pl. a büntetések mögött meghúzódó vélt zsidó érdekek); 3) a zsidó szó használata negatív jelzőként ideológiai vagy politikai tartalom nélkül. A sportmérkőzéseken leggyakrabban a cigányozás jelenik meg, az antiszemitizmus ritkábban, de a megjelenő rasszizmus tartalmát mindig nagyban befolyásolja az aktuális politikai diskurzus.

## 2.6. A zsidó közösség antiszemitizmussal kapcsolatos tapasztalatai és percepciói

Egy 2017-es felmérés<sup>581</sup> szerint a magyar zsidók 48%-a tapasztalt antiszemitizmust élete során, ami jelentős csökkenés az 1999-es kutatáshoz<sup>582</sup> képest, ahol még 75% volt ez az arány. Ezzel szemben a magyar zsidók percepciója szerint 1999. óta nőtt Magyarországon az antiszemitizmus: a 2017-es kutatásban a válaszadók inkább tartották antiszemitának a magyar társadalmat és valószínűbbnek látták a zsidóüldözés bekövetkeztét is, mint 1999-ben.<sup>583</sup> Bár zsidó szervezetek szerint a kormány megfelelően garantálja a közösség biztonságát és testi épségét, nem tesz eleget az előítéletesség ellen, például az oktatás, a média, és a kultúrák közötti párbeszéd terén.<sup>584</sup>

Minden általunk megkérdezett zsidó identitású fiatal és zsidó civil találkozott már őt ért antiszemita megjegyzéssel szóban vagy írásban (online). Emellett többen beszámoltak arról, hogy az antiszemita incidensek elkerüléséért elrejtették zsidó identitásukat. Ennek ellenére, több zsidó identitású interjúalany alacsonynak tartja az antiszemitizmus szintjét Magyarországon, és nem érzékelte, hogy növekedett volna az elmúlt 10-15 évben. Amellett, hogy szerintük az ország biztonságos a zsidók számára, többen beszámoltak arról, hogy a politikában megjelenő kettősbeszéd következtében folyamatos bizonytalanságot is megélnék azzal kapcsolatban, hogy a jelenlegi helyzet bármikor megváltozhat. Egy zsidó vallási vezető kiemelte, hogy a keresztények között jelen van több, a vallásban gyökerező antiszemita narratíva, amit az egyházak a kellő információk átadásával csökkenthetnének. Több zsidó identitású fiatal interjúalany szerint a zsidó közösségek, egyházak is hajlamosak a zsidó identitást a holokauszt traumájára építeni, ami véleményük szerint nem segíti az antiszemitizmus csökkentését az országban.

## 3. Más kisebbségi csoportokkal szembeni előítéletesség

A magyar társadalom meglehetősen kirekesztő a kisebbségi csoportokkal szemben, több kisebbségi csoporttal szemben is elterjedtek az előítéletek és sztereotípiák. A felmérések szerint a zsidók az egyik legkevésbé elutasított csoport. Míg 2014-ig a romákkal szembeni elutasítottság volt a legmagasabb, azt követően a bevándorlók/migránsok váltak a leginkább elutasítottá.<sup>585</sup>

<sup>580</sup> Telex, “UEFA: We have not permitted the use of Greater Hungary symbols at football matches,” Telex, March 22, 2022. <https://telex.hu/english/2023/03/22/uefa-we-have-not-permitted-the-use-of-greater-hungary-symbols-at-football-matches>.

<sup>581</sup> Kovács és Barna, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben, 111.

<sup>582</sup> Kovács András, szerk., Zsidók a mai Magyarországon. Az 1999-ben végzett szociológiai felmérés eredményei (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő Kiadó, 2002).

<sup>583</sup> Kovács és Barna, Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben, 121.

<sup>584</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 24.

<sup>585</sup> Hann Endre és Róna Dániel, Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban (Budapest: TEV, 2019); Kende Anna et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon: Projektzáró tanulmány (Budapest: Political Capital,

Több interjúalany véleménye szerint az előítéleteknek általában ugyanaz a gyökere, például a bizonytalanság (szociális, gazdasági, egzisztenciális), az információhiány, az oktatás problémái, a politikai szemlélet, a rossz tapasztalatok, illetve az irigység vagy a szolidaritás hiánya. Az interjúalanyok mindegyike legerősebbnek a romákkal, a migránsokkal és az LMBTQ+-közösséggel szembeni ellenérzéseket tartotta Magyarországon. A cigányellenességet többen a mindennapi beszéd részének érzik, de az LMBTQ+- és migránsellenességet is elfogadhatónak tartja a társadalom, ami az antiszemitizmus esetében viszont nem igaz. Egy LMBTQ+-közösség vezetője kiemelte, hogy míg a magyar kormány politikailag egyenrangúnak tekinti a zsidóságot, a romákat, az LMBTQ+-közösséget és a migránsokat nem.

A cigányellenesség a cigányságot alulról jövő gazdasági, kulturális és fizikai fenyegetésnek tekinti, megnyilvánulása elsősorban a dehumanizációban és a negatív sztereotípiákkal való egyetértésben jelenik meg.<sup>586</sup> Egy fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakember az interjúk során ezt úgy fogalmazta meg, hogy az antiszemitizmus és a cigányellenesség gazdaságilag és társadalmilag is elhelyezik ezeket a csoportokat: míg az antiszemitizmus mögött a zsidók vélt vagy valós jobb helyzete felé érzett irigység áll, addig a cigányellenesség mögött inkább az attól való félelem, hogy az adott ember is a cigányság vélt vagy valós rossz helyzetébe kerülhet.

A 2015-ös menekültválsággal kapcsolatos kormányzati kommunikáció a menekülteket és bevándorlókat fizikai, biztonsági, egészségügyi, szociális, munkaerőpiaci és kulturális/civilizációs veszélyként állította be.<sup>587</sup> A 2010-es évek közepétől az LMBTQ+-közösséggel kapcsolatos társadalmi attitűdökre is nagy hatással volt a kormány politikája és kommunikációja, amely kulturális, értékrendbeli és demográfiai veszélyként jelenítette meg az LMBTQ+ és a gender témáját.<sup>588</sup>

### 3.1. Gyűlöletbeszéd és gyűlölet-bűncselekmények más kisebbségi csoportok ellen

A gyűlölet-bűncselekmények hivatalos száma elenyésző Magyarországon<sup>589</sup>, bár a valós számuk minden bizonnyal és akár jelentősen meghaladja a statisztikákban szereplőket<sup>590</sup>. A Belügyminisztérium ezeket az adatokat nem engedi kisebbségi csoportok szerint lebontani, viszont az EBESZ-nek küldött adatok és kutatások alapján ezek túlnyomó többsége romák elleni bűncselekmény, melyeket a homofób incidensek

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2018); Republikon, Előítéletek, antiszemitizmus: A ComAnCE projekt kutatási eredményei II (Budapest: Republikon Intézet, 2019).

<sup>586</sup> Kende et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon; Vanja Ljujic et al., "Romaphobia: A unique phenomenon?," Romani Studies 22, no. 2 (2012): 141-52.

<sup>587</sup> Barna, Ildikó and Hunyadi Bulcsú, Report on Xenophobia, Discrimination, Religious Hatred and Aggressive Nationalism in Hungary in 2015 (Budapest: Political Capital, 2016); Sik Endre et al., "Az idegenellenesség alakulása és a bevándorlással kapcsolatos félelmek Magyarországon és a visegrádi országokban," Régió 24, no. 2, (2016): 81-108.

<sup>588</sup> A Háttér Társaság oldalán láthatóak időrendben az egyes kormányzati megszólalások és cselekvések: <https://hatter.hu/hirek/a-magyar-allam-nem-hogy-nem-vedi-aktivan-alaassa-az-lmbtqi-emberek-szabadsagat-es-jogait>; Political Capital, A comparison of the anti-gender and anti-LGBTQI mobilisation in Hungary and Poland (Budapest: Political Capital, 2022).

<sup>589</sup> Belügyminisztérium, "Bűnügyi Statisztikai Rendszer" .

<sup>590</sup> FRA, Antisemitism.

követnek.<sup>591</sup> Míg a romák elleni gyűlöletbeszédéről nincsenek adatok<sup>592</sup>, az LMBTQ+-közösség tagjai nagy arányban tapasztalnak gyűlöletbeszédet<sup>593</sup>.

A romák elleni diszkrimináció mindennapos és intézményes: a hétköznapokban munkaerőpiaci, lakhatási, egészségügyi, oktatási, gyámsági és rendészeti téren is éri őket diszkrimináció. A jogvédelemhez és érdekképviselőhöz való hozzáférés hiánya ezt tovább erősíti.<sup>594</sup>

## 4. Antiszemizmus és az oktatás

### 4.1. Antiszemizmus és más előítéletek az iskolákban

A fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek és a fiatalok egyetértettek abban, hogy nagyon iskolafüggő, hogy milyen mértékben van jelen az antiszemizmus. Abban is egyetértettek, hogy ha az antiszemizmus meg is jelenik a diákok között, a tanárok ritkán szereznek erről tudomást. Az iskolákban leginkább verbális formában jelenik meg az antiszemizmus, amely forrásaként sok fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakember interjúalanyunk egyrészt a felszínes, online információfogyasztást, másrészt az otthoni mintákat nevezte meg. Szerintük az iskolai antiszemita megnyilatkozások mögött többségében nem állnak antiszemita érzések, inkább lázadás a tiltások ellen, tudatlanság, vagy a „zsidó” mint szitokszó használata (ugyanígy jelennek meg a „cigány” és a „buzi” szavak is). Többekben felmerült a kérdés, hogy az ilyen megnyilatkozás mennyiben tekinthető antiszemitának. Ritkán megjelennek a zsidóság történelme és hagyományai iránt jobban érdeklődő, azokat jobban ismerő diákok részéről klasszikus antiszemita narratívák is. A holokauszt témájával kapcsolatban a nem antiszemita diákoknak is gyakran vannak ellenérzései, nem értik, mi közük van hozzá, miért kell tanulni róla. A fiatalok kiemelték, hogy számukra sokszor nem egyértelmű, hogyan lehetne korrekt módon beszélni a társadalmilag érzékeny témákról.

Az interjúalanyok szerint a cigányellenesség erősebben jelenik meg az iskolákban, mint az antiszemizmus. Több fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakember kiemelte, hogy a politikailag gerjesztett társadalmi polarizáció és a kormányzati kampányok is hatással vannak a fiatalokra, amit jól példáz a 2015-ös menekültellenes kampány nyomán a diákok körében felerősödő migránsellenesség.

### 4.2. Zsidósággal, antiszemizmussal és a holokauszttal kapcsolatos témák a tantervben

A kormány 2012-ben új Nemzeti alaptantervet (NAT) és egységes tankönyvrendszert hozott létre, amely során egyeztetett<sup>595</sup> a releváns tantervi változtatásokat a zsidó civil szervezeteket és hitközségeket magában foglaló Zsidó Közösségi Kerekasztallal<sup>596</sup>. A tantervet 2020-ban ismét módosították, ám ekkor nem vonták be a Kerekasztalt. Bár nem távolítottak el részeket a zsidó történelemből, a tananyagba bekerültek antiszemita

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<sup>591</sup> Az Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) oldalán megtalálható adatok: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/hungary>.

<sup>592</sup> Kende et al., Romaellenesség és antiszemizmus Magyarországon;

<sup>593</sup> Luke Hubbard, Speak Out: A Survey of Online Anti-LGBT+ Hate Speech and Hate Crime (online, 2019). Letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://en.hatter.hu/publications/speak-out-a-survey-of-online-anti-lgbt-hate-speech-and-hate-crime>.

<sup>594</sup> Király Júlia et al., Romák Magyarországon: A diszkrimináció kihívásai (Budapest: MRGE, 2021).

<sup>595</sup> Krausz Viktória, "Tájékoztató tankönyvviták közben," Szombat folyóirat, 2015. március 24. <https://www.szombat.org/politika/tajkep-tankonyvvitak-kozben>.

<sup>596</sup> Szunyogh Szabolcs, Áttekintés a Nemzeti alaptantervvel, a kerettantervekkel és a tankönyvekkel kapcsolatban (Budapest: TEV, 2015).

történelmi szereplők (pl. Wass Albert vagy Nyírő József).<sup>597</sup> Az antiszemitizmus visszaszorításához szükséges témák, például az emberi jogok, a kritikus gondolkodás, az elfogadás és a kultúrák közötti párbeszéd oktatása nem megfelelő, nemcsak a tanterv hiányosságai miatt, hanem a tanároknak nyújtott megfelelő támogatás, útmutatás hiánya miatt sem.<sup>598</sup>

Több interjúalany kifogásolta a Nemzeti alaptantervet, mert kikerültek belőle olyan szerzők, akiken keresztül hatékonyan lehetne beszélni a diákokkal a holokausztról és az antiszemitizmusról.

### 4.3. Az oktatás szerepe és lehetőségei az antiszemitizmus és más előítéletesség csökkentésében

Kutatások kimutatták, hogy középiskolában a diákok előítéletességére nagy hatással van az, hogy közösségükben az előítéletességet vagy az elfogadást érzékelik-e normának. Míg általában a többség inkább nem előítéletes, ha a közösséget inkább annak tartják, az közös normává teszi az előítéletességet.<sup>599</sup> A csoportközi és csoporton kívüli kapcsolatok létesítése is elősegíti, hogy ne az előítéletek váljanak közösségi normává az iskolában.<sup>600</sup> A tanároknak és az iskolának is kiemelt szerepe van tehát az előítéletek csökkentésében. Feltételezhető, hogy ha egy tanár képes támogatni az előítéletességet elutasító, befogadó közösségi normák kialakulását a diákok között, például teret adva a közösségben eleve meglévő ilyen hangoknak, az nagy eséllyel csökkenti a diákok előítéletességét.<sup>601</sup>

Az oktatást több interjúalany az előítéletek csökkentésének egyik legfontosabb eszközeként határozta meg, mivel ezzel lehet fiatalokat nagy számban, célzottan elérni. Fontos tantárgynak látták ebből a szempontból az idegennyelv-oktatást, az emberi jogi nevelést, valamint a fiatalok kiemelték a kritikus gondolkodást, az álhírek felismerésének képességét és az önismeretet. Kiemelten fontos szerintük a tanárok képzése is, hogy megfelelően tudjanak reagálni a diákok közt megjelenő előítéletességre. Több interjúalany szerint jól működnek az érzékenyítés szempontjából a civil szervezeti projektnapok, a kulturális, művészeti és a személyes találkozásokon alapuló programok. Többben kiemelték, hogy az előítéletek csökkentése lassú folyamat, sok időbe és energiába telik, alapvetően személyes beszélgetésekkel lehet eredményes, és fontos a teljes tanári kart bevonni ebbe.

Több interjúalany szerint a tapasztalatok azt mutatják, hogy az antiszemitizmust nem lehet tiltással visszaszorítani, mert ez csak elnyomja az előítéletességet, nem számolja fel azt, és a tiltás elleni lázadáshoz vezet. Ugyanakkor többek szerint a direkt érzékenyítés is könnyen kontraproduktív lehet, ha rossz eszközt választunk hozzá. A tényalapú információátadásnál sokkal eredményesebbek az érzelmi átélésre, empátiára és személyes kapcsolatteremtésre alapuló módszerek. Többek tapasztalata szerint például a holokauszttal kapcsolatos érzékenyítés nem működik jól száraz tényekkel és adatokkal, hanem inkább személyes történetekkel, amelyekhez a diák tud kapcsolódni. Nagyon erős ugyanakkor a traumára építő narratíva, ami a fiatalok esetében sokszor nem célravezető.

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<sup>597</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 14.

<sup>598</sup> NOA, Nemzeti jelentés az antiszemitizmus elleni és a zsidó élet támogatását célzó kormányzati intézkedésekről, 24.

<sup>599</sup> Váradi, Luca, "Youths Trapped in Prejudice: Hungarian Adolescents' Attitudes Towards the Roma," *Politische Psychologie*, 2014: 61-83; Váradi, Luca et al., "Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice? The Dynamics of Perceived Group Norms and Prejudice in New Secondary School Classes," *Frontiers in Psychology* 11, (2021): 1-17.

<sup>600</sup> Váradi et al., *Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice?*

<sup>601</sup> Váradi et al., *Whose Norms, Whose Prejudice?*

Az egyik fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakember véleménye szerint egy diákközösségben általában nem az előítéletesek és nem is az elfogadók vannak többségben, hanem azok, akik nem gondolnak semmit a kérdésről. Az oktatás célja így részben az kell, hogy legyen, hogy őket a helyes oldalra állítsa, hogy érző és szolidáris embereket neveljen.

Az oktatás lehetőségei az előítéletek csökkentésére Magyarországon több interjúalany szerint több szempontból korlátozottak. Az oktatási rendszer válságban van, ami megmutatkozik a pedagógushiányban, a nagylétszámú osztályokban, a központosított irányításban, a NAT változásaiban és az általános időhiányban. Bár az iskolák egy része fontosnak tartja, hogy fellépjen az előítéletek ellen, a fenti tényezők mellett a megfelelő ismeretek és módszerek hiánya is hátráltatja ezt.

Az oktatás fontosságának hangsúlyozása mellett az interjúalanyok több lehetséges módot is meghatároztak az előítéletek és ezen belül az antiszemitizmus csökkentésére. Ilyen például a közösségépítés, az önismeret, a sokféleség megtapasztalása. Az antiszemitizmus csökkentésében külön is segíthet, ha az embereknek van esélyük megismerni a zsidó vallást és kultúrát, kapcsolatba kerülni zsidó személyekkel. Emellett a fiatalok között, de társadalmi szinten is kiemelten fontos a kisebbségek megfelelő reprezentációja a médiában és a fellépés a kisebbségekkel szembeni sértő és gyűlöletkeltő narratívákkal szemben.

#### 4.4. Oktatási anyagok és programok

Több civil szervezet hozott már létre az előítéletek csökkentésében segítséget nyújtó oktatási anyagokat vagy tart/tartott rendszeresen iskolai foglalkozásokat fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek számára. Ilyenek például – a teljesség igénye nélkül – az antiszemitizmus témájában a Zachor Alapítvány, a Haver Alapítvány, a Centropa Alapítvány és a Tett és Védelem Alapítvány; más kisebbségekkel szembeni ellenérzések illetve általában az előítéletek témájában pedig az UCCU Alapítvány, a Menedék Egyesület, a Labrisz Egyesület, a Szimpozion Egyesület, a Demokratikus Ifjúságért Alapítvány, az Emberi Jogi Nevelők Hálózata, a Down Alapítvány, a Menhely Alapítvány, a Független Színház, valamint az Amnesty International Magyarország.<sup>602</sup>

A tankönyveken kívül több digitális oktatóanyag is a tanárok rendelkezésére áll a zsidósággal és a holokauszttal kapcsolatban. Ezek megfelelő felhasználásához szükséges azonban a tanárok módszertani továbbképzése, megismertetésük a digitális tananyagokkal. Ezek mellett egyrészt szükséges az iskolák számára megfelelő technikai háttérrel biztosítani az ilyen tananyagok használatához, másrészt a kerettantervek, a tananyagok és az óraszámok megfelelő kialakítása.<sup>603</sup> Valamint olyan környezet kialakítása az oktatásban és a közéletben, amely nem készíti öncenzúrára a tanárokat és az iskolaigazgatókat az oktatásirányítási szervek, a politika vagy a szülők reakciójától tartva, hanem ösztönzi és támogatja őket abban, hogy aktívan fellépjenek az előítéletek csökkentéséért és a kisebbségi csoportok megismertetéséért.

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<sup>602</sup> Euroguide, *Hogyan beszéljünk fiatalokkal érzékeny társadalmi kérdésekről? - Ötletgyűjtemény és módszertani segédanyag fiatalokkal foglalkozó szakemberek számára* kiadvány (online, 2021). letöltés dátuma: 2023. december 19. <https://euroguide-toolkit.eu/language-select/hu/hu-kezikonyv-bevezeto/>.

<sup>603</sup> Mezei Mónika, "Holokausztoktatás online. Közművelődési intézmények, közgyűjtemények és civil szervezetek online oktatási anyagai," in *A Holokauszt, az iskola és a tanár*, szerk. Forrás-Bíró Aletta (Budapest: OKFI, 2016).

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## **ANNEX 2: Italian national report in the local language**

### **Sommario**

Questo documento è stato redatto sulla base dell'analisi dei materiali reperiti attraverso la ricerca documentale, in particolare dei materiali e delle fonti messe a disposizione dalla Fondazione CDEC e dal portale dell'Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (UCEI), e dell'analisi dei dati acquisiti attraverso le risposte degli intervistati, con l'obiettivo di fornire informazioni strutturate e documentate sul fenomeno dell'antisemitismo in Italia oggi. In particolare, il report si concentra sulla situazione delle comunità ebraiche italiane e sulla vita ebraica nella sua dimensione sociale, politica, economica, culturale e religiosa.

La parte più consistente del report riguarda il livello di antisemitismo nella società italiana, le sue forme prevalenti e gli ambiti in cui si manifesta. In riferimento alle diverse manifestazioni dell'antisemitismo, vengono evidenziati gli stereotipi presenti nella società e quelli più diffusi. Da questa analisi emerge chiaramente che le forme e le aree in cui si manifesta l'antisemitismo differiscono a seconda del grado di scolarizzazione, della formazione culturale e del background socio-economico degli autori di atti antisemiti. Pertanto, è difficile identificare con precisione il profilo dell'antisemita.

Le aree in cui gli atti di odio e i crimini di odio sono più diffusi sono i social media e lo sport, in particolare il calcio. Tuttavia, anche nel dibattito politico è evidente la presenza di forme più o meno latenti di antisemitismo legate all'ideologia nazifascista, per i movimenti di estrema destra, e di antisionismo per l'estrema sinistra.

