



D2.2 Research reports: Antisemitic narratives online in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania

BOND

Building tOlerance, uNderstanding and Dialogue across communities



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Introduction

Deliverable 2.2 is in WP2 of the BOND project and contains the results of T2.3 Monitoring and analysing antisemitic narratives online.

The main aim of the deliverable is to provide an overview of the antisemitic narratives appearing online in the project countries. The detailed objectives of the task and the deliverable is to examine antisemitic narratives online before and after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on the 7th of October 2023.

Deliverable 2.2 contains four national reports (HU, IT, PL, RO) in English and in the local languages, as well as a comparative report concluding the results of the national reports.

Modifications in the task and the deliverable:

Initially, the plan was to implement the monitoring and analysis of antisemitic narratives task in three separate months, chosen by the project partners. For this reason, Political Capital collected information from the partners on particular events in each country, which could affect the presence of antisemitic narratives and hate speech online. An implementation plan was created based on the results of this collection. Political Capital managed and facilitated the consultation process with the service provider (SentiOne) leading to signing the contracts with the partners for the social listening software. Political Capital also created a monitoring guide for the partners.

Still, in November 2023, it became clear that the timeline had to be rescheduled for more reasons.

1. On the one hand, the conflict in Israel from 7 October 2023 has strongly affected the presence of online antisemitism in European societies. Political Capital did a pilot monitoring in November 2023 which took about two weeks. The pilot monitoring confirmed the assumption that the amount of antisemitic content and content related to Jews, particularly Israel, dramatically increased after October 2023. As the amount of content that had to be monitored multiplied, monitoring periods had to be reduced. To examine the changes of antisemitic narratives online after 7 October, the same period had to be monitored in 2023 and 2024 to get comparable results. Also it was especially important to have a common understanding of new antisemitism – antisemitism appearing in the form of Israel-critic – as this type of antisemitism increased significantly in 2024 but in many cases it is hard to identify.
2. On the other hand, with the delays in the research processes and preparing the research reports (T2.1, T2.2, D2.3), and later with the withdrawal of the Polish project partner the original timeline had to be rescheduled.

Research results:

The research examined antisemitic narratives online before and after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.

The findings revealed that antisemitic narratives were prevalent online in varying degrees across the project countries. The highest proportion of antisemitic content was found in the Hungarian dataset (47% of the data), followed by Poland (44%), Italy (28%), and Romania (27%). Additionally, potentially antisemitic content - content that could be interpreted as either antisemitic or not - accounted for 5% in Hungary, 3% in Poland, 8% in Italy, and 4% in Romania.

The vast majority of both antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content appeared in comments. The amount of data significantly increased in all countries in 2024, and so did the amount of antisemitic content. However,

when comparing 2024 to 2023, the proportion of antisemitic content slightly decreased in Hungary and Romania, increased slightly in Poland, and rose significantly in Italy. New antisemitism grew substantially in all countries, both in amount and as proportionally.

In terms of the issues that provoked antisemitism, the countries examined represent two groups. In Italy and Poland, antisemitism was mainly provoked by conflicts in the Middle East and Israel, especially by events on and after 7 October 2023. In Hungary and Romania, the connection between antisemitic content and specific topics was less direct.

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Research report – Poland (in Polish)

Research report – Romania (in Romanian)

Comparative research report

Online antisemitic narratives before and after the 7th of October 2023 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania

Key findings

- The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives online before and after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.
- The most antisemitic content appeared in the Hungarian dataset (47% of the data), followed by Poland (44%), Italy (28%), and Romania (27%). In addition, potentially antisemitic content, which can be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic, amounted to 5% in Hungary, 3% in Poland, 8% in Italy and 4% in Romania.
- The vast majority of antisemitic content and potentially antisemitic content appeared in comments in all countries.
- Although the data analysed increased in 2024 in all countries and thus quantitatively in almost all narrative categories, most categories decreased proportionally. However, new antisemitism increased significantly in all countries, both quantitatively and proportionally.
- In Italy and Poland, the most common narrative category was new antisemitism, while in Hungary and Romania it was conspiratorial antisemitism, which was the second most common category in the other two countries.
- In Italy, antisemitism was predominantly linked to new antisemitism in both 2023 and 2024, and all narrative categories were clearly triggered along with its increase. In the other countries, antisemitism was less associated with new antisemitism and more with conspiratorial antisemitism.
- Hate speech appeared to varying degrees in the datasets. It was most prevalent in Hungary (more than 10% of the data), followed by Poland (8.5%), Italy (4.6%), and Romania (2.6%). Content calling for violence against Jews was most prevalent in Italy (2.5%), followed by Poland (2.2%), Hungary (1%), and Romania (0.4%).
- In terms of the issues that provoked antisemitism, the countries examined represent two groups. In Italy and Poland, antisemitism was mainly provoked by conflicts in the Middle East and Israel, especially by events on and after 7 October 2023. In Hungary and Romania, the connection between antisemitic content and specific topics was less direct.
- In all four countries, several code words are used to describe Jews and Israel.

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Introduction

The research aimed to analyse changes in online antisemitic narratives following 7 October 2023—Hamas's terror attack on Israel and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, making it necessary to examine how online antisemitic narratives had evolved. The development of the research methodology and categories were completed in late 2023 and early 2024, and the research began in the spring of 2024.

Recognising and defining antisemitism in relation to Israel, i.e. distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel, has become particularly challenging since 7 October. Our research is based on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism¹, which is accepted by 43 countries and several international organisations including the EU and most of its member states.

The research was conducted simultaneously in four countries—Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania—using the same methodology. It focused on textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. The content was collected using social listening software from the websites and Facebook pages of the most relevant national media outlets across five media categories: independent (mainstream) media, biased/hyper-partisan media, mainstream tabloids, left-wing sites, far-right pages, and fake news/conspiratorial sites. The scraping process was guided by keywords designed to detect antisemitic content. Four core keywords—Jew, Israel, Holocaust, and Zionism/Zionist—were used in all countries in their respective local languages. Additionally, country-specific keywords were included. In languages where these words could have different endings, their base forms were followed by an asterisk (*), enabling the collection of results for all variations and endings.

The research focused on the period from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, with nearly 7,000 pieces of content analysed in each country. All content was examined by the national research teams and classified as either antisemitic, potentially antisemitic (content that could be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic), not understandable, or not antisemitic.

Drawing on publicly available resources—such as studies, research reports, and scientific articles—five main categories of antisemitic narratives were defined: classic antisemitic stereotypes, conspiratorial antisemitism, traditional religion-based antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, and new antisemitism (antisemitism based on the criticism of Israel). In addition to these, two supplementary categories were established: hate speech and calls for violence against Jews. Each piece of content was thoroughly analysed and assigned to one or more of these categories.


¹ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

1. The extent of antisemitic content in the national datasets

1.1 The extent of antisemitic content in the datasets


The most antisemitic content appeared in the Hungarian dataset (47% of the data), followed by Poland (44%), Italy (28%), and Romania (27%). In addition, potentially antisemitic content, which can be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic, or which appears antisemitic only in light of the context, amounted to 5% in Hungary, 3% in Poland, 8% in Italy and 4% in Romania. The most not understandable content was present in Italy (10%), followed by Poland (9%), Romania (5%) and Hungary (4%).

1. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic content in the whole of the national datasets examined.



As the amount of data analysed increased in all countries in 2024, the amount of antisemitic content also grew. However, antisemitism proportionally only grew in Italy. In Poland it remained more or less on the same level, and in Hungary and Romania, it decreased slightly.


2. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content in the national datasets in 2023 and 2024 (separately).



1.2 Distribution of the content examined

The vast majority of antisemitic content and potentially antisemitic content appeared in comments in all countries. The highest amount of **antisemitic posts** appeared in Poland, while in other countries, antisemitic content in posts either did not appear (Hungary) or were only found in a few cases. The proportion of **antisemitic articles** were more or less the same in all countries with the lowest in Poland (0.3%) and the highest in Italy (0.5%). The case of **potentially antisemitic articles** were similar, with the lowest amount in Poland (0.03%) and the highest in Italy (0.4%).


3. Figure: Distribution of the different types of content examined in the whole of the national datasets.



1.3 Antisemitism in the different types of media

In all countries, the majority of antisemitic content appeared among the comments of one particular media category, which was well ahead of the other categories. In Italy and Romania, most of the antisemitic content was found on independent media (82.7% in Romania, 53.2% in Romania). In Italy this was followed by mainstream tabloids (8.8%), and in Romania by fake news/conspiratorial sites (17.8%). In Hungary, most antisemitic content appeared on far-right sites (68.7%), followed by independent mainstream media outlets (16.5%). In Poland most antisemitic narratives appeared on mainstream tabloids (55.1%), followed by biased/hyper-partisan sites (20.3%). Antisemitic content in left-wing and fake news/conspiratorial sites was low in all countries, but also data scraped for these sites was low in all countries. Antisemitic content on left-wing and fake news/conspiratorial sites was low in all countries. However, the amount of data scraped from these sites in every country was relatively small .

4. Figure: Proportion of all antisemitic content in the national datasets distributed across different media categories.




2. Overview and extent of the different types of antisemitic content

2.1 Content with antisemitic narratives

In Italy and Poland, the most prevalent narrative category was new antisemitism, while in Hungary and Romania it was conspiratorial antisemitism, which was the second most common category in the other two countries. In Hungary, conspiratorial antisemitism was followed by classic stereotypes and new antisemitism, while in Romania the reverse was true, new antisemitism was the second most frequent category and classic antisemitism the third. The presence of traditional, religion-based narratives and Holocaust denial and distortion was quite low in all countries, with the highest amount of both in Hungary and the lowest in Italy.


5. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narrative categories within the full national datasets.



Although the amount of data analysed increased in 2024 in all countries and thus quantitatively in almost all narrative categories, the presence of most of them decreased proportionally from 2023 to 2024. However, **new antisemitism increased significantly in all countries, both quantitatively and proportionally**. The only exception was Italy, where the presence of all narrative categories also increased proportionally.

Italy also stands out in another respect: it is the only country in the sample where new antisemitism was already the most prevalent category in 2023. In the other three countries, conspiratorial antisemitism and classic stereotypes dominated in 2023, with new antisemitism playing only a minor role. **In 2024, however, new antisemitism surged and overtook the leading role in Hungary, Poland and Romania as well, in Hungary in a dead heat with conspiratorial antisemitism.**

6. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narratives in the national datasets for 2023 and 2024 (separately).




2.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

Besides narratives, two other types of antisemitic content were examined: hate speech and call for violence.

- **Hate speech:** Hateful content that either explicitly targets Jews or includes the word "Jew" as a negative marker based on antisemitic narratives .
- **Call for violence:** Content that incites violence of any kind against Jews.


Hate speech was most prevalent in Hungary (in more than 10% of the data), followed by Poland (8.5%), Italy (4.6%) and Romania (2.6%). Content calling for violence against Jews was most prevalent in Italy (2.5%), followed by Poland (2.2%), Hungary (1.5%) and Romania (0.4%).

7. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives within the full national datasets.



The amount of hate speech increased quantitatively in 2024 in all countries, except Hungary, where it remained about the same. Proportionally, it decreased everywhere except Italy. Content calling for violence also increased proportionally in 2024 in most countries, except Hungary, where it remained more or less the same.

8. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the national datasets for 2023 and 2024 (separately).



3. Types of antisemitic content in the data examined

3.1 Content of antisemitic narratives

3.1.1 New antisemitism

Across all countries examined, the prevalence of the narrative category new antisemitism increased significantly in 2024, largely due to the events of 7 October 2023, and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war. In 2024, this was the most common narrative category in the data examined in Italy and Poland, the second in Romania, and the third in Hungary.

- Portraying **Israel as a terrorist state** was prevalent in all countries, arguing that Israel is similar to or even worse than a terrorist organisation. In Hungary, Italy and Poland it was claimed that Israel was committing genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.
- The accusation of **double standards** against Israel was present in Hungary, Italy and Poland, and only to a really small extent in Romania. In Hungary and Italy it appeared in two forms: 1) Israel's actions are judged differently internationally (usually with the statement that Israel should be judged more harshly than it is), sometimes compared to the sanctions against Russia; 2) Israel thinks that it is allowed to do things that others are not (e.g. not following rules, not taking responsibility, etc.).
- Narratives about **Israel's responsibility for the Arab-Israeli/Hamas-Israeli conflict** appeared in all four countries, blaming Israel for the conflict, either by claiming that Israel provoked it or by saying that there has been no peace in the Middle East since Israel was founded.
- Content **delegitimising Israel** emerged in a similar way in all four countries. These narratives claimed that Israel is not a legitimate state/is an artificial state. Especially in Italy and Romania, the narrative that the state has no legitimate (historical, cultural, moral, etc.) foundation also emerged. In Italy, Zionism was also described as a "biblical psychopathology" aimed at total control of the "Land of Promise". In Hungary and Poland, some content suggested that Israel should disappear/be destroyed. In Italy and Poland it was also claimed that Israel should return the "illegally acquired land" to the Palestinians.
- The **demonisation of Israel** was also present in all countries, portraying the state as evil in various ways. In Hungary and Italy, it was also portrayed as a war-mongering state that deliberately creates conflicts around the world.
- Allegations of **Israeli influence on the media** were also present in all countries, mostly claiming that Israeli and Jewish actors manipulate the media to spread their propaganda and influence public opinion in line with their interests, either in general or about the current Israel-Hamas war.
- Content drawing **analogy between Nazis and Israel** was present in Hungary, Italy, and Poland, with the following categories:
 - In all three countries it was claimed that Israel was committing a holocaust in Gaza.
 - It was suggested that Israeli policies and politics were similar to those of the Nazis.
 - Only in Italy was Zionism described as a Nazi ideology.
- Speaking about Israel with a **colonialism analogy** was present in all countries except Poland, comparing Israel to a colonial power, implying that it occupies foreign lands.

- Content depicting Israel as an **apartheid or oppressor** state appeared in Hungary and Italy, claiming that Israel, through its control of various territories, has allegedly established a racist regime in which Israelis enjoy civil rights and freedom while Palestinians are segregated in limited territories and under the control of the Israeli army.
- Contents claiming that **Jews are collectively responsible for Israel's actions** were present in all countries except Romania, talking about Israel's actions as if all Jews were involved in them and therefore responsible for them.
- **Denial or relativisation of the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023** appeared in all countries except Romania. These narratives either suggested that Israel was responsible for/behind the attack to gain international support to justify the attack on Gaza, or claimed that it never happened. In Hungary there were also doubts that hostages had been taken, while in Italy Hamas' actions were described as an act of resistance against Israeli occupation and oppression.
- In Hungary, Italy and Poland, there was a very small amount of content about an alleged **taboo on criticism** of Israel, claiming that Israel can't be criticized, and, in Italy, accusing it of labelling criticism as antisemitism.
- **Speaking about Israel with classic antisemitic stereotypes** was mainly present in Hungary using conspiratorial and classic antisemitic narratives in relation to Israel.

3.1.2 Conspiratorial antisemitism

Conspiratorial antisemitism was one of the most widespread narrative categories in all countries analysed. It was the most common category in Hungary and Romania, and the second most prevalent in Italy and Poland.

- Narratives about **Jewish control and power** were prevalent in all countries. The most common version in Hungary, Romania, and Poland claimed that Jews controlled local politics, political parties, politicians, or governments. In Hungary and Poland, this extended to claims that Jews also control the media (e.g., news outlets, television channels), international organisations (e.g., the EU, NATO), institutions, and banks. In Poland, these entities, along with Israeli products, were not only portrayed as controlled by Jews, but also as tools of espionage and deception. Mentions of "American Jews" as symbols of Jewish control over the US also appeared in Hungary and Poland, and alleged US control over Israel was present in Romania. In Italy, such claims took the form of Israel's alleged control of the US and the EU. In Hungary, claims included mentions of Jewish power and lobby, the idea that Jews were buying and occupying Hungary, and accusations that they were spreading harmful ideologies to expand their influence. In Italy, narratives suggested that Israel enjoys international impunity. In Romania, Jews were accused of controlling the Russian-Ukrainian war and seeking to divide or destroy Christianity.
- Narratives linking Jews to Ukrainian President **Volodymyr Zelensky** were prevalent in all countries except Italy. These narratives mainly claimed that Jews, through Zelensky, were responsible for the Russian-Ukrainian war. In Italy, probably due to the greater geographical

distance from Ukraine, only one piece of content suggested that Zelensky benefited from the protection of the Jewish lobby.

- Narratives of so-called **Judeo-communism** appeared in Hungary and Poland, claiming that Jews created communism and were responsible for the communist regimes in those countries. In Romania, it was claimed that Jews were behind communist movements aimed at subverting capitalist societies. In Poland, it was used to discredit someone.
- The **Great Replacement theory** was most prominent in Hungary and Romania, claiming that Jews wanted to replace “white natives” and weaken traditional societies.
- Mentions of philanthropist **George Soros** appeared in Hungary, Romania and Italy. In Romania, Soros was accused of destabilising governments, while in Italy he was portrayed as a symbol of Jewish financial power. In Hungary, Soros was described using classic antisemitic tropes (e.g., liar, traitor, Satan, speculator) and was linked to the so-called “Soros Plan” (the term was introduced in Hungary by the Fidesz government in 2015, referring to Soros’s alleged plan to bring migrants to Hungary and Europe, resembling the Great Replacement theory).
- Narratives related to the **COVID-19** pandemic appeared to a limited extent in Romania and sporadically in Hungary, Italy, and Poland. These often claimed that Jews had invented or spread COVID-19 as a means of control or profit. In Italy, some content compared the effects of COVID-19 vaccines to Nazi atrocities against Jews.
- The **New World Order theory**, centred on alleged Jewish world domination and a supposed “Jewish world government,” appeared on a small scale in Hungary, Italy, and Romania.
- Mentions of Jewish involvement in the **Illuminati** were present in all countries except Italy.
- Content mentioning the **Protocols of the Elders of Zion**, a forged document from Russia in the early 20th-century, appeared in Hungary, Italy, and Poland.

3.1.3 Classic antisemitic stereotypes

Classic antisemitic narratives were prevalent in all countries except Italy. It was the second most common category in Hungary and Poland, the third in Romania, and the fourth in Italy.

- The portrayal of Jews as inherently **evil** was present in all four countries. While in Italy this claim was made in general terms, in the other countries it carried additional layers. In Hungary and Poland, Jews appeared as killers, murderers, or criminals, and in Poland also as terrorists and the cause of global problems. In Hungary it was also suggested that Jews were trying to provoke wars and conflicts. In Romania, these were more related to conspiratorial antisemitism.
- Claims about Jewish **disloyalty/dual loyalty** appeared to varying degrees in all four countries, claiming that Jews are disloyal to the countries in which they reside. While this narrative was marginal in Poland, it was more prominent in Hungary, where Jews were accused of being traitors who actively opposed Hungarian interests, and it was repeatedly suggested that they should emigrate to the US or Israel, where they "really belong". In Romania, this narrative appeared with claims that Jews prioritised a global agenda over national interests.

- The portrayal of Jews as **greedy or wealthy** was also common in all countries. In Romania, this claim was made without additional meanings, but in other countries Jews were often portrayed as profiteers. In Hungary and Italy, they were portrayed as bankers or usurers, with Italy also referring to Jews as merchants and invoking the Rothschild and Rockefeller families as symbols of wealth. In Poland, Jews were described as stingy and accused of valuing money over human life.
- Jews were commonly described as **deceivers and liars** in all four countries. In Hungary and Romania, these claims were made in general terms, while in Italy and Poland, they were mainly linked to Israel. The accusation that Jews lie appeared everywhere, in some cases describing them as untrustworthy.
- Narratives about the alleged **taboo of criticism** of Jews appeared in all countries. In Hungary, some content generally claimed that Jews were beyond criticism. In Poland, similar statements were more directly linked to new antisemitism, with claims that Israel's actions were insufficiently criticised by the international community. In Romania, this narrative even suggested that media freedom was restricted concerning topics related to Jews or Israel, linking it to a broader conspiracy of Jewish control over the media.
- The portrayal of **Jews as "the other"** appeared in all countries, mainly framed by an "us versus them" distinction. In Romania this was expressed in general terms, while in Hungary and Poland it also focused specifically on the division between Jews and Hungarians/Poles. In Hungary, there was an additional claim that Jews were not considered "white people," while in Poland, the emphasis was on differentiating between Polish and Jewish origins, and also on portraying Jews as seeking to destroy Poland. Claims of Jewish inferiority and dehumanisation were present in both Hungary and Poland. In addition, in Hungary, the narratives also described Jews as believing in their own superiority, referring to Jews as a race, and mentioning alleged Jewish physical characteristics.

3.1.4 Holocaust denial and distortion

The narrative category Holocaust denial and distortion was one of the least common categories in all four countries. In Italy, this category was practically only present in 2024. In Hungary and Romania, Holocaust denial and distortion appeared mostly on far-right sites, while in Poland and Italy it appeared on independent (mainstream) media sites.

- Content **denying or distorting the Holocaust** was present in various forms in all countries. In Hungary, Romania and Poland it mainly consisted of questioning various facts of the Holocaust (e.g., the number of victims) or distorting its seriousness or severity. In Hungary, total denial of the Holocaust also appeared. In Romania and Italy, this category appeared in the context of the Israel-Hamas war, and in Italy it was claimed that Jews use the Holocaust as an instrument to justify the actions of the State of Israel. In Poland and Italy, it also appeared that Jews and Israel have too much adapted to the role of victims and there is no need to remember it anymore.