Il report si propone inoltre di evidenziare quali siano le altre minoranze più discriminate in Italia e quali siano gli stereotipi e i pregiudizi ad esse associati, nonché quali siano le possibili intersezioni tra antisemitismo e altre forme di razzismo e intolleranza. Ampio spazio è, infine, dedicato alle strategie educative messe in atto nelle scuole per contrastare e prevenire l'antisemitismo, in quanto la direzione del Ministero dell'Istruzione e del Merito italiano (IMPE) punta alla diffusione e all'attuazione delle Linee guida per il contrasto dell'antisemitismo (2019) nelle scuole pubbliche e alla promozione di una cultura del dialogo e della pace.

## 1. Introduzione

### a) Il progetto e la ricerca

Il progetto<sup>604</sup> BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) si svolgerà tra gennaio 2023 e dicembre 2024 in Ungheria, Italia, Polonia e Romania. Il progetto mira ad affrontare i pregiudizi radicati, gli atteggiamenti ed i comportamenti di odio presenti nella società, in particolare nei confronti dell'ebraismo europeo. Il progetto mira anche a promuovere la comprensione, la tolleranza ed il dialogo. Particolare enfasi viene posta sulla sensibilizzazione dei giovani all'ebraismo e all'antisemitismo e sulla promozione del dialogo interculturale e interreligioso. La ricerca è stata condotta come una delle prime fasi del progetto BOND. Sia il progetto che la ricerca utilizzano la definizione di antisemitismo adottata dall'International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)<sup>605</sup>. Le varie fasi della ricerca si sono concluse a settembre 2023, quindi gli eventi successivi al 7 ottobre 2023 e il loro impatto non sono inclusi.

La ricerca mirava a fornire un quadro completo dell'antisemitismo in Italia, come base per ulteriori attività di progetto. La ricerca ha avuto dei limiti: è stata condotta nei tempi e negli ambiti definiti dal progetto e su temi rilevanti per le ulteriori attività del progetto.

### b) Metodologia

L'elaborazione di questo report è il risultato di due tipi di ricerca: la ricerca documentale e la ricerca sul campo. Nella ricerca documentale, abbiamo sintetizzato le fonti degli ultimi dieci anni disponibili in Italia sui vari argomenti e sotto-argomenti indicati nelle linee guida del progetto BOND. Abbiamo selezionato i siti più accreditati e riconosciuti a livello nazionale e, all'interno di questi, abbiamo individuato i contributi più rilevanti e recenti. A complemento della ricerca desk, nella ricerca sul campo abbiamo identificato le diverse categorie di persone e le abbiamo intervistate secondo le linee guida del progetto. La ricerca ha previsto otto interviste individuali e quattro interviste di gruppo. Le interviste individuali sono state condotte con due esperti chiave (specializzati in antisemitismo e relazioni internazionali), due FLP (un sociologo e un sacerdote cattolico) e quattro leader di comunità (comunità islamica, chiesa ortodossa, comunità LGBTQ+ e comunità di richiedenti asilo). Le interviste di gruppo sono state condotte con i seguenti gruppi: giovani ebrei, di cui quattro donne e sei uomini di Roma; studenti universitari italiani, di cui tre donne e tre uomini di varie città italiane; membri della comunità islamica italiana, di cui otto uomini di varie città; insegnanti di scuola secondaria superiore, di cui otto (quattro donne e quattro uomini).

## 1. Background: una breve panoramica della situazione attuale delle comunità ebraiche in Italia.

### a) Numero e caratteristiche generali (se esistenti) della popolazione ebraica nel paese.

Oggi, gli ebrei italiani registrati nelle 21 comunità ebraiche del Paese nel 2018 sono meno di 30.000 su una popolazione di 57 milioni di abitanti, la metà dei quali vive a Roma e meno di 10.000 a Milano. Gli altri sono sparsi in comunità definite "medie" - come quelle di Torino, Firenze, Trieste, Livorno e Venezia - o "piccole". Le varie comunità sono riunite nell'Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane, che ha sede a Roma e rappresenta gli ebrei nei rapporti con il governo e le istituzioni pubbliche. L'Unione coordina le esigenze

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<sup>604</sup> Sito web del progetto BOND: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>605</sup> <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

culturali delle Comunità ebraiche e sostiene le comunità più piccole. Nonostante i numerosi problemi, l'ebraismo italiano rimane vivo e vibrante e rappresenta un elemento di stimolo, riflessione e confronto all'interno della società circostante.<sup>606</sup>

Per una panoramica più approfondita, è interessante notare che dal focus group condotto con l'Unione Giovani Ebrei Italiani è emersa la presenza di una forte identità etnica, religiosa e culturale e il desiderio di preservarla all'interno della società italiana, infatti l'identità italiana è percepita come seconda rispetto a quella ebraica. Nonostante ciò, tra questi giovani c'è la tendenza a nascondere la propria identità per vari motivi, come la vergogna della propria appartenenza ebraica e l'evitare l'attenzione e la curiosità degli altri sulle proprie origini e sulle proprie usanze religiose e culturali.

Un'altra peculiarità della situazione italiana, evidenziata anche dai leader comunitari, come emerge dal dossier "Ebrei d'Europa"<sup>607</sup> pubblicato sul portale ebraico italiano MOKED nel maggio 2022, è la debolezza degli organismi educativi e la complessità e conflittualità degli organismi comunitari. Nove intervistati su dieci del dossier citato mettono al primo posto il problema dell'allontanamento dalla vita comunitaria, che in termini concreti significa scarsa partecipazione, non frequentazione di sinagoghe, centri comunitari, scuole comunitarie, e minore interesse per il ruolo svolto dalle comunità ebraiche nella politica nazionale. Questo spiega perché per gli ebrei italiani, più che per gli altri ebrei europei, sembra molto importante migliorare il dialogo e la cooperazione sia a livello di comunità ebraiche sia tra la comunità ebraica e gli ebrei che non fanno parte della comunità ebraica. È inoltre importante creare partnership con altre istituzioni ebraiche, migliorare la comunicazione e sviluppare strategie di sensibilizzazione per i non iscritti.<sup>608</sup>

## **b) Principali caratteristiche della vita sociale, politica, economica, religiosa e culturale degli ebrei**

In Italia, anche se l'Unione degli ebrei italiani e la comunità locale fanno molto per combattere l'antisemitismo - come ha rivelato la ricerca sul campo - secondo un recente sondaggio<sup>609</sup>, i leader ebraici danno la priorità alla ricerca di soluzioni interne alla comunità. La preoccupazione principale delle comunità ebraiche è la perdita del senso di appartenenza degli affiliati (ma non del senso di identità ebraica), ovvero la distanza e l'alienazione dalla vita comunitaria - come dimostra il calo del numero di membri della comunità ebraica -, la mancanza di impegno nelle attività comunitarie, il calo delle conoscenze sull'ebraismo, la mancanza di rinnovamento a livello organizzativo e la mancanza di una leadership efficace.<sup>610</sup>

E' stata condotta l'analisi dei contenuti delle interviste realizzate con esperti accademici e professionisti nel campo dell'antisemitismo e di altre forme di intolleranza. L'alto livello di integrazione professionale, culturale e sociale della comunità ebraica nel sistema socio-economico italiano è stato evidenziato dal fatto che la forte identità etnico-religiosa impedisce uno scambio fertile e costruttivo. Le iniziative culturali delle comunità ebraiche sono, infatti, scarsamente pubblicizzate e ricevono solo una modesta attenzione da parte di un piccolo numero di non ebrei.

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<sup>606</sup> Unione delle comunità ebraiche italiane, "Gli ebrei in Italia."

<sup>607</sup> Pagine ebraiche, "Dossier/Ebrei d'Europa."

<sup>608</sup> Pagine ebraiche, "Dossier/Ebrei d'Europa."

<sup>609</sup> Pagine ebraiche, "Dossier/Ebrei d'Europa."

<sup>610</sup> Pagine ebraiche, "Dossier/Ebrei d'Europa."

### 3. Antisemitismo in Italia

#### a) Livello di antisemitismo nella società

Una ricerca del 2021<sup>611</sup> ha rilevato che il 19% degli italiani può essere considerato antisemita in termini di antisemitismo primario<sup>612</sup>, il 35% in termini di antisemitismo secondario<sup>613</sup> e il 45% in termini di nuovo antisemitismo<sup>614</sup>.

Secondo una ricerca commissionata dall'Osservatorio Solomon sulle Discriminazioni e condotta dall'Euromedia Research di Alessandra Ghisleri nel 2019<sup>615</sup>, l'1,3% degli italiani ritiene che l'Olocausto sia una leggenda, il 10,5% pensa che la cifra finale delle vittime (6 milioni di ebrei) sia in realtà molto inferiore e il 49% afferma che gli ebrei sono una potenza finanziaria. Il Rapporto annuale sull'antisemitismo in Italia "mostra anche un importante calo rispetto alla percezione della diffusione dell'antisemitismo in Italia: se nel 2021 il 55% lo considerava abbastanza diffuso, a gennaio 2023 la percentuale era scesa al 42%. Si può ipotizzare che priorità come Covid-19 e la guerra in Ucraina abbiano diminuito la sensibilità nei confronti dell'antisemitismo".<sup>616</sup>

Un tratto specifico del Paese sembra essere la "inconsapevolezza italiana", che comporta una mancanza di dibattito pubblico e di riflessione storica collettiva sul tema del razzismo e dell'antisemitismo. Non essendo consapevole del proprio razzismo (anzi, volendo costruire un'immagine collettiva sull'idea di apertura e tolleranza), l'Italia tende a legittimare e minimizzare la gravità delle forme di antisemitismo e razzismo, contribuendo così alla loro diffusione.<sup>617</sup> L'italiano medio soffre di una forma cronica di ignoranza dovuta alle riduzioni<sup>618</sup> della propria responsabilità nella diffusione del sentimento antisemita in Italia e in Europa.

L'antisemitismo che caratterizza l'Italia potrebbe essere definito "a bassa intensità", il che, anche se non dà luogo a problemi urgenti, significa avere a che fare con un fenomeno pervasivo e strisciante, e proprio per questo più pericoloso perché finisce facilmente per de-rubricare atti di antisemitismo e razzismo per "cose" normali e innocue.<sup>619</sup> Esponenti della politica italiana, soprattutto di destra, pensano che l'antisemitismo sia meno diffuso in Italia che in altri Paesi europei<sup>620</sup>.

Secondo un sondaggio condotto dall'Osservatorio Salomone sulle Discriminazioni nel 2019<sup>621</sup> il 53,5% degli italiani ritiene che l'antisemitismo non sia diffuso in Italia e il 52,7% ritiene che l'antisionismo, cioè l'opposizione allo Stato di Israele sia poco o per nulla diffuso. Tuttavia, l'opinione degli esperti del settore è

<sup>611</sup> Kovács A. e Fischer G., "Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries."

<sup>612</sup> Primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>613</sup> Secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

<sup>614</sup> New antisemitism is anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

<sup>615</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni. "Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani". Euromedia Research. 2019.

<sup>616</sup> CDEC, "Relazione annuale sull'antisemitismo in Italia 2022".

<sup>617</sup> Pagine ebraiche, "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>618</sup> Idem.

<sup>619</sup> Rete nazionale per il contrasto ai discorsi e ai fenomeni d'odio, "Antisemitismo italiano a bassa intensità."

<sup>620</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>621</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni. "Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani". Euromedia Reserch. 2019.

che l'antisemitismo sia in aumento, anche se lo spazio semantico del termine è molto ampio e va dall'espressione di pregiudizi, stereotipi e opinioni ad azioni concrete più o meno gravi.<sup>622</sup>

Dalle interviste con gli esperti accademici è emerso che l'antisemitismo è diverso da altre forme di discriminazione, come è evidente anche dai dati raccolti attraverso la ricerca documentale, perché la minoranza ebraica, a differenza di altre minoranze, non viene esclusa perché considerata debole, ma in base alla sua presunta superiorità in quanto politicamente ed economicamente potente. Le interviste con i leader delle minoranze etniche e religiose e con i leader delle comunità minoritarie come LGBTQ e rifugiati politici hanno rivelato l'assenza di una loro esperienza diretta di atti antisemiti; queste persone non hanno mai assistito a episodi di antisemitismo.

L'Unione dei Giovani Ebrei Italiani ha sottolineato la necessità di distinguere l'antisemitismo contemporaneo, inteso come sentimento di avversione verso il popolo ebraico, dall'antisemitismo di origine nazifascista. Il primo appare oggi più insidioso e pericoloso, in quanto comprende antisemiti che disprezzano gli ebrei per il loro presunto potere socio-economico e perché sono critici nei confronti di Israele.

Dalla ricerca sul campo è emerso che i giovani italiani sanno definire l'antisemitismo individuandone le ragioni storiche; sono in grado di riconoscere i principali stereotipi legati al popolo ebraico (es. deicidio, usura, potere economico). Hanno la consapevolezza che in molte persone esistono sentimenti e atteggiamenti antisemiti latenti che agiscono a livello inconscio come patrimonio culturale e che, nella maggior parte dei casi, non sono esplicitamente connotati a livello ideologico-politico. Questi atteggiamenti trapelano soprattutto nel linguaggio dei tifosi di calcio, nel linguaggio dei giovani di cultura medio-bassa, in presenza di coetanei o più sui social network perché possono farlo in modo anonimo.

## **b) Profilo degli antisemiti**

L'antisemitismo odierno è legato a variabili economiche, socioculturali, psicologiche, politiche e religiose, cioè il profilo dell'antisemitismo non è unico e, quindi, non è facile da tracciare. Gli elementi che spesso si combinano nelle dichiarazioni antisemite sono la frustrazione sociale dovuta alle difficoltà economiche, che porta a sentimenti di rabbia e risentimento, il disorientamento per le informazioni e i media, l'ignoranza, l'avversione per Israele, il razzismo, il populismo, il complottismo e l'odio religioso. Inoltre, se da un lato si condivide l'idea di un antisemitismo legato al populismo di destra, dall'altro è altrettanto evidente che esiste un antisemitismo legato anche alle frange dell'estrema sinistra, come spiegato nella prossima sezione di questo report.<sup>623</sup>

Il dato evidente che è emerso sia dalle interviste individuali che dai focus group è l'idea che il profilo degli antisemiti, in ogni caso, è generalmente associato al genere maschile e all'età adulta, oltre che a connotazioni politiche di due tipi diversi, quello legato ai partiti di estrema destra, che hanno ereditato il pregiudizio antisemita e razzista dei regimi totalitari, e quello legato ai partiti di estrema sinistra, che si connota come antisemita sulla base della critica alla politica adottata dallo Stato di Israele nei confronti della questione palestinese.

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<sup>622</sup> Cit. "Dossier/Antisemitismo"

<sup>623</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

### c) Le forme di antisemitismo più diffuse

La forma più diffusa di antisemitismo è la teoria del complotto che utilizza il canale dei social media, come si legge "Oggi l'antisemitismo passa attraverso le teorie del complotto di cui internet è pieno. Le teorie del complotto sono tutte riducibili all'antisemitismo, più o meno, e alla matrice dei Protocolli dei Savi Anziani di Sion. C'è quindi una matrice chiara ed evidente, che è una forma di antisemitismo".<sup>624</sup>

La forma più arcaica di antisemitismo è legata all'ideologia nazifascista in cui si mescolano elementi etnici, religiosi e cospirativi. Questo tipo di antisemitismo persiste in alcuni individui fanatici che si professano appartenenti a movimenti politici di estrema destra che si rifanno espressamente al fascismo, come Lega, Fratelli d'Italia, Ordine Nuovo e Casa Pound.<sup>625</sup>

La forma di antisemitismo incentrata su Israele, invece, è il pregiudizio anti-israeliano, ovvero l'avversione nei confronti dello Stato ebraico, considerato la radice di tutti i mali, o di un Paese che, in quanto alleato storico degli USA, è ritenuto responsabile delle devastanti dinamiche geopolitiche in Medio Oriente. Alcuni in Italia pensano che l'antisemitismo come pregiudizio anti-israeliano sia un tratto identitario di sinistra e che questo possa essere alimentato in modo significativo dalla minoranza musulmana presente nelle città italiane e solidale con la causa palestinese.<sup>626</sup> Un'altra forma di antisemitismo, meno menzionata, è il negazionismo e la distorsione dell'Olocausto. Questo tema è al centro degli sforzi dell'International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)<sup>627</sup>, l'organizzazione intergovernativa fondata nel 1998 che riunisce governi ed esperti per rafforzare, promuovere e diffondere l'educazione all'Olocausto. Secondo l'IHRA, l'obiettivo del negazionismo è spesso la riabilitazione dell'antisemitismo palese.

#### I. Stereotipi antisemiti e pregiudizi presenti nella società

L'antisemitismo è un fenomeno antico, eterogeneo e persistente, in quanto si basa su una serie di stereotipi e pregiudizi presenti in modo trasversale nella società civile. L'antisemitismo si alimenta a livello psicologico con la riduzione dell'ebreo reale a quello immaginario, in cui l'ebreo risponde a determinate caratteristiche e presunti obiettivi. C'è poi la dimensione emotiva di chi vive la crisi economica, l'incertezza, la fragilità dei sistemi di rappresentanza e la globalizzazione come una minaccia all'identità, tutti fattori che contribuiscono a generare pulsioni antisemite.

I fattori più importanti sono i pregiudizi e gli stereotipi radicati storicamente e socialmente che producono sfiducia nella diversità e un diffuso pensiero cospirativo. Gli studi dimostrano che sia il cristianesimo che l'islam hanno incorporato il pregiudizio antisemita nelle loro memorie culturali e religiose e sono stati importanti nella diffusione dell'antisemitismo nel mondo. Secondo la prospettiva storica più accettata,

<sup>624</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo", p. 15.

<sup>625</sup> Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Technical working Group for the recognition of the definition of antisemitism approved by the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) Final report. "National strategy for combating antisemitism."

<sup>626</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

I fattori più importanti sono i pregiudizi e gli stereotipi radicati storicamente e socialmente che producono sfiducia nella diversità e un diffuso pensiero cospirativo. Gli studi dimostrano che sia il cristianesimo che l'islam hanno incorporato il pregiudizio antisemita nelle loro memorie culturali e religiose e sono stati importanti nella diffusione dell'antisemitismo nel mondo. Secondo la prospettiva storica più accettata, infatti, le radici dell'antisemitismo possono essere fatte risalire all'antico antigioudaismo di matrice cattolica, che persiste in alcuni stereotipi e pregiudizi, come quello del deicidio (gli ebrei hanno ucciso Gesù), gli ebrei sono cospiratori o gli ebrei sono portatori del male.<sup>627</sup> International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).<https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/ihra>

infatti, le radici dell'antisemitismo possono essere fatte risalire all'antico antiggiudaismo di matrice cattolica, che persiste in alcuni stereotipi e pregiudizi, come quello del deicidio (gli ebrei hanno ucciso Gesù), gli ebrei sono cospiratori o gli ebrei sono portatori del male.<sup>628</sup>

Il DOSSIER/Antisemitismo<sup>629</sup> pubblicato su Pagine Ebraiche nel gennaio 2022 mostra che tra i pregiudizi più condivisi nella popolazione italiana che contribuiscono al risentimento e all'odio ci sono la ricchezza e il potere economico degli ebrei, l'appartenenza a lobby finanziarie e culturali e la forte coesione sociale. La figura dell'ebreo è classificata come figura di potere, e questo non accade per nessun'altra razza o minoranza discriminata in Italia. Gli aggettivi associati all'ebreo sono "diverso" e "pericoloso" perché moralmente perverso: avido, individualista, egoista, pronto a sfruttare i più deboli, intrigante e infido. Inoltre, gli ebrei sono spesso visti come un gruppo distinto e separato dal resto della società, molto coeso e inaccessibile, quasi una setta convinta di possedere la verità, e questo suscita diffidenza e antipatia.

Secondo una ricerca condotta da Euromedia Research<sup>630</sup>, i cliché più comuni sono in ordine percentuale:

1. Gli ebrei hanno troppo potere nel mondo economico-finanziario internazionale
2. Gli ebrei pensano di essere superiori agli altri
3. Gli ebrei non si preoccupano di ciò che accade agli altri ma solo di ciò che accade a loro stessi
4. Gli ebrei sono molto più fedeli a Israele che all'Italia
5. I palestinesi sono vittime di un genocidio da parte degli ebrei
6. Gli ebrei parlano ancora troppo di ciò che è accaduto durante l'Olocausto.

- **Teorie cospirative anti-Semite e antisemitismo collegato al Coronavirus**

L'antisemitismo attuale, per definizione, viaggia con il complottismo, rinvigorito dalla crisi economica dell'ultimo decennio e poi dalla pandemia. In una fase come questa, gli aspetti della propaganda antiebraica storica possono tornare alla ribalta. Sembra infatti che l'antisemitismo sia sempre pronto a riemergere in alcuni periodi cruciali, come la crisi economica o la recente pandemia. Alle vecchie menzogne si sono aggiunti "nuovi miti antisemiti e teorie cospirative che incolpano gli ebrei della pandemia", come denuncia il rapporto dell'Agenzia Europea<sup>631</sup>, un documento che rileva un aumento degli episodi di antisemitismo negli Stati membri dell'UE, anche per quanto riguarda l'Italia. In Europa, la pandemia di Covid-19 ha "rattivato" la retorica antisemita e ha dato origine a "nuovi miti e teorie cospirative che incolpano gli ebrei" per l'attuale crisi sanitaria. Questo ha portato ad un aumento di "episodi" nei confronti delle persone di religione ebraica in diversi Paesi dell'UE nel 2020. Anche in Italia, che ha registrato 101 episodi di antisemitismo, il numero più alto registrato negli ultimi 10 anni. È quanto emerge da uno studio della FRA, l'Agenzia europea per i diritti fondamentali.<sup>632</sup>

<sup>628</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "L'antisemitismo."