- **Blurring the responsibility for the Holocaust** was present in Hungary, Romania and Poland, relativising the role of national actors and, in Poland, accusing Ukrainians of being the main perpetrators of the Holocaust. In Romania, this narrative was often linked to nationalist movements.
- **Blaming Jews for the Holocaust** was present to a lesser extent in all countries. In Hungary, Italy, and Poland, it was claimed that Jews (in Italy, Zionists) financed or controlled Adolf Hitler. Another version of this narrative argued that the Holocaust was created for Jewish interests, such as the creation of the State of Israel. In Poland, these narratives mainly blamed the Jews for their passivity during the war and accused them of killing each other or collaborating with the Nazis during the war. It also appeared that Jews were using the Holocaust to obtain financial compensation. In Hungary, there were also claims that Jews were victims of the Holocaust for a reason.
- Describing the **Holocaust as a positive event** was present in all four countries. In Hungary and Italy, this narrative mainly suggested that the Holocaust should be repeated, while in Romania and Italy it was claimed that Hitler was right.
- Narratives drawing **analogies between the actions of the Nazis during World War II and the actions of the Jews today** (often referring to Israel) appeared in all countries except Poland. In Hungary, references to “Jewish Nazis” often appeared as hate speech. In Italy, Jews were compared to Nazis on the basis that both groups considered themselves superior to others, in some cases even claiming that Jews were the natural heirs of Nazi culture.

3.1.5 Traditional, religion-based antisemitism

Traditional religion-based antisemitism was one of the least common narrative categories in all countries. It was the least prevalent category in Hungary, Italy and Poland, and the second least common in Romania. In Hungary and Italy the emergence of this category was more linked to specific issues than in the case of the other categories.

- Narratives about **deicide** appeared in all countries except Poland, blaming the Jews for the death of Jesus, and in Hungary also for his betrayal.
- **Blood libel/child murder** narratives appeared in Hungary and Romania. The blood libel myth had a historical presence in these countries, claiming that the Jews murder/poison children and enjoy when children die. In Hungary in 2024, this appeared in connection with the claim that Israel deliberately kills Palestinian children.
- Content depicting **Jews as Satan or the Devil** was present in all four countries. These claimed that Jews appeared to be Satanists/Satan's servants. In Hungary, it also appeared that Jews are the descendants of Satan, while in Romania it was claimed that the Antichrist is or will be Jewish, setting Jews in opposition to Christianity.
- The portrayal of **Jews as the “other” (in the religious sense)** was common in all countries, describing the Jewish religion negatively (e.g., as fanatical, violent, heretical, strange, or bad) and ridiculing Jewish religious rituals. In Poland, there was also content about paedophiles in rabbinical schools and the mistreatment of non-Jews in the Talmud. In Romania, it was

claimed that Judaism inherently promotes a sense of superiority, with accusations that Jews deviate from or oppose Christian beliefs, often labelling them as enemies of the faith. In Italy and Hungary, negative references to Jews as "the chosen people" also appeared. In Hungary, circumcision was also frequently mentioned negatively, and was the basis for many code words for Jews.

3.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

3.2.1 Antisemitic hate speech

Hate speech appeared in all the countries surveyed, with the highest prevalence in the Hungarian dataset.

Two different types of hate speech emerged in almost all countries:

- Hate speech that explicitly targets Jews, and
- Hate speech that includes the word "Jew" as a negative marker.

In Hungary, hate speech appeared mainly in comments on far-right sites, while the second type – using the word "Jew" negatively but targeting others – was also more common in other media categories, such as mainstream and biased/hyper-partisan sites. In Italy, hate speech was mainly present in Facebook comments, often targeting Israel and linked to new antisemitic narratives. In Poland, hate speech appeared mainly in tabloids, while in Romania it had a conspiratorial tone and was most common in comments, with the second type of hate speech appearing on far-right and conspiratorial/fake news sites. In addition, antisemitic jokes and sayings appeared in both Hungary and Poland.

3.2.2 Antisemitic violence

Content calling for violence against Jews appeared in all countries and also increased significantly in 2024.

In almost all countries, calls for violence against Jews were to some extent linked to events on and after 7 October. In Italy and Romania, these narratives appeared only in this context, in comments under articles about the conflict. In Poland, they appeared mainly on tabloid and biased/hyper-partisan websites. Some of this content was also related to Israel, but calls for Jews to be expelled from the countries where they live or to be exterminated/killed also appeared. In Hungary, incitement to violence appeared mainly on far-right sites and mainly called for Jews to be killed. There were also some against President Volodymyr Zelensky and calls for a new Holocaust.

3.3 Issues provoking antisemitism

In terms of the issues that provoked antisemitism, the countries analysed can be divided into two groups. In Italy and Poland, antisemitism was mainly provoked by conflicts in the Middle East and Israel, especially by the events on and after 7 October 2023. In Italy, the presence of antisemitism was closely linked to these issues not only in 2024, but also in 2023. In Poland, additional factors also contributed, such as the antisemitic activities of a far-right politician and various domestic events.

In Hungary and Romania, by contrast, the connection between antisemitic content and specific topics was less direct. In Romania, antisemitic narratives appeared across a wide range of subjects, though domestic politics tended to trigger antisemitism in general, while finance and banking were more likely to provoke conspiratorial narratives. In Hungary, antisemitic content appeared in comments under almost any topic. Some narrative types, such as traditional, religion-based antisemitism, were more closely linked to specific subjects, while the topic of an article often influenced the particular elements of the antisemitic narratives that emerged.

3.4 Code words used for Jews, examples

In all four countries, various code words are used to refer to Jews and Israel. In Hungary, Italy and Poland, some terms are associated with the alleged, stereotypical Jewish appearances or occupations. In Hungary and Poland, code words are often based on formal similarities or phonetic substitutions, using identical or similar-sounding letters. These words typically exploit the similarity between the first syllable of the word for "Jew" or "Jewish" (in the local language) and other terms. In addition, word contractions are common as code words in these two countries, often referring not directly to Jews but to perceived Jewish power and influence. In all countries, highly offensive, dehumanising and derogatory terms are also used to refer to Jews.

4. Conclusion

- The research analysed changes in online antisemitic narratives following the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war.
- These events led to a significant increase in online content related to Jews across all countries examined, with a corresponding rise in the amount of antisemitic content.
- In all countries, the amount of data collected in 2024 was higher than in 2023. The smallest increase was in Hungary, where the data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. In Romania, the data increased by almost three times, in Poland by almost five times, and in Italy by almost seven times. In all countries, most of the data consisted of comments, where most of the antisemitic content was found.
- Antisemitic content increased proportionally in 2024 only in Italy. In Poland and Romania it remained more or less the same as in 2023, while in Hungary it decreased slightly.
- The proportion of most narratives also decreased in almost all countries except Italy. However, new antisemitism increased significantly in all countries, driven due to the events of 7 October and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war.
- In Italy and Poland, new antisemitism was the most prevalent narrative category, while in Hungary and Poland it was conspiratorial antisemitism.
- The content examined was categorised into the previously defined antisemitic narratives, and almost all of them appeared in the period examined. In addition, a number of code words for Jews were identified in the content.

5. Methodology

The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives in online textual content - such as comments, articles and Facebook posts - before and after 7 October 2023. We analysed content from websites and Facebook pages of previously defined media outlets. The content was collected using social listening software based on pre-defined keywords, covering the same period in both 2023 and 2024. The research was conducted in four countries (Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania) by national research teams coordinated by Political Capital, using the same methodology.

Definition of antisemitism

The basis of the research was the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism: "*Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.*" A detailed explanation of the definition, along with illustrative examples, is available on the IHRA website².

5.1 Data collection

In our research, we analysed online textual content: articles, posts and comments from websites and Facebook pages. The data was collected using social listening software, SentiOne. SentiOne scrapes data in a given timeframe, from the given media sources based on the given keywords.

5.1.1 Keywords

We defined four keywords that we used to identify potentially relevant content in all countries: 1) Jews, 2) Israel, 3) Holocaust, 4) Zionism/Zionist. In addition, we included specific keywords relevant to each country³. In languages where these words could have different endings, we used the base form of the keywords followed by an asterisk (*). This approach allowed SentiOne to identify results for all variations and endings of the keywords.

5.1.2 Sources monitored

With input from the national research teams, Political Capital identified six categories of online media to monitor content from: 1) independent (mainstream) media, 2) mainstream tabloids, 3) (hyper-)partisan/biased media, 4) right-wing/far-right sites, 5) fake news/conspiratorial sites, 5) left-wing/far-left sites. We collected pages for each category in all countries, including media outlets' websites and Facebook pages. In all countries, we selected the three media outlets per category with the most results for our keywords in the same time period.

² IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

³ HU: biboldó, bibsi; IT: rabbin, talmudist; PL: żydowie, mykci, pejsy a ndparchy; RO: jid, iud, mosaic, ovre and khazar.

- **Independent (mainstream) media:** Independent media in all countries, with content is mainly focused on public life: politics, economics, international news. In Romania, these platforms represent diverse political and audience perspectives. In Poland, these media are strongly associated with left-wing and centrist politics.
- **Far-right pages:** Pages often promoting nationalist, xenophobic, or extremist ideologies, including antisemitic narratives. In Poland, they refer to the teachings of the Catholic Church. In Italy, these sometimes also promote sovereignist, traditionalist, anti-European, and anti-globalist ideologies, and show affinities with neo-fascism, sometimes recalling Mussolini's fascist government.
- **Mainstream tabloids:** Media outlets focusing mainly on celebrity news. These pages focus on sensationalist and entertainment-driven content, often prioritizing headlines that grab attention. In Poland, these portals are extremely popular and usually rank in the top in Polish readership rankings.
- **Fake news/conspiratorial sites:** Media outlets mainly promoting fake news, disinformation and conspiracy theories on various topics. In Poland, they are right-wing, anti-EU, and actors associated with these are also known for antisemitic comments, and are also strongly associated with the extreme right.
- **Pro-government partisan/biased media:** Pages promoting content aligned with specific political or ideological agendas. In Hungary, these media outlets are dominated by pro-government media conglomerates and focus on promoting the political agenda of the Fidesz government. In Italy, they are inspired by liberal conservatism, with conservative positions on social and cultural issues, and liberalist ones on economics. In Poland, these are conservative portals with strong visible support for Christian traditions and appear as unequivocally right-wing on the political spectrum.
- **Left-wing/far-left pages:** Communist- and Marxist-inspired sites, critical of modern capitalism and modern imperialism. In Italy, these criticise the EU and the globalization. In Hungary, the one page included is an independent left-wing news portal that publishes daily news, editorials, analysis and live coverage.

5.1.3 Monitoring period

Based on our previous experiences in coding textual content into previously defined categories and the resources available to the project, we set a goal of analysing 7,000 pieces of content per country. Because we wanted to examine changes in antisemitic narratives after 7 October 2023, we chose the same time period in both 2023 and 2024. This was determined by identifying the country with the least data for our keywords and calculating how many days were needed, starting from a chosen date (in this case, 1 April), for the downloaded data in that country to exceed 7,000 pieces of content. As a result, data collection in all countries was standardised to the same timeframe: April 1 and April 15, 13:00.

5.1.4 The amount of data analysed

We filtered each dataset to include more than 7,000 pieces of content, maintaining the original proportions of keywords, sources (websites and Facebook pages), and years within the dataset. This

approach resulted in the following proportions of the total downloaded dataset being analysed in each country: Romania - 100%, Hungary - 73%, Italy - 44%, and Poland - 35%.

In all countries the amount of data collected in 2024 was higher than in 2023. The smallest increase was in Hungary, where the data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. In Romania the data increased by almost three times, in Poland by almost five times and in Italy by almost seven times. In all countries most of the data consisted of comments.

The amount of data also varied between countries by media category:

- Hungary: The majority of data came from far-right pages, followed by mainstream media, biased outlets, tabloids, and minimal data from conspiratorial and left-wing sources.
- Italy: Most data came from mainstream media, followed by tabloids, biased outlets, left-wing and conspiratorial sources, with very little data from far-right pages.
- Poland: Most data came from tabloids, followed by biased outlets, mainstream media, far-right pages, conspiratorial sites and very little from left-wing sources.
- Romania: Most of the data came from mainstream media, followed by conspiratorial sites, tabloids, far-right sources, biased outlets and a small amount of data from left-wing sources.

		<i>Examined content in media categories</i>								
		Mainstream	Far-right	Conspiratorial	Biased	Tabloid	Left	Total amount of data/year	T amc d	
Hungary	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7	
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221		
Italy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7	
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163		
Poland	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7	
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818		
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7	
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165		

5.2 Coding the data

5.2.1 Conceptual framework

Using publicly available resources, such as studies, research reports, scientific articles, etc., Political Capital developed a conceptual framework to define the theoretical background of the research. In addition to stating that the research was based on the IHRA's working definition of antisemitism, the document thoroughly presented the main categories of antisemitic narratives and sub-narratives on which the research was based. All partners had the opportunity to discuss, comment on, and add to the content of the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework was also discussed with members of the BOND project's Advisory Board and external experts.

5.2.2 Finalising the methodology and creating a methodology guide

Finalising the research methodology involved multiple discussions - including consultations with an expert member of the BOND Advisory Board and several attempts to analyse and code online texts in different ways. From these efforts, the final categories for coding the data were established. Four classifications were defined for the nature of content:

1. Antisemitic – Content that contained at least one antisemitic narrative.
2. Potentially antisemitic – Content that included a narrative that could be either interpreted as both antisemitic and non-antisemitic, or it appeared antisemitic only in light of the context (the article/post it was responding to).
3. Not understandable – Content that was incomprehensible (this category was almost only applicable to comments).
4. Not antisemitic – Content that did not include any antisemitic narratives.

Based on the conceptual framework, five main categories of antisemitic narratives were identified, each containing sub-categories (the details and definitions of these categories will be described later):

- Classic antisemitic stereotypes
- Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism)
- Conspiratorial antisemitism,
- Holocaust denial and distortion,
- New antisemitism (antisemitism based on criticism of Israel).

Two additional categories were defined: "hate speech" and "call for violence".

The coding process was described in detail in a methodology guide.

As part of the coding process, coders were required to document the antisemitic phrases identified in the content. For comments, they also had to record the context - specifically, the subject of the article or post under which the comment was written.

5.2.3 Training of the coders

After sharing the conceptual framework and the methodology guide with the national research teams, Political Capital organised a meeting to explain and discuss these documents and the process and to provide space for questions. Throughout the research process, the research teams met regularly to discuss issues and questions that arose during the research process.

To ensure a common understanding of the theoretical framework and to increase the reliability of the research - within the constraints of resources and team capacities - the research process included a learning phase. During this phase, 350 pieces of content were filtered from the dataset while maintaining the original proportions of results by keyword, media category, and year. A slight

overrepresentation of results for the keyword "Israel" was included, based on the assumption that identifying new antisemitism would be the greatest challenge. In each country, two members of the national research teams coded these data independently. Their results were then compared and discrepancies were discussed to reach an agreement. In cases where agreement could not be reached, they were given the opportunity to consult with Political Capital for further clarification.

5.2.4 The coding process

Coding the data followed the same procedure across all countries. The national teams received their content in an Excel file, which included all relevant properties (e.g., comment/article/post, date of publishing, source, context, etc.). During the coding process, coders read the content itself and, for comments, also examined the context.

If antisemitic narratives were identified in the content, coders labelled it as either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic, defined the antisemitic narrative, and categorised it into a main antisemitic narrative category along with one of its sub-categories. A single piece of content could be categorised into multiple (maximum four) narrative categories, as it was possible for more than one antisemitic narrative to appear within the same text. If the content did not contain any antisemitic narratives, or if its meaning was not understandable, it was not assigned to any category.

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Introduction to the BOND project

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities) project⁹ was implemented from January 2023 to December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. Its primary goal was to address deep-rooted prejudices, hateful attitudes, and behaviors within society, particularly those targeting European Jewry. The project also aimed to foster understanding, tolerance, and dialogue. A significant focus was placed on educating young people about Judaism and antisemitism, as well as promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. Its activities included researching antisemitism, monitoring antisemitic narratives, developing educational curricula, training teachers, organising youth education and exchange programs, facilitating inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, and hosting local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion. The project was guided by the definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).⁴

⁴ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

Research report – Hungary

Antisemitic narratives online in Hungary before and after the 7th of October 2023

● Key findings

- The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives online before and after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.
- 7008 pieces of content containing one of our keywords were analysed in Hungary, mainly from far-right sites, mainstream media and biased/hyper-partisan sites, and a smaller number from fake-news/conspiracy sites and left-wing sites. Most of the content was comments, 10% were articles and there were some Facebook posts. The amount of data analysed increased by about one and a half times from 2023 to 2024, showing the impact of 7 October and the subsequent war.
- 52% of the analysed content contained either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic narratives, i.e. narratives that can be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic. Most of these were comments, and most antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content appeared on far-right sites in both 2023 and 2024.
- The proportion of antisemitic content decreased slightly in Hungary from 2023 to 2024. In 2023, 50.91% of the data was antisemitic and in 2024, 44.44%. The proportion of potentially antisemitic content remained more or less the same, with 5.13% in 2023 and 5.45% in 2024.
- The most common narrative category in the Hungarian data was conspiratorial antisemitism, followed by classic stereotypes. New antisemitism (antisemitism based on criticism of Israel) ranked third, followed by Holocaust denial and distortion, and traditional religion-based antisemitism.
- Even though the extent of antisemitic narratives increased in 2024, their proportion altogether remained more or less the same. New antisemitism appeared almost seven times more in 2024 proportionally increasing more than four times, while the proportion of the other narrative categories decreased.
- Antisemitic hate speech was relatively common in the Hungarian data, while content explicitly calling for violence against Jews was less frequent.
- The results show that antisemitism can be triggered by almost any topic. Antisemitic narratives were found in the comments sections of articles on a wide range of topics, including celebrity news, government decisions, and neutral topics. However, in many cases, the subject of the article influenced elements of the appearing narratives, such as actors of a conspiracy. Some narrative categories were strongly tied to specific topics (e.g. traditional, religion-based antisemitism/anti-Judaism).
- A number of code words are used to describe Jews, which can be divided into several categories.

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Introduction

The research aimed to analyse changes in online antisemitic narratives following 7 October 2023—Hamas's terror attack on Israel and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, making it necessary to examine how online antisemitic narratives had evolved. The development of the research methodology and categories were completed in late 2023 and early 2024, and the research began in the spring of 2024.

Recognising and defining antisemitism in relation to Israel, i.e. distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel, has become particularly challenging since 7 October. Our research is based on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism⁵, which is accepted by 43 countries and several international organisations including the EU and most of its member states.

The research was conducted simultaneously in four countries—Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania—using the same methodology. It focused on textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. The content was collected using social listening software from the websites and Facebook pages of the most relevant national media outlets across five media categories: independent (mainstream) media, biased/hyper-partisan media, mainstream tabloids, left-wing sites, far-right pages, and fake news/conspiratorial sites. The scraping process was guided by keywords designed to detect antisemitic content. Four core keywords—Jew, Israel, Holocaust, and Zionism/Zionist—were used in all countries in their respective local languages. Additionally, country-specific keywords were included. In languages where these words could have different endings, their base forms were followed by an asterisk (*), enabling the collection of results for all variations and endings.

The research focused on the period from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, with nearly 7,000 pieces of content analysed in each country. All content was examined by the national research teams and classified as either antisemitic, potentially antisemitic (content that could be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic), not understandable, or not antisemitic.

Drawing on publicly available resources—such as studies, research reports, and scientific articles—five main categories of antisemitic narratives were defined: classic antisemitic stereotypes, conspiratorial antisemitism, traditional religion-based antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, and new antisemitism (antisemitism based on the criticism of Israel). In addition to these, two supplementary categories were established: hate speech and calls for violence against Jews. Each piece of content was thoroughly analysed and assigned to one or more of these categories.


⁵ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

1. The extent of antisemitic content in the national dataset

1.1 The extent of antisemitic content in the dataset

Antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content was present in 52% of the Hungarian dataset. Out of a total 7008 pieces of content, 3295 were labelled as antisemitic, 373 as potentially antisemitic, 3101 as not antisemitic, and 239 as not understandable.


9. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic content in the full dataset.



1.2 Distribution of the content examined

The vast majority of the downloaded content were comments, and most antisemitic content appeared in them. About 87.5% of the downloaded content was comments (6134), about 10.5% were articles (744), and only about 2% were Facebook posts (130). Antisemitic narratives appeared predominantly in comments, of which over 53% (3261) were antisemitic, 6% (362) were potentially antisemitic, 37% (2272) were not antisemitic, and about 4% (239) were not understandable. Regarding articles, 94% (700) were not antisemitic, 5% (34) were antisemitic, and 1% (10) were potentially antisemitic. Nearly all posts were not antisemitic, with only one categorised as potentially antisemitic.

10. Figure: Distribution of the different types of content examined in the full dataset.




1.3 Antisemitism in the different types of media

In Hungary, the majority of antisemitic content was found on far-right pages, making up 68.7% of all antisemitic content in the dataset. This was followed by independent mainstream media outlets (16.5%), biased/hyper-partisan sites (10.1%), mainstream tabloids (2.3%), fake news/conspiratorial sites (1.8%), and left-wing sites (0.6%). A similar pattern was observed with potentially antisemitic content, most of which also appeared on far-right pages (51.2%). Independent mainstream media outlets accounted for (25.7%), biased/hyper-partisan sites (17.4%), mainstream tabloids (2.4%), left-wing sites (2.1%), and fake news/conspiratorial sites (1.1%).

With more data in the dataset in 2024, the number of antisemitic content also increased but its proportion remained relatively stable on mainstream media sites compared the all data from this media category. However, it increased on left-wing and conspiratorial sites and decreased slightly on tabloid, biased/hyper-partisan, and far-right pages.

Antisemitic (including both antisemitic and potentially antisemitic) content was most prevalent on far-right media sites, both quantitatively (2,455 pieces) and proportionally (75.5%), especially in comments. Proportionally, antisemitic content was also present in 71% of the data collected from conspiratorial sites, although the absolute number was relatively small (62 pieces). In all other media categories, the proportion of antisemitic content was quite similar (mainstream - 30.7%, biased - 29.8%, tabloid - 39.3%, and left-wing 28.1%). However, when looking at the total amount of content, larger differences emerged: the mainstream and biased media categories contained the highest number of antisemitic content (640 and 379, respectively), while fewer were found in the tabloid (85) and left-wing (29) media categories.

11. Figure: Presence of antisemitic content within the different media categories.



● 2. Overview and extent of the different types of antisemitic content

2.1 Content with antisemitic narratives

The conceptual framework of the research identified the following five main antisemitic categories. Within each of these main categories, narratives and sub-narratives were defined.

- **Classic stereotypes:** Narratives historically rooted in antisemitic prejudice. These encompass hatred of Jews based on their existence as human beings, not simply as adherents of the Jewish religion. It does so through contradictory logic that sees Jews as both overly powerful and weak or even subhuman. Classic stereotypes include for example that Jews are evil, greedy, disloyal or liars.⁶
- **Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism):** Traditional religion-based Judeophobia, or traditional antisemitism, refers to anti-Jewish sentiments rooted in beliefs associated with either the perceived Christian or Jewish religion and traditions. Traditional,

⁶Matthias J. Becker et al., "Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets", *Humanities & Social Sciences Communications* 9, 2022

[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3/](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3;); Matthias J. Becker et al., "Decoding Antisemitism" Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, p. 11, 13; ADL Antisemitic Myths. <https://antisemitism.adl.org/>

religion-based antisemitic narratives include for example blood libel/child murder, deicide or Jews are Satanic.⁷

- **Conspiratorial antisemitism:** Conspiracy theories have perpetuated antisemitic beliefs by suggesting that Jews wield undue influence for personal gain and conspire to dominate spheres such as the media, politics, and the economy. Many of these theories are rooted in the antisemitic myth of the "hidden hand," and blame Jews, or actors perceived to be Jewish, for the world's worst tragedies, such as instigating wars or even causing COVID-19. Conspiratorial antisemitic narratives include for example Jewish power/control, Judeo-Communism, Great Replacement Theory⁸ or New World Order Theory^{9,10}.
- **Holocaust denial and distortion:** Holocaust denial or distortion seeks to deny or misrepresent the historical facts of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. Holocaust denial includes denying the scale or methods used by the Nazis and their allies during the Holocaust. Holocaust denial and distortion promote the false idea that Jews invented or exaggerated the Holocaust and they profited from it. Holocaust denial and distortion narratives include for example blaming Jews for the Holocaust or depicting the Holocaust as a positive event.¹¹
- **New antisemitism:** New antisemitism refers to the expression of anti-Jewish sentiment directed at Israel. A key function of new antisemitism is to enable the expression of antisemitic views in a way that appears politically acceptable. We define new antisemitism using Natan Sharansky's 3D test: demonisation, double standards and delegitimisation. New antisemitism includes for example Nazi/Apartheid/Colonialism Analogy, claiming that Israel is a terrorist state or that Israeli bears influence on media.¹²

The most prevalent narrative category in the Hungarian data was conspiratorial antisemitism, appearing in 19.1% (1,339 pieces) of the examined content. This was followed by classic stereotypes,

⁷ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, p. 13.

<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

⁸ The Great Replacement Theory is a conspiracy theory rooted in the belief that the white race is under threat of extinction at the hands of Jews and other minorities. This theory also known as white replacement theory or white genocide theory, claims there is an intentional effort, led by Jews, to promote mass non-white immigration, inter-racial marriage, and other efforts that would lead to the "extinction of whites." <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/great-replacement>

⁹ The New World Order theory is a conspiracy theory claiming that a small group of powerful individuals working in secret to establish all-powerful control. The conspiracy theory behind the New World Order involving Jewish leaders is based on the idea that Jews have formed a power structure in which they control every aspect of humankind — the economy, media, and political landscape. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/New-World-Order>

¹⁰ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, pp. 13-14.


<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

¹¹ IHRA Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion (2013).
<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion>

¹² ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>


present in 14.4% (1,011 pieces). New antisemitism ranked third with 11.6% (811 pieces), while Holocaust denial and distortion appeared in 2.8% (198 pieces), and traditional religion-based antisemitism in 2.6% (184 pieces).

12. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narrative categories in the full dataset.



The proportion of antisemitic content remained roughly the same over two years with most narrative categories declining proportionally, except new antisemitism. The number of new antisemitic narratives, rose nearly sevenfold, resulting in a proportional increase of over four times. In contrast, the amount of other narratives remained relatively stable in 2024, leading to a slight proportional decrease, with traditional, religion-based narratives showing a more notable decline.

13. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).




2.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

Besides narratives, two other types of antisemitic content were examined : hate speech and calls for violence.


- **Hate speech:** Hateful content that either explicitly targets Jews or includes the word "Jew" as a negative marker based on antisemitic narratives.
- **Call for violence:** Content that incites violence of any kind against Jews.

Hate speech was relatively common in the Hungarian data, appearing in 14% (998 pieces) of the content, with a slight decrease in 2024. Content calling for violence against Jews was less common, appearing in around 1% (103 pieces) of the data, its amount increased by in 2024 but proportionally its extent remained unchanged.

14. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the full dataset.



15. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).



3. Types of antisemitic content in the data examined

3.1 Content of antisemitic narratives

3.1.1 Conspiratorial antisemitism

The most common type of antisemitic narrative was conspiratorial antisemitism, which appeared in 19.1% of the data examined. The prevalence of this narrative remained relatively high over the two years, but its proportion decreased in 2024. As the most widespread narrative type, it was present in all media categories, mainly in comments and occasionally in articles. These narratives were not tied to specific topics but appeared in relation to a variety of subjects.

The most common narrative concerned alleged **Jewish control/power**. It claims that Jews control or support various actors and fields to pursue their interests. The subject of the narratives - who or what is controlled by Jews - was in many cases strongly linked to current events. Many versions of Jewish control appeared, such as:

- *Political actors*: According to the narratives, many Hungarian and foreign political actors were controlled by Jews. In many cases, this accusation was made explicitly, or it was stated that the actor in question was either perceived as Jewish or supported by Jews. Code words were also used to express this narrative, such as "zsidesz", a combination of the words "Jew" ("zsidó") and the name of the ruling party, "Fidesz". Almost all political actors were accused of being controlled or supported by Jews, but most often, the narrative focused on the ruling Fidesz party and Péter Magyar, leader of the newly formed opposition TISZA Party, founded in 2024. Other opposition actors, such as former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and his Democratic Coalition (Demokratikus Koalíció) party, and the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) party and its deputy leader Dóra Dúró, were also subjects of these narratives. Among foreign political actors, European leaders were mentioned most frequently: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen; former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell; leaders of European states, including Emmanuel Macron, Andrzej Duda, Mateusz Morawiecki, and Volodymyr Zelensky (see below for details). Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden were also mentioned, as well as the German far-right party AfD, and historical figures such as Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler (see also Holocaust narratives).
- *International organisations*: UN, EU, NATO, WHO, charities, etc.
- *Countries*: Mostly Hungary, Germany and the USA were mentioned, but many other countries also appeared in this context.
- *The world of finance*: the local and global economy, banks, the stock market, and multinational corporations. In some narratives, Jewish big capital was mentioned as a source of influence.
- *Media in Hungary*: news media such as Index, Telex, 444, HVG, Lakmusz; television channels such as ATV, RTL Klub.
- *Institutions in Hungary*: courts, universities, scientific organisations, churches.

There were also numerous other references to Jewish power, often described as the secret pursuit of Jewish interests. These included references to the "Jewish lobby" and the belief that Jews were seeking world domination. A particularly common element of these narratives was the figure of the "American Jew", which referred to the alleged Jewish control over the United States and its activities. Some narratives claimed that Jews intended to buy or occupy Hungary by acquiring its waters, lands, and real estate. There were also claims that Jews spread ideologies such as multiculturalism, liberalism, communism, anarchism, gender/LGBTQI ideology, and even democracy, which was mentioned as a tool to establish their dictatorship.

The narrative that **Jews control Ukraine through Volodymyr Zelensky**, the president of Ukraine, who allegedly represented Jewish interests, was also prevalent. These narratives took various forms, claiming that Jews were behind the Russian-Ukrainian war and often included hate speech and various derogatory markers and code words for Zelensky.

The notion of **Judeo-Communism** also appeared in some narratives that depicted Jews as Bolsheviks or Communists who had played a political role under socialism/communism. It was also claimed that members of the State Protection Authority, the state security service of the communist dictatorship in Hungary, were Jewish.


The Great Replacement theory was also present in the content examined in Hungary, claiming that Jews wanted the "white natives" in Europe to disappear. To achieve this, they control migration from other continents, either by organising it or by backing politicians who support it. Some narratives suggested that Jews wanted to make Hungary or Ukraine the "new Israel".

Narratives about the philanthropist **George Soros** also emerged, often highlighting his alleged influence on the Western world, the USA, Europe, Hungary and the economy. These narratives often characterised him with classic antisemitic labels such as liar, traitor, Satan, speculator, etc. The "Soros Plan" was also mentioned, a term that was introduced in Hungary by the Fidesz government in 2015, referring to Soros's alleged plan to bring migrants to Hungary and Europe, resembling the Great Replacement Theory. Since 2017, the government has used it to discredit various actors - NGOs, institutions, and politicians - accusing them of being "Soros agents" implementing the "Soros Plan".

Other less common narratives included the **New World Order theory**, which posits "Jewish world domination" and a "Jewish world government"; and the **Illuminati**, with accusations of "Jewish freemasonry", citing figures such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the Hungarian poet Endre Ady as examples. The **COVID-19** pandemic also appeared in some narratives, with the virus and vaccines pictured as tools for Jewish control of society. A few mentions of **The Protocols of the Elders of Zion**, a fraudulent document from the early 20th century from Russia, were also present.

Of all the narratives, those concerning Jewish control and power were the most common, with their prevalence increasing from 2023 to 2024. The appearance of the Great Replacement theory and the New World Order theory also increased slightly by 2024. In contrast, narratives involving Volodymyr Zelensky, about George Soros, and the COVID-19 pandemic decreased by 2024. The prevalence of narratives on other topics remained more or less the same.

16. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Conspiratorial antisemitism.



3.1.2 Classic antisemitic stereotypes

Classic antisemitic narratives were the second most common in the Hungarian dataset, appearing in 14.4% of all examined content and across all media categories. The prevalence of these narratives remained largely consistent between 2023 and 2024. While they were most frequently present in comments, they also appeared occasionally in articles. Comments containing classic antisemitism were present under articles on various topics.

Classic antisemitic narratives most commonly depict **Jews as the “other”**. These mentions can be categorised into four groups.

- 1) Describing Jews as superior
 - a. Narratives that claim Jews think they are superior: these express that Jews think they are smart, they know everything; they are arrogant, conceited, narcissistic, they think they can do anything, nothing is good enough for them;
 - b. Narratives about Jews perceived as superior: these state that Jews are intellectuals, they are in a privileged position, they look down on others.
- 2) Describing Jews as inferior: alleging that Jews are
 - a. stupid, useless, dirty, smelly, etc.
 - b. deviant (drug users, paedophiles, homosexuals);
 - c. parasites and bestial;

- d. not human (e.g. rats, worms, reptilian humanoid);
 - e. without a soul;
 - f. diseases of the world/humanity (e.g. cancer, plague).
- 3) Talking about Jews as a race: mentioning their alleged physical racial traits, such as the “Jewish nose”.
- 4) Claiming that Jews are not white and/or not Hungarian.

Claims that **Jews are deceivers and liars** were also common. These depicted Jews as unfair and dishonest: thieves, liars, cheaters, unreliable; also manipulative, playing the role of victim, cunning, and ingenious.


Talk of Jews as **evil** was also widespread, including the following claims:

- Jews are killers, who want to kill white people/Hungarians/their enemies, they kill for their interests, they enjoy seeing others die, and human life is not important to them;
- Jews think they are allowed to commit crimes, they don't have a conscience, they are the people of revenge;
- Jews want bad for others, provoke conflicts and wars, are violent, manipulative, want only good for themselves and want power;
- Jews poison wells, spread plague and desecrate graves;
- Jews provoked antisemitism by their evilness, so they are to blame for it.

Jews were widely portrayed as **greedy and wealthy**, with claims that they were rich, profiteering, dispossessing others (e.g. Hungarians) and dominating big capital. Accusing Jews of **disloyalty/dual loyalty** appeared too, by statements that they are traitors, serving foreign interests, stick together, they are not loyal to Hungary and/or are against Hungarians. Statements that Jews should move to Israel/ the US, “where they belong”. To a much lesser extent, claims that Jews being beyond criticism (**a taboo of criticism**) also appeared.

The presence of the sub-narratives evil, disloyalty/dual loyalty, and taboo of criticism increased slightly in 2024 within the narrative category, while mentions of Jews as the “other” decreased. Some sub-narratives appeared only in connection with specific events, such as the campaign of the far-right party Our Homeland against the registration and taxation of drilled wells, which triggered comments about Jews allegedly poisoning wells. These sub-narratives disappeared once the issue was off the political agenda.

17. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Classic antisemitic stereotypes.



3.1.4 New antisemitism

New antisemitic narratives appeared in 11.6% of the whole data examined. The prevalence of new antisemitism changed the most between the two years analysed, with the amount of new antisemitic content increasing almost sevenfold with a proportional increase almost four times by 2024, reflecting the impact of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war. New antisemitic narratives appeared in some articles and one post but were predominantly present in comments. Although present in all media categories, this narrative type was most prevalent on far-right and independent (mainstream) media sites, but its presence also increased on biased/hyper-partisan sites in 2024. These narratives were primarily associated with war-related articles, with a notable concentration around the Israeli army's accidental attack on the World Central Kitchen aid convoy on 1 April 2024, and Iran's large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel on 13 April.

The majority of new antisemitic content claimed that **Israel is a terrorist state** in two main forms: 1) the State of Israel or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commits genocide or war crimes or crimes against humanity; 2) the State of Israel or the Israeli Defence Forces operates as a terrorist organisation.

Mentioning **double standards** concerning Israel was also common, either by claiming that Israel's actions are judged differently internationally, usually by saying that Israel should be judged more harshly than it is. or by saying that Israel thinks that it is allowed to do things that others are not (e.g., not following rules, not taking responsibility, etc.).

Narratives about **Israel's responsibility for the Arab-Israeli/Hamas-Israeli conflict** were also widespread. These narratives suggested, on the one hand, that Israel had provoked the conflicts and


was therefore responsible for the 7 October terrorist attack by Hamas, and, on the other hand, that there had been no peace in the Middle East since Israel had been founded.

The **delegitimisation** of Israel, i.e. the claim that Israel is not a legitimate state, also emerged, with calls for its destruction. The **demonisation** of Israel also appeared, depicting it as evil and picturing it as a pro-war state which aims to bring the whole world to war. Depicting **Israel with classic antisemitic stereotypes** was also common. These narratives claimed that Israel controls other countries (e.g. Hungary, EU, USA), that it lies, that it is protected by the global Jewish (background) power, that it always plays the role of the victim, or characterised Israel with derogatory terms often used for Jews (e.g. rat, satanic).

Some content also used the **colonialism analogy** to depict Israel as an occupying state which aims to colonise areas or that its territory was by default a result of the occupation, stating that it was stolen from the Palestinians. Claims about **Israeli influence on the media** were also present, either stating that the Western media reports along Israel's interests or that Israel manipulates news and controls media freedom. Drawing an **analogy between Israel's activities and the Nazis** also appeared, suggesting that Israel's politics is similar to the Nazis', and that Israel commits a Holocaust in Gaza. Narratives claiming **Jews' collective responsibility for Israel's actions** and describing Israel as an **apartheid** or oppressor state were also present. Content **denying or relativising the Hamas attack of 7 October** also appeared, either doubting that hostages had been taken, accusing Israel of lying about the attack, claiming that Israel was responsible for the attack and deserved it, or claiming that Israel was behind the attack and that it was a Mossad operation. On a very small scale, narratives about the **taboo of criticising Israel, accusing Israel for the Holocaust and denying Israel's right to self-determination** also appeared.

In 2023, mentions of the colonialism analogy and claims that Israel is a terrorist state were the most common, appearing mostly in comments. These appeared mostly under articles about Israeli actions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as reports of Israeli airstrikes in Syria, clashes at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and subsequent attacks from Lebanon and Gaza. In 2024, the prevalence of all new antisemitic narratives had increased significantly, with a particular rise in describing Israel as a terrorist state.

18. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category New antisemitism.



3.1.5 Holocaust Denial and Distortion

Holocaust denial and distortion was the second least common category in the Hungarian dataset, appearing in 2.8% of all content. Its presence decreased slightly in 2024. These narratives appeared most frequently in both years on far-right sites, mainly in comments and only occasionally in articles (one on a far-right site, one on a conspiratorial site, and one on a biased media site).

Narratives **denying or distorting the Holocaust** mainly either questioned various elements of the Holocaust, such as the number of victims, distorted its gravity and severity, or denied the Holocaust altogether.


Blaming Jews for the Holocaust was also present, claiming that Jews were behind the Holocaust, for example, by controlling Hitler, that they created the Holocaust to have a reason to create Israel afterwards, that they participated in making the Holocaust happen, or that they became victims for a reason.

Descriptions of the **Holocaust as a positive event** also appeared, mainly suggesting that it should happen again. There were also examples of **Nazi analogy**, mainly talking about Jewish Nazis, often as hate speech, and drawing parallels between the actions of the Nazis in World War II and those of Israel – or Jews – today. Some content aimed to **blur the responsibility** of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, mainly by relativising the role of Hungary or Hungarian actors at the time, such as Miklós Horthy, Hungary's head of state until October 1944 or Ferenc Szálasi, Hungary's Nazi leader who succeeded Horthy.

In 2024 the proportion of narratives denying and distorting the Holocaust decreased slightly, while describing the Holocaust as a positive event increased a bit. In 2023, narratives denying or distorting

the Holocaust appeared primarily in connection with articles about the Holocaust Memorial Day and the death of Benjamin Ferencz, one of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials, which also triggered content describing the Holocaust as a positive event. In 2024, such narratives appeared in connection with the 80th anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust and the 100th anniversary of the publication of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

19. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Holocaust denial and distortion.




3.1.6 Traditional, religion-based antisemitism

Traditional, religion-based antisemitic narratives were the least common, appearing in 2.6% of all data. In both 2023 and 2024, these narratives appeared on far-right sites, mostly in comments, with one exception in an article. In 2024, the frequency of these narratives decreased, appearing in comments under articles on any topic, but more often in the context of Israel. These narratives often included various derogatory terms for circumcision, using them as code words for Judaism or Jewish people.

Content in this category mostly portrayed **Jews as the “other” in a religious sense**, either speaking negatively about the Jewish religion (e.g. it is hateful, fanatical/violent, disgusting, lying, immoral, etc.) or referring negatively to Jews as the “chosen people”. Circumcision was also frequently mentioned negatively and was the basis for many code words for Jews. Picturing **Jews as Satan/devil** was also present, either by claiming that Jews are Satanists/believe in Satan or that they are the descendants of Satan. Content about **blood libel/child murder** also appeared, portraying Jews as child murderers, claiming that they murder/poison children, that they are happy when children die, and also in connection with Israel deliberately killing Palestinian children. Content about **deicide** also appeared on a small scale, claiming that Jews killed/betrayed Jesus.

In 2023, these narratives appeared mainly in connection with specific events, such as an article about an old and notorious child murder case in Hungary¹³, which triggered much of the content about blood libel. In 2024, blood libel narratives were more closely associated with the Hamas-Israel war. Narratives about deicide and depictions of Jews as Satanic or "other" in a religious sense were most prevalent in comments under articles about Easter.

20. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Traditional, religion-based antisemitism.



3.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

3.2.1 Antisemitic hate speech

Antisemitic hate speech appeared in 14% of the Hungarian dataset, distributed approximately equally across the two years studied. The vast majority of it was found in comments on far-right pages and in two far-right articles.

The data analysed revealed two distinct types of antisemitic hate speech:

- 1) Hate speech that explicitly targets Jews: This was most prevalent in comments on far-right sites, although it also appeared in other media categories, albeit much less frequently. Besides various forms of hate speech, antisemitic jokes and sayings also appeared in this category.
- 2) Hate speech that includes the word "Jew" as a negative marker: This was also most common on far-right sites, but appeared slightly more frequently on mainstream and biased media sites than the previous type

¹³ The murder of a child in Kör mend in 1998 was portrayed by Hungarian far-right media as a blood libel, claiming that the young girl was killed by a *shochet* (an Orthodox Jewish butcher) and that her blood was needed to start a new soft drink manufacturing plant owned by a Jewish businessman.

Hate speech was almost completely absent from left-wing sites.

3.2.2 Antisemitic violence

Some narratives explicitly called for violence against Jews. Although this category was the least common, appearing in 1% of all data and only within comments, it contained deeply hateful statements. These narratives were primarily found on far-right portals, but there were also comments calling for violence on other sites, except left-wing sites.

One of the central narratives was the explicit call to kill Jews or the statement that Jews should be killed/exterminated. Other narratives advocated various forms of harm to Jews. Related narratives targeted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, with calls for his death or assassination. In addition, Holocaust-related claims were prominent in this category, including calls for a new Holocaust or the use of Holocaust-related language (e.g., references to shooting Jews in the Danube, the "final solution", gassing, or burning Jews in boilers) to advocate violence.

3.3 Topics provoking antisemitism

The analysis of the content revealed that almost any topic can provoke antisemitism. Antisemitic speech appeared in comments on a wide range of topics, from celebrity news to government decisions to any kind of neutral topic. In many cases, the content of antisemitic speech in comments was unrelated to the topic of the article under which it was written, although there were cases where elements of the antisemitic narratives were closely related to the topic of the article. There were some antisemitic narratives that appeared only under specific topics, such as the blood libel narrative, which appeared only under articles about a child murder case in Kör mend, and the classic antisemitic narrative about Jews poisoning wells, which appeared under articles about the far-right Our Homeland party's petition about drilled wells.

3.4 Code words used for Jews

Several code words were used to describe Jews in the Hungarian dataset. These can be grouped into the following main categories:

- **Code words based on formal similarity:** These code words are used to refer to Jews on the basis of the similarity between their first syllable and the first syllable of the word Jew/Jewish (zsidó). In general, these words have no direct connection with Jews, but in many cases, they refer to animals or money, such as "zsiráf" (giraffe), "zsizsik" (weevil), "zsé" (Hungarian slang word for money).
- **Code words created by distorting (e.g., contracting) words based on prejudice:** These artificially created, often demeaning words with a strong negative overtone refer mainly to perceived Jewish power and influence, such as "Judapest" (a combination of the words Judah and Budapest), "Jewsa" (a combination of the words Jews and USA), "jewuro" (a combination of Jew and Euro), "jewtube" (a combination of Jew and YouTube), "zsidesz" (a combination

of Jew and the ruling party Fidesz), “zsindex” (a combination of Jew and the Hungarian media outlet Index). However, other words with negative connotations are also used, such as “Israhell” (a combination of Israel and hell).