<sup>629</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>630</sup> Solomon Osservatorio sulle discriminazioni, "Antisemitismo. Le percezioni degli italiani".

<sup>631</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Nuovo rapporto sull'antisemitismo dell'Agenzia dell'Unione Europea per i Diritti Fondamentali (FRA): pandemia e antisemitismo cresce l'allarme".

<sup>632</sup> Moked. Il portale dell'ebraismo italiano, "Pandemia e antisemitismo in Europa. Pericoloso aumento degli incidenti."



- **Antisemitismo nel calcio**

L'antisemitismo nel mondo dello sport, in particolare nel calcio, non è un fenomeno solo italiano ma di molti paesi del mondo, soprattutto in Europa, in particolare in Belgio, Inghilterra e Germania. Nel corso del 2022, in questi Paesi si sono verificati numerosi episodi di antisemitismo. Anche nel calcio italiano il fenomeno è diffuso in alcune tifoserie.<sup>633</sup> Un esempio è il derby Lazio-Roma, disputato nella capitale italiana domenica 19 marzo 2023, nel quale un ultras laziale<sup>634</sup> di origine tedesca è entrato nella tribuna dello Stadio Olimpico indossando una maglietta che glorificava e inneggiava ad Adolf Hitler. I cori antisemiti sono un problema trentennale della tifoseria laziale, a detta della stessa squadra, ma questa volta è stato applicato il codice etico contro la discriminazione antisemita, che rappresenta una svolta nella storia del calcio italiano. Nonostante le multe e le revoche non abbiano l'effetto sperato di eliminare l'antisemitismo dagli stadi, molti Paesi si sono resi conto che per sradicare questo comportamento è necessaria una rieducazione dei responsabili per far capire loro la gravità di tali atti. La pubblicazione "Combating Antisemitism in Sport" si basa su questi valori di rieducazione e cooperazione, creando una rete internazionale che riunisce queste attività nell'ottica che lo sport può essere un utile mezzo per promuovere la pace, la tolleranza e il rispetto dei diritti umani.<sup>635</sup>

#### **d) Discorsi d'odio antisemita e crimini d'odio**

Il Rapporto annuale sull'Antisemitismo in Italia per l'anno 2022<sup>636</sup> mostra che l'Osservatorio Antisemitismo della Fondazione CDEC ha ricevuto 327 segnalazioni, di cui 241 classificate come atti contro gli ebrei: "I dati del 2022 mostrano un aumento rispetto al 2021 (226 episodi). 164 riguardano l'antisemitismo su Internet, mentre 77 riguardano episodi avvenuti fisicamente, tra cui due aggressioni, dieci casi di minacce e un grave atto di vandalismo contro la sinagoga di Trieste".<sup>637</sup> La pericolosità del web come luogo di diffusione dell'odio e dell'antisemitismo è ormai assodata, anche perché la velocità della rete non lascia spazio alla riflessione etica.

Con il web, lo spazio per l'espressione dell'antisemitismo e la visibilità dei sentimenti antisemiti sono cresciuti enormemente perché le persone con la stessa ideologia possono facilmente entrare in contatto attraverso specifici algoritmi dei social media, il che rende più pericoloso il passaggio dal virtuale al reale e quindi la possibilità di impatto sulla vita reale. Internet fornisce agli antisemiti di tutti i tipi un mezzo per diffondere la loro narrativa sia attraverso discorsi d'odio espliciti sia attraverso manifestazioni codificate in discorsi impliciti o indiretti.<sup>638</sup> Secondo il dossier "Quando il veleno è sociale", la rete favorisce

<sup>633</sup> Il portale dell'ebraismo italiano, "Un calcio all'antisemitismo".

<sup>634</sup> Il fatto quotidiano, "La lotta all'antisemitismo nel calcio fra i provvedimenti anche il divieto della maglia numero 88."

<sup>635</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Combattere l'antisemitismo'nello'sport'la nuova'iniziativa'del wjc per rieducare fan e atleti."

<sup>636</sup> CDEC, "Relazione annuale sull'antisemitismo in Italia 2022", a cura dell'Osservatorio antisemitismo, pag. 10.

<sup>637</sup> Idem.

In Italia esistono gruppi minoritari più discriminati della minoranza ebraica (per ragioni diverse da quelle che spiegano l'avversione per gli ebrei). La percezione dominante nella società italiana è che altre forme di discriminazione siano più evidenti dell'antisemitismo, che è percepito in Italia come un problema marginale, esistente come atteggiamento di offesa e insulto non sempre intenzionale e semanticamente fondato. Secondo le fonti consultate, le minoranze più discriminate, in ordine di priorità, sono:

- a. le minoranze etniche legate ai flussi migratori dall'Africa e dal Medio Oriente
- b. minoranza musulmana
- c. minoranza rom e sinti

l'antisemitismo a causa di tre fenomeni: l'anonimato, la velocità dello strumento con cui si può diffondere il proprio pensiero e il consenso che si riceve per avere ragione. Pertanto, è evidente la necessità di misure legali e penali per scoraggiare i discorsi di odio, i discorsi e le azioni antisemite.<sup>639</sup>

### e) Antisemitismo a livello politico

La ricerca ha dimostrato che esistono due tipi di narrazioni politiche: quella dei partiti di estrema destra xenofoba in Europa, che in misura marginale è presente anche in Italia (i due principali gruppi apertamente neofascisti ancora presenti in Italia sono Casapound e Forza Nuova), e quella dei partiti di estrema sinistra (in particolare alcuni esponenti del Partito Democratico), che criticano la politica dello Stato di Israele per quanto riguarda la gestione del conflitto con la Palestina.<sup>640</sup>

## 4. Inimicizia nei confronti di altri gruppi nel paese

In Italia esistono gruppi minoritari più discriminati della minoranza ebraica (per ragioni diverse da quelle che spiegano l'avversione per gli ebrei)<sup>641</sup>. La percezione dominante nella società italiana è che altre forme di discriminazione siano più evidenti dell'antisemitismo, che è percepito in Italia come un problema marginale, esistente come atteggiamento di offesa e insulto non sempre intenzionale e semanticamente fondato. Secondo le fonti consultate, le minoranze più discriminate, in ordine di priorità, sono:

- a. le minoranze etniche legate ai flussi migratori dall'Africa e dal Medio Oriente
- b. minoranza musulmana
- c. minoranza rom e sinti
- d. minoranza LGBTQ

I dati italiani mostrano che il 37% degli intervistati provenienti dall'Africa subsahariana e il 20% dei nordafricani si sono sentiti discriminati a causa del colore della pelle negli ultimi cinque anni, mentre il 32% degli intervistati provenienti dall'Asia meridionale si è sentito discriminato a causa della propria origine etnica. Circa il 10% degli africani subsahariani si è sentito discriminato a causa della religione. La discriminazione coinvolge anche le seconde generazioni di origine straniera, infatti il 29% delle donne e il 19% degli uomini di origine subsahariana, il 37% delle donne e il 31% degli uomini di origine nordafricana e il 21% dei gruppi di origine sud-asiatica hanno subito qualche forma di discriminazione. Il rapporto si riferisce a questi risultati come a "tassi relativamente alti di discriminazione". Per quanto riguarda la discriminazione nell'accesso al lavoro, il rapporto sottolinea che il 23% delle persone intervistate di origine nordafricana ha riferito di aver subito qualche forma di discriminazione durante la ricerca di un lavoro<sup>642</sup>.

A ciascuna di queste minoranze sono legati stereotipi specifici di minore o maggiore gravità, come il gruppo a. delinquenti, spacciatori, persone che tolgono il lavoro agli italiani; il gruppo b. terroristi, persone inaffidabili, persone che limitano la libertà delle donne e non rispettano i loro diritti, persone che vogliono imporre la loro fede; il gruppo c. persone che rubano; il gruppo d. persone malate, persone che non rispettano la morale cattolica e i costumi socialmente accettati. La presenza di questi pregiudizi e la

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d. Minoranza LGBTQ<sup>638</sup> Cit., "Dossier/Antisemitismo."

<sup>639</sup> Idem.

<sup>640</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "Forza nuova e casa pound le maggiori organizzazioni del radicalismo di destra in Italia."

<sup>641</sup> Liberties-Monitoraggio UE, "La discriminazione su base etnica continua in Italia e in tutta Europa."

<sup>642</sup> Liberties-Monitoraggio UE, "La discriminazione su base etnica continua in Italia e in tutta Europa," 1.

costruzione di questi stereotipi sono dovuti principalmente alla narrazione mediatica nazionalista e antieuropea, che manipola e indirizza l'opinione pubblica, nonché alla pubblicazione di contenuti e commenti da parte di singoli cittadini sui social network che infiammano il dibattito e rafforzano i pregiudizi. Gli atteggiamenti discriminatori, i comportamenti o gli atti di odio nei confronti delle minoranze in generale si manifestano principalmente online sotto forma di insulti o accuse e, solo in rari casi, raggiungono livelli di estrema violenza. I responsabili di questi atti condividono un basso livello culturale e, talvolta, una situazione economica precaria. I pregiudizi associati alle diverse categorie di minoranze sono strutturati e sedimentati nella coscienza civica grazie ai media e, in parte, alle narrazioni politiche<sup>643</sup>.

Queste ultime narrazioni influenzano l'opinione pubblica manipolando gli strumenti democratici attraverso una propaganda che può essere definita "fascista" anche se non si presenta come tale nei contenuti ma nel metodo.

Anche se cose come "la superiorità di una razza" o "l'inutilità della memoria della Resistenza partigiana" o "l'inutilità della Giornata della Memoria" non possono essere dichiarate apertamente, il messaggio passa in altre forme in modo non esplicito, cioè attraverso il linguaggio socialmente accettato in tutti i discorsi, senza etichette di destra o di sinistra.

I discorsi potenzialmente molto pericolosi sono quelli che sono intrinsecamente fascisti, ma in cui l'ideologia nazionalista non è apertamente riconoscibile. Per alimentare la loro ideologia, questi discorsi hanno bisogno di "costruire" un nemico. Il processo di costruzione della categoria del nemico prevede diverse fasi: nominare i nemici con un'identità indefinibile, non con un nome ed un cognome, il che significa che il nemico può essere incarnato da categorie generiche, ad esempio "immigrati" o "musulmani".

In un secondo momento, il nemico viene annientato facendo passare il messaggio che non è rispettabile. L'annientamento e la disumanizzazione sono possibili attraverso l'identificazione del nemico con animali come capra, scarafaggio, maiale, ratto, o attraverso l'uso di soprannomi che distorcono il suo nome o si concentrano su un difetto fisico (se è basso viene chiamato "nano"). Se si fa notare l'uso offensivo e inappropriato di questo tipo di vocabolario, si può sempre replicare che il tono era scherzoso e che non si aveva intenzione di offendere, ma nel frattempo si sarà raggiunto l'obiettivo di far entrare nella testa di tutti quel nome deformato, con il risultato che a lungo andare si riduce un "uomo" ad un oggetto di denigrazione ed odio.

Nei dibattiti televisivi italiani, in particolare sui canali privati e non nazionali, o sui giornali, assistiamo a questo tipo di narrazione in cui la categoria eletta a nemico viene dipinta come non rispettabile e anche "colpevole" e "minacciosa". La "vittima" viene delegittimata e la colpa di un individuo viene attribuita alla categoria a cui appartiene, ad esempio tutti i musulmani sono considerati terroristi e tutti i rom/sinti sono considerati ladri, costruendo equivalenze immaginarie sulla base di un meccanismo di identificazione, trasferimento e proiezione della parte al tutto. Il nemico così descritto diventa qualcuno con cui è impossibile dialogare, qualcuno che può essere assimilato ad un potere forte, che ha sempre secondi fini che ci danneggerebbero e rispetto al quale dobbiamo proteggerci e quindi prendere le distanze, rifiutarlo. Su questo terreno si impianta la cospirazione.

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<sup>643</sup> Osservatorio di politica internazionale, "Nuove forme di antisemitismo e mezzi di contrasto", a cura di Andrea Spagnolo

Le narrazioni politiche che abbiamo descritto utilizzano i media in modo "apparentemente democratico", il che significa dare l'ultima parola all'ultima persona che dovrebbe poter parlare, utilizzando il presunto principio democratico di dare voce a tutti. In questo "parlare del popolo al popolo", si assiste a un totale annullamento delle competenze, alla mistificazione, alla banalizzazione e alla ripetizione sistematica e infinita di semplici slogan che diventano parole d'ordine martellate, che entrano nella testa delle persone e impiantano pregiudizi. Il processo di sedimentazione dei pregiudizi dà poi origine a stereotipi che servono ad alimentare la leadership di figure politiche potenzialmente pericolose<sup>644</sup>.

Come è emerso dalle interviste, un giudizio condiviso soprattutto dai giovani studenti e dagli universitari è che lo Stato dovrebbe farsi carico di queste minoranze garantendo l'applicazione dei diritti sanciti dalla Costituzione italiana e varando nuove misure per combattere la discriminazione perché quelle esistenti non si sono dimostrate efficaci. Anche la comunità educante, come la scuola e l'associazionismo, dovrebbe e potrebbe fare di più per costruire una società in cui le nuove generazioni siano aperte al confronto e libere da pregiudizi.

Tuttavia, esse stesse sono state oggetto di atti di discriminazione, legati, da un lato, al tradizionalismo e al conservatorismo culturale di matrice cattolica, ad esempio, nei confronti dei diversi orientamenti sessuali. Dall'altro, è legata al razzismo di alcuni cittadini italiani, ostili all'accoglienza di migranti e rifugiati, per ragioni legate al nazionalismo identitario e alla situazione socio-economica italiana, che solo costituzionalmente, ma non di fatto, garantisce a tutti i cittadini gli stessi diritti relativi al lavoro e a una vita dignitosa.

## 5. Intersezioni dell'antisemitismo con alter forme di razzismo ed intolleranza

La storia del nazifascismo mostra una relazione tra varie forme di razzismo e antisemitismo. Le persecuzioni durante i regimi totalitari del XX secolo hanno colpito varie minoranze per motivi etnici, religiosi, politici e di orientamento sessuale, come lo sterminio di Rom e Sinti tra il 1939 e il 1945 o "l'omocausto", cioè lo sterminio degli omosessuali tedeschi o ancora lo sterminio dei disabili di "razza ariana", secondo il programma eugenetico<sup>645</sup>. La presenza di un'intersezione tra sentimenti antisemiti e altre forme di discriminazione in Italia oggi è attestata dalla ricerca condotta dall'Osservatorio Antisemitismo e riportata nell'articolo "Hate speech nelle piattaforme sociali online: Un caso intersezionale di antisemitismo e omolesbobitransfobia nel contesto italiano"<sup>646</sup>.

I dati dimostrano che le piattaforme sociali sono un ricettacolo di discorsi d'odio e uno spazio attivo per la discriminazione. È facile trovare post offensivi e discorsi d'odio sui principali social network che aderiscono al Codice di condotta dell'Unione europea, e la situazione è ancora più estrema sulle piattaforme che non aderiscono al Codice di condotta dell'Unione europea, per cui vengono portate all'attenzione due urgenze: in primo luogo, quella di estendere il Codice di condotta per contrastare l'incitamento illegale all'odio online, alle piattaforme di social media che devono ancora aderirvi, e in secondo luogo, la necessità che "le

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<sup>644</sup> Murgia, Istruzioni per diventare fascisti.

<sup>645</sup> Conoscere la Shoah "Eugenetica nazista e sterminio dei disabili"

<https://www.scuolaememoria.it/site/it/2020/07/07/eugenetica-nazista-e-sterminio-dei-disabili/>

<sup>646</sup> Cambuzzi, "Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homolesbobitransphobia in the Italian context".

organizzazioni della società civile, i ricercatori, gli attivisti e i politici adottino un approccio alle politiche antidiscriminatorie basato sull'intersezione"<sup>647</sup>.

Il rapporto<sup>648</sup> 2021 di Amnesty International Italia si è concentrato sulle narrazioni di odio durante la pandemia. L'analisi di 36.269 contenuti su Facebook e Twitter ha mostrato che un post e un tweet su dieci erano offensivi, discriminatori o incitavano all'odio: "Secondo il rapporto, i discorsi d'odio online in Italia sono aumentati del 40% rispetto all'anno precedente. Il 55,6% dei contenuti si concentrava su narrazioni antireligiose riguardanti le minoranze, seguite da narrazioni anti-ziganismo (47,6%) e anti-immigrati (42,1%). La comunità LGBTQ è stata il gruppo più bersagliato con il 98,2% dei contenuti di incitamento all'odio, seguita dai musulmani con il 46% e dalle ONG e dagli individui che lavorano in attività legate ai diritti umani più in generale con il 25,9%."<sup>649</sup>

L'incitamento all'odio non è specificamente disciplinato dal codice penale italiano, ma la legge Mancino del 1993 (articolo 604bis del codice penale), successivamente modificata nel 2006, stabilisce pene fino a un anno e sei mesi di reclusione per le persone riconosciute colpevoli di incitamento o propaganda razzista per motivi etnici, nazionali o religiosi. Tuttavia, il dato importante che evidenzia la necessità di un approccio olistico e intersezionale e che contribuisce ad una migliore comprensione del profilo dell'antisemitismo è che gli account che diffondono l'odio antisemita sono spesso gli stessi che diffondono omofobia, transfobia, antiziganismo, xenofobia e razzismo. Nell'articolo "Le discussioni sull'antisemitismo devono includere il genere e la sessualità", pubblicato il 9 gennaio 2023, l'attenzione si concentra sul ruolo importante che il genere e la sessualità svolgono nell'antisemitismo. Gli uomini ebrei sono più discriminati delle donne ebraiche e la ragione risiede nel fatto che sono più identificabili in pubblico.

Gli ebrei ortodossi, ad esempio, sono più esposti al rischio di discriminazione perché portano segni di riconoscimento evidenti come la kippah (zucchetto) o lo shtreimel (cappello di pelliccia), portano tzitzit (frange) visibili o indossano il tallis (scialle di preghiera) e acconciano i capelli con i payot (riccioli laterali). In effetti, l'articolo afferma che: "Gli uomini avevano 1,8 volte più probabilità di subire un attacco fisico, 1,4 volte più probabilità di subire commenti offensivi o minacciosi, 2,3 volte più probabilità di subire gesti offensivi e sguardi truci. Inoltre, hanno una probabilità 1,5 volte maggiore di subire antisemitismo online".<sup>650</sup> Questa differenza di genere nell'antisemitismo è corroborata anche dall'iconografia, poiché la maggior parte dei disegni o delle immagini antisemite raffigurano uomini e non donne. Un altro aspetto rilevante è la correlazione tra antisemitismo e orientamento sessuale, un fatto spesso assente dalle discussioni sull'antisemitismo eppure, a ben vedere, già individuato dallo storico ebreo tedesco G. Mosse in *Nazionalismo e sessualità* (1984).

In quest'opera Mosse sosteneva che una caratteristica tipica dell'ideologia razzista era quella di collegare l'eccesso di libido alle cosiddette "razze inferiori", tanto che l'ascesa del nazionalismo si avvaleva di una narrazione che collegava la "razza" alla sessualità. Gli ebrei, infatti, erano considerati libidinosi e perversi. Ancora oggi, questa intersezione esiste e si concretizza nel fatto che

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<sup>647</sup> Cambuzzi, "Hate speech in online social platforms: An intersectional case of antisemitism and homophobia/transphobia in the Italian context".

<sup>648</sup> Amnesty International, "Barometro dell'odio: intolleranza pandemica".

<sup>649</sup> Amnesty International, "Barometro dell'odio: intolleranza pandemica".

<sup>650</sup> Cambuzzi M. "Discussions about antisemitism need to include gender and sexuality". The conversation. 9 January 2023. <https://theconversation.com/discussions-about-antisemitism-need-to-include-gender-and-sexuality-196997>

alcune persone, ad esempio le donne ebraiche non eterosessuali, subiscono una "doppia discriminazione", in quanto ebraiche e transgender. È evidente, quindi, che "molti estremisti sono sia antisemiti che anti-LGBTQ [...] Affrontare adeguatamente l'antisemitismo significa considerare come altri aspetti dell'identità possano influenzare le esperienze di discriminazione o di odio antiebraico delle persone"<sup>651</sup>.

## 6. Prevenzione dell'antisemitismo nell'educazione

Dalla ricerca sul campo è emerso che i giovani studenti delle scuole e delle università italiane hanno una scarsa conoscenza dell'ebraismo a causa della mancanza di esperienze e di contatti diretti con la comunità ebraica italiana, una debole conoscenza storica e religiosa a causa della mancanza di un'accurata formazione sul tema, ma anche a causa della mancanza di dialogo con la comunità ebraica italiana e del mancato coinvolgimento della popolazione in iniziative ed eventi culturali ebraici. Come dimostra l'importante raccolta di articoli relativi agli episodi di antisemitismo nelle scuole dal 2013 a oggi, prodotta dall'Osservatorio sull'Antisemitismo<sup>652</sup>, i fenomeni di antisemitismo nelle scuole sono aumentati notevolmente negli ultimi anni.

Per contenere e prevenire questi fenomeni, ci sono alcune importanti azioni educative:

- Estendere il dibattito pubblico sull'antisemitismo e sul razzismo in generale e condannare con forza tutti gli atti di intolleranza e di odio;
- Promuovere il dialogo tra le culture;
- Conoscere il mondo ebraico nel suo complesso;
- Mettere l'antisemitismo in relazione ad altre forme di intolleranza;
- Creare alleanze e occasioni di incontro nel mondo dello sport, in particolare del calcio, dove spesso si verificano episodi di antisemitismo e/o di banalizzazione dell'Olocausto;
- Perseguire i discorsi e le azioni di odio;
- Rispondere, ad esempio sul web e sui social media;
- Aggiornare la storia ebraica collocandola all'interno delle problematiche contemporanee.