- **Code words associated with stereotypical Jewish appearance or profession:** These terms often refer to the appearance of Orthodox Jews (e.g. “tetűlétrás” – with lice ladder; “pajeszos” – with sideburns; “kipás” - wearing a kipa) or to the stereotypical image of Jews (e.g. “kilincsorrú” - handle-nosed).
 - Terms such as “kufárok” (peddlers), and names, such as Rockefeller and Rothschild.
- **Code words related to religion:** These terms either refer to religious literature (e.g., “talmudista” - Talmudist), the religious tradition of circumcision, Jews as descendants of Satan, religious figures (e.g., Abraham), or Jews being “unbaptised” “biboldó” and “bibsi” (meaning unbaptised in Romani language).
- **Other terms:** These include terms such as “spinózák” (Spinoza), “zionisták” (Zionists).

5. Conclusion

- The research analysed changes in online antisemitic narratives following the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war.
- These events led to a significant increase in online content related to Jews across all countries examined, with a corresponding rise in antisemitic content. In Hungary, the amount of data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. The amount of antisemitic narratives also increased quantitatively, but proportion of most them decreased slightly, except for new antisemitism, which quantitatively increased sevenfold in 2024 and proportionally over four times.
- The content examined was categorised into the previously defined antisemitic narratives, almost all of which appeared in the period examined. In addition, a variety of code words for Jews were identified in the content.
- Antisemitic narratives appeared mainly in comments, but also in some articles, mostly on far-right sites. Even though antisemitic content appeared in comments in all media categories examined, it was most frequent both quantitatively and proportionally on far-right sites, followed by comments on independent (mainstream) media sites. Antisemitic content appeared in a few articles, mostly on far-right sites.
- The presence of antisemitic narratives in comments was generally not related to specific topics, but appeared in comments under a wide range of subjects. In many cases, however, the topic of the article influenced elements of the narratives, such as which politician was mentioned as part of a conspiracy. Some narratives were strongly tied to specific themes, such as a small amount of traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism).

6. Methodology

The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives in online textual content - such as comments, articles and Facebook posts - before and after 7 October 2023. We analysed content from websites and Facebook pages of previously defined media outlets. The content was collected using social listening software based on pre-defined keywords, covering the same period in both 2023 and 2024. The research was conducted in four countries (Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania) by national research teams coordinated by Political Capital, using the same methodology.

Definition of antisemitism

The basis of the research was the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism: "*Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.*" A detailed explanation of the definition, along with illustrative examples, is available on the IHRA website¹⁴.

6.1 Data collection

In our research, we analysed online textual content: articles, posts and comments from websites and Facebook pages. The data was collected using social listening software, SentiOne. SentiOne scrapes data in a given timeframe, from the given media sources based on the given keywords.

6.1.1 Keywords

We defined four keywords that we used to identify potentially relevant content in all countries: 1) Jews, 2) Israel, 3) Holocaust, 4) Zionism/Zionist. In addition, we included specific keywords relevant to each country. In Hungary, these were: Holohoax (holokamu in Hungarian) and two code words used for Jews, biboldó and bibsi. In languages where these words could have different endings, we used the base form of the keywords followed by an asterisk (*). This approach allowed SentiOne to identify results for all variations and endings of the keywords.

6.1.2 Sources monitored

With input from the national research teams, Political Capital identified six categories of online media to monitor content from: 1) independent (mainstream) media, 2) mainstream tabloids, 3) (hyper-)partisan/biased media, 4) right-wing/far-right sites, 5) fake news/conspiratorial sites, 5) left-wing/far-left sites. We collected pages for each category in all countries, including media outlets' websites and Facebook pages. In all countries, we selected the three media outlets per category with

¹⁴ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

the most results for our keywords in the same time period. In Hungary, we monitored the following media outlets' websites and Facebook pages:

- **Independent (mainstream) media:** 444, Telex, HVG. These online news media are independent and their content is mainly focused on public life: politics, economics, international news. The owners of these media are not linked to any political interest groups.
- **Far-right pages:** Magyar Jelen, Vadhajtások, kuruc.info. Magyar Jelen is an unofficial media outlet of the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) party. Vadhajtások is a far-right news site spreading pro-government narratives. Kuruc.info is one of the most extremist news sites in Hungary, linked to an Our Homeland MP. There have been several attempts over the past decade to remove some of its content or to take it down entirely, mainly because of its Holocaust denial content, but these attempts have been unsuccessful.
- **Mainstream tabloids:** Blikk, Bors, Meglepetés. These media outlets focus mainly on celebrity news. Bors is part of the pro-government media conglomerate Mediaworks, which belongs to the Central European Press and Media Foundation, while the other two sites, Blikk and Kiskegyed, are published by international publishers.
- **Fake news/conspiratorial sites:** Világ Titkai, Kimondott Igazságok, Mai Világ. These media outlets mainly promote fake news, disinformation and conspiracy theories in various topics.
- **Pro-government partisan/biased media:** Mandiner, Demokrata, Magyar Nemzet. These media outlets are dominated by pro-government media conglomerates. These websites focus on promoting the political agenda of the Fidesz government.
- **Left-wing/far-left pages:** Mérce, (Partizán). Mérce is an independent left-wing news portal that publishes daily news, editorials, analysis and live coverage. Funded entirely by its readers, the site focuses on labour, social movements, minority rights, and political economy at local and global levels. Partizán is an independent online YouTube channel that covers various topics related to public life. We have put it in brackets, because its content consists mainly of videos and, as we only analysed textual content, almost no data was downloaded from its channels for the keywords used in this research.

6.1.3 Monitoring period

Based on our previous experiences in coding textual content into previously defined categories and the resources available to the project, we set a goal of analysing 7,000 pieces of content per country. Because we wanted to examine changes in antisemitic narratives after 7 October 2023, we chose the same time period in both 2023 and 2024. This was determined by identifying the country with the least data for our keywords and calculating how many days were needed, starting from a chosen date (in this case, 1 April), for the downloaded data in that country to exceed 7,000 pieces of content. As a result, data collection in all countries was standardised to the same timeframe: April 1 and April 15, 13:00.

6.1.4 The amount of data analysed

We filtered each dataset to include more than 7,000 pieces of content, maintaining the original proportions of keywords, sources (websites and Facebook pages), and years within the dataset. This approach resulted in the following proportions of the total downloaded dataset being analysed in each country: Romania - 100%, Hungary - 73%, Italy - 44%, and Poland - 35%.

In all countries the amount of data collected in 2024 was higher than in 2023. The smallest increase was in Hungary, where the data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. In Romania the data increased by almost three times, in Poland by almost five times and in Italy by almost seven times. In all countries most of the data consisted of comments.

The amount of data also varied between countries by media category:

- Hungary: The majority of data came from far-right pages, followed by mainstream media, biased outlets, tabloids, and minimal data from conspiratorial and left-wing sources.
- Italy: Most data came from mainstream media, followed by tabloids, biased outlets, left-wing and conspiratorial sources, with very little data from far-right pages.
- Poland: Most data came from tabloids, followed by biased outlets, mainstream media, far-right pages, conspiratorial sites and very little from left-wing sources.
- Romania: Most of the data came from mainstream media, followed by conspiratorial sites, tabloids, far-right sources, biased outlets and a small amount of data from left-wing sources.

		<i>Examined content in media categories</i>							
		Mainstream	Far-right	Conspiratorial	Biased	Tabloid	Left	Total amount of data/year	am d
Hungary	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221	
Italy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163	
Poland	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818	
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165	

6.2 Coding the data

6.2.1 Conceptual framework

Using publicly available resources, such as studies, research reports, scientific articles, etc., Political Capital developed a conceptual framework to define the theoretical background of the research. In addition to stating that the research was based on the IHRA's working definition of antisemitism, the document thoroughly presented the main categories of antisemitic narratives and sub-narratives on

which the research was based. All partners had the opportunity to discuss, comment on, and add to the content of the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework was also discussed with members of the BOND project's Advisory Board and external experts.

6.2.2 Finalising the methodology and creating a methodology guide

Finalising the research methodology involved multiple discussions - including consultations with an expert member of the BOND Advisory Board and several attempts to analyse and code online texts in different ways. From these efforts, the final categories for coding the data were established. Four classifications were defined for the nature of content:

5. Antisemitic – Content that contained at least one antisemitic narrative.
6. Potentially antisemitic – Content that included a narrative that could be either interpreted as both antisemitic and non-antisemitic, or it appeared antisemitic only in light of the context (the article/post it was responding to).
7. Not understandable – Content that was incomprehensible (this category was almost only applicable to comments).
8. Not antisemitic – Content that did not include any antisemitic narratives.

Based on the conceptual framework, five main categories of antisemitic narratives were identified, each containing sub-categories (the details and definitions of these categories will be described later):

- Classic antisemitic stereotypes
- Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism)
- Conspiratorial antisemitism,
- Holocaust denial and distortion,
- New antisemitism (antisemitism based on criticism of Israel).

Two additional categories were defined: "hate speech" and "call for violence".

The coding process was described in detail in a methodology guide.

As part of the coding process, coders were required to document the antisemitic phrases identified in the content. For comments, they also had to record the context - specifically, the subject of the article or post under which the comment was written.

6.2.3 Training of the coders

After sharing the conceptual framework and the methodology guide with the national research teams, Political Capital organised a meeting to explain and discuss these documents and the process and to provide space for questions. Throughout the research process, the research teams met regularly to discuss issues and questions that arose during the research process.

To ensure a common understanding of the theoretical framework and to increase the reliability of the research - within the constraints of resources and team capacities - the research process included a learning phase. During this phase, 350 pieces of content were filtered from the dataset while maintaining the original proportions of results by keyword, media category, and year. A slight overrepresentation of results for the keyword "Israel" was included, based on the assumption that identifying new antisemitism would be the greatest challenge. In each country, two members of the national research teams coded these data independently. Their results were then compared and discrepancies were discussed to reach an agreement. In cases where agreement could not be reached, they were given the opportunity to consult with Political Capital for further clarification.

6.2.4 The coding process

Coding the data followed the same procedure across all countries. The national teams received their content in an Excel file, which included all relevant properties (e.g., comment/article/post, date of publishing, source, context, etc.). During the coding process, coders read the content itself and, for comments, also examined the context.

If antisemitic narratives were identified in the content, coders labelled it as either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic, defined the antisemitic narrative, and categorised it into a main antisemitic narrative category along with one of its sub-categories. A single piece of content could be categorised into multiple (maximum four) narrative categories, as it was possible for more than one antisemitic narrative to appear within the same text. If the content did not contain any antisemitic narratives, or if its meaning was not understandable, it was not assigned to any category.

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Introduction to the BOND project

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities) project¹⁵ was implemented from January 2023 to December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. Its primary goal was to address deep-rooted prejudices, hateful attitudes, and behaviors within society, particularly those targeting European Jewry. The project also aimed to foster understanding, tolerance, and dialogue. A significant focus was placed on educating young people about Judaism and antisemitism, as well as promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. Its activities included researching antisemitism, monitoring antisemitic narratives, developing educational curricula, training teachers, organising youth education and exchange programs, facilitating inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, and hosting local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion. The project was guided by the definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).¹⁶

¹⁵ Webpage of the BOND project: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

¹⁶ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

Research report – Italy

Antisemitic narratives online in Italy before and after the 7th of October 2023

Key findings

The aim of the research was to analyse online antisemitic narratives perpetrated in the past two years, 2023 and 2024, with a focus on the October 7 Hamas attack and how much this has affected antisemitic narratives.

- Our dataset contained 7053 pieces of content, extracted from SentiOne based on the keywords provided to it.
- Most of the content was user comments (84,2%) on Facebook, followed by online articles (13,4%) and social posts (2,4%).
- The amount of data analysed has increased almost sevenfold from 2023 to 2024, showing the impact of 7 October and the subsequent war.
- About 37% of the analysed content contained either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic narratives, i.e. narratives that can be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic.
- Most antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content appeared in the comments section of the online versions of mainstream media in both 2023 and 2024.
- The most common narrative category in the Italian data was New antisemitism, followed by Conspiratorial, Classic stereotypes, Holocaust denial and distortion and, finally, Traditional religion-based antisemitism.
- In 2024, not only did the total number of comments in the dataset increase significantly, but the proportion of antisemitic narratives to the total content analyzed also increased
- From 2023 to 2024, the percentage distribution of narrative categories changed. Compared to 2023, the percentage of traditional religion-based antisemitic narratives out of the total remained almost unchanged, while the percentages of antisemitism related to classical stereotypes (about -1.87%) and conspiratorial antisemitism (about +0.9%) changed slightly.
- Significant percentage changes, on the other hand, should be noted for the categories New antisemitism (+14.7% compared to 2023) and Holocaust denial and distortion (more than doubled from <1% in 2023)
- Hate speech and call for violence are highly present in 2024 in Italy's dataset (hate speech: 11.3 percent of the total, call for violence: 6.2 percent), compared with a negligible percentage in 2023.
- The results of the analysis show that news stories related to Israel, in particular the conflicts in the Middle East, are the main trigger of online antisemitism in Italy.
- Antisemitic narratives of a conspiratorial nature were particularly present in user comments on statements made by top authorities in the Western alliance (heads of European governments, UN secretary general, US president...).

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Introduction

The research aimed to analyse changes in online antisemitic narratives following 7 October 2023—Hamas's terror attack on Israel and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, making it necessary to examine how online antisemitic narratives had evolved. The development of the research methodology and categories were completed in late 2023 and early 2024, and the research began in the spring of 2024.

Recognising and defining antisemitism in relation to Israel, i.e. distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel, has become particularly challenging since 7 October. Our research is based on the working definition of antisemitism of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA)¹, which is accepted by 43 countries and several international organisations including the EU and most of its member states.

The research was conducted simultaneously in four countries—Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania—using the same methodology. It focused on textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. The content was collected using social listening software from the websites and Facebook pages of the most relevant national media outlets across five media categories: independent (mainstream) media, biased/hyper-partisan media, mainstream tabloids, left-wing sites, far-right pages, and fake news/conspiratorial sites. The scraping process was guided by keywords designed to detect antisemitic content. Four core keywords—Jew, Israel, Holocaust, and Zionism/Zionist—were used in all countries in their respective local languages. Additionally, country-specific keywords were included. In languages where these words could have different endings, their base forms were followed by an asterisk (*), enabling the collection of results for all variations and endings.

The research focused on the period from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, with nearly 7,000 pieces of content analysed in each country. All content was examined by the national research teams and classified as either antisemitic, potentially antisemitic (content that could be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic), not understandable, or not antisemitic.


Drawing on publicly available resources—such as studies, research reports, and scientific articles—five main categories of antisemitic narratives were defined: classic antisemitic stereotypes, conspiratorial antisemitism, traditional religion-based antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, and new antisemitism (antisemitism based on the criticism of Israel). In addition to these, two supplementary categories were established: hate speech and calls for violence against Jews. Each piece of content was thoroughly analysed and assigned to one or more of these categories.

1. The extent of antisemitic content in the national dataset

1.1 The extent of antisemitic content in the dataset

Antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content was present in 36% of the Italian dataset. Out of a total of 7053 pieces of content, 1994 were labelled as antisemitic, 581 as potentially antisemitic, 3785 as not antisemitic, and 693 as not understandable.


21. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic content in the full dataset.



1.2 Distribution of the content examined

The vast majority of the downloaded content were comments, and most antisemitic content appeared in them. antisemitic content appeared in comments. About 68.4% of the downloaded content was comments (5939), about 13.5% were articles (954), and only about 2.4% were Facebook posts (169). Antisemitic narratives appeared predominantly in comments, of which over 32.7% (1947) were antisemitic, 9% (546) were potentially antisemitic, 46.6% (2768) were not antisemitic, and about 11.4% (678) were not understandable. Regarding articles, 90.6% (865) were not antisemitic, 4% (38) were antisemitic, 3% (29) were potentially antisemitic and 1.4% (13) were not understandable. Nearly all posts were not antisemitic, with only 5.3% (9) categorised as antisemitic, 3.5% (6) as potentially antisemitic and 1.2% (2) as not understandable.

22. Figure: Distribution of the different types of content examined in the full dataset.




1.3 Antisemitism in the different types of media

With more data in 2024, both the number and proportion of antisemitic content increased in most media categories, except for left-wing and fake news/conspiratorial sites, where the proportion of antisemitic content decreased by 2024.

Antisemitic content (including both antisemitic and potentially antisemitic) was most prevalent on independent media sites, both proportionally (37.4%) in terms of quantity (2,126 pieces), particularly in comments. This was followed by left-wing sites (35.5%), fake news/conspiratorial sites (35%), mainstream tabloids, and biased/hyper-partisan sites. However, when considering the amount of antisemitic content, significant differences emerged: mainstream tabloids (221 pieces) contained the largest amount, followed by biased/hyper-partisan sites (94 pieces), and left-wing sites (71 pieces) and fake news/conspiratorial sites (56 pieces) had fewer. In far-right pages, antisemitic content was lower both proportionally (17.9%) and quantitatively (7 pieces).

23. Figure: Presence of antisemitic content within the different media categories.



2. Overview and extent of the different types of antisemitic content

2.1 Content with antisemitic narratives


The conceptual framework of the research identified the following five main antisemitic narratives. Within each of these main narratives, sub-narratives were also defined.

- **Classic stereotypes:** Narratives historically rooted in antisemitic prejudice. These encompass hatred of Jews based on their existence as human beings, not simply as adherents of the Jewish religion. It does so through contradictory logic that sees Jews as both overly powerful and weak or even subhuman. Classic stereotypes include for example that Jews are evil, greedy, disloyal or liars.³
- **Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism):** Traditional religion-based Judeophobia, or traditional antisemitism, refers to anti-Jewish sentiments rooted in beliefs associated with either the perceived Christian or Jewish religion and traditions. Traditional, religion-based antisemitic narratives include for example blood libel/child murder, deicide or Jews are Satanic.⁴
- **Conspiratorial antisemitism:** Conspiracy theories have perpetuated antisemitic beliefs by suggesting that Jews wield undue influence for personal gain and conspire to dominate spheres such as the media, politics, and the economy. Many of these theories are rooted in the antisemitic myth of the "hidden hand," and blame Jews, or actors perceived to be Jewish, for the world's worst tragedies, such as instigating wars or even causing COVID-19. Conspiratorial antisemitic narratives include for example Jewish power/control, Judeo-Communism, Great Replacement Theory or New World Order Theory.⁵
- **Holocaust denial and distortion:** Holocaust denial or distortion seeks to deny or misrepresent the historical facts of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. Holocaust denial includes denying the scale or methods used by the Nazis and their allies during the Holocaust. Holocaust denial and distortion promote the false idea that Jews invented or exaggerated the Holocaust and they profited from it. Holocaust denial and distortion narratives include for example blaming Jews for the Holocaust or depicting the Holocaust as a positive event.⁶
- **New antisemitism:** New antisemitism refers to the expression of anti-Jewish sentiment directed at Israel. A key function of new antisemitism is to enable the expression of antisemitic views in a way that appears politically acceptable. We define new antisemitism using Natan Sharansky's 3D test: demonisation, double standards and delegitimisation. New antisemitism includes for example Nazi/Apartheid/Colonialism Analogy, claiming that Israel is a terrorist state or that Israeli bears influence on media.⁷

The most prevalent narrative category in the Italian data was new antisemitism, appearing in 26.4% (1861 pieces) of the examined content. This was followed by conspiratorial antisemitic content, present in 7.4% (521 pieces) of the data. Classical stereotypes were third with 2% (138 pieces), while


Holocaust denial and distortion was present in 0.8% (58 pieces) and traditional religion-based appeared in 0.5% (38 pieces) of the examined content.

24. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narrative categories in the full dataset.



The amount of data had increased nearly sevenfold, and so did the content in all narrative categories both quantitatively and proportionally. The biggest rise was in new antisemitism which proportionally increased from being present in 20% of the data from 2023 to 27.3% in the data from 2024. The presence of conspiratorial antisemitism and Holocaust denial and distortion also increased, while classic stereotypes and traditional, religion-based antisemitism remained more or less the same.

25. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).




2.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

Besides narratives, two other types of antisemitic content were examined by the research: hate speech and calls for violence.

- **Hate speech:** Hateful content aimed against Jews and/or based on antisemitic narratives.
- **Call for violence:** Content that incites violence of any kind against Jews.


Hate speech was relatively common in the Italian dataset, appearing in 4.6% (324 pieces) of content. Content calling for violence against Jews was also relatively common, appearing in around 2.5% (175 pieces) of the data.

26. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the full dataset.



Both categories increased significantly in 2024: hate speech was present in 0.6% of the data from 2023 and 5.2% in 2024, and calls for violence in 0.1% of the data in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024.

27. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).



3. Types of antisemitic content in the data examined

3.1 Content of antisemitic narratives

3.1.1 New antisemitism

The category of “New Antisemitism” is the one in which the largest number of comments in our country's dataset fall.

ISRAEL IS A TERRORIST STATE

This sub-category has at least five different versions, including:

1. Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
2. Israel is like Hamas (if not worse).
3. Hamas is a creation of Israel in anti-PLO function.
4. Israel is an infanticidal regime.
5. Israel deliberately targets health facilities, schools, hospitals and civilians in general.

NAZI ANALOGY

This sub-category has four main versions:

1. Israel is carrying out a new Holocaust against the Palestinians, repeating what Nazism had done with the Jews.
2. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is regarded as being on a par with Adolf Hitler.
3. Gaza has been turned into an open-air concentration camp.
4. Zionism is described as a Nazi ideology.

DELEGITIMATION

This sub-category has three versions:

1. Israel is seen as an artificial state, lacking historical or cultural legitimacy, and therefore should not exist.
2. Zionism is described as a “biblical psycho-pathology” aimed at total control of the “Land of Israel,” i.e., the territory that, according to tradition, God promised to Abraham and his descendants.