Nel novembre 2021 sono state pubblicate in Italia *Le Linee guida per il Contrasto dell'Antisemitismo nelle Scuole*<sup>653</sup>, contenenti importanti strumenti per le istituzioni, le scuole, le università e il mondo della comunicazione. Attraverso questo strumento, l'Italia ha dimostrato di voler sviluppare il lavoro di educazione e formazione dei giovani nelle scuole per valorizzare la storia del popolo ebraico, per cercare di scindere il lavoro sull'antisemitismo dalla Shoah, tenendo conto che anche l'educazione ai nuovi media online e l'alfabetizzazione digitale sono determinanti. Il Ministero dell'Istruzione promuove la conservazione della memoria della Shoah e l'educazione al rispetto delle differenze contro ogni forma di violenza e discriminazione. Con questo obiettivo ha avviato una serie di collaborazioni con l'Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (UCEI), il Museo Nazionale dell'Ebraismo Italiano e della Shoah (MEIS) e il Memoriale della Shoah.

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<sup>651</sup> Cambruzzi M. "Discussions about antisemitism need to include gender and sexuality". The conversation. 9 January 2023. <https://theconversation.com/discussions-about-antisemitism-need-to-include-gender-and-sexuality-196997>

<sup>652</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, "L'antisemitismo nella scuola."

<sup>653</sup> <https://www.miur.gov.it/scuola-e-shoah>

Dal 2001 il Ministero, in collaborazione con l'UCEI, indice annualmente il concorso nazionale I giovani ricordano la Shoah, dedicato a tutti gli studenti delle scuole di ogni ordine e grado e organizza ogni anno diversi viaggi della memoria per studenti, insegnanti e istituzioni.<sup>654</sup> Con l'obiettivo di fornire a insegnanti e studenti italiani uno strumento di formazione sui temi della Shoah, dell'antisemitismo e dell'indifferenza alle discriminazioni, il Ministero, in collaborazione con l'UCEI, ha creato il portale Scuola e Memoria<sup>655</sup>, che offre una piattaforma per lo scambio di buone pratiche nell'insegnamento della Shoah tra le scuole di tutto il Paese.

C'è anche 'La Rete Italiana della Memoria', nata dalla collaborazione tra Musei e Memoriali della Shoah in Italia.<sup>656</sup> Con la legge n. 211 del 20 luglio 2000, il Parlamento italiano ha riconosciuto il 27 gennaio, data in cui furono abbattuti i cancelli di Auschwitz, come “Giorno della Memoria in ricordo dello sterminio e della persecuzione del popolo ebraico e dei deportati militari e politici italiani nei campi nazisti”, precisando all'art. 2, che in occasione di quella giornata «saranno organizzate cerimonie, iniziative, incontri e momenti comuni di racconto dei fatti e di riflessione, particolarmente nelle scuole di ogni ordine e grado, su ciò che accadde al popolo ebraico e ai deportati militari e politici italiani nei lager nazisti, per preservare nel futuro dell'Italia la memoria di un periodo tragico e oscuro della storia italiana e europea, e perché eventi simili non si ripetano mai più».<sup>657</sup>

Secondo l'indagine riportata nel Rapporto annuale sull'antisemitismo in Italia 2022 della Fondazione CDEC, “nove studenti su dieci pensano che sia importante che la Shoah venga ricordata, e più di sette su dieci pensano che sia molto importante. Si tratta di un dato estremamente positivo e risultato incoraggiante rispetto al lavoro svolto finora da governi, istituzioni e scuole sul valore della memoria della Shoah.<sup>658</sup> Nonostante i punti di forza, c'è bisogno di maggiore conoscenza sugli ebrei e sull'identità ebraica, nelle scuole.

Nel 2017, in concomitanza con le celebrazioni del Giorno della Memoria, il Ministero ha inviato alle scuole di ogni ordine e grado una lettera contenente le “Linee guida nazionali per l'educazione alla Shoah a scuola”<sup>659</sup>. È inoltre opportuno ricordare che materiali e attività didattiche che trattano i temi dell'Ebraismo e antisemitismo sono disponibili su molti siti, riportati nella ricerca, tra cui il sito dell'Osservatorio Antisemitismo, che mette a disposizione di insegnanti e formatori, opuscoli, film, documentari e lezioni.<sup>660</sup>

Dalla ricerca sul campo sono emerse alcune criticità del mondo della scuola e dell'istruzione, quali:

1. La mancanza di esperti ebrei nelle scuole;
2. La necessità di inserire programmaticamente la storia del popolo ebraico, della cultura e della religione nel triennio delle scuole superiori anche attraverso progetti specifici;
3. Utilizzo parziale delle risorse digitali disponibili;

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<sup>654</sup><https://www.miur.gov.it/-/i-giovani-ricordano-la-shoah-xxii-edizione-del-concorso-per-l-anno-scolastico-2023-24>

<sup>655</sup> Materiali e fonti consultate [www.scuolaememoria.it](http://www.scuolaememoria.it)

<sup>656</sup> <https://www.miur.gov.it/scuola-e-shoah>

<sup>657</sup> [www.scuolaememoria.it](http://www.scuolaememoria.it)

<sup>658</sup> CDEC, “Relazione annuale dell'antisemitismo in Italia, 2022”.

<sup>659</sup> Ministero dell'istruzione e del merito, “Linee guida nazionali per una didattica della Shoah a scuola” Giorno della Memoria, 27 gennaio 2018.

<sup>660</sup> Osservatorio antisemitismo, “Materiale per il contrasto all'antisemitismo”.

4. Mancanza di attività e progetti legati alla conoscenza, al dialogo e all'inclusione sociale delle minoranze discriminate;

5. La necessità di aumentare il numero di materiali, esperienze e risorse umane a disposizione della scuola come formatori esperti, studiosi e ricercatori.

I temi su cui ci proponiamo di lavorare e riflettere sono:

- migliorare la conoscenza dell'ebraismo e del giudaismo con riferimento alla storia, alla cultura e alla religione, spiegando, ad esempio, le dovute differenze tra l'ebraismo ortodosso e l'ebraismo riformato, detto anche liberale e progressista;
- dissociare la discussione sull'ebraismo dall'antisemitismo;
- identificare i pregiudizi inconsci che sono alla base del pensiero e dell'agire individuale e collettivo;
- smascherare le teorie del complotto e decostruire gli stereotipi e i pregiudizi che le sostengono con riferimento all'antisemitismo e alle altre forme di discriminazione presenti nella società italiana;
- affrontare la negazione, la distorsione e la banalizzazione della Shoah;
- affrontare l'antisemitismo online;
- migliorare la conoscenza della situazione in Medio Oriente per sensibilizzare i giovani sulle differenze tra ebrei e Stato di Israele.

Le strategie dei formatori per educare i giovani alla diversità dovrebbero includere l'analisi di argomenti o la conduzione di ricerche e attività che mirano a sviluppare sentimenti di solidarietà, inclusione e sostegno per le minoranze discriminate attraverso:

- L'uso di narrazioni personali per enfatizzare la diversità all'interno del mondo ebraico per mostrare che gli ebrei, come persone di altre tradizioni, hanno molte credenze e pratiche religiose diverse o non ne hanno affatto; i punti in comune tra ebrei e altri, come caratteristiche culturali, socio-economiche, geografiche, linguistiche e di altro tipo; l'impatto positivo che gli ebrei, o altre persone appartenenti a diverse comunità religiose o culturali, hanno sui contesti locali, nazionali e/o internazionali.
- L'uso di lezioni di storia - a scuola, insegnare la storia degli ebrei come parte della storia locale, nazionale o internazionale, compresa la storia dello Stato di Israele e la situazione israelo-palestinese e utilizzando un approccio multi-punto di vista; personalizzare la storia e raccontare le storie personali degli ebrei (persone comuni e famose che hanno contribuito allo sviluppo della scienza, delle arti, della filosofia, ecc.); considerare come gli ebrei, o altre persone provenienti da diverse comunità religiose o culturali, hanno contribuito allo sviluppo della scienza, delle arti, della filosofia, ecc.; considerare come hanno contribuito allo sviluppo del mondo. Tenere conto di come i vari stereotipi socialmente accettati hanno avuto e hanno conseguenze negative sui diritti di cui godono uomini, donne e membri di determinati gruppi o comunità, compresi gli ebrei, in vari momenti della storia e del presente; insegnare le origini e le cause dell'antisemitismo prima e dopo l'Olocausto, rivolgendosi al mondo di oggi e facendo attenzione a non sostituire queste lezioni con lezioni specifiche sull'Olocausto.
- L'utilizzo delle diverse identità degli studenti per creare il proprio autoritratto (in forma scritta, grafica o poetica); lavorare sulla diversità etnica, linguistica, religiosa, culturale, sull'orientamento sessuale, sugli hobby, sugli interessi e sugli ideali individuali; guidare gli studenti verso l'identificazione di alcuni aspetti del proprio autoritratto che possono rivelare o generare uno stereotipo basato su fattori, come scelte interiori e pressioni esterne, che influenzano pensieri e



azioni, dimostrare come sono costruite le narrazioni sociali, analizzare la relazione tra la percezione di uno studente di alcuni tratti particolari di se stesso e come gli altri li percepiscono.

Il lavoro degli educatori deve mirare a raggiungere risultati migliori rispetto a quelli degli ultimi anni per quanto riguarda il contrasto all'ignoranza, l'innalzamento del livello culturale dei giovani, anche quelli che non frequentano gli studi universitari, e l'affinamento del pensiero critico. In questa prospettiva sarà possibile contrastare anche la precoce tendenza dei giovani alla stereotipizzazione e alla categorizzazione dei pregiudizi causata dalla sovraesposizione mediatica, che porta allo pseudo-apprendimento di una grande quantità di informazioni che gli adolescenti non sono in grado di gestire. Sarebbe necessario nonché auspicabile che, tra le competenze che un giovane deve sviluppare al termine del percorso scolastico secondario e universitario, vi siano competenze socio-relazionali inclusive per costruire una società europea multietnica pacifica e solidale, capace di disgregare muri e barriere fisiche e mentali tra i suoi cittadini.

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## **ANNEX 3: Polish national report in the local language**

### **Streszczenie**

Dane ilościowe z ostatnich lat oraz wypowiedzi uczestników badania jakościowego sugerują, że antysemityzm jest nadal istotnym problemem w polskim społeczeństwie.

Członkowie społeczności żydowskiej często doświadczają antysemityzmu w postaci nieodpowiednich żartów i stereotypów, rzadziej w formie otwartej dyskryminacji. Dyskusje o Holokauście i polsko-żydowskiej historii nierzadko prowadzą do pojawienia się antysemitycznych stereotypów i mowy nienawiści. Zauważalne jest, że Holokaust bywa również tematem żartów.

W kontekście edukacyjnym, nauczanie o społeczności żydowskiej skupia się głównie na historii, zwłaszcza na okresie II wojny światowej. Większość rozmówców, z wyjątkiem nieżydowskiej młodzieży, zgadza się, że współczesne tematy związane z Żydami są rzadko poruszane w szkołach. Wydaje się, że brak edukacji wielokulturowej w różnych grupach wiekowych polskiego społeczeństwa prowadzi do niedostatecznego zrozumienia problemów dyskryminacji i mniejszości.

Młodsze pokolenia, choć pozornie bardziej tolerancyjne i otwarte na naukę o mniejszościach, nadal używają określenia "Żyd" w pejoratywnym znaczeniu. Dyskryminacja nie ogranicza się tylko do Żydów; uczestnicy badań fokusowych wskazali także na Ukraińców, Romów, osoby o różnym kolorze skóry i społeczność LGBT jako inne grupy doświadczające dyskryminacji.

## Wprowadzenie

### Projekt i badania

Projekt BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities)<sup>661</sup> realizowany jest od stycznia 2023 r. do grudnia 2024 r. na Węgrzech, we Włoszech, w Polsce i Rumunii. Ma ona na celu zajęcie się głęboko zakorzenionymi uprzedzeniami, postawami nienawiści i zachowaniami społeczeństwa, szczególnie wobec europejskich Żydów. Projekt ma również na celu promowanie zrozumienia, tolerancji i dialogu. Szczególny nacisk kładziony jest na podnoszenie świadomości młodzieży na temat judaizmu i antysemityzmu oraz na wspieranie dialogu międzykulturowego i międzyreligijnego. Badania zostały przeprowadzone jako jeden z pierwszych etapów projektu BOND. Zarówno w projekcie, jak i w badaniach wykorzystano definicję antysemityzmu przyjętą przez Międzynarodowy Sojusz na rzecz Pamięci o Holokauście (IHRA).<sup>662</sup> Wszystkie fazy badań zostały zakończone do września 2023 r., więc nie uwzględniono wydarzeń po 7 października 2023 r. i ich wpływu na poziom antysemityzmu.

Badania miały na celu przedstawienie kompleksowego obrazu antysemityzmu w Polsce jako podstawy do dalszych działań projektowych. Badania miały jednak ograniczenia: były prowadzone w ramach czasowych i zakresie określonych w projekcie oraz z tematami istotnymi dla dalszych działań projektu.

### Metodologia

Zastosowaliśmy podejście badawcze oparte o dwie metody – analizę danych zastanych oraz badanie jakościowe. W ramach analizy danych zastanych podsumowano dostępną literaturę z ostatnich dziesięciu lat dotyczącą antysemityzmu i dyskryminacji w Polsce. Badanie jakościowe miało na celu uzupełnienie wyników analizy danych zastanych poprzez przeprowadzenie indywidualnych wywiadów oraz wywiadów grupowych z przedstawicielami wcześniej zdefiniowanych grup docelowych. W grupach fokusowych uczestniczyli liderzy społeczności żydowskiej (w tym pięć kobiet i jeden mężczyzna); młodzież żydowska w wieku licealnym, (dwie kobiety i dwóch mężczyzn); liderzy mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych (pięć kobiet z grup mniejszościowych i jeden przedstawiciel organizacji); edukatorzy, w tym pięciu nauczycieli – cztery kobiety, jeden mężczyzna – z małych miast w województwie lubelskim; młodzież nieżydowska w wieku licealnym pochodząca z małych miast w województwie lubelskim. (trzy kobiety i dwóch mężczyzn). Łącznie w grupach fokusowych wzięło udział 20 kobiet i pięciu mężczyzn. W lipcu 2023 roku przeprowadzono również cztery indywidualne wywiady z ekspertami, w tym z jedną kobietą i trzema mężczyznami, specjalizującymi się w antysemityzmie i innych formach nietolerancji. Uczestnikami badania byli zarówno naukowcy, jak i praktycy - uczestnik Programu Liderów Przyszłości, lider religijny z społeczności niereligijnej oraz lider społeczności mniejszościowej. Wywiady indywidualne trwały średnio 87 minut.

### Sytuacja społeczności żydowskich w Polsce

Historia Polski jest ściśle związana z obecnością społeczności żydowskiej która sięga już X wieku. Przez stulecia, społeczność ta była integralną częścią kulturowego, ekonomicznego i politycznego krajobrazu Polski. Na tle innych krajów w Europie autonomia żydowska została ustanowiona bardzo wcześnie, bo już w XIII wieku. Po rozbiorach Polski w 1795 roku, proces emancypacji Żydów był zależny od polityki zaborców. W okresie międzywojennym, mimo oficjalnego statusu obywateli, Żydzi często spotykali się z dyskryminacją.

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<sup>661</sup> <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>662</sup> <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

Przed wybuchem II wojny światowej stanowili oni około 10% ogółu mieszkańców. Holokaust dramatycznie zredukował liczebność polskich Żydów (o około trzy miliony). Kolejna fala emigracji po wojnie jeszcze bardziej uszczupliła tę społeczność.

Zgodnie z danymi pochodzącymi ze spisu powszechnego z 2011 roku, około 8000 osób w Polsce zadeklarowało żydowską tożsamość, co stanowiło tylko niewielki odsetek populacji liczącej 38,5 miliona. Z kolei dane z kolejnego spisu z 2021 roku wykazały wzrost liczby osób identyfikujących się jako Żydzi do 17 000. Wzrost ten może być przypisany możliwości zaznaczenia więcej niż jednej identyfikacji narodowej w najnowszym spisie.

Nie ma wiele informacji na temat statusu społeczno-ekonomicznego Żydów w Polsce. Przede wszystkim wskazuje się, że są to głównie mieszkańcy miast, osoby świeckie i zasymilowane z dominującą kulturą polską. Według naszych rozmówców, polscy Żydzi nie wyróżniają się statusem społecznym, politycznym czy ekonomicznym na tle reszty społeczeństwa. W wywiadach jeden z ekspertów specjalizujący się w antysemityzmie i innych formach nietolerancji zauważył, że wielu Żydów pracuje w sektorze IT, jest to jednak dowód anegdotyczny – nie ma na ten temat rzetelnych danych. Poziom wykształcenia wśród Żydów nie różni się od ogółu populacji polskiej. Wywiady pokazują także, że Żydzi nie różnią się z wyglądu od reszty społeczeństwa i czasem nawet ukrywają swoją tożsamość. Ich przynależność do społeczności żydowskiej często ujawniana jest tylko w bezpośredniej rozmowie, na wyraźne zapytanie.

## Antysemityzm w Polsce

### Poziom antysemityzmu w Polsce

Antysemityzm jest nadal istotnym problemem w polskim społeczeństwie. Taki wniosek wyłania się zarówno z danych ilościowych jak i z wypowiedzi naszych rozmówców. W badaniu przeprowadzonym w 2021 roku<sup>663</sup> zidentyfikowano, że 42% badanych w Polsce wykazywało postawy zgodne z definicją tradycyjnego antysemityzmu, 71% odpowiadało kryteriom antysemityzmu wtórnego, natomiast 74% można było zakwalifikować w kategoriach tzw. nowego antysemityzmu, który obejmuje antyżydowskie sentymenty postrzegane jako zamaskowany antysemityzm<sup>664665</sup>.

Antysemityzm jest złożonym zagadnieniem, na które składają się trzy elementy: tradycyjne uprzedzenia, uprzedzenia wtórne i wiara w spisek żydowski.<sup>666</sup> Tradycyjne uprzedzenia, zakorzenione w historycznych motywach religijnych, wiążą się z wierzeniami, takimi jak rytualne używanie przez Żydów chrześcijańskiej krwi lub ponoszenie zbiorowej odpowiedzialności za śmierć Chrystusa. Wtórny antysemityzm przybiera bardziej subtelną formę, charakteryzując się negacją antyżydowskich uprzedzeń, umniejszaniem skali i znaczenia Holokaustu, a niekiedy nawet przypisywaniem Żydom odpowiedzialności za te wydarzenia. Często postrzega się również Holokaust jako środek wykorzystywany do osiągnięcia korzyści przez Żydów. Negowanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu odgrywają znaczącą rolę w tej formie antysemityzmu, usprawiedliwiając antysemickie przekonania poprzez oskarżanie Żydów o fabrykowanie historii. To zaprzeczenie może być

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<sup>663</sup> Kovács A. & Fischer G., "Uprzedzenia w Europie: badanie w 16 krajach europejskich".

<sup>664</sup> Według badań, wtórny antysemityzm jest relatywizacją, negowaniem i zniekształcaniem Holokaustu.

<sup>665</sup> Według badań, nowy antysemityzm to antyżydowskie sentymenty projektowane na Izrael jako punkt centralny.

<sup>666</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antysemityzm we współczesnej Polsce: aspekty ekonomiczne, religijne i historyczne. *Dziennik Badań nad Antysemityzmem*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Szkodliwe pomysły. Struktura i konsekwencje przekonań antysemickich w Polsce. *Psychologia polityczna*, 34, 821-839.

zarówno "twarde" (odrzućenie historycznej prawdy o Holokauście), jak i "miękkie" (kwestionowanie części jego aspektów). Zasadniczo dziedzictwo Holokaustu, które obejmuje te formy zaprzeczania i zniekształcania i służy utrwalaniu antysemityzmu.<sup>667</sup> Z kolei wiara w spisek żydowski wiąże się z poglądem, że Żydzi potajemnie próbują kontrolować porządek świata.<sup>668</sup> Jest to forma współczesnego antysemityzmu, skupiająca się wokół idei, że Żydzi dążą do władzy, i przypisuje im jedność i tajemnicę.<sup>669</sup> W badaniu przeprowadzonym w Polsce w 2021 roku zaobserwowano, że antysemityzm wtórny oraz antysemityzm spiskowy były dość rozpowszechnione, co zostało odzwierciedlone w wysokich średnich wynikach na skalach mierzących te zjawiska. W skali, gdzie maksymalna wartość to siedem, średni wynik dla antysemityzmu wtórnego wyniósł 3,39, wskazując na umiarkowany poziom wtórnych postaw antysemickich wśród respondentów. Analogicznie, średni wynik dla antysemityzmu spiskowego także osiągnął wartość 3,39, co wskazuje na umiarkowaną tendencję do przyjmowania antysemickich teorii spiskowych. Natomiast tradycyjny antysemityzm był mniej powszechny, z niższą średnią wynoszącą 1,96, co sugeruje, że uczestnicy badania wykazywali średnio niższy poziom przekonań zgodnych z tradycyjnym antysemityzmem.<sup>670</sup> Badanie to ujawniło również, że w Polsce antysemityzm może być powiązany z krytyką państwa Izrael, przy czym największe powiązanie występuje między postawami antyizraelskimi a antysemityzmem spiskowym. Jednakże, wyniki wskazują także na to, że nawet tradycyjne stereotypy mogą przyczyniać się do zwiększenia niechęci wobec Izraela.<sup>671</sup>

W 2021 r. badacze zaobserwowali także ogólny spadek poziomu antysemityzmu w Polsce, ale zmiany w różnym stopniu dotyczyły różnego rodzaju postaw antysemickich. Podczas gdy akceptacja tradycyjnych poglądów antysemickich znacznie wzrosła w 2017 r. w porównaniu z 2014 r., po 2021 r. nastąpił znaczny spadek tych postaw. Wydaje się, że zmiany nastrojów antysemickich są związane przede wszystkim z klimatem społeczno-politycznym w kraju. Równocześnie antysemityzm wtórny pozostawał stosunkowo stabilny w latach 2009-2021, co wskazuje, że współczesne formy antysemityzmu wydają się być odporne na zmiany społeczno-polityczne. Jeśli chodzi o wiarę w żydowski spisek, trend ten spadał do 2014 r., ale w 2017 r. odnotował wzrost, po czym ponownie spadł w 2021 r.<sup>672</sup> Interesujące wydaje się to, że większość respondentów (80%) Polskiego Badania Uprzedzeń z 2021 r. zadeklarowała, że nie zna osobiście żadnych Żydów. W latach 2009-2021 poziom deklarowanych kontaktów nie zmienił się zbytnio. Kontekst ten jest o

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<sup>667</sup> Barna, Ildikó, Tamás Kohut, Michał Bilewicz, Ol'ga Gyarfášová, Jiří Kocián, Grigorij Meseżnikov i Maria Babińska. "Badanie na temat uprzedzeń antysemickich w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: raport z badań". Instytut Toma Lantosa, 2022. Dostęp 28 września 2023 r.

<sup>668</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antysemityzm we współczesnej Polsce: aspekty ekonomiczne, religijne i historyczne. *Dziennik Badań nad Antysemityzmem*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Szkodliwe pomysły. Struktura i konsekwencje przekonań antysemickich w Polsce. *Psychologia polityczna*, 34, 821-839.

<sup>669</sup> Bulska, Dominika., Winiewski, Mikołaj. "Diagnoza i konsekwencje antysemityzmu w Polsce" w *Polskim Badaniu Uprzedzeń 2017 – Oblicza przemocy międzygrupowej* pod redakcją Anny Stefaniak, Mikołaj Winiewski, 221-252. Warszawa: LiberiLibri, 2018.

<sup>670</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Postawy Polaków wobec mniejszości: raport z Polskiego Badania Uprzedzeń 2021" w *Polskim Badaniu Uprzedzeń 2021 – postawy a ideologia polityczna* pod redakcją Dominiki Bulskiej, Mikołaja Winiewskiego, Michała Bilewicza. Warszawa: Liberi Libri, w druku.

<sup>671</sup> Bulska Dominika., Winiewski Mikołaj. "Postawy antyizraelskie i antysemityzm w Polsce. Raport na podstawie Polskiego Badania Uprzedzeń z 2013 roku". Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami. Dostęp 8 października 2023 r.

<sup>672</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Postawy Polaków wobec mniejszości: raport z Polskiego Badania Uprzedzeń 2021" w *Polskim Badaniu Uprzedzeń 2021 – postawy a ideologia polityczna* pod redakcją Dominiki Bulskiej, Mikołaja Winiewskiego, Michała Bilewicza. Warszawa: Liberi Libri, w druku.



tyle istotny, że podkreśla istnienie silnych negatywnych postaw wobec grupy, z którą respondenci nie mają na co dzień do czynienia<sup>673</sup> Zjawisko to określa się w badaniach nad antysemityzmem jako "antysemityzm bez Żydów".<sup>674</sup>

Dane na temat związku między pandemią Covid-19 a antysemityzmem w Polsce są ograniczone. Temat związany postawami antysemitycznymi w kontekście pandemii z praktycznie nie pojawiał się w przeprowadzonych przez nas wywiadach. Raport na temat trendów społecznych wśród Polaków w czasie pandemii ujawnił jednak wzmożone emocje wobec grup mniejszościowych i zwiększony poziom obrzydzenia skierowanego przeciwko tym grupom. Na podstawie badań opublikowanych w roku 2021, Polacy nie mają szczególnie pozytywnego nastawienia do Żydów. Wyniki te wskazują na istotną potrzebę działań mających na celu zwiększenie pozytywnych postaw wobec społeczności żydowskiej.<sup>675</sup> W skali globalnej incydenty antysemityczne w czasie pandemii COVID-19 były szczególnie powszechne w Europie – a więc prawdopodobnie także w Polsce – stanowiąc blisko 50% takich incydentów w 2021 r. Od początku pandemii w 2020 r. pojawiły się teorie spiskowe łączące Żydów lub państwo Izrael z COVID-19, sugerujące, że czerpią korzyści z globalnego cierpienia. Poziom antysemityzmu i mowy nienawiści szczególnie wzrósł na platformach mediów społecznościowych. Nastąpił również alarmujący wzrost trywializacji Holokaustu, z symbolami Holokaustu używanymi w protestach przeciwko środkom COVID-19, czemu towarzyszyły niewłaściwe porównania ograniczeń pandemicznych do prześladowań Żydów.<sup>676</sup>

W raportach wskazujących, które cechy demograficzne są istotne dla wyrażania antysemityzmu, płeć jest jednym z najbardziej istotnych czynników. Wyniki pokazują, że mężczyźni wyrażają postawy antysemityczne częściej niż kobiety. Czynniki takie jak wiek, poziom wykształcenia i dochód również w pewnym stopniu przyczyniają się do wyznawania antysemitycznych przekonań. Antysemityzm częściej jest wyrażany przez osoby starsze, o niższym poziomie wykształcenia i przez osoby o niższych dochodach.

W trakcie wywiadów, uczestnicy wyrażali obawy dotyczące jawnych problematycznych działań, takich jak wandalizm cmentarny i pojawianie się swastyk. Podkreślali oni absolutną niestosowność takich aktów i konieczność przeciwstawienia się im. Uczestnicy badania zwrócili również uwagę na głębsze niepokoje wynikające z dwuznacznych uwag, które często zaczynają się od słów "Nie mam nic przeciwko Żydom, ale..." oraz wyrazów nostalgii za przedwojenną społecznością żydowską, które nie przekładają się na aktywne wsparcie współczesnej społeczności żydowskiej. Uczestnicy cytowali wypowiedzi, w których Polacy deklarowali akceptację dla Żydów tylko wtedy, gdy pozostają oni niezauważalni w przestrzeni publicznej. Wydaje się, że istnieje pewnego rodzaju sympatia dla Żydów, pod warunkiem, że są oni "poza zasięgiem wzroku" i nie spotyka się ich twarzą w twarz. Ujawnia to wyraźny brak interakcji ze społecznością żydowską.

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<sup>673</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Postawy Polaków wobec mniejszości: raport z Polskiego Badania Uprzedzeń 2021" w Polskim Badaniu Uprzedzeń 2021 – postawy a ideologia polityczna pod redakcją Dominiki Bulskiej, Mikołaja Winiewskiego, Michała Bilewicza. Warszawa: Liberi Libri, w druku.

<sup>674</sup> Bednarz, Leo. "Antysemityzm bez Żydów". W cieniu polskiego orła, Palgrave Macmillan, Londyn 2000.

<sup>675</sup> Molenda Zuzanna., Marchlewska Marta., Górka Paulina., Michalski Piotr, Szczepańska Dagmara., Furman Aleksandra., Malinowska Katarzyna. "Koronawirus w Polsce: perspektywa psychologii społecznej. Wyniki pierwszej fali badań podłużnych przeprowadzonych na reprezentatywnej próbie Polaków". Dostęp 28 września 2023 r. <http://cbu.psychologia.pl/2021/02/20/koronawirus-w-polsce-perspektywa-psychologii-spoecznej/>

<sup>676</sup> Raheli Baratz-Rix "Stan antysemityzmu w 2021 roku". Departament ds. Zwalczania Antysemityzmu i Zwiększania Odporności. Dostęp 28 września 2023 r. [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/wzo24012022/en/file\\_2021%20report-final.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/wzo24012022/en/file_2021%20report-final.pdf)

Wygląda na to, że antysemickie postawy są zakorzenione w fantazji, mitach, a być może w obawie przed realnym kontaktem.

### **Antysemickie stereotypy, uprzedzenia, teorie spiskowe**

Muzeum Historii Żydów Polskich POLIN przeprowadziło badanie, które ujawniło dominujące narracje i język używany w dyskusji o Żydach we współczesnej Polsce.<sup>677</sup> Badanie obejmowało analizę szerokiej gamy materiałów, w tym artykułów prasowych, tweetów, książek, filmów, seriali telewizyjnych, okładek i grafik z lat 1950-2022. W przeprowadzonym badaniu zidentyfikowano dziesięć kluczowych wątków antysemickich narracji. Jednym z dominujących tematów była wiara w istnienie tzw. „żydowskiego lobby”, które miało być ściśle powiązane z działaniami państwa Izrael i globalnej diaspory żydowskiej, szczególnie w kontekście roszczeń do majątków sprzed II wojny światowej. Inne rozpowszechnione narracje dotyczyły postrzegania Żydów jako odpowiedzialnych za kreowanie negatywnego obrazu Polski na arenie międzynarodowej. Wśród przekonań badanych znajdowało się również to, że Żydzi nie doceniają polskiej gościnności i nie uznają wspólnej historii ofiary w czasie wojny.

Narracje spiskowe opisane w badaniu przedstawiały Żydów jako zakulisowych graczy, powiązanych z masonerią, światowymi spiskami oraz globalnymi ruchami lewicowymi. Co więcej, niektóre z tych opowieści obarczały Żydów winą za różne negatywne zdarzenia na świecie, łącząc ich obecność ze zjawiskami takimi jak choroba, korupcja i zagrożenie.

Przykłady uprzedzeń i stereotypów wymieniane przez uczestników badania jakościowego pokrywały się z przedstawioną powyżej analizą antysemickich narracji. Rozmówcy wskazywali że obecne są przekonania, że Żydzi są wyjątkowi pod względem inteligencji i radzenia sobie z życiem, co wydaje się osobom badanym być wyznacznikiem spiskowego antysemityzmu. Stereotypna temat Żydów obejmują również przekonanie, że Żydzi byli odpowiedzialni za zabicie Jezusa, pogląd, że Żydzi nie są prawdziwymi Polakami oraz stereotyp, że Żydzi są mądrzejsi i bogatsi. Uczestnicy badania wspominają, że niektórzy Polacy błędnie zakładają, że wszyscy Żydzi są ortodoksyjni, co prowadzi ich do postrzegania społeczności żydowskiej jako ortodoksyjnej sekty.

Rozmówcy sugerowali, że w Polsce istnieje pewna forma antysemityzmu kulturowego, szczególnie związana ze stereotypami kojarzącymi Żydów z bogactwem (np. przekonanie, że Żydzi zawsze mają pieniądze, niesprawiedliwie, ale sprytnie zarobione). Stereotypy te od wielu lat są głęboko zakorzenione w polskiej kulturze. Według rozmówców niektórzy ludzie mogą nawet nie rozpoznawać tych kodów kulturowych jako antysemickich, co dodatkowo ilustruje normalizację tych przekonań w społeczeństwie. Stereotyp Żydów posiadających pieniądze jest w Polsce tak żywy, że niektórzy nie uważają go za antysemicki.

Najczęstsze spiskowe narracje antysemickie koncentrują się wokół twierdzeń, że Żydzi dążą do dominacji nad instytucjami finansowymi, globalną gospodarką, a nawet całym światem i że działają potajemnie.<sup>678</sup> W ramach przeprowadzonego badania jakościowego, żydowscy uczestnicy często zgłaszali spotkanie się z

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<sup>677</sup> Damaszk, Joanna., Napiórkowski, Marcin., Polak, Krzysztof., Żurawicka, Marzena., Bierca, Marta., Wiszejko-Wierzbicka, Dorota. "Kogo widzą Polacy, kiedy widzą Żyda. Raport z badań realizowanych przez Muzeum Żydów Polskich POLIN" edited by Marcin Napiórkowski. Warsaw, 2023

<sup>678</sup> Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Radzik, Z. (2012). Antysemityzm we współczesnej Polsce: aspekty ekonomiczne, religijne i historyczne. *Dziennik Badań nad Antysemityzmem*, 4 (2), 423-442; Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., Wójcik, A. (2013). Szkodliwe pomysły. Struktura i konsekwencje przekonań antysemickich w Polsce. *Psychologia polityczna*, 34, 821-839.

teoriami spiskowymi. Najczęściej wskazywali na przekonanie, że wpływowe globalne korporacje i ogólna dynamika ekonomiczna są rzekomo dominowane przez Żydów lub tajemnicze siły mistyczne. Podkreślali, że według tych teorii spiskowych, żydowska obecność miałaby koordynować kluczowe ruchy polityczne i ekonomiczne, szczególnie od roku 1989. Ciekawą obserwacją było również to, że niektóre teorie spiskowe w Polsce zaprzeczają postrzeganiu Żydów w innych krajach, takich jak USA. Rozmówcy wyjaśniali, że w Polsce stereotyp Żydów potajemnie rządzących krajem został połączony z tymi samymi treściami dotyczącymi masonerii, podczas gdy te dwie grupy w USA są postrzegane jako swoje przeciwieństwa. Ustalenia te są zbieżne z wynikami badań POLIN. Ich analizy również wskazywały narracje ukazujące Żydów jako członków wpływowych grup, takich jak masoneria, lub po prostu jako elitę społeczeństwa.<sup>679</sup>

Podczas wywiadów wspomniano również o błędnych przekonaniach opartych na kontekście historycznym. Jednym z nich jest przekonanie, że Żydzi jako policjanci, kolaborowali z władzami komunistycznymi i aresztowali Polaków. Uczestnicy badania tłumaczyli, że większość policjantów stanowili Polacy, a jedynie kilka procent tej grupy stanowili Żydzi. Mimo to Żydzi są związani w antysemickich narracjach z siłami bezpieczeństwa. Drugą teorią spiskową którą wymieniały osoby badane jest przekonanie, że Holocaust nie miał miejsca lub że odpowiedzialność za niego ponoszą Żydzi. Ostatni przykład przywoływany w wywiadach mit związany z Żydami wywodzi się z mitu stworzonego i kultywowanego przez wspólnotę katolicką mianowicie przekonanie, że Żydzi porywają polskie dzieci, aby zdobyć ich krew.

### **Antysemicka mowa nienawiści i przestępstwa z nienawiści**

Według badań z 2016 roku<sup>680</sup> Żydzi są jedną z najbardziej nielubianych grup w Polsce. W 2017 r. badanie dotyczące mowy nienawiści<sup>681</sup> wykazało, że około dwie trzecie respondentów miało styczność z mową nienawiści skierowaną przeciwko Żydom. Co zaskakujące, nienawistne komentarze skierowane do Żydów zostały uznane mniej obraźliwe niż te, wyrażające mowę nienawiści wobec Ukraińców i uchodźców.

Badania z 2021 r.<sup>682</sup> wskazują na niewielki związek między wszelkimi formami antysemityzmu a poziomem wykształcenia, wiekiem i preferencjami politycznymi respondentów. Przede wszystkim osoby o niższym poziomie wykształcenia, starsi respondenci i osoby identyfikujące się jako "prawicowe" politycznie wykazują większą skłonność do wyrażania poglądów antysemickich. Osoby lepiej wykształcone i pochodzące z dużych miast mają większy kontakt z mową nienawiści, są na nią bardziej wyczulone i postrzegają ją jako bardziej obraźliwą.

### **Antysemityzm w polityce**

W ciągu ostatnich ośmiu lat prawicowe partie, a zwłaszcza Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), koncentrowały się na kreowaniu narracji antysemickich mających na celu obronę reputacji Polski i Polaków. Narracje te mają

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<sup>679</sup> Damaszkó, Joanna., Napiórkowski, Marcin., Polak, Krzysztof., Żurawicka, Marzena., Bierca, Marta., Wiszejko-Wierzbicka, Dorota. "Kogo widzą Polacy, kiedy widzą Żyda. Raport z badań realizowanych przez Muzeum Żydów Polskich POLIN" edited by Marcin Napiórkowski. Warsaw, 2023

<sup>680</sup> Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej. "Stosunek do innych narodów. Ogłoszenie o badaniach". Dostęp 28 września 2023 r. [http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K\\_053\\_16.PDF](http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_053_16.PDF)

<sup>681</sup> Hansen Karolina. "Mowa nienawiści – raport z badania Polish Prejudice Survey 3". Centrum Badań nad Upředzeniami. Dostęp 28 września 2023 r. [http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/PPS3\\_MowaNienawisci\\_Hansen\\_fin.pdf](http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/PPS3_MowaNienawisci_Hansen_fin.pdf)

<sup>682</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Postawy Polaków wobec mniejszości: raport z Polskiego Badania Upředzeń 2021" w Polskim Badaniu Upředzeń 2021 – postawy a ideologia polityczna pod redakcją Dominiki Bulskiej, Mikołaja Winiewskiego, Michała Bilewicza. Warszawa: Liberi Libri, w druku.

charakter defensywny i koncentrują się wokół Holokaustu, II wojny światowej i relacji między Polakami a Żydami. Prawicowi politycy podkreślają wspólny los Polaków i Żydów w czasie II wojny światowej za który obwiniają za to Niemców. Uznając udział Polaków w Holokauście, niektórzy politycy PiS uważają przypadki zabijania Żydów przez Polaków za działania zdemoralizowanej mniejszości. W niektórych narracjach polityków pojawia się również twierdzenie, iż Żydzi sami przyczynili się do swojego tragicznego losu poprzez kolaborację z Niemcami.<sup>683</sup> Ostatnia debata na temat historii polsko-żydowskiej miała miejsce w 2018 r. w kontekście nowelizacji ustawy o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej. Dyskusja ta obejmowała argumenty opisane wyżej, ale także podjęto kwestię odpowiedzialności Żydów za zbrodnie popełnione na Polakach podczas sowieckiej okupacji i w okresie powojennym.<sup>684</sup>

Badania pokazują, że przejawy uprzedzeń i posługiwanie się mową nienawiści jest przede wszystkim charakterystyczne dla partii prawicowych. Badani przez nas rozmówcy zauważyli jednak, że inne partie polityczne również wykorzystują insynuacje o żydowskim pochodzeniu przeciwników w celu osłabienia ich pozycji w oczach wyborców. Jeden z ekspertów wyjaśnił, że istotnym aspektem narracji antysemitki jest fakt, że zarówno prawica, jak i lewica polityczna używają terminu "Żyd" jako obraźliwego epitetu. Sugeruje to, że osoby zaangażowane w politykę, w obliczu różnicy zdań, są uwłaczająco określane jako Żydzi. Jest to przykład antysemityzmu opierającego się na kojarzeniu braku wiarygodności z żydowskim pochodzeniem i danym politykiem.

Wyniki badania jakościowego pokazały, że politycy wykorzystują uprzedzenia i mowę nienawiści wobec grup mniejszościowych w dyskursie politycznym jako strategię zdobywania poparcia obywateli. Dlatego nienawistne narracje polityków są szczególnie powszechne w okresach wyborczych. Stwierdzenia te są zgodne z wynikami badania przeprowadzonego w sierpniu i wrześniu 2023 r., w którym monitorowano rozpowszechnienie nienawistnych treści w telewizji publicznej w okresie przedwyborczym. Badanie wykazało, że treści dotyczące Żydów zajęły czwarte miejsce pod względem częstotliwości wśród treści nienawistnych dotyczących wszystkich badanych mniejszości.<sup>685</sup> Politycy wykorzystują uprzedzenia, aby wywołać reakcje i przyciągnąć uwagę obywateli. Antysemityzm często plasuje się w pierwszej trójce lub czwórce najważniejszych kwestii w dyskusjach publicznych, często zbiegając się z narracjami anty-LGBT, antyuchodźczymi lub antyimigranckimi. Warto zauważyć, że antysemityzm i antymuzułmańskie nastroje rzadziej się pokrywają. Często jednocześnie publicznie podkreślane są liczne uprzedzenia wobec różnych grup, najczęściej antysemitki, anty-LGBT i antyuchodźcze.

### Antysemityzm w sferze sportu

Pomimo niewielkiej mniejszości żydowskiej w Polsce, znaczna część populacji nadal przejawia postawy antysemitki. Jest to szczególnie widoczne na stadionach piłkarskich, gdzie określenie "Żyd" jest używane jako obelga. Badania nad antysemityzmem w polskiej kulturze piłkarskiej klasyfikują i analizują informacje

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<sup>683</sup> Babińska Maria. "Individual and intergroup determinants of social representations of attitudes towards Jews during World War II", 48-50, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2023. <https://uwedu.pl/bip.gov.pl/doktoraty-udostepnione-na-stronie-bip-zgodnie-z-art-188-ust-1-i-2-ustawy-z-dnia-3-lipca-2018-r-prawo-o-szkolnictwie-wyzszym/maria-babinska.html>

<sup>684</sup> Babińska Maria, Bilewicz Michał, Bulska Dominika, Haska Agnieszka, Winiewski Mikołaj. "Postawy wobec Żydów i ich historia po wprowadzeniu ustawy IPN" Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami. Dostęp 8 października 2023 r. [http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/Analiza\\_Skutki\\_ustawy\\_o\\_IPN.pdf](http://cbu.psychologia.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/410/2021/02/Analiza_Skutki_ustawy_o_IPN.pdf)

<sup>685</sup> "Monitoring Treści Nienawistnych W TVP: 05.09 – 24.09.2023 " Otwarta Rzeczpospolita." Otwarta Rzeczpospolita RSS, September 25, 2023. <https://www.otwarta.org/monitoring-tresci-nienawistnych-w-tvp-05-09-24-09-2023/>.

związane z tym problemem, ujawniając, że często występuje on w miastach z historią współistnienia polsko-żydowskiego i utrzymującymi się napięciami. W trakcie meczów piłki nożnej można spotkać się z różnymi formami antysemityzmu. Kibice często przywołują "Żyda" jako sposób wyrażania pogardy i nienawiści.<sup>686</sup>

Nasi rozmówcy również wspomnieli też o tzw. antysemityzmie kibolskim. W Polsce rozróżnia się kibiców piłki nożnej, którzy interesują się sportem, oraz tych, którzy charakteryzują się agresywnym zachowaniem i traktują kontekst meczu jako pole bitwy lub pretekst do ataku. W tych drugich społecznościach kibicowskich popularne przyśpiewki i okrzyki często zawierają antysemicką mowę nienawiści. W trakcie wywiadów zwracano również uwagę na popularność tych antysemickich zwrotów, szczególnie widoczną w internecie.