3. The inhabitants of Israel are called upon to return illicitly acquired land to its rightful Palestinian owners.

DEMONISATION

This sub-category has two main versions:

1. The Israeli government is portrayed as demonic, perfidious and sadistic toward its enemies and the Palestinian people
2. Israel is a rogue state that constantly threatens war in the Middle East.

These narratives aim to demonize the Israeli state and its government, painting them as inherently cruel entities, suggesting in some cases that they take devilish pleasure in striking civilian targets. In the second version of the subcategory, Israel is accused of provoking third-party states to cause an escalation of the Middle East conflict on an international scale in order to put pressure on its backers.

DOUBLE STANDARD

This sub-category has two versions:

1. Israel is considered a state that does not comply with the norms of international law
2. Israel enjoys preferential treatment compared to other countries. Israel's crimes are not legally prosecuted or sanctioned, as is the case with Russia

The two versions of the “Double standard” sub-category denounce the existence of a double standard in international treatment between Israel and other states, such as Russia (which, in the imaginations of users critical of Israel, can be compared to it in terms of its crimes) in relation to violations of human rights and international law. The democratic qualification of Israel is, therefore, questioned.

COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID ANALOGY

This sub-category, similar to the previous two, also has two versions:

1. Israel is accused of colonizing Palestinian territory and the West Bank, with the aim of restoring the “land of its ancestors promised by God,” perpetuating a form of colonization.
2. Israel, through its control of various territories, allegedly established a racist regime in which Israelis enjoy civil rights and freedoms, while Palestinians are segregated in limited territories and under the control of the Israeli army.

These narratives compare Israeli policies to colonization and apartheid, accusing Israel of racial discrimination and oppression against Palestinians.

OTHER NARRATIVES

Israel is often accused of exercising widespread control over the media, deciding which news to disseminate and which to censor in order to manipulate public opinion and pursue propaganda purposes. Some believe that through the dissemination of distorted information, Israel constructs a narrative favorable to itself, nurturing a positive view among the international community, while omitting or distorting more inconvenient truths. There are also those who argue that Israel buys the silence of journalists, paying them to avoid publishing critical articles, thus creating a narrative that is always favorable to the Israeli government.

Israel and its supporters are also accused of not accepting any kind of criticism and of using the label of “antisemitism” as a means of deterrence.


In the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, some deny or downplay the October 7th attack by the terrorist organization, claiming that the event never happened or that it was a maneuver orchestrated by Israel to gain international support, or to create an excuse to justify a premeditated ethnic cleansing operation in Gaza. According to this view, Israel would also be guilty of spreading false news about the atrocities committed by Hamas, or amplifying true news in order to gain global sympathy. For others, the October 7th attack is not considered an act of terrorism, but rather an act of resistance, the result of years of Israeli occupation and oppression.

There are also those who argue that Jews, Israelis, and Zionists are collectively responsible for Israel's actions, accusing them of being complicit in Israeli policies, particularly for having democratically elected Benjamin Netanyahu, for supporting his leadership, and for not opposing in any way the massacre of Palestinian civilians.

Finally, Israel is accused of being the main cause of the conflict with Hamas and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The occupation of Palestine, deemed illegal, is considered the beginning of a chain reaction that has led to an escalation of the conflict. Israel is held responsible for perpetuating a cycle of violence that keeps the region in a permanent state of war.

Comparison 2023/2024: In 2024, compared to the same period the previous year, the incidence of all the sub-categories under the category “New Antisemitism” grew exponentially (Israel is a terrorist state +706,7%, Nazi analogy +1010%, Delegitimation +251,7%, etc...), primarily due to the October 7th Hamas attack in 2023 and the subsequent Israeli military response, which acted as multipliers of antisemitism.

28. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category New antisemitism.



3.1.2 Conspirational

JEWISH CONTROL/POWER

The sub-category "Jewish control/power" presents three versions:

1. Israel benefits from the support and protection of Western countries, particularly the United States, influencing their policies and gaining advantages.
2. Israel enjoys international impunity and does not face sanctions for its actions.
3. Israel exerts control over EU member states and has the power to influence their governments, causing them to fall if they do not align with its interests.

In the "Conspirational" category, the sub-category "Jewish control/power" deserves the most attention, as the other sub-categories do not reach a significant number of comments to provide a comprehensive view useful for drawing meaningful conclusions. Power narratives related to Israel show a significant presence of the United States in the comments, with the idea of a shadowy Israel-USA axis being deeply ingrained in the narratives. The idea of power is more frequently associated with Israel and Zionism than with Jews in general. Many comments reverse the hierarchy of international sources, asserting that Israel de facto exerts more power than organizations like the UN, NATO, and the European Union.

ZELENSKY

Only one comment was catalogued in the sub-category “Zelensky,” which supports the idea that the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, benefits from the protection exercised by the so-called “Jewish lobby”

COVID-19

This narrative has several versions, among others very different from each other.

1) Deaths due to the side effects of vaccines are compared to Jews killed by the Nazis. The vaccine is thus a new Holocaust

2) Jews have been profiting from COVID-19.

3) The Italian minister of health during the pandemic, Roberto Speranza, is a servant of the Rothschilds, in whose London academy he trained, and therefore serves their interests

SOROS

This narrative is evoked in just two comments, which identify Hungarian Jewish banker George Soros as the top of the pyramid of Jewish financial power

PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION

Only one commentary was labeled in this way. In this commentary, the “Protocols of the Saviors of Zion” are referred to in a derogatory manner (the “Saviors” are called “Noses” - more information at 3.2 Code Words Used for Jews, Examples). In a conspiratorial mood, it is asserted that this document is evidence of a secret Jewish plot to dominate the world and that anyone who denies its historical validity, e.g., Umberto Eco in his novel “The Prague Cemetery,” is in bad faith.

NEW WORLD ORDER THEORY

The accusation that Jews have a covert agenda of world control is present in that form in antisemitic narratives in every country, so it does not have a country-specific connotation

OTHER

Several sub-narratives, also different from each other, have been assigned to this narrative, which could not fall under other narratives in the category of conspiratorial antisemitism.


1) The American Jewish lobby planned the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center so that the U.S. government would have a free hand in Iraq, whose oil fields were an attraction for Jewish-Americans

2) Israel agreed with Iran on the latter's missile attack, so that it would be harmless to Israel on the one hand, and silence partisan demands by the Iranian people to be vindicated on the other

3) The Mossad was aware of Hamas' plans to cross the barrier between Israel and the Gaza Strip and carry out a massacre, but did not intervene to give its government an alibi to bomb the Strip persistently

Comparison 2023/2024: From 2023 to 2024, narratives associated with the idea of Jewish control and power saw a percentage increase of 1235,9%. The news that catalyzed conspiratorial antisemitism in 2024 were primarily the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria, where seven officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were killed, along with five Iran-backed militants, one member of Hezbollah, one advisor, and two Iranian civilians. Another triggering factor was the lack of condemnation of the attack by European leaders, particularly Giorgia Meloni, the current Italian Prime Minister, and António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General. Finally, the hypocrisy — always presumed by users — of U.S. President Joe Biden in urging Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to show moderation further fueled these narratives.

29. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Conspiratorial antisemitism.



3.1.3 Classic stereotypes

EVIL

The sub-category "Evil" aims to describe Jews as evil, particularly through the tone of the comments. Terms like "Zionist" or the adjective "radical" associated with "Jew" take on a threatening charge in the context in which they are invoked. Users tend to make sweeping generalizations, generating a sense of fear towards Jews among those reading the comments.

DECEIT AND LIE

In our country, the sub-category "Deceit and Lie" is used in a targeted manner, almost always in isolated narratives that do not blend with other types of discourse. In these narratives, as in other categories, Israelis are often targeted more than Jews themselves. It is often questioned everything


that is claimed by those defending Israel, as, according to a widespread view, "Zionists/Israelis/Jews lie." While one could reasonably suspect that such comments intend to limit their attack to the Israeli government alone, it is equally undeniable that stating that Zionists are inherently false or that "lying is part of their DNA" is a clear derivation of the stereotype that Jews are naturally skilled deceivers. For this reason, such narratives are included in this sub-category.

GREED AND WEALTH

The sub-category "Greed/Wealth" in our country is associated with "Hate Speech" or "Call for violence" in about a quarter of the cases. Frequently, it refers to some of the wealthiest Jewish families (e.g., the Rothschilds and Rockefellers) as negative models of "speculative finance." Wealth, in these antisemitic comments, is automatically associated with malice and dishonesty. Less frequent, but still present, are references to the stereotype of Jews as usurers, bankers, and merchants, portraying them as individuals driven solely by the greed for profit.

Comparison 2023/2024: In 2024, the number of antisemitic comments related to the "Classic Stereotypes" category significantly increased compared to the previous year. Again, as with the other categories, the events of October 7th and their consequences played a key role in increasing antisemitic comments from users. However, available news does not provide a clear specific trigger for this type of antisemitism. The narratives have remained largely unchanged, with a growing tendency in 2024 to focus more on Israelis rather than Jews in general. It can be said that traditional antisemitic stereotypes have been directed with greater intensity towards Israelis and Zionists.

30. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Classic antisemitic stereotypes.



3.1.4 Holocaust denial and distortion

BLAMING JEWS

The analysis conducted in our country shows a small but significant number of comments accusing either Zionists or the Ashkenazi Rothschild family of financing Adolf Hitler and his plan to exterminate the Jewish people in exchange for a Jewish state in Palestinian land.

NAZI ANALOGY

Although the sub-category "Nazi Analogy" has a significantly higher incidence within the category of "New Antisemitism," it is also one of the most prevalent in the category of Holocaust denial and distortion. In these narratives, Jews are compared to Nazis because, while the former consider themselves the chosen people, the latter considered themselves a superior race. In some cases, it is even claimed that Jews are the natural heirs of Nazi culture. Such discourse not only minimizes the suffering of the Jewish people but also contributes to fostering a climate of hate and intolerance.

HOLOCAUST AS A POSITIVE EVENT

This sub-category presents three main versions:

1. Hitler was right to consider Jews a problem to get rid of.
2. Concentration camps were "works of art."
3. The Holocaust should be repeated.

It is no surprise that such narratives are frequently placed in the context of "Hate speech" or "Call for violence," given the inherent violence of such extreme content.

DENYING OR DISTORTING THE HOLOCAUST IN ANY WAY

During the monitoring phase in our country, no Holocaust denial comments were detected under the category "Denying or distorting the Holocaust in any way."

However, two alternative versions emerged within this sub-category that deserve analysis:


1. The memory of the Holocaust is being used instrumentally by some members of the Jewish community to justify the violent actions of the State of Israel.
2. We need to stop "crying" about an event that happened more than eighty years ago. Comments in this sub-category tend to insist on the perception that Israel is adopting the victim rhetoric, which seems inappropriate given the temporal distance from the Holocaust.

Additionally, there is a confusion between past and present, where the Holocaust is reduced to an event that no longer needs to be remembered because it is no longer relevant, blending the suffering of the Jewish people with the current policies of the State of Israel. In other words, not only is the historical memory of the Holocaust denied, but the Jewish figure in the historical context of the

Holocaust is being conflated with the State of Israel, creating a short circuit that undermines the distinction between the two and risks distorting the understanding of historical and political facts.

Comparison 2023/2024: In 2023, narratives that could be classified under "Holocaust denial and distortion" were practically absent in our country. One year later, a significant change was observed in the dataset of analyzed comments. In 2024, there was a noticeable spread of such narratives, largely fueled by news related to ongoing conflicts, including the war between Israel and Hamas and the escalation of tensions with Iran.

31. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Holocaust denial and distortion.



3.1.5 Traditional, religion-based antisemitism


Excluding the "Hate speech" and "Call for violence" categories, the category "Traditional religion-based antisemitism" is the least present in the dataset of comments analyzed in our country. Due to the scarcity of comments available, we decided to conduct a single analysis that includes all the narratives in this category. In these narratives, Jews, and more often Zionists, are accused of being Satan worshipers. They are also blamed for the killing of Jesus Christ, and practicing Jews are ridiculed for their religious rituals. Sometimes the criticism is ambiguously directed at Israel, described as a state that rejects and discriminates against anyone who professes a different religion. The most radical part of the Jewish community is accused of justifying Israel's military actions through religion, described as a necessary evil carried out in the name of a "holy war against the infidels." Finally, the myth of the "promised land" and the concept of the "chosen people" are frequently ridiculed, even using emoticons and colorful expressions, further reinforcing a narrative of contempt and derision toward Jewish faith and culture.

Comparison 2023/2024: The category "Traditional religion-based antisemitism," like all the others, has seen a spike in antisemitic comments in recent times. Some sub-categories, such as "Other," "Jew as Satan/Devil," and "Blood libel/Child murder," which were completely absent in 2023, have

appeared in 2024, indicating a worrying increase in narratives associating Jews with Satanism and sacrificial rites.

Antisemitism, in this context, was primarily fueled by news with a religious backdrop. These included the pilgrimage to Mecca by the Italian singer Ghali, which had already caused controversy due to his comments during the Sanremo music festival; the broadcast of the Via Crucis by Radio Maria, which was blocked by Facebook for "nude images"; the closure of a footwear factory in Padova during Ramadan; and finally, the Molotov cocktail attack on a synagogue in northern Germany.

32. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Traditional, religion-based antisemitism.



3.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

3.2.1 Antisemitic hate speech

The analysis conducted showed that the hate speech detected was predominantly focused on Israel rather than the Jewish community in general. This phenomenon was almost always related to updates on the various war fronts in which Israel is engaged (Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, West Bank). The media category in which antisemitic hate speech appeared the most is the hate speech-call for violence combination. Next, the media category “New antisemitism,” with the “Israel is a terrorist state” sub-category predominating, is quite a lot in our country's monitoring file. The most recurrent accusations against Israel were that it commits war crimes and benefits from favorable treatment by the international community.

The analysis also showed that the social platform Facebook was the main platform for the spread of this type of hate speech, compared to the websites of the monitored media outlets. As for hate speech directly aimed at Jews, this was often in the form of gratuitous and pithy slurs, devoid of further narrative or subtext. Such disparaging expressions were characterized by foul and offensive language.

3.2.2 Antisemitic violence

Analysis of content classified as “call for violence” revealed a similar pattern to that found in hate speech. The statistics on the media categories most prevalent under the label “call for violence” replicate what we have already seen for antisemitic hate-speech in the paragraph above. “New antisemitism” is the media category most found in phrases encouraging violence against Jews. Predominantly, threats and incitements to violence were directed at the State of Israel, rather than the Jewish community as a whole.

News about conflicts in the Middle East and Israeli military interventions acted as catalysts for this type of speech, generating a climate of tension and fueling feelings of hatred. Users who posted these comments often incited Arab countries to take violent action against Israel, going so far as to call for its destruction.

Importantly, although rare, cases of generalization of hatred were also found, with attacks directed at the Jewish community as a whole. However, as mentioned above, most of the comments had Israel as their primary target.

A recurring narrative in the comments categorized as a “call for violence” was one that portrayed Israel as a criminal state, treated favorably by the UN, NATO and supranational bodies, and deserving instead of severe punishment. This narrative, accompanied by violent and offensive language, contributed to a climate of polarization and intolerance around Israel and, indirectly, around its inhabitants and supporters.

User comments emerge as the main channel of dissemination of such content, clearly distinguished from posts and articles, which rarely feature antisemitic narratives.

3.3 Code words used for Jews, examples

In Italy, as in many other parts of the world, the use of terms to describe Jews has often been exploited to spread prejudice and discrimination. In our country there are no specific and local linguistic codes as there are in other countries where antisemitism is more entrenched¹, so the terms used to refer to Jews more or less allusively are the same as those used in any other corner of the world.

Terms used:

- Sionista (Zionist): Originally related to the political movement that led to the creation of the State of Israel, this term is often used derogatorily to refer to all Jews, regardless of their political views.
- Giudeo (Jew): Derived from the biblical name Judah, this term has acquired a negative connotation over time, often associated with antisemitic stereotypes.
- Nasoni (Noses)/Usurai (Usurers): These terms, based on centuries-old stereotypes, are used to denigrate Jews, associating them with physical traits (the nose) and alleged economic activities (usury).
- Kippato: Neologism derived from the Yiddish term for kippah, the Jewish headdress. It is used in a derogatory sense to identify Jews in a stereotypical way.

Narrowing the field to Israel, however, a location found in some comments is “banana republic,” a journalistic term originally used to describe small Latin American states considered politically unstable and economically dependent. It has been used derogatorily to refer to Israel, with the intent of discrediting its legitimacy and democratic nature. In this case, the term is not a Jewish-specific language code, but is used in an antisemitic context to associate Israel with negative stereotypes and spread prejudice.

3.4 Topics provoking antisemitism

In 2024, there was a significant increase in hateful and contemptuous comments towards Israel and Jews, closely linked to the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7th. This attack triggered a series of events, including Israel's military response and the escalation of the conflict. Although antisemitic comments increased, it is important to contextualize this data. In fact, what grew significantly after October 7th was the number of articles about Israel in Italian newspapers, suggesting that antisemitism did not increase directly but that pre-existing sentiments found an "easy" target in Israel. The intensification of the debate about Israel gave voice to pre-existing grievances, not only related to Israeli politics but also to broader prejudices.

In 2023, before the incursions of Palestinian militias across the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, the main news stories were the Israeli police raid on the Al-Aqsa mosque in April, the missile launches from Gaza and Lebanon, and the subsequent Israeli bombings on Hamas, as well as the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv that resulted in the death of an Italian tourist and the wounding of five other people.

In 2024, the news that most triggered antisemitic reactions included the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza, the death of World Central Kitchen humanitarian workers during an Israeli raid, the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, the preventive closure of Israeli diplomatic missions after the announced Iranian retaliation, Iran's missile attack on Israel, Israel's use of artificial intelligence systems to identify Hamas militants, and the banning of Al Jazeera.

Although most of the antisemitic comments were directed at Israel and Zionism, these news stories also fueled antisemitic reactions targeting the entire Jewish community. Traditional antisemitism blended with political narratives, signaling that there is still confusion among users regarding the various figures that populate the Jewish imagination (Jews, Israel, Israeli government, Zionists). This phenomenon is concerning, especially due to the widespread dissemination of such comments through social media.

4. Conclusion

During the monitoring period, a rather alarming picture emerged regarding the spread of antisemitic narratives on social media and other online platforms in Italy. The most widespread narratives are attributed to the so-called "new antisemitism," which is intolerance and hatred directed at Zionism and the State of Israel.

Specific characteristics of our country

Italy displays peculiar characteristics in the expression of antisemitism online. The presence of hate speech and incitement to violence remains the most troubling aspect of such a multifaceted phenomenon as antisemitism. However, the majority of users have directed disdainful, stereotypical, or hateful comments towards Israel, rather than towards Jews, masking antisemitic intentions under the socially accepted guise of anti-Zionism.

Most affected media

Social platforms, particularly Facebook, appear to be the primary channels where antisemitic narratives proliferate. Analyzing content on traditional media, however, revealed that the press and online news sites are often involved, but more indirectly, as access channels for user comments.

Countering online antisemitism

To effectively counter online antisemitism, it would be essential to adopt a strategy targeted at multiple fronts:

- **Education and Awareness:** Promote a culture of respect and historical knowledge of the Holocaust and the roots of antisemitism to reduce the spread of prejudice, fake news, and conspiracy theories about Jews, Israel, and Zionism.
- **Active Monitoring and Moderation:** Strengthen the presence of moderators on social media and improve algorithms to identify and remove hate content.
- **Collaboration between Institutions and Platforms:** Local and international institutions must work together with digital platforms to ensure a timely and effective response against antisemitic content.

In conclusion, the fight against online antisemitism requires collective commitment that unites the government, media, and citizens. Improving historical understanding and promoting a more inclusive dialogue are key steps in reducing the influence of these dangerous narratives.

5. Methodology

The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives in online textual content - such as comments, articles and Facebook posts - before and after 7 October 2023. We analysed content from websites and Facebook pages of previously defined media outlets. The content was collected using social listening software based on pre-defined keywords, covering the same period in both 2023 and 2024. The research was conducted in four countries (Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania) by national research teams coordinated by Political Capital, using the same methodology.

Definition of antisemitism

The basis of the research was the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism: "*Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.*" A detailed explanation of the definition, along with illustrative examples, is available on the IHRA website⁹.

5.1 Data collection

In our research, we analysed online textual content: articles, posts and comments from websites and Facebook pages. The data was collected using social listening software, SentiOne. SentiOne scrapes data in a given timeframe, from the given media sources based on the given keywords.

5.1.1 Keywords

We defined four keywords that we used to identify potentially relevant content in all countries: 1) Jews, 2) Israel, 3) Holocaust, 4) Zionism/Zionist. In addition, we included specific keywords relevant to each country. In Romania, these were: *jid, iud, mosaic, ovre* and *khazar*. In languages where these words could have different endings, we used the base form of the keywords followed by an asterisk (*). This approach allowed SentiOne to identify results for all variations and endings of the keywords.

5.1.2 Sources monitored

With input from the national research teams, Political Capital identified six categories of online media to monitor content from: 1) independent (mainstream) media, 2) mainstream tabloids, 3) (hyper-)partisan/biased media, 4) right-wing/far-right sites, 5) fake news/conspiratorial sites, 5) left-wing/far-left sites. We collected pages for each category in all countries, including media outlets' websites and Facebook pages. In all countries, we selected the three media outlets per category with the most results for our keywords in the same time period. In Romania, we monitored the following media outlets' websites and Facebook pages:

- **Independent (mainstream) media:** Corriere della Sera; Il Fatto Quotidiano, Ansa

- **Mainstream tabloids:** Il Messaggero: Include mainstream media that are widespread and reliable, ensuring quality information through rigorous verification of sources. In the analysis of our country, two online newspapers, which also come out on newsstands, and one news agency were included. Editorials are balanced and non-partisan, avoiding partisan stances.
- **Far-right pages:** Il Primo Nazionale; L'Italia Mensile; Il Missino. Include online media that promote sovereignist, traditionalist, anti-European, and anti-globalist ideologies. The two online newspapers analyzed in Italy show affinities with neo-fascism, sometimes recalling Mussolini's fascist government. These media have been criticized for spreading fake news and polarizing public debate.
- **Fake news/conspirational pages:** Luogocomune; La Cruna dell'Ago; Maurizio Blondet blog. Include online media that spread false or misleading news, presenting it as revelations. Two online newspapers monitored in our country offer themselves as an alternative to traditional media, which have been accused of manipulation. They spread conspiracy theories and narratives without scientific foundation, presenting themselves as the only reliable source.
- **(Hyper-)Partisan/biased media:** Osservatorio internazionale per i diritti; Il Tempo; La Verità. Include online, originally print media with a strong ideological alignment and a partially partisan approach. They are inspired by liberal conservatism, with conservative positions on social and cultural issues, and liberalist ones on economics. In our case, they approach the national center-right and share its values and priorities.
- **Left-wing/far-left pages:** Potere al Popolo; Contro Piano; L'antidiplomatico. They include communist- and Marxist-inspired newspapers critical of modern capitalism and modern imperialism. In our context, they refer to two online magazines and a political blog that criticize the EU and globalization. They support Palestinian resistance and denounce Israel as an “apartheid state.”