### **Postrzeżenie antysemityzmu w społeczności żydowskiej**

Podczas odpowiadania na pytania dotyczące osobistych doświadczeń z antysemityzmem i innymi formami nietolerancji wobec grup mniejszościowych, żydowscy uczestnicy naszego badania terenowego przywołali swoje pierwsze doświadczenia. Stwierdzili, że kiedy doświadczali antysemityzmu, nie byli świadomi tego, z czym się zetknęli i odczuwali jedynie wewnętrzny niepokój, nie wiedząc dlaczego ani jak zareagować. Doświadczenia te miały miejsce w szkole lub na uniwersytecie. Obecnie uczestnicy badania najczęściej spotykają się z antysemityzmem online. Zniekształcanie Holocaustu było najczęstszym objawem antysemityzmu wśród nieżydowskich przyjaciół osób uczestniczących w badaniu. Rozpowszechnioną formą antysemityzmu były również antyizraelskie postawy wyrażane zarówno przez prawą, jak i lewą stronę sceny politycznej, głównie przez młodsze osoby podatne na dezinformację i fałszywe wiadomości. Obawa przed atakami antysemickimi nie była bardzo wysoka wśród żydowskich respondentów, mimo że 20% doświadczyło tego w ostatnich latach. Wszystkie doświadczenia miały charakter werbalny i były przeprowadzone przez przypadkowych nieznajomych po „ujawnieniu” żydowskiej tożsamości. Przykładowo, ujawnienie online tożsamości żydowska jednego z rozmówców, skutkowało atakiem nienawiści w Internecie. Inny rozmówca z kolei natknął się na przechodnia, który wpadł na niego i dał upust swojej frustracji poprzez wrogi antysemicki okrzyk. Innym przykładem doświadczenia antysemityzmu było napotkanie nietrzeźwego mężczyzny, który krzyczał, przechodząc obok synagogi w sobotnią noc. Te incydenty ilustrują różne formy dyskryminacji i wrogości, z którymi osoby te spotykają się ze względu na swoją żydowską tożsamość.

Co ciekawe, uczestnicy badania stwierdzili, że Polacy reagują zaskoczeniem i konsternacją na informację o tym, że ktoś jest Żydem, co podkreśla znaczący brak świadomości na temat interakcji z przedstawicielami grup mniejszościowych w Polsce. Werbalne formy ataków antysemickich wywoływały u ofiar uczucia zaskoczenia, strachu i gniewu. W obronie często używają humoru, aby złagodzić sytuację, paradoksalnie dając swoim agresorom możliwość refleksji nad sobą i potencjalnie ścieżkę do odwrotu. Pozostawia to jednak ofiary obciążone uczuciem niepokoju i osamotnienia. Co więcej, rozmówcy odnotowali wzrost czujności po takich incydentach. Dodatkowo niepokój nasilany jest przez medialne relacje z konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. Antysemickie zniewagi, slogany i stereotypy o Żydach są popularne i głęboko zakorzenione w języku polskim. W rezultacie, uczestnicy badania mają kontakt z wieloma antysemickimi stwierdzeniami. Zgodnie z wywiadami, najczęstsze to: "Żydzi mają pieniądze i wpływy.", "Wszyscy Żydzi się znają.", "Zawsze stoją za wydarzeniami politycznymi.", oraz oskarżenia Izraela o bycie krajem terrorystycznym i okupantem.

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<sup>686</sup> Kucia, Marek, and Bogna Wilczyńska. "Antysemityzm stadionowy: analiza i interpretacja zjawiska." *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 58.4 (2014): 171-200.

Według osób biorących udział w badaniu, rozmowy o Holokauście w Polsce oraz polsko-żydowskiej historii zawsze prowadzą do przywoływania antysemitycznych stereotypów i mowy nienawiści. Osoby badane opowiadały również o sposobach radzenia sobie z antysemityzmem przez społeczność żydowską i jej liderów. Zauważyli, że niektórzy Żydzi nie odczytują pewnych zachowań jako dyskryminacji (np. okrzyki na meczach piłkarskich czy codzienne zwroty o antysemitycznym zabarwieniu). Może to wynikać z faktu, że doświadczali oni takich postaw na tyle często, że się do nich przyzwyczaili. Ten proces przyzwyczajania się do antysemityzmu może czasami pełnić rolę radzenia sobie ze strachem przed nękaniami. Kiedy członkowie społeczności żydowskiej doświadczają mowy nienawiści czy antysemitycznych zachowań, tłumaczą to sobie jako coś powszechnego. Aby poradzić sobie z antysemityzmem, niektórzy członkowie społeczności żydowskiej starają się go normalizować i tym samym emocjonalnie dystansować się od ataków.

Ponadto, społeczność żydowska podejmuje działania mające na celu ograniczenie antysemityzmu poprzez budowanie relacji z lokalną społecznością. Stwarzane są otwarte i przyjazne przestrzenie, które mają zachęcać do wzajemnego poznawania się i pozytywnej interakcji. Niektóre synagogi udostępniają swoje wnętrza okolicznym mieszkańcom, organizują wydarzenia społeczne i kulturalne, jak również różne inne aktywności. Ma to na celu wspieranie poczucia wspólnoty i wzajemnego zrozumienia. Oferując społeczności możliwość bezpośredniego zapoznania się z synagogą i podkreślając wagę lokalnego zaangażowania społeczność żydowska nie tylko zwiększa zrozumienie, ale również wspiera redukcję uprzedzeń.

### **Wrogość wobec innych grup mniejszościowych w kraju**

Badania pokazują, że stosunek Polaków do różnych grup mniejszościowych zmieniał się w czasie. Do 2013 r. stawali się coraz bardziej otwarci na Żydów, Romów i Ukraińców, ale w latach 2014-2017 nastąpił spadek akceptacji. W 2021 r. pozytywne nastawienie do tych grup mniejszościowych ponownie wzrosło. Tymczasem w latach 2016-2021 zmieniła się również akceptacja uchodźców i homoseksualistów, przy czym największy wzrost akceptacji odnotowano w 2021 roku. Mimo to w 2021 r. najbardziej odrzuceni byli uchodźcy, Romowie i homoseksualiści.<sup>687</sup>

Nasi rozmówcy wśród najbardziej dotkniętych wrogością grup mniejszościowych wymieniali najczęściej Ukraińców, następnie Rosjan i Białorusinów oraz mniejszości etniczne i religijne – Romów i mużulmanów. Równie często wymienianymi grupami były osoby LGBT+, kobiety i osoby o innym kolorze skóry. Kilka osób wspomniało również o osobach niepełnosprawnych i neuroatypowych. Zdaniem uczestników badania sytuacja mniejszości pogorszyła się po 2015 r. z powodu kryzysu politycznego i propagandy posługującej się nienawistnym i dzielącym językiem. Sytuacja ta uległa dalszemu pogorszeniu w związku z pojawieniem się syryjskich uchodźców na granicy białoruskiej i trwającym konfliktem na Ukrainie. Polacy zaczęli coraz bardziej wrogo traktować mniejszość rosyjską. Spowodowało to również wzrost uprzedzeń wobec innych grup. Narracje sugerujące, że Czeczeni i Białorusini wspierają Rosję, doprowadziły do ataków cywilnych na przedstawicieli tych mniejszości i wzrostu poziomu dyskryminacji uchodźców, ukraińskich Romów i rosyjskojęzycznych Ukraińców.

Najogólniej rzecz ujmując, na podstawie wypowiedzi rozmówców można stwierdzić, że najczęstsze uprzedzenia i stereotypy dotyczą mniejszości, które postrzegane są jako uciążliwe, wymagające od innych

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<sup>687</sup> Mirucka, Maria., Zochniak, Kamila., Bulska, Dominika. "Postawy Polaków wobec mniejszości: raport z Polskiego Badania Uprzedzeń 2021" w Polskim Badaniu Uprzedzeń 2021 – postawy a ideologia polityczna pod redakcją Dominiki Bulskiej, Mikołaja Winiewskiego, Michała Bilewicza. Warszawa: Liberi Libri, w druku.

specjalnego traktowania i uprzywilejowane. Powoduje to uczucia od irytacji do otwartej wrogości. Ukraińcom często mówi się, żeby wracali do domu i walczyli na wojnie. Ukrainki oskarża się o odbieranie Polakom świadczeń socjalnych i niszczenie polskich małżeństw. Romowie nazywani są Cyganami i przedstawiani jako złodzieje, którzy nieuczciwie zarabiają pieniądze. Przedstawiciele społeczności LGBT są odczłowieczani a geje są oskarżani o krzywdzenie dzieci. Podobne oskarżenia kierowane są pod adresem osób o innym kolorze skóry. Ostatnia z wymienianych grup, kobiety, jest uważana za niestabilną, histeryczną, nieprofesjonalną i przypisaną do roli matki.

Z przeprowadzonych przez nas wywiadów można również wywnioskować, że ogólnie rzecz biorąc, najczęstszą formą wyrażania uprzedzeń jest wykorzystywanie mowy nienawiści w mediach społecznościowych. Z kolei najczęściej wskazywaną formą uprzedzeń których doświadczali nasi rozmówcy był codzienny, przypadkowy antysemityzm: opowiadanie antysemickich dowcipów i używanie obraźliwego języka. Zdaniem uczestników naszego badania każda mniejszość może zostać zaatakowana a nawet milczenie na temat mniejszości jest postrzegane przez nich jako forma dyskryminacji. Członkowie mniejszości są wtedy pomijani i uważani za nieistotnych. Zdaniem rozmówców pomijanie mniejszości wynika z potrzeby postrzegania społeczeństwa polskiego jako homogenicznego etnicznie. Wszyscy "inni" są postrzegani negatywnie, a "ich problemy nie są naszym zadaniem do rozwiązania". Ta niewidzialność dotyczy nie tylko mniejszości religijnych czy etnicznych, ale także osób niepełnosprawnych, które zostały zgłoszone jako wykluczone na poziomie edukacyjnym, społecznym i politycznym.

Uczestnicy wywiadów stwierdzili, że mowa nienawiści jest powszechnie akceptowana w społeczeństwie i że uprzedzenia istnieją w całej populacji. Zdaniem naszych rozmówców uprzedzenia i brak wrażliwości antydyskryminacyjnej są powszechne wśród nauczycieli, którzy nie chcą się otworzyć i uczyć.

### **Antysemityzm a edukacja**

#### **Tematy związane z żydostwem, antysemityzmem i Holokaustem w oficjalnych programach nauczania**

Przed upadkiem komunizmu temat znaczącej obecności Żydów w różnych miastach Polski nie był szeroko znany polskim uczniom. Od 1989 r. edukacja o Holokauście jest w Polsce obowiązkowa, ale nie jako samodzielny przedmiot. Co więcej, w ostatnim czasie można zaobserwować tendencję do zaprzeczania historii i rewizjonizmu, przykładowo próbując umniejszyć historyczne zaangażowanie obywateli polskich w antysemickie pogromy. Dodatkowo, ograniczenia prawne i międzynarodowa krytyka wzbudziły obawy co do jakości i rzetelności nauczania o Holokauście w Polsce, szczególnie pod rządami Prawa i Sprawiedliwości.<sup>688</sup>

Badanie jakościowe wykazało, że w polskich szkołach tematy związane z Żydami, antysemityzmem i Holokaustem, poruszane są przede wszystkim na lekcjach historii i języka polskiego. Lektury obowiązkowe także obejmują takie tematy jak pogromy w Polsce i Holokaust. Pogłębienie dyskusji i wyjaśnienie uczniom kontekstu w dużej mierze zależy jednak od poszczególnych nauczycieli. Osoby badane przywołały w wywiadach osobiste doświadczenia z lekturami obowiązkowymi w szkole, takimi jak "Mendel Gdański" Marii Konopnickiej i "Medaliony" Nałkowskiej. Były one dla nich pierwszym kontaktem z historią pogromów w okresie edukacji i wspominane były jako szokujące.

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<sup>688</sup> Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Jolanta. 2019. "Zastosowania i nadużycia edukacji o Holokauście w Polsce po 1989 roku". *Studia nad Holokaustem* 25 (3): 329–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17504902.2019.1567668>.

## **Materiały edukacyjne i działania dotyczące antysemityzmu**

Doświadczenia rozmówców wskazują, że wielu naukowców, badaczy, pedagogów oraz liderów społeczności żydowskiej jest czynnie zaangażowanych w działania przeciwdziałające antysemityzmowi. Tworzą i stosują różnorodne materiały, w tym raporty dotyczące antysemityzmu w Polsce.

Rozmówcy podkreślali znaczenie przeciwdziałania antysemityzmowi poprzez lepszą edukację, która oferuje dokładne informacje o Żydach i ich historii. Zalecili również organizowanie wydarzeń, które ułatwią interakcję między Polakami a członkami grup mniejszościowych. Innym skutecznym podejściem jest zapraszanie izraelskich ekspertów do udziału w konferencjach uniwersyteckich w celu zacieśnienia więzi i rozproszenia wrogości. Ponadto niezbędne jest tworzenie materiałów pomagających w identyfikacji mowy nienawiści i uprzedzeń. W szczególności potrzebne są konkretne polskie przykłady negacjonizmu Holokaustu, dostosowane do kontekstu językowego i społecznego oraz zgodne z wypowiedziami osób publicznych. To lokalne podejście odnosiłoby się do unikalnych aspektów zagadnienia w polskim kontekście.



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## **ANNEX 4: Romanian national report in the local language**

### **Rezumat**

Acest raport de cercetare prezintă concluziile unui studiu amplu realizat în România în perioada martie-septembrie 2023, care se concentrează pe problema cu multiple fațete a antisemitismului în această țară. Studiul oferă o analiză a situației contemporane a comunităților evreiești din România, a prevalenței și a percepțiilor antisemitismului și a intersectării acestuia cu alte forme de intoleranță. În plus, raportul examinează eforturile de prevenire a antisemitismului prin inițiative educaționale. Cercetarea relevă faptul că antisemitismul din România are rădăcini istorice profunde și este încă omniprezent și răspândit. De obicei, acesta ia forma unor stereotipuri și prejudecăți latente, care se manifestă în legende care sunt profund împletite cu teorii complexe ale conspirației și interpretări naționaliste ale istoriei României. Mulți indivizi nu sunt conștienți de expresiile și manifestările actuale ale antisemitismului, iar această lipsă de conștientizare exacerbează și mai mult problema. Deși România a introdus în ultimii ani o legislație pentru a combate antisemitismul și alte forme de discriminare și intoleranță, aplicarea și implementarea a acestor legi este inconsecventă și sporadică. O evoluție pozitivă este introducerea educației privind Holocaustul ca materie obligatorie în licee, începând cu 2023. Cu toate acestea, există provocări în ceea ce privește punerea în aplicare eficientă a acestui program de învățământ. Profesorii solicită orientări mai clare, formare și materiale educaționale actualizate pentru a se asigura că noul curriculum își îndeplinește obiectivele.

Cercetarea subliniază nevoia urgentă de a depune eforturi pentru a recunoaște și aborda antisemitismul în România. Aceste eforturi ar trebui să includă creșterea gradului de conștientizare cu privire la manifestările contemporane ale antisemitismului, aplicarea consecventă a legislației existente și colaborarea între sectoare pentru a consolida inițiativele de educație privind Holocaustul. Aceste măsuri sunt esențiale pentru combaterea antisemitismului adânc înrădăcinat în țară și pentru promovarea unei societăți mai incluzive și mai tolerante pentru toți.

## Introducere

Proiectul<sup>689</sup> BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities) este implementat între ianuarie 2023 și decembrie 2024 în Ungaria, Italia, Polonia și România. Acesta își propune să abordeze prejudecățile adânc înrădăcinate, atitudinile și comportamentele de ură din societate, în special față de evreii europeni. Proiectul urmărește, de asemenea, să promoveze înțelegerea, toleranța și dialogul. Se pune un accent deosebit pe creșterea gradului de conștientizare a tinerilor cu privire la iudaism și antisemitism și pe promovarea dialogului intercultural și interreligios. Cercetarea a fost realizată ca una dintre primele etape ale proiectului BOND. Atât proiectul, cât și cercetarea utilizează definiția antisemitismului adoptată de Alianța Internațională pentru Memoria Holocaustului (IHRA)<sup>690</sup>. Toate etapele cercetării au fost finalizate până în septembrie 2023, astfel încât evenimentele ulterioare datei de 7 octombrie 2023 și impactul acestora nu sunt incluse. Scopul cercetării a fost de a oferi o imagine cuprinzătoare a antisemitismului în România, ca bază pentru activitățile viitoare ale proiectului. În consecință, cercetarea a avut limitările sale: a fost realizată în cadrul calendarului și domeniului de aplicare definite în cadrul proiectului și de-a lungul unor subteme relevante pentru activitățile ulterioare ale proiectului.

## Metodologie

Raportul se bazează pe o combinație de cercetare documentară și de teren, folosind date din diverse surse. În cadrul cercetării documentare, a fost rezumată literatura de specialitate disponibilă privind România pe teme identificate în cadrul proiectului din ultimii zece ani. Rezultatele cercetării pe teren au fost compilate cu constatările din cercetarea calitativă pe teren (opt interviuri și patru focus-grupuri). La interviuri au participat trei experți, trei practicieni (profesori și educatori) și doi lideri ai comunității (minoritățile romă și maghiară). Cele patru grupuri de discuții (FG) au fost realizate cu următoarele părți interesate: FG1: practicieni de primă linie (profesori și educatori); FG2: lideri ai minorităților religioase; FG3: tineri din comunitățile majoritare și minoritare, și FG4: lideri și membri ai comunităților evreiești. Analiza tematică, ghidată de analiza literaturii, a fost utilizată pentru a structura și a analiza datele din cercetarea de teren.

## Limitări

Cercetătorii au întâmpinat un obstacol major în identificarea evreilor dispuși să participe la cercetare. Prin conversațiile cu experți și reprezentanți ai comunității evreiești, a devenit evident faptul că există o reticență puternică față de a fi identificat și de a conversa cu persoane din afară despre experiențele lor ca evrei în România. Din cauza acestor provocări, faza de cercetare a fost prelungită, iar Focus Group-ul cu membrii comunității evreiești a fost restructurat în trei interviuri separate.

## Situația comunităților evreiești din România

Înainte de cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial, în România trăiau aproximativ 800.000 de evrei<sup>691</sup>. În prezent, Institutul de Cercetare a Politicilor Evreiești (JPR) estimează o populație evreiască de bază de aproximativ 8.700<sup>692</sup>, dar ultimul recensământ din 2021 relevă un număr mult mai mic: 2378<sup>693</sup>. Conform

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<sup>689</sup> <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

<sup>690</sup> <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

<sup>691</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC European Jewish Congress, 2022, accessed 13 September 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>692</sup> "Romania," JPR Institute for Jewish Policy Research, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://www.jpr.org.uk/countries/how-many-jews-in-romania>

recensământului din 2021, majoritatea populației evreiești de bază din România (906) locuiește în București. Grupuri mai mici locuiesc în Timiș (144), Cluj (139) Bihor (135), Iași (133) și sunt răspândite în întreaga țară<sup>694</sup>. Cea mai mare parte a populației evreiești are peste 70 de ani, iar foarte puțini tineri (sub 25 de ani) trăiesc în prezent în România<sup>695</sup>.

În ciuda regimului comunist care interzicea orice activitate sionistă, viața evreiască organizată, inclusiv religia, cultura și educația, a fost activă după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial<sup>696</sup>. După 1989, proprietatea comunală evreiască a fost returnată Federației Comunităților Evreiești. Rămășițe ale vieții de "shtetl" (sat evreiesc) sunt încă prezente în unele părți ale României<sup>697</sup>. Sinagogile și infrastructura religioasă sunt menținute, deși sunt din ce în ce mai puține cele care funcționează.

În București, trei sinagogi<sup>698</sup> mai țin încă slujbe săptămânale. Există cafenele cușer în unele orașe, iar toți copiii evrei primesc educație evreiască de bază<sup>699</sup>. În urma tranziției la democrație, a fost înființată o editură evreiască numită *Hasefer*, iar *Centrul de Istorie a Evreilor din România*, înființat în 1976, a obținut statut legal. La București, a fost înființat un departament dedicat studiilor evreiești. Comunitatea evreiască din București administrează, de asemenea, un azil de bătrâni, un spital evreiesc, o clinică și o farmacie<sup>700</sup>.

Interviurile au confirmat faptul că comunitatea evreiască este mică și discretă în comparație cu alte grupuri minoritare (IR1). Potrivit unei persoane intervievate, Federația Comunităților Evreiești (JCC) din România raportează 7.000-8.000 de membri, ceea ce este mult mai mult decât înregistrările recensământului din 2021 (IR2). Unii expatriați s-au întors din Israel, dar nu participă activ în comunitatea evreiască (IR2). Lipsa unei identificări vizibile, cum ar fi purtarea unei *kippa*, face ca altora să le fie dificil să le distingă originea evreiască (FG4). Micșorarea comunității evreiești este însoțită de provocări legate de asimilare și de îmbătrânirea populației (IR3). Conform interviurilor, membrii comunității evreiești sunt percepuți ca fiind bine integrați și bine adaptați; cu un nivel ridicat al statutului social și profesii respectabile (IR1). Există evrei religioși în cadrul comunității evreiești și, în ciuda percepției generale a bogăției evreiești, mulți dintre ei duc un stil de viață modest (IR3). Respondenții la interviuri au confirmat faptul că comunitatea evreiască din România este în curs de îmbătrânire; mulți dintre cei din generația tânără, în special cei care s-au întors din Israel, nu se mai identifică ca făcând parte din comunitatea evreiască (IR3). Organizații precum JCC depun eforturi pentru a păstra tradițiile, limba și alte aspecte ale moștenirii evreiești. Există încă locuri semnificative de comemorare, cum ar fi cimitirele și sinagogile, deși acestea din urmă au adesea funcții multiple care nu au legătură cu scopul lor inițial (IR3). Mulți români au avut puține sau deloc interacțiuni cu evreii (IR6, FG3), ceea ce contribuie la percepția generală conform căreia există foarte puțini evrei în România de astăzi (IR7).

<sup>693</sup> "Rezultate definitive: Caracteristici etno-culturale demografice". Populația după etnie la recensămintele din perioada 1930-2021 (Etnii, Județe). Recensământul populației și locuințelor 2021, accessed 1 December 2023: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-definitive/>

<sup>694</sup> "Rezultate definitive: Caracteristici etno-culturale demografice". Populația după etnie la recensămintele din perioada 1930-2021 (Etnii, Județe). Recensământul populației și locuințelor 2021, accessed 1 December 2023: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-definitive/>

<sup>695</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 13 September 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>696</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>697</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>698</sup> <https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Bucharest>

<sup>699</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

<sup>700</sup> "Back to communities: Romania," EJC, 2022, accessed 10 July 2023, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/romania/>

## Antisemitismul în România

### Nivelul și tendința antisemitismului în societate

Rezultatele unei cercetări a Ligii pentru Acțiune și Protecție din 2021<sup>701</sup> au arătat că proporția combinată de antisemitism latent și manifest din România era peste medie (53%), iar 16% dintre respondenții din România au răspuns că "au mai degrabă sentimente negative" față de evrei. Conform aceleiași cercetări, 28% dintre români pot fi considerați antisemiți în ceea ce privește antisemitismul primar<sup>702</sup>, 63% în ceea ce privește antisemitismul secundar<sup>703</sup> și 49% în ceea ce privește noul antisemitism<sup>704</sup>. Convingerile antisemite religioase sunt deosebit de ridicate (pe locul al doilea după Grecia în același studiu realizat în 16 țări europene), 30% dintre aceștia fiind de acord cu afirmația: "Chiar și acum, răstignirea lui Iisus Hristos este un păcat de neiertat al evreilor"<sup>705</sup>. Interesant este că, deși proporția de antisemiți din România era ridicată, raportul a constatat, de asemenea, o proporție mare de simpatizanți ai Israelului (44%)<sup>706</sup>. La fel ca în majoritatea celorlalte țări post-comuniste, atunci când se măsoară ambii indicatori pentru "filosemitism", raportul arată că sprijinul pentru Israel este mult mai mare decât sprijinul pentru evrei în România<sup>707</sup>.

Probabil din cauza dimensiunii reduse a populației evreiești din România, antisemitismul se exprimă în principal sub forma revizionismului istoric, a negării și/sau a banalizării Holocaustului și a legendelor<sup>708</sup> conspiraționiste antisemite globale. Este orientat în principal în jurul problemelor legate de memorie și istorie - pe o interpretare naționalistă a istoriei românești, în special discuțiile despre comunism vs. fascism, mai degrabă decât pe evenimentele<sup>709</sup> actuale imediate. Lipsa de educație cu privire la Holocaust este ilustrată de faptul că doar 32% dintre respondenții din România credeau că Holocaustul a avut loc în România, conform rezultatelor unei cercetări din 2021<sup>710</sup>. Este vorba, în principal, de acte de vandalism, sabotaj sau incidente dăunătoare, extremism în instituțiile publice, comerț cu literatură și obiecte fasciste, ceremonii și comemorări ale unor grupuri militante neonaziste, antisemitism și banalizare a Holocaustului în Parlament, precum și antisemitism și negare a Holocaustului în mediul online<sup>711</sup>.

Cercetarea pe teren a indicat că majoritatea oamenilor nu sunt conștienți sau nu sunt capabili să identifice manifestările de antisemitism. Atunci când au fost întrebați direct, mulți respondenți nu au putut da exemple de antisemitism, însă, prin intermediul conversațiilor, aceștia prezintă adesea prejudecăți inconștiente, prejudecăți sau interpretări istorice care îi pun pe evrei într-o lumină negativă. Confirmând ceea ce a fost menționat în literatura de specialitate, antisemitismul în România se exprimă prin revizionism

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<sup>701</sup> Kovács, András, Fischer, Gyorgy, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries". Action and Protection League. 2021, p. 33, accessed 3 November 2023, <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-2408>

<sup>702</sup> Primary antisemitism/traditional antisemitism includes three dimensions: 1) cognitive – the content of prejudicial statements, 2) affective – the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, 3) conative – the willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, to accept discrimination.

<sup>703</sup> Secondary antisemitism is Holocaust relativisation, denial, and distortion.

<sup>704</sup> New antisemitism is anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point.

<sup>705</sup> Kovács and Fischer, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe". 2021, p. 27.

<sup>706</sup> Kovács and Fischer, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe". 2021, p. 68.

<sup>707</sup> Kovács and Fischer, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe". 2021, p. 68.

<sup>708</sup> Carstocea, "Between Europeanisation and Local Legacies," p. 318.

<sup>709</sup> INSHR-EW and Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania", p.12.

<sup>710</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania", p.15.

<sup>711</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023".

istoric, retorică naționalistă, omiterea menționării Holocaustului sau lăsând să se creadă că ceea ce s-a întâmplat în acea perioadă nu a fost responsabilitatea României (FG3).

Pandemia Covid-19 a avut efecte asupra antisemitismului din România: protestele anti-restricție din timpul pandemiei au adus retorica antisemită pe străzi<sup>712</sup>. În mai 2020, un grup de protestatari a pus o mască de protecție pe statuia lui Elie Wiesel din București, explicând că "această personalitate a transmis un virus care este mult mai periculos decât virusul Wuhan [...]"<sup>713</sup>. Protestatarii promovau o povestire care prezenta lupta împotriva antisemitismului și a ideilor care îl însoțesc ca fiind un virus mai periculos decât Covid-19<sup>714</sup>. În martie 2021, protestatarii au continuat să promoveze mesaje de trivializare a Holocaustului, comparând România cu un lagăr nazist și comparând vaccinările obligatorii cu experimentele medicale care au fost efectuate pe victimele Holocaustului<sup>715</sup>.

În mai 2021, Guvernul României a adoptat prima Strategie Națională de Prevenire și Combatere a Discursului care incită la Antisemitism, Xenofobie, Radicalizare și Ură și a numit un reprezentant special pentru promovarea politicilor memoriale și de combatere a antisemitismului și xenofobiei<sup>716</sup>. Cu toate acestea, la nivel local, există o slabă înțelegere și o lipsă de conștientizare și responsabilitate, ceea ce împiedică punerea în aplicare practică a legislației<sup>717</sup>. Cu toate acestea, în ciuda îmbunătățirii legislației, străzi, statui și alte instituții poartă încă numele unor criminali de război<sup>718</sup> antisemiți cunoscuți. Aplicarea sporadică a legii și lipsa de reacție din partea autorităților au încurajat un segment al societății cu atitudini și comportamente extremiste<sup>719</sup>.

Expresiile de antisemitism par să fie ceva mai răspândite în rândul persoanelor care se identifică drept conservatoare din punct de vedere politic sau de dreapta<sup>720</sup>. Un sondaj din 2021 a arătat că 22% dintre români cred că evreii acționează pentru a destabiliza societatea<sup>722</sup>. Minoritatea care are această opinie este suprareprezentată de tineri (18-29 de ani), fără studii superioare, de persoane care aderă la opinii politice populiste, care se uită rar, dacă nu chiar niciodată, la știri la televizor și care comentează des articole online (zilnic sau de mai multe ori pe săptămână)<sup>723</sup>.

<sup>712</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p. 51.

<sup>713</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.20.

<sup>714</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.20.

<sup>715</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.21.

<sup>716</sup> Guvernul Romaniei, "Fresh news: The Romanian government officially starts the implementation of the 2021-2023 National Strategy for preventing and combating anti-Semitism, xenophobia, radicalisation and hate speech, Press Release," Tuesday 22 March 2022, accessed 7 August 2023, <https://gov.ro/en/news/the-romanian-government-officially-starts-the-implementation-of-the-2021-2023-national-strategy-for-preventing-and-combating-anti-semitism-xenophobia-radicalization-and-hate-speech>

<sup>717</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>718</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021", p. 2-3.

<sup>719</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie: RAPORT 2021-2022," July 2022, accessed 16 August 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/monitorizarea-antisemitismului-in-romania-raport-2022/>

<sup>720</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie: RAPORT 2021-2022," July 2022, p. 3.

<sup>721</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.22, accessed 7 August 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Raport-monitorizare-2021.pdf>

<sup>722</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

<sup>723</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

Genul nu pare să joace un rol semnificativ în antisemitismul din România. Cercetările efectuate de ADL în 2014-2015 au constatat că 47% dintre români au atitudini antisemite, cu o prevalență mai mare în rândul bărbaților (54%) în comparație cu femeile (40%)<sup>724</sup>. Cu toate acestea, experții sugerează că, deși bărbații ar putea fi mai gălăgioși sau mai vizibili în exprimarea antisemitismului, genul nu este un factor determinant în comportamentul și atitudinile antisemite (IR2). Mai degrabă, experții susțin că stereotipurile și prejudecățile antisemite sunt omniprezente în societate, fără a exista diferențe notabile între sexe (IR2).

Practicienii (FG1) își exprimă îngrijorarea cu privire la fascinația crescândă a tinerilor față de povestirile istorice naționaliste, cum ar fi Mișcarea Legionară. Astfel de conținut circulă pe rețelele de socializare (TikTok) și ar putea duce la adoptarea ideologiilor corespunzătoare, inclusiv a antisemitismului (FG1). Respondenții evrei (FG4) și experții (IR5) susțin că stereotipurile și prejudecățile antisemite sunt adânc înrădăcinate în subconștientul oamenilor și nu sunt recunoscute ca fiind antisemite de către cei care le dețin. Unii ar putea chiar să interpreteze anumite stereotipuri, cum ar fi ideea că evreii sunt pricepuți din punct de vedere financiar, ca fiind mai degrabă complimente decât stereotipuri dăunătoare (FG4).

### **Stereotipuri antisemite, prejudecăți, teorii ale conspirației**

Raportul ADL din 2015<sup>725</sup> a identificat că printre cele mai des întâlnite stereotipuri antisemite în România se numără "evreii vorbesc prea mult despre ce li s-a întâmplat în timpul Holocaustului" (63%), "evreii au prea multă putere în lumea afacerilor... pe piețele financiare internaționale" (61% și, respectiv, 59%) și "evreii sunt mai loiali Israelului decât țării în care trăiesc" (58%)<sup>726</sup>.

Raportul de monitorizare al INSHR-EW (2021)<sup>727</sup> a clasificat manifestările online de antisemitism în următoarele categorii:

1. "Evreii conduc lumea sau România" (a crescut de la 70% la 73% în sursele monitorizate între 2020 și 2021),
2. "Iudeo-bolșevism", care echivalează iudaismul cu comunismul (a scăzut de la 25% în 2020 la 11% în 2021),
3. Negarea sau banalizarea/relativizarea Holocaustului,
4. Antisemitismul economic și religios (într-o măsură mai mică).

Discursul antisemit pe rețelele de socializare se bazează adesea pe context și, prin urmare, poate fi dificil de identificat de către inteligența artificială sau de către persoane care nu sunt instruite în mod special pentru aceasta.<sup>728</sup> De obicei, linkurile către știri despre conflictul israeliano-palestinian sau evenimente actuale care implică evreii sunt antisemite din cauza modului în care sunt conectate la o povestire care incită la ură.<sup>729</sup> Cel mai frecvent, aceste mesaje vizează întreaga populație evreiască (mai degrabă decât anumite persoane). Aproximativ 65-70% dintre mesajele antisemite de pe Facebook promovează legenda conform căreia "evreii conduc lumea sau România". Multe alte mesaje nu se încadrează în retorica antisemită tipică, dar sunt în

<sup>724</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015, Accessed 7 August 2023, <https://global100.adl.org/country/romania/2014>

<sup>725</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015.

<sup>726</sup> ADL, "ADL Global 100: Romania: 2014-2015," 2015.

<sup>727</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.35.

<sup>728</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.35.

<sup>729</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p.35.



general insultătoare, dezaprobatoare sau rezistente la tot ceea ce are legătură cu iudaismul sau cu identitatea evreiască<sup>730</sup>.

Cele mai răspândite stereotipuri care au apărut în cercetarea de teren includ faptul că evreii sunt bogați și au simțul afacerilor, că evreii dețin o putere și o influență semnificative și că evreii sunt foarte inteligenți și remarcabil de capabili și productivi. Membrii comunității evreiești din România au declarat că sunt percepuți ca având ca prioritate exclusivă propria comunitate sau că sunt frugali și egocentrice (FG4). Cercetarea pe teren a scos la iveală cazuri de utilizare a termenului românesc depreciativ "jidani", care are origini slave (IR1). Evreii sunt deseori asociați cu puterea și cu simboluri negative, cum ar fi faptul că George Soros este un simbol al răului și că i se atribuie problemele societății (IR5). Alții au descris antisemitismul pasiv, în care evreii sunt prezentați ca vinovați responsabili de conspirații și legende (IR2).

Antisemitismul conspirativ este prezent și în România. Majoritatea antisemitismului de pe rețelele de socializare se învârtă în jurul teoriilor conspirației<sup>731</sup>, dintre care cele mai multe circulă pe teme de iudeo-bolșevism, negarea Holocaustului și narațiuni despre intervenția evreilor în politică sau în economie<sup>732</sup>. Raportul INSHR-EW din 2021 a arătat o ușoară creștere (3%) între 2020-2021 a conținutului antisemit online de tip conspiraționist, în special pe tema "evreii conduc lumea sau România"<sup>733</sup>. În ultimii ani, multe dintre articolele publicate folosesc în mod sistematic războiul din Ucraina ca punct de plecare pentru a valida teoriile antisemite despre cum evreii conduc lumea.<sup>734</sup> De-a lungul anului 2021, a existat o reapariție a conținutului online care susține ideologiile antisemite și celebrează Mișcarea Legionară<sup>735736</sup>. În prezent, discursul este strâns legat de conflictul în curs de desfășurare din Ucraina. În diverse narațiuni conspiraționiste, evreii sunt portretizați ca indivizi care profită de pe urma războiului sau care au interese în acest sens<sup>737</sup>.

Pandemia Covid-19 a scos la iveală noi povești antisemite conspiraționiste. O mare parte din conținutul antisemit care a fost găsit online la începutul pandemiei din 2020 îi învinovățește pe evrei pentru criza medicală. Unele dintre mesajele conexe elaborate și partajate între 2020-2021 includ: "Evreii finanțează companiile care produc serul și încurajează vaccinarea pentru a obține controlul, precum și pentru câștiguri economice; evreii încurajează vaccinarea, dar serul administrat lor și cel administrat neevreilor este diferit, acesta din urmă având efecte nocive; evreii încurajează discriminarea și segregarea celor care refuză vaccinarea". 13% din articolele monitorizate în legătură cu vaccinurile Covid-19 au fost legate de acest subiect, susținând ideea că sistemele globale sunt controlate de evrei.<sup>738</sup> A existat o creștere a popularității în jurul mișcării QAnon pe rețelele de socializare, în special pe Facebook, pe parcursul anului 2020. Din cauza

<sup>730</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, The Antisemitism in The Street," 2021, p. 36-37

<sup>731</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>732</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023" p. 51

<sup>733</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.28.

<sup>734</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.28.

<sup>735</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.36

<sup>736</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>737</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p. 45., <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Raport-monitorizare-20-IULIE-2023.pdf>

<sup>738</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.28.

intervențiilor din partea Facebook, aceste grupuri sunt acum mult mai greu de găsit, iar audiența lor este mai mică decât era în 2020<sup>739</sup>.

### Discursul antisemit care incită la ură și infracțiunile motivate de ură

Discursul instigator la ură continuă să se manifeste în mediul online, pe site-uri web, bloguri și rețele sociale. Subiecte de pe agenda publică (campanii de vaccinare, studierea istoriei evreilor și a Holocaustului în școli, izbucnirea războiului în Ucraina) sunt folosite pentru a promova povești<sup>740</sup> antisemite. Facebook rămâne cea mai populară rețea de socializare, servind drept sursă principală de informații și canal major de exprimare publică. În ultimii ani, mecanismele îmbunătățite ale platformei de eliminare a conținutului care încalcă legea sau standardele comunității au dus la o migrare a conținutului către canale mai permissive, cum ar fi Telegram sau VK.<sup>741</sup>

Cele mai frecvente forme de discurs instigator la ură la care sunt martori oamenii din România se bazează pe etnie (47%), urmată de orientarea politică (40%), religie (33%), orientare sexuală (31%), rasă (30%) și dizabilități (30%)<sup>742</sup>. Incidentele au fost cel mai frecvent observate pe stradă (53%), la locul de muncă (24%) și între prieteni (19%)<sup>743</sup>. 65% dintre respondenți consideră că discursul instigator la ură s-a intensificat în ultimii ani.<sup>744</sup> Majoritatea discursurilor de ură antisemite monitorizate online în perioada 2020-2021 au fost îndreptate în mod colectiv împotriva evreilor în ansamblu. Unele ținte individuale apar în mod recurent (George Soros, Liviu Beris etc.), dar și ținte noi, identificate în mod fals (Dominic Fritz), la care se face referire tocmai pentru că simbolizează evreitatea.<sup>745</sup> Articolele care au fost monitorizate pentru conținut antisemit în perioada 2020-2021 nu incită în mod deschis la ură împotriva evreilor, dar ar putea fi asociate potențial cu un "apel la rezistență". Există adesea utilizarea unui limbaj agresiv și a atacurilor personale.<sup>746</sup>

Se pare că nivelurile ridicate de atitudini antisemite se traduc rareori în violență antisemită. Nici în România, și nici în alte țări, nu există, în esență, nicio relație între numărul de acte violente și gradul de prejudecăți antievreiești.<sup>747</sup> S-a înregistrat o creștere a numărului de incidente antisemite raportate în România între 2009 și 2019, de la patru incidente în 2009, atingând un vârf de 22 de incidente în 2017 și scăzând la 16 în 2019.<sup>748</sup> Între 2020 și 2023, rata conținutului antisemit online a crescut<sup>749</sup>, de asemenea. La evenimente sau date importante (de exemplu, campania electorală, sărbătorile evreiești), antisemitismul apare mai frecvent online și în discursurile reprezentanților publici.<sup>750</sup> Retorica mesajelor antisemite a rămas destul de

<sup>739</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.33.

<sup>740</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>741</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>742</sup> CNCD and IRES, "Sondaj de opinie 2018," 2018, p. 28, accessed 13 September 2023, [https://www.cncd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sondaj\\_de\\_opinie\\_NolntoHate\\_2018.pdf](https://www.cncd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sondaj_de_opinie_NolntoHate_2018.pdf)

<sup>743</sup> CNCD and IRES, "Sondaj de opinie 2018," 2018, p.30

<sup>744</sup> CNCD and IRES, "Sondaj de opinie 2018," 2018, p.31

<sup>745</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.31, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Raport-monitorizare-2021.pdf>

<sup>746</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.31.

<sup>747</sup> Kovács and Fischer, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe". 2021, p. 81.

<sup>748</sup> Statista, "Number of incidents pertaining to antisemitism in Romania from 2009 to 2019," 2023, accessed 17 September 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1173749/romania-incidents-pertaining-to-antisemitism/>

<sup>749</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023", 2023, accessed 4 August 2023, , <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Raport-monitorizare-20-IULIE-2023.pdf>

<sup>750</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021, 2021, p. 3.

consistentă în mass-media, dar apare într-un ritm crescut.<sup>751</sup> Mesajele care pun în circulație temele iudeo-bolșevismului, negarea Holocaustului și narațiunile conspiraționiste despre intervenția evreilor în politică sau în economie sunt larg răspândite. Recent, multe articole folosesc în mod sistematic războiul din Ucraina ca punct de plecare pentru a valida teorii despre cum evreii conduc lumea.<sup>752</sup>

De asemenea, în ultimii ani au avut loc acte de infracțiuni motivate de ură, în special sub formă de vandalism.<sup>753</sup> La 12 septembrie 2021, un memorial din orașul nordic Bistrița a fost supus vandalizării, iar la începutul anului 2023, a avut loc un incident într-un parc din Deva, simboluri și sloganuri naziste fiind lăsate pe aleile parcului.<sup>754</sup> În Iași, panourile recent instalate care amintesc evenimentele din pogromul de la Iași au fost vandalizate de mai multe ori.<sup>755</sup> În martie 2021, o declarație pe rețelele de socializare a directoarei Teatrului Evreiesc de Stat, Maia Morgenstern, despre o întâlnire cu un limbaj antisemit, a fost urmată de amenințări cu moartea la adresa familiei sale și de amenințări cu incendierea teatrului evreiesc.<sup>756</sup> Evenimentul a instigat o anchetă penală și o condamnare din partea Parlamentului care a remarcat creșterea numărului de incidente antisemite.<sup>757</sup>

Experții și practicienii intervievați și-au exprimat propriile experiențe de a fi fost ținte ale discursului instigator la ură, din cauza apropierii lor de subiect. S-a menționat că persoanele din România care lucrează în domeniul abordării acestor subiecte (educația privind Holocaustul, educația interculturală, democrația și drepturile omului) devin adesea ținta discursurilor de ură și chiar a amenințărilor cu moartea (IR5).