5.1.3 Monitoring period

Based on our previous experiences in coding textual content into previously defined categories and the resources available to the project, we set a goal of analysing 7,000 pieces of content per country. Because we wanted to examine changes in antisemitic narratives after 7 October 2023, we chose the same time period in both 2023 and 2024. This was determined by identifying the country with the least data for our keywords and calculating how many days were needed, starting from a chosen date (in this case, 1 April), for the downloaded data in that country to exceed 7,000 pieces of content. As a result, data collection in all countries was standardised to the same timeframe: April 1 and April 15, 13:00.

5.1.4 The amount of data analysed

We filtered each dataset to include more than 7,000 pieces of content, maintaining the original proportions of keywords, sources (websites and Facebook pages), and years within the dataset. This approach resulted in the following proportions of the total downloaded dataset being analysed in each country: Romania - 100%, Hungary - 73%, Italy - 44%, and Poland - 35%.

In all countries the amount of data collected in 2024 was higher than in 2023. The smallest increase was in Hungary, where the data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. In Romania the data increased by almost three times, in Poland by almost five times and in Italy by almost seven times. In all countries most of the data consisted of comments.

The amount of data also varied between countries by media category:

- Hungary: The majority of data came from far-right pages, followed by mainstream media, biased outlets, tabloids, and minimal data from conspiratorial and left-wing sources.
- Italy: Most data came from mainstream media, followed by tabloids, biased outlets, left-wing and conspiratorial sources, with very little data from far-right pages.
- Poland: Most data came from tabloids, followed by biased outlets, mainstream media, far-right pages, conspiratorial sites and very little from left-wing sources.
- Romania: Most of the data came from mainstream media, followed by conspiratorial sites, tabloids, far-right sources, biased outlets and a small amount of data from left-wing sources.

		<i>Examined content in media categories</i>							
		Mainstream	Far-right	Conspiratorial	Biased	Tabloid	Left	Total amount of data/year	Total amount of data
Hungary	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7008
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221	
Italy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7053
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163	
Poland	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7054
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818	
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7012
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165	

5.2 Coding the data

5.2.1 Conceptual framework

Using publicly available resources, such as studies, research reports, scientific articles, etc., Political Capital developed a conceptual framework to define the theoretical background of the research. In addition to stating that the research was based on the IHRA's working definition of antisemitism, the document thoroughly presented the main categories of antisemitic narratives and sub-narratives on which the research was based. All partners had the opportunity to discuss, comment on, and add to the content of the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework was also discussed with members of the BOND project's Advisory Board and external experts.

5.2.2 Finalising the methodology and creating a methodology guide

Finalising the research methodology involved multiple discussions - including consultations with an expert member of the BOND Advisory Board and several attempts to analyse and code online texts in different ways. From these efforts, the final categories for coding the data were established. Four classifications were defined for the nature of content:

1. Antisemitic – Content that contained at least one antisemitic narrative.
2. Potentially antisemitic – Content that included a narrative that could be either interpreted as both antisemitic and non-antisemitic, or it appeared antisemitic only in light of the context (the article/post it was responding to).
3. Not understandable – Content that was incomprehensible (this category was almost only applicable to comments).
4. Not antisemitic – Content that did not include any antisemitic narratives.

Based on the conceptual framework, five main categories of antisemitic narratives were identified, each containing sub-categories (the details and definitions of these categories will be described later):

- Classic antisemitic stereotypes
- Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism)
- Conspiratorial antisemitism,
- Holocaust denial and distortion,
- New antisemitism (antisemitism based on criticism of Israel).

Two additional categories were defined: "hate speech" and "call for violence".

The coding process was described in detail in a methodology guide.

As part of the coding process, coders were required to document the antisemitic phrases identified in the content. For comments, they also had to record the context - specifically, the subject of the article or post under which the comment was written.

5.2.3 Training of the coders

After sharing the conceptual framework and the methodology guide with the national research teams, Political Capital organised a meeting to explain and discuss these documents and the process and to provide space for questions. Throughout the research process, the research teams met regularly to discuss issues and questions that arose during the research process.

To ensure a common understanding of the theoretical framework and to increase the reliability of the research - within the constraints of resources and team capacities - the research process included a learning phase. During this phase, 350 pieces of content were filtered from the dataset while maintaining the original proportions of results by keyword, media category, and year. A slight

overrepresentation of results for the keyword "Israel" was included, based on the assumption that identifying new antisemitism would be the greatest challenge. In each country, two members of the national research teams coded these data independently. Their results were then compared and discrepancies were discussed to reach an agreement. In cases where agreement could not be reached, they were given the opportunity to consult with Political Capital for further clarification.

5.2.4 The coding process

Coding the data followed the same procedure across all countries. The national teams received their content in an Excel file, which included all relevant properties (e.g., comment/article/post, date of publishing, source, context, etc.). During the coding process, coders read the content itself and, for comments, also examined the context.

If antisemitic narratives were identified in the content, coders labelled it as either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic, defined the antisemitic narrative, and categorised it into a main antisemitic narrative category along with one of its sub-categories. A single piece of content could be categorised into multiple (maximum four) narrative categories, as it was possible for more than one antisemitic narrative to appear within the same text. If the content did not contain any antisemitic narratives, or if its meaning was not understandable, it was not assigned to any category.

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Introduction to the BOND project

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities) project¹⁰ was implemented from January 2023 to December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. Its primary goal was to address deep-rooted prejudices, hateful attitudes, and behaviors within society, particularly those targeting European Jewry. The project also aimed to foster understanding, tolerance, and dialogue. A significant focus was placed on educating young people about Judaism and antisemitism, as well as promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. Its activities included researching antisemitism, monitoring antisemitic narratives, developing educational curricula, training teachers, organising youth education and exchange programs, facilitating inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, and hosting local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion. The project was guided by the definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).¹¹

Research report – Poland

Online antisemitic narratives in Poland before and after the 7th of October 2023

Key findings

Antisemitism in the material studied was somewhat surprising. It appeared most often in clearly right-wing media or from people who described their views as clearly right-wing. Several phenomena were observed.

- There was a surprising amount of antisemitic content.
- Many commenters did not see the difference between Jews and Israel. In many comments, the use of the word Jew was synonymous with the word Israel. These comments were classified as new antisemitism. In the vast majority of them, Jews were collectively accused of the actions of the State of Israel.
- Among antisemitic content, stereotypes proved very popular. Ascribing wealth and greed to Jews turned out to be the most common stereotype. Within the CLASSIC STEREOTYPE category, the dominant comments were those portraying Jews as evil.
- A lot of antisemitic content was related to attacking the state of Israel for its activities in the Middle East, especially in the Gaza Strip.
- There was relatively little content that could be classified as INCITING VIOLENCE.
- It is easy to point out which events were the triggers for the wave of antisemitic comments. A small number of antisemitic content appeared in smaller categories or without context at all. Nevertheless, completely neutral content was also a pretext for antisemitic comments.
- In Polish, it is very easy to create antisemitic words naming Jews and it is easy to edit existing ones so that they are harder to catch by automatic filters. There were many in the analyzed material. These words are usually easy to understand and it is not a problem to guess that it is the Jewish community that is meant.
- The word JEW often appeared in a negative context as an insult. It was often used to offend someone, lower the level of trust in that person or institution, and this is a disturbing phenomenon.
- A large amount of antisemitic content concerned conspiracy theories. The myth of Judea-Communism and the identification of Jews from Russia with the guilt for communism in Poland are still strong in Poland.

It was common to criticize political events (regardless of the party and side of the political dispute) and link them to Jewish control if they were not identical with the views of the person commenting. Polish politics were often blamed for Jewish influence.

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Introduction

The research aimed to analyse changes in online antisemitic narratives following 7 October 2023—Hamas's terror attack on Israel and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, making it necessary to examine how online antisemitic narratives had evolved. The development of the research methodology and categories were completed in late 2023 and early 2024, and the research began in the spring of 2024.

Recognising and defining antisemitism in relation to Israel, i.e. distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel, has become particularly challenging since 7 October. Our research is based on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism¹⁷, which is accepted by 43 countries and several international organisations including the EU and most of its member states.

The research was conducted simultaneously in four countries—Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania—using the same methodology. It focused on textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. The content was collected using social listening software from the websites and Facebook pages of the most relevant national media outlets across five media categories: independent (mainstream) media, biased/hyper-partisan media, mainstream tabloids, left-wing sites, far-right pages, and fake news/conspiratorial sites. The scraping process was guided by keywords designed to detect antisemitic content. Four core keywords—Jew, Israel, Holocaust, and Zionism/Zionist—were used in all countries in their respective local languages. Additionally, country-specific keywords were included. In languages where these words could have different endings, their base forms were followed by an asterisk (*), enabling the collection of results for all variations and endings.

The research focused on the period from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, with nearly 7,000 pieces of content analysed in each country. All content was examined by the national research teams and classified as either antisemitic, potentially antisemitic (content that could be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic), not understandable, or not antisemitic.

Drawing on publicly available resources—such as studies, research reports, and scientific articles—five main categories of antisemitic narratives were defined: classic antisemitic stereotypes, conspiratorial antisemitism, traditional religion-based antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, and new antisemitism (antisemitism based on the criticism of Israel). In addition to these, two supplementary categories were established: hate speech and calls for violence against Jews. Each piece of content was thoroughly analysed and assigned to one or more of these categories.


¹⁷ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

1. The extent of antisemitic content in the dataset

1.1 The extent of antisemitic content in the datasets

Antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content was present in 47% of the Polish dataset. Out of a total of 7054 pieces of content, 3128 were labelled as antisemitic, 191 as potentially antisemitic, 3110 as not antisemitic, and 625 as not understandable.


33. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic content in the full dataset.



1.2 Distribution of the content examined

The vast majority of antisemitic content appeared in comments. About 78% of the downloaded content were comments (5500), about 16.2% were posts (1143), and 5.8% were articles (411). Antisemitic narratives appeared predominantly in comments, of which over 51.6% (2840) were antisemitic. 2.9% (162) of them were labelled as potentially antisemitic, 36.6% (2014) as not antisemitic, and about 8.8% (484) as not understandable. Regarding articles, 84.4% (347) were labelled as not antisemitic, 5.6% (23) as antisemitic, 0.5% (2) as potentially antisemitic and 2.9% (12) as not understandable. 23.2% (265) of the posts were labelled as antisemitic, 2.4% (27) as potentially antisemitic, 11.3% (129) as not understandable and 63.2% (722) as not antisemitic.

34. Figure: Distribution of the different types of content examined in the full dataset.




1.3 Antisemitism in the different types of media

With more data in 2024, both the number and proportion of antisemitic content increased in most media categories, except for left-wing and fake news/conspiratorial sites, where the proportion of antisemitic content remained unchanged, and mainstream media sites, where antisemitic content proportionally decreased slightly.

Antisemitic content (including both antisemitic and potentially antisemitic) was the most prevalent on tabloid sites in terms of quantity (1853 pieces of content in the two years together), but proportionally these content appeared the most on biased/hyper-partisan (59.5%), fake news/conspiratorial (59.4%) and independent mainstream media sites (54.3%). Quantitatively the amount of antisemitic content in these categories varied (658 pieces on tabloid sites, 495 on mainstream media sites, and only 180 pieces on fake news/conspiratorial sites). The smallest amount of antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content was found on far-right pages (132 pieces, 29.9%). Data from left-wing sites were nearly absent from the Polish dataset.

35. Figure: Presence of antisemitic content within the different media categories.




2. Overview and extent of the different types of antisemitic content

2.1 Content with antisemitic narratives


The most prevalent narrative category in the Polish data was new antisemitism, appearing in 18% (1268 pieces) of the examined content. This was followed by conspiratorial antisemitic narratives, present in 12.8% (902 pieces) of the dataset. Classical stereotypes were third with 7.5% (526 pieces), while Holocaust denial and distortion was present in 4.3% (124 pieces) and traditional religion-based appeared in 1.8% (70 pieces) of the content examined.

36. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narrative categories in the full dataset.



Although the proportion of antisemitic content remained roughly the same, most narrative categories declined proportionally. The number of new antisemitic narratives, however, rose fourteenfold, resulting in a proportional increase of over three times. The amount of content with other narratives increased by 2024, but proportionally these slightly decreased, with classical stereotypes showing a more notable decline.

37. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).




2.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

Besides narratives, two other types of antisemitic content were examined: hate speech and call for violence.


- **Hate speech:** Hateful content that either explicitly targets Jews or includes the word "Jew" as a negative marker based on antisemitic narratives .
- **Call for violence:** Content that incites violence of any kind against Jews.

Hate speech was relatively common in the Polish dataset, appearing in 8.5% (603 pieces) of content, with a slight decrease in proportions to 2024. Content calling for violence against Jews also appeared in around 2.2% (158 pieces) of the data. Its amount increased by 2024 and proportionally its extent remained unchanged.

38. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the full dataset.



39. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).



3. Types of antisemitic content in the data examined

3.1 Content of antisemitic narratives

3.1.1 New antisemitism

The leading media in this category are WYKOP (posts and comments), TV REPUBLIKA (posts and comments) and DO RZECZY (posts and comments), but it is surprising that as many examples from this category appeared on WYBORCZA.PL (comments only) as on DO RZECZY. As for articles, they appeared in this category in media such as NEON 24 and MAGNA POLONIA.

The most popular category in the material being developed was NEW ANTISEMITISM. The most common subcategory is recognizing Israel as a terrorist country. In that subcategory, there were many comments accusing Israel of committing genocide and war crimes in the Gaza Strip, and eliminating Palestinians. Israelis were often called murderers. There were accusations of torture, attempts to starve Palestinians to death, ethnic cleansing, and starting World War III. Saying that Israel's goal was defined as murdering every last Palestinian. Israelis were often referred to as barbarians, terrorists, bandits, or criminals. Israel's actions in Palestine were also called a massacre of civilians. There were many accusations of Israel murdering women and children, and, in general innocent civilians. Several times, there were calculations, as well as comparisons with the number of victims (women and children) on the Ukrainian side in the war with Russia. Israel was called a violent and aggressive country, and that's way compared to Russia or sometimes even Nazi Germany. The narrative that sometimes appeared indicated Israel's provocations to be attacked and have a pretext to attack other countries. The attack on October 7 was also perceived by some people as a provocation to attack Palestine. What is more, the event in the Polish parliament, where Grzegorz Braun, a far-right politician and antisemite, put out Hanukkah candles with a fire extinguisher during the celebration of Hanukkah was compared to the actions of Israel and different reactions of Polish politicians that to the crimes in the Middle East.

Many antisemitic comments in this category appeared in the context of the death of a Polish humanitarian worker in the Gaza Strip. This event and the comments of the Israeli ambassador on the situation caused a wave of criticism, quite often very aggressive and referring also to the category HATE SPEECH. Israel was also called a terrorist country in this context. There were many comments that these actions were carried out with premeditation, on purpose, that Israel murdered humanitarian workers in cold blood.

An event that was also widely commented on was the Iranian attack on Israel after the Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy in Syria. Many comments also referred to Jews and the actions of the state of Israel, but these comments were included in another subcategory described later.

Comments related to this category often included fragments from the category of "taboo criticism" or "double standards", where they were also classified. Many people commented negatively on the passivity of the international community and the lack of clear opposition from other countries. They pointed out the disproportion in the number of Israelis killed by Hamas in October 2023 and the Palestinians killed by Israel. Commentators also wrote that Israel does whatever it wants, is unpunished, and although it violates human rights and international law, it does not face

any consequences because of the American support and finances. The European Union, NATO, and the United States were accused of being guardians of genocide and supporting war crimes. Also, Polish government was criticized for that.

The narrative of many comments focused exclusively on civilians suffering and dying during warfare and presented Israel's actions as criminal and murderous. In non-antisemitic comments, there was also a narrative about Israel's fight against terrorism and combating Hamas. However, the antisemitic comments seemed to murdering civilians was Israel's primary goal.

Most comments in the category Collective responsibility of the Jews for Israel also described Israel's actions as terrorist, but instead of Israel, they wrote that Jews are terrorists, murderers and genocidal perpetrators. In this subcategory, the bombing of Palestine, the deaths of women and children were attributed simply to Jews without separating them from the state of Israel. Antisemitism and hatred of Jews were very often justified by Israeli war actions. Jews were attributed with responsibility for the bombing of a humanitarian convoy in Gaza, in which a Pole was killed, and with responsibility for Iran's attack on Israel as a consequence of Jewish actions. These two events also seem to be the most triggering. Jews were often called antisemitic offensive names, which was included in the HATE SPEECH category.


Another popular subcategory was "Israel is responsible for the Arab-Israeli/Hamas-Israeli conflict". This category included accusing Israel (sometimes also Jews, as mentioned earlier) of financing Hamas and building its power, and the events related to this were later described as consequences of this. Israel's actions were often described as provocative and as leaving Iran and Hamas no other option than to attack Israel. There were frequent comments that Israel itself had organized the October Hamas attack on Israel, in order to have a pretext to start a war. Israel was then accused of massacring its own citizens. Israel's policy was also described as aggressive towards other countries, which had to end in conflict. The events that caused the biggest stir were the conflict between Israel and Iran and the Iranian missile attack on Israel after the bombing of the Iranian embassy in Syria, as well as the situation in the Gaza Strip. Israel was accused of being exclusively responsible for the situation in the Gaza Strip, very bad, inhumane living conditions, just to clean that territory. The commentators wrote that since 1948/the beginning, Israelis have murdered people and committed genocide of Palestinians ["Holocaust"], built illegal settlements in their area, and bombed refugee camps. Very often they called them occupants.

In the NEW ANTISEMITISM category, a lot of content also concerned the subcategory "Nazi analogy". Many comments simply called Israel or Jews Nazis. The situation in the Gaza strip was often compared to World War II and the building of the ghetto and the Gaza Strip was called a concentration camp created by Israel. They wrote about starving Palestinians and murdering "innocent people", especially children. It was common in this subcategory to compare Israel and Jews to the SS, and even write that Hitler was better and murdered less or that they have learned from him. The methods of warfare were very often compared to those of Nazi Germany.

The categories of "Nazi analogy" and "Accusing Israel of the Holocaust" were difficult to distinguish, but accusing Israel of actions such as the Holocaust against Palestinians in several places was unambiguous. The actions in the Gaza Strip were called Holocaust 2.0, and Israelis – Nazis.

In the category of NEW ANTISEMITISM, several more subcategories appeared, in fewer numbers than the previous subcategories. "Taboo of criticism" and "Double standards" appeared, where the world was accused of passivity in response to Israel's crimes, the silence of the UN, the lack of reliable information from the world media for fear of criticizing Israel. The subcategory "Israeli influence on the media" also included comments about the deliberate concealment of Israel's actions in the media and the control that Jews and Israel have over the media in the world. Israel was described as evil, bad intentions were attributed, and people were called barbarians. Delegitimization of Israel occurred as often as demonization. One of the main politicians of the far right, known for his antisemitic comments and the event in the Polish parliament, where he put out Hanukkah candles with a fire extinguisher during the celebration of Hanukkah – Grzegorz Brown – referred to Israel as the "State Located in Palestine". This narrative was repeated several times as an obvious information that Israel occupies the land of Palestine and should not have been established there. There were chambers that Israel should disappear from the world map and the lands on which it is located should return to Palestine. Also, it was questioned its right to create the state after World War II. "Colonialism analogy" didn't appear at all, and "Apartheid analogy" appeared only two times.

40. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category New antisemitism.



3.1.2 Conspiratorial antisemitism

The leading media in this category are WYKOP, TV REPUBLIKA and DO RZECZY, but also NCZAS (all only comments). As far as articles are concerned, they appeared in this category in such media as NEON 24, W POLITYCE and MAGNA POLONIA.

Another category that turned out to be very popular is "Conspiratorial". The most content appeared in the subcategory "Jewish control/power", but many comments classified here also fit into the subcategory "The new world order theory". It turned out that the most common comment in the entire document examined was an advertisement for a "patriotic" book. The comment was of a recommedatory nature. It was long and summarized the book, which according to the author of the

comment is banned by censorship, but available for download online. The comment said that Jews are behind the creation of most political parties in Poland, but also Germans and Americans. All three of these groups allegedly control the Polish political system. The evidence of Jewish control over Polish politics is supposed to be the joint celebration of Hanukkah in the Polish Parliament, the unanimous condemnation of Braun's act (an extreme right-wing MP who blew out Hanukkah candles with a fire extinguisher during the Hanukkah celebration in the parliament), the unanimous transfer of PLN 100 million for the renovation of the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw. This comment appeared in various contexts, on many websites. Mainly in the Fake news/conspiratorial category and in right-wing media. In addition, there were often comments about GAZETA WYBORCZA (a popular nationwide opinion-forming socio-political daily with a centro-liberal profile) and his editor-in-chief is Adam Michnik (He was born from an informal union of pre-war communist activists of Jewish origin. A former politician, historian journalist). The newspaper was accused of Jewish control in many comments, its name was changed in a vulgar way. GAZETA WYBORCZA was accused of manipulation, using Jewish methods, and was called a Jewish newspaper for Poles. It was also denied the right to comment on some events because it was a Jewish newspaper. TVN (the most popular Polish commercial television station) was also accused of Jewish control. Also, Polish politicians were accused of Jewish influence, especially Andrzej Duda, Donald Tusk, Radosław Sikorski (the latter mainly because of his wife). The commentators suggested that because they are afraid of Jews, they don't condemn Israel for its crimes and don't criticize the Ambassador of Israel to Poland. What is more, Jews from America were suspected of steering Polish or Israeli policy, and they finance Israel's acts.