### Antisemitismul la nivel politic

La nivel politic, antisemitismul a fost exprimat în principal sub forma glorificării liderilor fasciști antisemiți cunoscuți din perioada interbelică și a criminalilor de război din cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial, făcându-i să pară patrioți și eroi români.<sup>758</sup> Personalitățile politice folosesc de obicei retorica antisemită pentru a promova o legendă<sup>759</sup> istorică naționalistă și anticomunistă. Expresiile de antisemitism economic sau religios sunt mai rar observate.<sup>760</sup>

Remarci antisemite au fost făcute de lideri politici din partea partidului liberal de dreapta, Partidul Național Liberal (PNL), și a partidului naționalist de extremă dreapta, Alianța pentru Unitatea Românilor (AUR). În mod obișnuit, narațiunea iudeo-bolșevismului (asocierea iudaismului cu comunismul) este promovată ca parte a unei narațiuni naționaliste de dreapta care asociază identitatea națională românească cu anticomunismul și aliază comunismul cu iudaismul, descriindu-i astfel pe evrei ca fiind "ceialți" și nefăcând parte din identitatea națională românească.<sup>761</sup> La 3 martie 2021, Daniel Gheorghe, un parlamentar din partea PNL, a ținut un discurs în care l-a lăudat pe Mircea Vulcănescu, un criminal de război condamnat care

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<sup>751</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023".

<sup>752</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p. 51.

<sup>753</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>754</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p. 6.

<sup>755</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.7.

<sup>756</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>757</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>758</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Responsabil de Holocaustul din România: Hitler Sau Antonescu," 2021, p.3.

<sup>759</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Responsabil de Holocaustul din România: Hitler Sau Antonescu," 2021, p.3.

<sup>760</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.30.

<sup>761</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," 2023, p. 14.

a susținut politici antisemite în timp ce a servit în timpul guvernului Antonescu din timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial.<sup>762</sup> Câteva zile mai târziu, în timpul unei ședințe a Senatului din 8 martie 2021, senatorul Lavric, membru al AUR, a vorbit despre implicarea evreilor în inițierea și promovarea comunismului. Comentariile lui Lavric au fost făcute ca răspuns la criticile lui Silviu Vexler, un parlamentar evreu, care își exprimase îngrijorarea cu privire la natura antisemită a declarațiilor făcute de unii parlamentari, inclusiv de Lavric. Este demn de remarcat faptul că AUR a distribuit discursul lui Lavric pe pagina sa oficială de Facebook, făcându-l parte dintr-un efort mai amplu de a modela legenda istorică a țării.<sup>763</sup>

Din ce în ce mai mult, organizațiile care promovează ideologii naționaliste și extremiste încearcă să câștige legitimitate prin utilizarea clădirilor publice ca locuri de desfășurare a evenimentelor lor.<sup>764</sup> De exemplu, în octombrie 2022, Centrul Cultural "Reduta", o instituție aflată în subordinea Consiliului Local Brașov, a încheiat un parteneriat cu Fundația neolegionară Ogoranu pentru a organiza un eveniment dedicat lui Nicolae Purcărea, prezentându-l ca pe un luptător anticomunist. Nicolae Purcărea a fost un membru al Mișcării Legionare care a fost arestat în timpul regimului Antonescu, iar după 1990 s-a numărat printre cei care au încercat să reînființeze Mișcarea Legionară prin intermediul partidului "Totul pentru Țară".<sup>765</sup> Incidente similare au avut loc în toată țara în ultimul an, dând legitimitate organizațiilor care glorifică și încearcă să reînvie identitatea Mișcării Legionare.

### Antisemitismul în sfera sportivă

Cel mai recent raport de monitorizare al INSHR-EW evidențiază incidentele antisemite din sfera sportului din România în perioada mai 2022 - aprilie 2023<sup>766</sup>. Aceste incidente au avut loc în principal pe stadioanele de fotbal. La Cluj, în octombrie 2022, la meciul de fotbal dintre CFR Cluj și Slavia Praga, unii suporterii din Cluj-Napoca au afișat, în limba cehă, pancarte cu mesajul antisemit: "Ești doar niște evrei, Slavia". Câteva zile mai târziu, suporterii CFR-ului s-au prezentat la o întâlnire afișând un mesaj rasist care viza comunitatea romă.<sup>767</sup> În ianuarie 2023, meciul de fotbal Sepsi Sfântu-Gheorghe - FC U Craiova a fost suspendat din cauza scandărilor xenofobe ale suporterilor craioveni. Cântece similare au fost folosite în ultimii ani la mai multe meciuri în care una dintre echipe este asociată cu comunitatea maghiară. La un meci de fotbal din aprilie 2023, echipa CSA Steaua a afișat un steag cu chipul liderului Mișcării Legionare, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. La meciul România-Ucraina din 24 iunie 2023, unul dintre mesajele din tribune a lăudat Mișcarea Legionară.<sup>768</sup> Aceste incidente antisemite și xenofobe din ultimii ani evidențiază prevalența discursului instigator la ură, inclusiv a antisemitismului, în sfera sportivă.

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<sup>762</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>763</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania".

<sup>764</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," 2023, p. 14.

<sup>765</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," 2023, p. 14.

<sup>766</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.11

<sup>767</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.11

<sup>768</sup> INSHR-EW, "Raport de Monitorizare: Mai 2022-Aprilie 2023," p.12.

## Percepția antisemitismului în cadrul comunității evreiești

Conform sondajelor realizate de INSHR-EW în 2023, 71% dintre evreii din România sunt de acord că antisemitismul există în societatea actuală; doar 6% consideră că acesta nu există deloc.<sup>769</sup> 41% dintre evreii respondenți consideră că antisemitismul a crescut în ultimii cinci ani, în timp ce 38% consideră că acesta a rămas la fel.<sup>770</sup> Principalele expresii ale antisemitismului, așa cum sunt percepute de comunitatea evreiască, sunt profanarea cimitirelor, 68% dintre respondenți raportând-o ca fiind o problemă foarte mare sau mare, urmată de antisemitismul în social media (53%), vandalizarea instituțiilor și monumentelor evreiești (52%), antisemitismul pe scena politică (51%), în mass-media (42%) și pe stradă sau în locuri publice (38%).<sup>771</sup> 24% dintre respondenții evrei declară că au fost ținta unor remarci antisemite, iar 14% au fost ținta unor acțiuni antisemite în ultimii cinci ani.<sup>772</sup> 27% dintre respondenți declară că evită adesea sau uneori să poarte obiecte care i-ar putea identifica drept evrei atunci când se află în public, iar 21% evită să posteze online conținut care ar putea dezvălui identitatea lor evreiască.<sup>773</sup>

Respondenții evreilor din grupurile de discuție au susținut constatările care indică un antisemitism larg răspândit și omniprezent în România (FG4). Experiențele includ opoziția evidentă față de căsătoriile interconfesionale, vocabularul negativ despre evrei, reticența de a se autoidentifica ca evreu din cauza fricii de prejudecăți și prejudecăți, negarea Holocaustului și stereotipuri mai ascunse care sunt exprimate în conversații și comportamente banale (FG4). Un respondent a dat exemplul unei situații în care și-a dezvăluit moștenirea evreiască unei doamne ungueroaice în vârstă, care i-a răspuns cu comentarii "măgulitoare" despre evrei ca fiind "inteligenți" și "șmecheri", fără să își dea seama că vorbele ei reflectau stereotipuri comune și dăunătoare despre evrei (FG4). Respondenții evrei (FG4) au afirmat, de asemenea, că au observat o creștere a actelor violente de antisemitism în ultimii ani, unii dintre ei atribuind acest lucru unei creșteri a naționalismului și a diviziunilor tot mai mari între diferitele grupuri din cadrul societății. S-a sugerat că sentimentele antisemite au fost exacerbate de ideologiile naționaliste și de divizare predominante (FG4).

Respondenții evrei au caracterizat credința că nu există antisemitism în România ca fiind o "gândire ideală", care provine din inocență, ignoranță sau o lipsă de conștientizare a ceea ce constituie antisemitismul. Unele persoane pot avea convingeri antisemite fără să-și dea seama, deoarece aceste convingeri au fost transmise din generație în generație ca fiind "normale". (FG4).

## Inamia față de alte grupuri minoritare din țară

În afară de comunitatea evreiască, grupurile minoritare care sunt cel mai mult afectate de ura centrată pe grup sunt românii, LGBTQI+ și minoritatea maghiară<sup>774</sup>. Principalele forme de exprimare a dușmăniei împotriva

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<sup>769</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești", 2023, p.3, accessed 4 Dec 2023, <https://www.inshr-ew.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Raport-de-cercetare-minoritatea-evreiasca.pdf>

<sup>770</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești" 2023, p. 4

<sup>771</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești" 2023, p. 5.

<sup>772</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești", 2023, p. 7-14

<sup>773</sup> INSHR-EW and Avangarde, "Raport de cercetare: Percepții ale minorității evreiești asupra societății Românești", 2023, p. 18-19

<sup>774</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.12.

acestor grupuri, în special a romilor, includ discriminarea, discursul instigator la ură și prejudecățile. Un sondaj din 2021 a constatat că majoritatea oamenilor au o atitudine neutră față de minoritățile etnice, cea mai puternică percepție negativă fiind față de romi, un grup considerat o problemă de un procent impresionant de 38% din populație<sup>775</sup>. Sondajele de opinie din 2018<sup>776</sup> au arătat că grupurile din România cărora li se acordă cea mai puțină încredere sunt romii (72%), urmați de grupurile minoritare religioase (56%) și de minoritățile maghiară (53%) și evreiască (46%). Singurul grup căruia i se acordă încredere mai puțină decât grupului romilor sunt persoanele care se identifică drept homosexuali (74%), urmate de imigranți (69%) și musulmani (68%). Deși discriminarea bazată pe orientarea sexuală este interzisă de legislația română, discriminarea împotriva LGBTQI+ este frecventă. Un sondaj realizat în 2020 de Agenția pentru Drepturi Fundamentale a UE a constatat că 15% dintre persoanele LGBTQI+ au suferit agresiuni fizice sau sexuale legate de orientarea lor sexuală sau de identitatea de gen în ultimii cinci ani; doar 4% dintre acestea le-au raportat autorităților de teama discriminării.<sup>777</sup> Discursul de ură care vizează orice fel de minoritate, în special cea sexuală și etnică, este de obicei combinat cu euroscepticismul și antiglobalismul.<sup>778</sup>

Cercetarea pe teren a indicat un acord larg răspândit cu privire la faptul că romii sunt principala țintă a urii și a discriminării axate pe grup în România. Interveniurile cu experți (IR2) au evidențiat faptul că sentimentele antiromi și anti-LGBTQI+ sunt atât mai răspândite, cât și mai periculoase decât antisemitismul în manifestările lor. Un respondent evreu (din FG4) a subliniat că grupurile cele mai afectate sunt cele pe care le poți identifica cel mai clar ca fiind "diferite" de grupul majoritar, cei care sunt ușor de identificat prin aspectul lor ca fiind "diferiți". În concordanță cu acest lucru, respondenții maghiari (IR8) și romi (IR1, IR4, IR7, FG3) au subliniat, de asemenea, că încearcă să își ascundă identitatea etnică, invocând teama de discriminare, ură sau pierderea de oportunități.

Cercetarea pe teren a constatat că romii sunt frecvent prezentați ca fiind hoți, murdari, periculoși și proști (FG3). Respondenții evrei (FG4) au crescut auzind folosirea unui limbaj depreciativ atunci când se vorbește despre romi ("țigani"), înrădăcinându-le de la o vârstă fragedă presupunerea că romii sunt periculoși pentru că sunt diferiți. Tinerii romi (FG3) au împărtășit povești care exemplifică discriminarea, în care etnia lor a dus la un tratament nedrept. De exemplu, un profesor a refuzat să acorde o notă de trecere unui elev rom competent, în ciuda rezultatelor bune în general, împiedicându-l să absolve liceul (FG3). Un alt exemplu ilustrativ a fost acela în care un administrator a făcut presupuneri prejudiciate despre un student rom, ceea ce a dus la refuzarea accesului acestuia la un curs. Presupunerea a fost că tânăra avea copii, ceea ce nu era cazul. Tinerii romi consideră că măsurile corective introduse de statul român, cum ar fi locurile speciale în școli, exacerbează diviziunile și tensiunile, izolând și mai mult și marginalizând tinerii romi (FG3). Un tânăr român a menționat un incident în care o persoană de etnie romă a fost coborâtă pe nedrept dintr-un autobuz. Respondentul a perceput acest lucru ca pe un act de ură etnică și a subliniat nedreptatea tratamentului bazat pe etnie (FG3). Un lider al comunității rome a indicat suprapunerile cu genul, subliniind că violența bazată pe gen este o problemă transversală omniprezentă (IR4). Aceste povești subliniază discriminarea și ura omniprezente cu care se confruntă romii, atât în mod deschis, cât și prin prejudecăți instituționale. Stereotipurile despre minoritatea maghiară se concentrează de obicei pe idei naționaliste,

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<sup>775</sup> Studio12, "Perceptions of interethnic relations and the Holocaust in Romania," 2021, p.3-6.

<sup>776</sup> CNCD and IRES, "Sondaj de opinie 2018," p. 12.

<sup>777</sup> US Department of State, "2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania", accessed 16 Sep 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/>

<sup>778</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021," p.26.

temeri și întrebări despre "de ce mai sunt încă aici" (FG1). Minoritățile evreiască și maghiară au fost uneori percepute ca amenințări intelectuale sau ca având mai multă putere socială în România, în timp ce minoritatea romă are un statut inferior și mai puține drepturi (IR7).

## Prevenirea antisemitismului în educație

### Evreii, antisemitismul și Holocaustul în programele educaționale oficiale

Până de curând, predarea Holocaustului în școli a fost opțională și deseori a lipsit.<sup>779</sup> În 2021, Guvernul României a adoptat o lege care face obligatorie<sup>780</sup> în școli predarea Holocaustului, "Istoria evreilor și Holocaustul în România". În programa școlară actualizată din 2021, elevii din clasa a IX-a învață la istorie despre istoria evreilor, printre alte grupuri.<sup>781</sup> Din 2022, elevii din clasa a X-a învață la istorie despre regimurile politice din perioada interbelică și despre relațiile internaționale interbelice, inclusiv despre Holocaust și despre România în cele două războaie mondiale.<sup>782</sup> Elevii de clasa a X-a învață la religie, de asemenea, despre iudaism, cultura evreiască și Vechiul Testament.<sup>783</sup> Din 2023, elevii elevii din clasa a XI-a învață la istorie despre idei și regimuri politice<sup>784</sup>; elevii din clasa a XI-a ar putea studia la religie iudaismul<sup>785</sup>, iar termenul general de "discriminare" va fi abordat în cadrul disciplinei Sociologie și economie<sup>786</sup>. Cu toate acestea, în programa școlară nu sunt incluse orientări clare privind discuțiile despre antisemitism.

Profesorii folosesc adesea lecțiile de educație privind Holocaustul și antisemitismul pentru a aborda alte probleme contemporane legate de discriminare, xenofobie și șovinism (FG1). De exemplu, deși în prezent există o educație obligatorie privind Holocaustul pentru elevii de liceu, nu există un echivalent pentru istoria romilor.

Practicienii de primă linie (FG1) au raportat că există o diviziune în rândul profesorilor, unii considerând că studiul Holocaustului este inutil și că primește prea multă atenție. În timp ce respondenții consideră că educația privind Holocaustul se îmbunătățește, sunt exprimate îngrijorări cu privire la calitatea manualelor și a altor materiale educaționale privind istoria evreilor și antisemitismul. Unii profesori sunt îngrijorați de imaginile violente folosite adesea în prezentările din sălile de clasă, ceea ce duce la o asociere negativă între

<sup>779</sup> INSHR-EW, "Monitoring Report: May 2020-April 2021", p. 2-3.

<sup>780</sup> INSHR-EW, "Antisemitismul în vremuri de pandemie," 2022.

<sup>781</sup> Ministerul Educației, "REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI la CLASA A IX-A în anul școlar 2021-2022 LIMBA ȘI LITERATURA ROMÂNĂ, învățământ liceal și profesional," 2021, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>782</sup> Ministerul Educației, "REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a X-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2022-2023, Disciplina ISTORIE," 2022, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>783</sup> Ministerul Educației, "REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a X-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2022-2023, Disciplina RELIGIE," 2022, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>784</sup> Ministerul Educației, "REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina ISTORIE," 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>785</sup> Ministerul Educației, "REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina RELIGIE," 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

<sup>786</sup> Ministerul Educației, "REPERE METODOLOGICE PENTRU APLICAREA CURRICULUMULUI LA CLASA a XI-a ÎN ANUL ȘCOLAR 2023-2024, Disciplina SOCIO-UMANE," 2023, Centrul Național De Politici Și Evaluare În Educație, accessed 15 September 2023, <https://edu.ro/>

evrei și moarte, tristețe și victimizare (IR3). Profesorii au la dispoziție o gamă largă de materiale pentru educarea elevilor cu privire la Holocaust; cu toate acestea, este nevoie de mai multe și mai bune materiale care să se concentreze pe situația istorică locală din România și să o conecteze cu antisemitismul și alte manifestări actuale de intoleranță (IR3). Profesorii consideră că aceste materiale ar trebui să fie mai bine adaptate pentru a se potrivi nevoilor tinerilor și susțin că ar fi trebuit să fie organizate înainte de a fi introduse în clase (FG1).

### **Materiale și activități educaționale care abordează antisemitismul**

Materialele și activitățile furnizate în programa școlară oficială se concentrează în primul rând pe Holocaust în termeni istorici, mai exact pe Holocaustul așa cum s-a întâmplat în alte țări europene (nu în România). Resursele constau în principal în documentare, învățarea fiind bazată în principal pe povestiri și mărturii ale supraviețuitorilor, dar și pe analiza mișcărilor din societate care au dus la ascensiunea regimului nazist și la Holocaust. În programa de istorie actualizată pentru clasa a X-a, există link-uri către resursele TedEd, către Muzeul Memorial al Holocaustului din Statele Unite<sup>787</sup>, și către Muzeul online Casa Anne Frank<sup>788</sup>. Aceste materiale și activități sunt ușor de accesat de către profesori, însă majoritatea sunt în limba engleză, iar barierele lingvistice ar putea împiedica mulți profesori să utilizeze și/sau să înțeleagă conținutul.

Profesorii caută adesea materiale suplimentare în afara curriculumului oficial pentru a îmbunătăți experiențele de învățare. De exemplu, INSHR-EW a elaborat caiete de notițe specifice unei regiuni din România, axate pe Holocaust, pentru a ajuta profesorii să facă legătura între evenimentele istorice și geografia locală și să adapteze memoriile victimelor (IR2). Deși au fost aprobate de Ministerul Educației, utilitatea lor în sălile de clasă rămâne incertă (IR2). În plus, INSHR-EW a introdus în 2023 o expoziție de benzi desenate în aer liber care comemorează victimele locale ale Holocaustului (IR1). Alte resurse includ videoclipuri realizate de Centrul Național de Cultură a Romilor, informații online despre comunitatea romă (IR7), lecții interactive la Muzeul de Istorie a Sinagogii din Oradea și inițiative ale unor profesori dedicați pentru organizarea de proiecte, activități și excursii legate de educația privind Holocaustul. Cu toate acestea, unii sunt îngrijorați de faptul că a face obligatorie istoria Holocaustului fără o pregătire adecvată a profesorilor poate compromite calitatea educației pe această temă (FG1). În ciuda disponibilității a numeroase resurse dezvoltate de ONG-uri, profesorii nu sunt frecvent conștienți de libertatea lor de a încorpora aceste materiale pentru a satisface cerințele curriculumului (IR5). Mulți profesori cred în mod eronat că sunt restricționați la manualele școlare oficiale, ceea ce duce la subutilizarea unor resurse valoroase în activități extracurriculare, în ciuda alinierii lor perfecte la curriculum. În timp ce unii educatori înțeleg potențialul și sunt deschiși la utilizarea acestor resurse pentru a satisface nevoile curriculare, rezistența apare adesea din partea funcționarilor de conducere de nivel mediu din cadrul ierarhiilor educaționale (IR5).

### **Nevoile FLP în abordarea antisemitismului prin educație**

Cercetarea pe teren a evidențiat mai multe nevoi ale FLP în abordarea antisemitismului prin educație. Respondenții au evidențiat importanța conectării elevilor cu istoria comunității locale, oferind o privire de

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<sup>787</sup> United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Online lectures: Studying Primary Sources from the Holocaust,” accessed 13 September 2023, <https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online>

<sup>788</sup> Anne Frank House, “The Anne Frank House online,” accessed 13 September 2023, <https://www.annefrank.org/en/museum/web-and-digital/>



ansamblu asupra împrejurimilor și stilului de viață al comunității evreiești înainte de Holocaust (IR3). Experții au subliniat importanța utilizării de imagini pozitive și a respectării drepturilor victimelor atunci când se utilizează imagini în contexte pedagogice (IR3). Experții și practicienii de primă linie au susținut că multe școli nu fac suficient pentru a aborda discriminarea, ura și intoleranța. Există adesea rezistență sau bariere sistemice care împiedică eforturile bune (IR1, IR5). Din acest motiv, este necesar să se adopte o abordare la nivelul întregii școli, care să vizeze nu numai profesorii și elevii, ci și implicarea părinților și a altor părți interesate (IR5). Profesorii și educatorii (FG1) au susținut că este nevoie de materiale, manuale și manuale actualizate, care să fie testate la nivel pilot, relevante și care să rezoneze cu tinerii de astăzi (FG1). Este nevoie de resurse care să ajute la deconstruirea narațiunilor și la combaterea prejudecăților internalizate (FG1). Activitățile extracurriculare și colaborările cu ONG-urile sunt valoroase pentru a crea spații de abordare a acestor probleme în afara constrângerilor cadrului școlar tradițional (IR5 & IR6).

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