Jewish control was often mentioned in comments about the European Union, calling it NEUROPE. The entire world, the US, and NATO were also seen as ruled by Jews. Polish politicians were accused of sucking up to Jews, but they were also said to be Jews in order to discredit them (comments using the word Jew as an insult were classified as HATE SPEECH). Politicians who supported Israel were called traitors. The comment that appeared many times was about Polish history, 1944, when Jews from Moscow (leftists) sent to Poland other Jews that were placed in crucial places like media, movie schools, prosecutor's office, courts to make a new rule and keep the Russian plan working. The comment says that there are still Jews in Polish politics – from Platforma Obywatelska (PO) or Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS).

There were many comments about Jewish control. You can read in them that Jews control, for example, banks, media, all kinds of institutions, products of Israeli production are accused of espionage and deception, just like Jews themselves. Many comments came down to the sentence - Jews are everywhere in the world and they decide about everything. Sometimes they involved calls for a boycott of Israel and Israeli products.


There were also many comments in the subcategory "Judeo-communist" as there is still a threat that communism was created by Jews. Sometimes it was used to insult or discredit someone. "Jews are communists" was a very popular comment.

A big stir among commentators was caused by the Ukrainian President's visit to Poland. Most comments focused on Zelensky's Jewish background ("mean Ukrainian Jew", "Russian Jew"), and the fact that Jews caused the war in Ukraine. The writers raised the issue of the lack of apology for the

Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. It was often connected with HATE SPEECH and CALL FOR VIOLENCE.

Subcategories that practically did not appear or appeared once, without any major significance, were "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", "Illuminati", "The great replacement theory", "Soros". The contexts in which comments in this category appeared most often were the Polish elections, and Polish politics in general. Events in the Middle East were of marginal importance, although the death of a Polish humanitarian worker in the Gaza Strip appeared as a context in dozens of cases. There were a few comments concerning ties of Jews to the pandemic "COVID 19".

41. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Conspiratorial antisemitism.



3.1.3 Classic stereotypes

The leading media in this category are WYKOP, WYBORCZA, TV REPUBLIKA and DO RZECZY.

The "Classical stereotype" category was also a large category. The most numerous among them was the portrayal of Jews as EVIL. There were descriptions of individual situations in which people of Jewish origin behaved in a specific way, which was supposed to be proof that all Jews are evil and unlikable (for example bad judge = "Jewish judge"). The classic mechanism of how stereotypes work appeared in this subcategory. All Jews were described through the prism of individual situations. Several comments spoke of spreading diseases, which sounds like a narrative from the thirties. There were also comments that Jews hate Poles, and sometimes there were comments that Jews hate everyone. Many comments that referred to Jews as murderers, criminals and terrorists were included in the category of attributing responsibility to Jews for the actions of the state of Israel, if the context of the statement referred to the conflict in the Middle East, and that they can't even apologize. There was also a narrative that Jews are fed up everywhere in the world and it is no wonder that other countries are expelling them from each other. Jews were also accused of being the cause of most of the problems in the world. Often it was connected with HATE SPEECH and CALL FOR VIOLENCE.

A large subcategory was also comments referring to the classic stereotype of Jews – “Greed/Wealth”. Among others, calling someone a Jew because they are stingy appeared here, but also the narrative that Jews do everything for money, that they only care about business, that they believe that the whole world owes them some money and that they value money over human life, or even steal. There were suggestions that they accuse of the Holocaust just to get compensation. In Polish, the word "POŻYDZIĆ" is also very common - means that someone is a bit greedy and doesn't want to spend money on something. This also appeared in the material being developed.


Referring to Jews as OTHER also appeared in this category. In some cases, Jews of Polish origin were separated from Poles, there was talk of Jewish surnames and that Jews change them to Polish ones in order to blend in with Poles, while Poles never change their surnames to Jewish ones. On the other hand, the commentators searched for Jewish origin to explain someone's bad behavior. There were also comments bordering on dehumanization. Jews were also referred to as the enemy of Poland, persons who want to destroy Poland. It was also written that no Poles were kidnapped by Hamas, but it was Jews were born in Poland.

In the subcategory "Deceit and lie" there were comments that Jews cannot be trusted because they lie, cheat, they are traitors, but also portals and newspapers were called Jewish, in order to lower the level of trust in them. It was connected with so-called Jewish propaganda, but it was related also with the category NEW ANTISEMITISM.

Less significant subcategories were "Disloyalty/Dual loyalty" and "Taboo of criticism". In the subcategory "Taboo of criticism" most of the content concerned the lack of criticism from the international community towards Israel's actions, which is why these comments were included in the category NEW ANTISEMITISM. According to commentators, Jews are “untouchable.” Only a few appeared in this category.

Among the unclassified content there were comments that Jews are anti-Polish, several about denying the existence of antisemitism in Poland, standing up for an antisemitic MP who blew out the Hanukkah candles in parliament. There were also those related to appearance, mainly concerning the shape of the nose.

42. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Classic antisemitic stereotypes.




3.1.4 Holocaust denial and distortion

The most content from this category appeared on WYKOP (posts and comments). Next were WYBORCZA (comments), TV REPUBLIKA (comments), MAGNA POLONIA (comments).

The next category in order of content quantity was "Holocaust denial distortion". It was not a very numerous category (about several dozen of comments). The narratives that appeared here were mainly accusing Jews of complicity in the Holocaust ("Blaming Jews"), their passivity during the war, examples of how Jews killed other Jews in camps or collaborated with the Nazis, but there were also stories of Jews killing Poles to prove that they did not deserve to be called victims of the Holocaust. A theory appeared that Hitler was financed by wealthy Jews. The Holocaust was presented as a positive event several times. There were also questions about the number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust and accusations against the Jewish community of appropriating the suffering during World War II and leading the narrative that Jews were the only victims. It is difficult to say precisely what events prompted such comments, because there were relatively few of them, but often there were discussions about World War II in general, the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the war in Ukraine – Ukrainians were accused of being the main perpetrators of the Holocaust and Poles were denied killing Jews ("Blur the responsibility"). The argument that Jews use the Holocaust for their own purposes, especially for financial compensation, was very popular.

43. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Holocaust denial and distortion.




3.1.5 Traditional, religion-based antisemitism

The most content from this category appeared on WYKOP (posts and comments). Next were DO RZECZY (comments), NEON 24 (comments).

"Traditional religion-based" was a small category. A dozen or so comments referred mainly referring to Satanism and Satan or deicide. A similar number of comments were made about making fun of Judaism, and the appearance of the orthodox, and that the Jewish religion is it's bad or weird. Also, the authors wrote that Jews lie or "tell the ties" with reference to their religion. Sometimes there were related to "Jew as the "other" (in religious sense)". There was some comments concerned the pedophiles in rabbinical schools. They pointed to the Talmud and the resulting mistreatment of the non-Jews. There were only two examples of "Blood libel/Child murder". Bigger category turned out "Deicide". It simply repeated the phrase that the Jews killed Jesus.

44. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Traditional, religion-based antisemitism.



3.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

3.2.1 Antisemitic hate speech

The most hate speech appears in the comments. Most often, hate speech came down to calling Jews derogatory names or insulting others by calling them Jews. The most hate speech appears in the media known as tabloids. This is mainly because the sites where antisemitism has appeared most often are created by users. The topics that caused a great deal of commotion and where the most hate speech appeared were the Iranian attack on Israel, the situation when a far-right, antisemitic politician put out the Hanukkah candles with a fire extinguisher in the Polish parliament, the film of Agnieszka Holland about immigrants, the anniversary of Smolensk air disaster, Zelensky's visit in Poland, and definitely the whole situation around the death of a Polish humanitarian worker in Gaza who was killed by Israeli shelling and connected with this event – words of the Ambassador of Israel to Poland, and also the wrong – in the opinion of the writers – reaction of Polish politicians to Israel's acts. The comments often had a character of CALL FOR VIOLENCE, too. This category also included antisemitic jokes and sayings.

3.2.2 Antisemitic violence

Calls for violence turned out to be a category in which not so many comments appeared. The context in which most appeared was the Iranian attack on Israel and the interview of Israeli Ambassador to Poland after a Polish volunteer killed in the Gaza Strip. Among others, there appeared that Jews should be dead or that they should be bombed by Iran. Calls to expel Jews from the countries where they live, especially Israeli Ambassador to Poland, calls to exterminate/kill them, break off diplomatic relations or to annihilate the state of Israel were repeated. It was connected with the comments talking about the genocide against Palestinians. Also, calls like "Fuck the Jews" were quite often. Texts like: "Fuck the Jewish scumbags", "Fuck those Semitic thugs" or "Fuck Israelis' terrorists" have appeared. What is more, the authors of the comments wanted to exclude Israel from different sport

playing. In this category, Israel was often compared to Russia or even Nazi Germany. The comments had a character of HATE SPEECH, too. If it comes to media the largest number of examples of "calls to violence" appeared on TV REPUBLIKA and WYKOP.

3.3 Topics provoking antisemitism

The topics that seem to be the main triggers for antisemitic content are conflicts in the Middle East, which can be broken down into more narrow contexts. One of the most popular is Iran's missile attack on Israel, where the most content appeared in the NEW ANTISEMITISM category and less, although still a lot of HATE SPEECH. An event strongly related to the situation in the Middle East, which was a context for antisemitism, is the death of a Polish humanitarian worker in the Gaza Strip, who died after a car belonging to the CETRAL KITCHEN organization was hit by the Israeli army. This event generated by far the most antisemitic comments. It can be divided into smaller contexts (comments by the Israeli Ambassador to Poland, an interview with him, comments by the Palestinian Ambassador, the funeral of a humanitarian worker, a demand from Polish politicians for an apology and compensation from Israel). This situation also caused many comments about Jews as evil (CLASSIC STEREOTYPE), and accusations of Jewish influence among Polish politicians (CONSPIRATIONAL).

A big stir among commentators was caused by the Ukrainian President's visit to Poland. Most comments focused on Zelensky's Jewish background ("mean Ukrainian Jew", "Russian Jew"), and the fact that Jews caused the war in Ukraine. The writers raised the issue of the lack of apology for the Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. It was often connected with HATE SPEECH and CALL FOR VIOLENCE.

A very inflammatory event also turned out to be when a far right, antisemitic politician - Grzegorz Braun from the Konfederacja party put out the Hanukkah candles with a fire extinguisher in the Polish parliament (when Hanukkah was celebrated in the Parliament). Punishing an antisemitic MP was also a trigger. It should be added that MP Grzegorz Braun is known for his antisemitism and anti-Ukrainian approach. He is perceived as a pro-Russian politician and his behavior had no connection with the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Wherever the word "Israel" appeared, one could expect antisemitic content. Many people strongly and unequivocally accused Jews of Israel's actions and these words were often used interchangeably. In the comments, sometimes there was not only hatred for Jews, but also for Muslims, often both in one comment. Antisemitic comments also appeared when someone wanted to lower someone's credibility, discredit him by calling them a Jew, but also to lower trust in certain content, especially the WYBORCZA newspaper ("Jewish newspaper"). Ascribing Jewish roots to politicians in Poland, searching for Jewish ancestors or modifying their surnames to sound Jewish had a similar goal, no matter real or not (for example with Radosław Sikorski's wife). It doesn't matter which side of the political dispute in Poland a specific politician stood on. Also, the film of Agnieszka Holland about the refugee crisis on the border with Belarus and the anniversary of Smolensk air disaster became the pretexts for antisemitic comments.

Many times, the context, i.e. the post or article had no connection with Israel, Jews or the Middle East in general, but antisemitism appeared in the comments. It could refer to internal Polish politics, feasts or motherhood.

A lot of antisemitism also appeared in the context of various events in Poland. Elections, the economic situation, support for Ukraine, fuel prices, abortion law. Less, although not a little, in the context of World War II. The topic of the Holocaust was usually called on occasion NEW ANTISEMITISM category.

3.4 Code words used for Jews¹⁸

In Polish comments, you can find many recurring words describing Jews. Several of them are clearly popular. The most frequently appearing words include the word PARCHY, which the dictionary translates to SCABS. Very contemptuous, strongly associated with illness. Another very popular word is PEJSY. This word means SIDELOCKS. An equally popular word is ŻYMIANIE or RZYMIANIE. These words were created in order to bypass internet censorship by publicists. These words are a spelling of the word ROMANS in Polish, but using a different, identically sounding letter. Another way to avoid the censorship is writing 7YD.

Many other words are often diminutives used in a contemptuous manner. These words are ŻYDKI, ŻYDZIOSZKI, ŻYDÓWECZKI. There also appeared augmentatives of words and various other forms of the word ŻYDZI-JEWS (ŻYDY, ŻYDOWSTWO, ŻYDOSTWO, ŻYDÓWY, ŻYDŁA, ŻYDOWIZNY, ŻYDAJSTWO). There were also several combinations of the word JEW with other words. Such as the combination of the words ŻYDZI (Jews) and PASOŻYT (parasite)- PASOŻYDZI. Another combination was the combination of the words JEWS and SZCZYZNY (vulgarily about urine)- ŻYDOSZCZYZNY. There were also several modifications of politicians' names. For example... From the surname of the Polish former Prime Minister Beata Szydło (ŻYDŁO) or Volodymyr Zelensky (JEWLENSKI or ŻYDEŃSKI). There were also cases of using the names of countries described as controlled by Jews. Poland - POLIN, Ukraine - UKROPOLIN, EU-NEUROPA or UNIA JEW-ROPEJSKA. Very often, people were called JEWS to belittle, discredit or simply offend. Many politicians were thus attributed with Jewish roots. Arguments between users also often ended with calling each other JEWS to offend.

¹⁸ Examples: parchy, pasożydy, żydowstwo, żydoszczyny, pejsy, żydkie, żydzioszki, żymianie, żydówy, żydajstwo, żydy, żydowizna, rzymianie, żydostwo, garbate nosy, izraelska/żydowska dziwka/kurwa, rzydzi, szabesgoje, syjonistyczny nowotwór, obrzezany quatas, starozakonny, żydło, 7ydowski, 7yzdy, 7ydzi, zydojobancy

4. Conclusion

A surprising amount of antisemitism has appeared on the Polish internet. The platform with the most of it was definitely WYKOP.PL. The amount of antisemitic content made up almost half of all antisemitic content. This site does not seem to control the content posted there by commenters well enough. Nevertheless, it is difficult to automatically control and remove antisemitic content, because in Polish it is easy to create new antisemitic words or modify existing ones in such a way that they are not caught by filters. In order for filters to be more effective, it would be necessary to monitor the media from time to time and find new words used to spread antisemitic content.

A lot of antisemitic content concerned Polish politics, which means that stereotypes related to Jews are still very much alive and popular. The word JEW was often used to insult others, and any dissatisfaction with the opinions or political views of others was often associated with Jewish control. Even completely trivial and neutral topics could be a trigger. There weren't many such situations, but they happened often enough to be noticeable.

Current events in the Middle East generated waves of antisemitic comments. In recent years, a group strongly antagonized by the previous Law and Justice government were Muslims (mainly refugees), which is why the number of antisemitic comments in the context of the conflict in the Middle East is surprising. There were also anti-Muslim comments, and even anti-Muslim and antisemitic comments in one, but it was still a large number of antisemitic comments and those where the commenters were rooting for Iran during the bombing of Israel, for example.

Analysis of the material also showed how common it is to identify all Jews with Israel. Content often appeared where the word JEW was synonymous with the word ISRAEL.

Stereotypical thinking about the Jewish community also turned out to be common. Perceiving Jews through the prism of individual cases and attributing characteristics of individual people to the entire nation has appeared many times. There is still too little education in Poland about stereotypes and disarming the mechanisms of their creation. Young people and adults are not taught enough about strategies for controlling stereotypes and using them consciously.

The topic of Jews in Poland is still very polarizing. Antisemitic comments are very likely to appear when the topic of an article or post concerns events in the Middle East or Jews directly.

5. Methodology

The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives in online textual content - such as comments, articles and Facebook posts - before and after 7 October 2023. We analysed content from websites and Facebook pages of previously defined media outlets. The content was collected using social listening software based on pre-defined keywords, covering the same period in both 2023 and 2024. The research was conducted in four countries (Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania) by national research teams coordinated by Political Capital, using the same methodology.

Definition of antisemitism

The basis of the research was the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism: "*Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.*" A detailed explanation of the definition, along with illustrative examples, is available on the IHRA website¹⁹.

5.1 Data collection

In our research, we analysed online textual content: articles, posts and comments from websites and Facebook pages. The data was collected using social listening software, SentiOne. SentiOne scrapes data in a given timeframe, from the given media sources based on the given keywords.

5.1.1 Keywords

5.1.2 Sources monitored

With input from the national research teams, Political Capital identified six categories of online media to monitor content from: 1) independent (mainstream) media, 2) mainstream tabloids, 3) (hyper-)partisan/biased media, 4) right-wing/far-right sites, 5) fake news/conspiratorial sites, 5) left-wing/far-left sites. We collected pages for each category in all countries, including media outlets' websites and Facebook pages . In all countries, we selected the three media outlets per category with the most results for our keywords in the same time period.

¹⁹ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

- **Independent (mainstream) media:** gazeta.pl; Wyborcza.pl; **Oko press.** The mainstream media analyzed in the project can be described as pro-democratic. The two most important portals (gazeta.pl and wyborcza.pl) belong to one company, the third was created with the support of this company and has an informational and opinion-forming character. These media are strongly associated with left-wing and centrist politics. They do not publish antisemitic content, but antisemitic comments appear under their articles.
- **Far-right pages:** Fronda.pl; Magna Polonia; Tygodnik Solidarność. These are socio-political media with a conservative profile. They refer to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Some of them are controversial even on the right.
- **Mainstream tabloids:** Fakt; Super Express; Wykop. Two of them are entertainment, gossip, but also provide local and national news about the lives of celebrities, as well as health, culture, business, politics, sports and social issues. These portals are extremely popular and usually rank in the top in Polish readership rankings. One, however, is social news. There is a lot of controversy associated with it. It is created by the community.
- **Fake news/conspiratorial sites:** Najwyższy czas; W Realu 24; neon24. They are of an informational and journalistic nature with socio-political themes. They are right-wing, anti-EU, and people associated with them are also known for antisemitic comments. They are strongly associated with the extreme right. They use specific language. They appear as media that are not silent and speak the truth.
- **(Hyper-)Partisan/biased media:** tv republika; dorzeczy; wpolityce. information and journalistic media. The analyzed portals are conservative in nature with a strong visible support for Christian traditions. The position of the portals on the political spectrum in Poland is clear and they appear as unequivocally right-wing.
- **Left-wing/far-left pages:** Lewicza There aren't many media outlets that are clearly left-wing. The one that took part in the study isn't very popular either.

5.1.3 Monitoring period

Based on our previous experiences in coding textual content into previously defined categories and the resources available to the project, we set a goal of analysing 7,000 pieces of content per country. Because we wanted to examine changes in antisemitic narratives after 7 October 2023, we chose the same time period in both 2023 and 2024. This was determined by identifying the country with the least data for our keywords and calculating how many days were needed, starting from a chosen date (in this case, 1 April), for the downloaded data in that country to exceed 7,000 pieces of content. As a result, data collection in all countries was standardised to the same timeframe: April 1 and April 15, 13:00.

5.1.4 The amount of data analysed

We filtered each dataset to include more than 7,000 pieces of content, maintaining the original proportions of keywords, sources (websites and Facebook pages), and years within the dataset. This

approach resulted in the following proportions of the total downloaded dataset being analysed in each country: Romania - 100%, Hungary - 73%, Italy - 44%, and Poland - 35%.

In all countries the amount of data collected in 2024 was higher than in 2023. The smallest increase was in Hungary, where the data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. In Romania the data increased by almost three times, in Poland by almost five times and in Italy by almost seven times. In all countries most of the data consisted of comments.

The amount of data also varied between countries by media category:

- Hungary: The majority of data came from far-right pages, followed by mainstream media, biased outlets, tabloids, and minimal data from conspiratorial and left-wing sources.
- Italy: Most data came from mainstream media, followed by tabloids, biased outlets, left-wing and conspiratorial sources, with very little data from far-right pages.
- Poland: Most data came from tabloids, followed by biased outlets, mainstream media, far-right pages, conspiratorial sites and very little from left-wing sources.
- Romania: Most of the data came from mainstream media, followed by conspiratorial sites, tabloids, far-right sources, biased outlets and a small amount of data from left-wing sources.

		<i>Examined content in media categories</i>						Total amount of data/year
		Mainstream	Far-right	Conspiratorial	Biased	Tabloid	Left	
Hungary	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221
Italy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163
Poland	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165

5.2 Coding the data

5.2.1 Conceptual framework

Using publicly available resources, such as studies, research reports, scientific articles, etc., Political Capital developed a conceptual framework to define the theoretical background of the research. In addition to stating that the research was based on the IHRA's working definition of antisemitism, the document thoroughly presented the main categories of antisemitic narratives and sub-narratives on which the research was based. All partners had the opportunity to discuss, comment on, and add to the content of the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework was also discussed with members of the BOND project's Advisory Board and external experts.

5.2.2 Finalising the methodology and creating a methodology guide

Finalising the research methodology involved multiple discussions - including consultations with an expert member of the BOND Advisory Board and several attempts to analyse and code online texts in different ways. From these efforts, the final categories for coding the data were established. Four classifications were defined for the nature of content:

1. Antisemitic – Content that contained at least one antisemitic narrative.
2. Potentially antisemitic – Content that included a narrative that could be either interpreted as both antisemitic and non-antisemitic, or it appeared antisemitic only in light of the context (the article/post it was responding to).
3. Not understandable – Content that was incomprehensible (this category was almost only applicable to comments).
4. Not antisemitic – Content that did not include any antisemitic narratives.

Based on the conceptual framework, five main categories of antisemitic narratives were identified, each containing sub-categories (the details and definitions of these categories will be described later):

- Classic antisemitic stereotypes
- Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism)
- Conspiratorial antisemitism,
- Holocaust denial and distortion,
- New antisemitism (antisemitism based on criticism of Israel).

Two additional categories were defined: "hate speech" and "call for violence".

The coding process was described in detail in a methodology guide.

As part of the coding process, coders were required to document the antisemitic phrases identified in the content. For comments, they also had to record the context - specifically, the subject of the article or post under which the comment was written.

5.2.3 Training of the coders

After sharing the conceptual framework and the methodology guide with the national research teams, Political Capital organised a meeting to explain and discuss these documents and the process and to provide space for questions. Throughout the research process, the research teams met regularly to discuss issues and questions that arose during the research process.

To ensure a common understanding of the theoretical framework and to increase the reliability of the research - within the constraints of resources and team capacities - the research process included a learning phase. During this phase, 350 pieces of content were filtered from the dataset while maintaining the original proportions of results by keyword, media category, and year. A slight

overrepresentation of results for the keyword "Israel" was included, based on the assumption that identifying new antisemitism would be the greatest challenge. In each country, two members of the national research teams coded these data independently. Their results were then compared and discrepancies were discussed to reach an agreement. In cases where agreement could not be reached, they were given the opportunity to consult with Political Capital for further clarification.

5.2.4 The coding process

Coding the data followed the same procedure across all countries. The national teams received their content in an Excel file, which included all relevant properties (e.g., comment/article/post, date of publishing, source, context, etc.). During the coding process, coders read the content itself and, for comments, also examined the context.

If antisemitic narratives were identified in the content, coders labelled it as either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic, defined the antisemitic narrative, and categorised it into a main antisemitic narrative category along with one of its sub-categories. A single piece of content could be categorised into multiple (maximum four) narrative categories, as it was possible for more than one antisemitic narrative to appear within the same text. If the content did not contain any antisemitic narratives, or if its meaning was not understandable, it was not assigned to any category.

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Introduction to the BOND project

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities) project⁹ was implemented from January 2023 to December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. Its primary goal was to address deep-rooted prejudices, hateful attitudes, and behaviors within society, particularly those targeting European Jewry. The project also aimed to foster understanding, tolerance, and dialogue. A significant focus was placed on educating young people about Judaism and antisemitism, as well as promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. Its activities included researching antisemitism, monitoring antisemitic narratives, developing educational curricula, training teachers, organising youth education and exchange programs, facilitating inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, and hosting local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion. The project was guided by the definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).²⁰

²⁰ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

Research report – Romania

Antisemitic narratives online in Romania before and after the 7th of October 2023

Key Findings

By analyzing 7.012 pieces of content posted during 2023-2024, including articles, posts, and comments, it is possible to bring in insight into the current Romanian antisemitic discourse and how it has unfolded in response to both internal and external events.

The findings exhibit a consistency in the conspiratorial narrative, a rise in new antisemitism following the events of October 7th, the persistence of classic antisemitic stereotypes, and the role of specific media outlets concerning the public opinion. Below are the key findings from the analysis of 7.012 pieces of content:

- Antisemitic: 1.605 pieces of content (22.9%)
- Potentially Antisemitic: 256 pieces of content (3.7%)
- Not understandable: 366 pieces of content (5.2%)
- Not antisemitic: 4.785 pieces of content (68.2%)

Throughout the monitoring process, antisemitic content was categorized into seven main narratives so as to better understand its forms and themes. These include: classic stereotypes, which perpetuate traditional stereotypes and prejudices about Jewish individuals or communities; traditional religion-based narratives, drawing on theological arguments or historical accusations; conspiratorial content, which associates Jewish people with hidden agendas and global manipulation; Holocaust denial or distortion, seeking to undermine, falsify or misrepresent historical truths; new antisemitism, targeting the State of Israel or Zionism as a guise for broader prejudice; hate speech, including explicit insults or dehumanizing language; and call for violence, inciting or endorsing harm against Jewish individuals or communities.

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Introduction

The research aimed to analyse changes in online antisemitic narratives following 7 October 2023—Hamas's terror attack on Israel and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, making it necessary to examine how online antisemitic narratives had evolved. The development of the research methodology and categories were completed in late 2023 and early 2024, and the research began in the spring of 2024.

Recognising and defining antisemitism in relation to Israel, i.e. distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel, has become particularly challenging since 7 October. Our research is based on the working definition of antisemitism of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA)²¹, which is accepted by 43 countries and several international organisations including the EU and most of its member states.

The research was conducted simultaneously in four countries—Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania—using the same methodology. It focused on textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. The content was collected using social listening software from the websites and Facebook pages of the most relevant national media outlets across five media categories: independent (mainstream) media, biased/hyper-partisan media, mainstream tabloids, left-wing sites, far-right pages, and fake news/conspiratorial sites. The scraping process was guided by keywords designed to detect antisemitic content. Four core keywords—Jew, Israel, Holocaust, and Zionism/Zionist—were used in all countries in their respective local languages. Additionally, country-specific keywords were included. In languages where these words could have different endings, their base forms were followed by an asterisk (*), enabling the collection of results for all variations and endings.

The research focused on the period from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, with nearly 7,000 pieces of content analysed in each country. All content was examined by the national research teams and classified as either antisemitic, potentially antisemitic (content that could be interpreted as both antisemitic and not antisemitic), not understandable, or not antisemitic.

Drawing on publicly available resources—such as studies, research reports, and scientific articles—five main categories of antisemitic narratives were defined: classic antisemitic stereotypes, conspiratorial antisemitism, traditional religion-based antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, and new antisemitism (antisemitism based on the criticism of Israel). In addition to these, two supplementary categories were established: hate speech and calls for violence against Jews. Each piece of content was thoroughly analysed and assigned to one or more of these categories.


²¹ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

1. The extent of antisemitic content in the national dataset

1.1 The extent of antisemitic content in the dataset

Antisemitic and potentially antisemitic content was present in 27% of the Romanian dataset. Out of a total of 7012 pieces of content, 1605 were labelled as antisemitic, 256 as potentially antisemitic, 4785 as not antisemitic, and 366 as not understandable.


45. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic content in the full dataset.



1.2 Distribution of the content examined

The vast majority of the downloaded content were comments, and most antisemitic content appeared in them. antisemitic content appeared in comments. About 75.4% of the downloaded content was comments (5288), about 19.2% were articles (1346), and only about 5.4% were Facebook posts (378). Antisemitic narratives appeared predominantly in comments, of which over 29% (1567) were antisemitic, 4.6% (247) were potentially antisemitic, 59% (3115) were not antisemitic, and about 6.8% (359) were not understandable. Regarding articles, 96% (1296) were not antisemitic, 2.7% (37) were antisemitic, and 0.6% (9) were potentially antisemitic. Nearly all posts were not antisemitic, with only one categorised as potentially antisemitic and three as not understandable.

46. Figure: Distribution of the different types of content examined in the full dataset.




1.3 Antisemitism in the different types of media

Most of the antisemitic content was found in comments on independent (mainstream) pages, followed by fake news media sites. With more data in 2024, the number of antisemitic content also increased, but their proportion remained more or less the same in most media categories, except biased media pages, where it increased slightly, and mainstream media sites, where it decreased lightly.

Antisemitic (including both antisemitic and potentially antisemitic) content was the most prevalent on independent media sites quantitatively (1025 pieces), but proportionally it was about a quarter of the data (24.8%). Proportionally antisemitic content was the most common in far-right pages (58.8%), while number-wise it was less (297 pieces) than in the previous category. These were followed by biased/hyper-partisan sites (30.7%) and on a quite similar level with fake news/conspiratorial sites (23%), and mainstream tabloids (21.7%). However, when looking at the total amount of antisemitic content, larger differences emerged: data from the fake news/conspiratorial sites contained the highest number of antisemitic narratives (327), followed by mainstream tabloid sites (147), and biased/hyper-partisan pages (65). Only one not antisemitic content appeared on the left-wing site.

47. Figure: Presence of antisemitic content within the different media categories.



2. Overview and extent of the different types of antisemitic content

2.1 Content with antisemitic narratives

The conceptual framework of the research identified the following five main antisemitic narratives. Within each of these main narratives, sub-narratives were also defined.

- **Classic stereotypes:** Narratives historically rooted in antisemitic prejudice. These encompass hatred of Jews based on their existence as human beings, not simply as adherents of the Jewish religion. It does so through contradictory logic that sees Jews as both overly powerful and weak or even subhuman. Classic stereotypes include for example that Jews are evil, greedy, disloyal or liars.²²
- **Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism):** Traditional religion-based Judeophobia, or traditional antisemitism, refers to anti-Jewish sentiments rooted in beliefs associated with either the perceived Christian or Jewish religion and traditions. Traditional, religion-based antisemitic narratives include for example blood libel/child murder, deicide or Jews are Satanic.²³
- **Conspiratorial antisemitism:** Conspiracy theories have perpetuated antisemitic beliefs by suggesting that Jews wield undue influence for personal gain and conspire to dominate spheres such as the media, politics, and the economy. Many of these theories are rooted in the antisemitic myth of the "hidden hand," and blame Jews, or actors perceived to be Jewish, for the world's worst tragedies, such as instigating wars or even causing COVID-19. Conspiratorial antisemitic narratives include for example Jewish power/control, Judeo-Communism, Great Replacement Theory²⁴ or New World Order Theory^{25 26}.

²² Matthias J. Becker et al., "Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets", *Humanities & Social Sciences Communications* 9, 2022

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3>; Matthias J. Becker et al., "Decoding Antisemitism" Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, p. 11, 13; ADL Antisemitic Myths. <https://antisemitism.adl.org/>

²³ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, p. 13.

<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

²⁴ The Great Replacement Theory is a conspiracy theory rooted in the belief that the white race is under threat of extinction at the hands of Jews and other minorities. This theory also known as white replacement theory or white genocide theory, claims there is an intentional effort, led by Jews, to promote mass non-white immigration, inter-racial marriage, and other efforts that would lead to the "extinction of whites." <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/great-replacement>


²⁵ The New World Order theory is a conspiracy theory claiming that a small group of powerful individuals working in secret to establish all-powerful control. The conspiracy theory behind the New World Order involving Jewish leaders is based on the idea that Jews have formed a power structure in which they control every aspect of humankind — the economy, media, and political landscape. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/New-World-Order>

²⁶ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, pp. 13-14.

- **Holocaust denial and distortion:** Holocaust denial or distortion seeks to deny or misrepresent the historical facts of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. Holocaust denial includes denying the scale or methods used by the Nazis and their allies during the Holocaust. Holocaust denial and distortion promote the false idea that Jews invented or exaggerated the Holocaust and they profited from it. Holocaust denial and distortion narratives include for example blaming Jews for the Holocaust or depicting the Holocaust as a positive event.²⁷
- **New antisemitism:** New antisemitism refers to the expression of anti-Jewish sentiment directed at Israel. A key function of new antisemitism is to enable the expression of antisemitic views in a way that appears politically acceptable. We define new antisemitism using Natan Sharansky's 3D test: demonisation, double standards and delegitimisation. New antisemitism includes for example Nazi/Apartheid/Colonialism Analogy, claiming that Israel is a terrorist state or that Israeli bears influence on media.²⁸

The most prevalent narrative category in the Romanian data was conspiratorial antisemitism, appearing in 31% (657 pieces) of the examined content. This was followed by new antisemitism, present in 28% (584 pieces). Classical stereotypes ranked third with 18.6% (392 pieces), while traditional religion-based appeared in 7% (146 pieces), and Holocaust denial and distortion in 5% (110 pieces).

48. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narrative categories in the full dataset.



The amount of the analysed data increased in general in 2024, and so did the amount of antisemitic content. However, the proportion of most narrative categories declined, except for new


<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

²⁷ IHRA Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion (2013). <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion>

²⁸ ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>

antisemitism. The number of new antisemitic narratives rose nearly fourteen times, resulting in a five times increase proportionally (from 2.1% to 10.6%). Proportionally conspiratorial antisemitic narratives decreased the most (from 16.6% to 6.8%).

49. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).




2.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

Besides narratives, two other types of antisemitic content were examined by the research: hate speech and calls for violence.

- **Hate speech:** Hateful content aimed against Jews and/or based on antisemitic narratives.
- **Call for violence:** Content that incites violence of any kind against Jews.


Hate speech was relatively common in the Romanian dataset, appearing in 2.6% (183 pieces) of content. Content calling for violence against Jews was less common, appearing in around 0.4% (28 pieces) of the data, and appearing only in 2024.

50. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the full dataset.



The amount of hate speech also increased in 2024, but proportionally it remained largely unchanged. As call for violence did not appear in 2023, in 2024 it increased both quantitatively and proportionally (appearing in 0.5% of the data from 2024).

51. Figure: Proportion of antisemitic categories beyond narratives in the dataset for 2023 and 2024 (separately).



3. Types of antisemitic content in the data examined

3.1 Content of antisemitic narratives

3.1.1 Conspiratorial antisemitism

Conspiratorial antisemitism increased sharply, especially with the *Jewish control/power* sub-narrative (177 to 258), which claims that Jews secretly control global politics, finance, or media, often manipulating world events for their benefit. Other prominent conspiracies included the *New World Order theory* (6 to 31), suggesting that a secret elite, often linked to Jews, is working to create a global government, eroding national sovereignty. While mentions of the *Illuminati* (19 to 14) and *Soros* (27 to 12) saw a decrease, both still feature prominently in conspiracies: the *Illuminati* sub-narrative claims a hidden group, often involving Jews, is orchestrating world affairs, and the *Soros* conspiracy centers around George Soros, who is accused of using his wealth to destabilize governments or advance a political agenda, framed through antisemitic lenses. The *Great Replacement theory* (37 to 25) dropped slightly, but it still suggests that Jewish influence is part of a plot to replace native populations and weaken traditional societies. *Covid-19*-related conspiracies (4 to 10) saw an increase, with false claims linking Jews to the creation or spread of the pandemic for control or financial gain. Mentions of *Judeo-Communism* (17 to 26) also grew, suggesting that Jews are behind communist movements aimed at subverting capitalist societies. Additionally, the *Zelensky* sub-narrative, focused on accusations that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was part of a larger Jewish conspiracy, once prevalent (63), dropped significantly to 29.

The general theme of the conspiratorial antisemitic pieces of content suggests that Jews secretly control economic, political, and media systems. Jews are depicted as manipulative, controlling and exploiting, especially in relation to financial and political spheres, in order to serve their own interests.


A predominant narrative in the Romanian sector involves the idea that Jews control or significantly influence Romanian politics. For example, there have been persistent accusations that Jews manipulate political figures or parties, especially those in power. (e.g. “Nicolae Ciucă is the servant of the Khazarian satanists who turned the Holy Romania into a colony,” “Jews control the people in positions of power like Mircea Geoană,” “Marcel Ciolacu is the servant of America and the Kykes,” “the Jewish freemasons are numerous in all the parties, but AUR”)

In 2023, the antisemitic messages with a conspiratorial undertone centered on the Russo-Ukrainian war or on accusations about the Jews' desire to divide Christians and destroy Christianity. (e.g. “Israel wants to outlaw Christianity,” “Christianity is manipulated by Jews”) The moment the Israeli-Palestinian conflict began, however, brings to the forefront a new face of this category, namely accusations of Jewish control and power in the US. Along these lines, criticism of US support for Israel is becoming increasingly common, and Romania is not immune from similar accusations.

The bulk of this category is represented by the *Jewish control/power* sub-narrative. The next most prevalent narrative, though with fewer occupancies, is equally significant and encompasses conspiracy theories about President Zelensky and his Jewish ethnicity.

The conspiratorial narrative had a steady dynamic across both years. In 2023, there were 507 pieces of conspiratorial antisemitic content, and this number increased to 550 in 2024. (e.g. “When will we get rid of all kinds of Jewish experiments, such as communism, democracy, plandemic, the great reset, globalization, new world order, the EU and its subsidiaries, NATO with the related scumbags, bilderberg, davos, g7”)

52. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Conspiratorial antisemitism.



3.1.2 New antisemitism

New antisemitism targeting Israel spiked alarmingly in 2024, especially in the sub-narratives of *demonization* (6 to 178), *delegitimization* (3 to 52), and *colonialism analogies* (1 to 43), indicating an increase in public hostility toward Israel. Other notable sub-narratives also saw significant rises, including accusations of *Israel as a terrorist state* (11 to 84), *collective responsibility* (3 to 38), and *Israel being solely responsible for the Arab-Israeli conflict* (2 to 49). These shifts reflect a troubling trend toward the vilification of Israel and its supporters, with broader generalizations affecting the Jewish community as a whole. The *apartheid analogy* (4 to 27) compares Israel's policies toward Palestinians to South Africa's racial segregation system, suggesting Israel practices systemic oppression. The *collective responsibility* sub-narrative holds all Jews collectively accountable for Israel's actions, fostering widespread blame on individuals based on their ethnic or religious identity. The *Nazi analogy* (3 to 44) draws comparisons between Israeli actions and those of Nazi Germany, while the *taboo of criticism* (6 to 30) refers to the belief that criticism of Israel is often shut down unjustly, while denying the right of refers to rejecting Israels' right to exist or defend itself. These sub-

narratives have intensified the atmosphere of hostility and polarization surrounding discussions of Israel in the public sphere.

New antisemitism often recontextualizes traditional antisemitic tropes in the context of political issues Jewish states' policies and Israel, sometimes blending these types of criticism with globalist conspiracies.

Unlike other narrative categories, the new antisemitic content presented the most substantial increase, in response to the events of October 7th. In 2023, there were 38 cases of new antisemitic comments, whereas in 2024, the number has increased to 546.

As a general expression, the new antisemitic narrative in Romania is largely rooted in the disagreement with Israels' actions subsequent October 7th. However, the 584 pieces of content considered antisemitic went beyond mere criticism of the Israeli policies, embodying broader anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli rhetoric. This discourse blurs the line between political critique and outright antisemitism, fact that determined a high degree of difficulty in classifying them.

As previously mentioned, among the subcategories of the new antisemitism narrative, the most encountered ones were: *demonisation*, Israel perceived as a *terrorist state*, and the assertion that *Israel is solely responsible for the Arab-Israeli conflict*, followed closely by *delegitimization*, the *colonialism analogy* and claims about *the influence on the media*.


The pieces of content that were classified in the *demonisation* section, portray Israel as a malevolent force, as a villain or a historical oppressor. (e.g. “the genocidal criminal state of Israel,” “the exponents of the Zionist regime are possessed by an evil spirit”) The sub-narrative labeled *Israel is a terrorist state* also saw an increase following the October 7th events. It embodies a series of critical comments about the Israeli actions in the region, which cross into antisemitism if the statements portray Israel as inherently malevolent or uses it as a proxy to promote hostility against Jews. (e.g. “in Israel you get eaten if you say things against the terrorist regime there,” “Israel is a terrorist state run by criminals”) The *Israel is solely responsible for the Arab-Israeli conflict* sub-narrative includes comments that imply a reductive perspective that places all blame for the long-standing and complex regional conflict exclusively on Israel. (e.g. “Israelis are responsible for all bad things that happen in the Middle East,” “the challenges in the area are manufactured only by Jews and their Jewish American mates”)

Delegitimization involves questioning or denying Israels' right to exist as a legitimate state, and regarding the Middle East conflict that escalated in 2024, the antisemitic comments often claim that the Jewish state has no historical or moral foundation. (e.g. “Israel is a randomly and wrongly invented country”, “Jews have no right to the promised land”)

The *colonialism analogy* likens Israel to a colonial power, implying that it is occupying land that does not belong to it. (e.g. “Israel is full of colonists who steal, rob and kill”) This type of narrative depicts the conflict with an imperial domination overtone, rather than a complex geopolitical issue.

The sub-narrative that suggests an *Israeli influence on the media* claims that Israel and some Jewish figures control or influence the media not only in Romania, but also worldwide, in order to manipulate the public opinion regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. (e.g. “Israel owns the media”)

53. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category New antisemitism.



3.1.3 Classic stereotypes

In Romania, classic antisemitic stereotypes have fluctuated significantly between 2023 and 2024. The sub-narrative of *Evil* (33 to 118) saw a drastic increase, while accusations of *Greed/wealth* (44 to 45) and *Deceit and lie* (36 to 39) remained relatively stable. The stereotype of *Disloyalty/dual loyalty* grew (8 to 18), and *Jew as the "other"* also rose (15 to 23). However, the *Taboo of criticism* remained unchanged (8 to 8).

This category includes classic stereotypes about the Jew being *evil, greedy, deceitful, disloyal* or dangerous to society, the enumeration representing also some of the subcategories of this narrative. It often reinforces the idea that Jews are inherently problematic members of society.

In Romania, these age-old stereotypes are oftentimes invoked in economic contexts, with Jews being accused of financial crises or portrayed as hoarding wealth insatiably (e.g. “no one ever saw a poor Kyke”). These presumptions are specifically evident in the financial industry or business discourse, where Jews are often considered to be manipulative and predatory. The year 2023 reveals that the *greed/wealth* sub-narrative was much more prevalent among antisemitic views.

Within this category, there is a worrying rise in the year 2024, particularly in the *evil* sub-narrative. In the context of the Romanian space, this stereotype has often been associated with the idea that Jews are an evil force, involved in conspiracies to control economies, governments or media institutions. This myth of the Jew as "evil" is often linked to the idea that Jews would seek to undermine the majority societies in order to impose their own agenda, being perceived as manipulators or even as a "threat" to national identity. Usually, this narrative goes alongside conspiratorial accusations of *Jewish control/power*. (e.g. "the US is 100% under the control of the Jews, more than 50% of US senators are Jews," "Zionists form the 1% "elite" who, through criminal means, own the world's resources")


The *deceit and lie* stereotype portray Jews as inherently untrustworthy, accusing them of using deception and manipulation for personal or communal gain. (e.g. "Jews are wolves in sheep's clothing," "nothing you see or are told in Israel is what it seems, they are two faced liars")

The antisemitic comments in the *disloyalty/dual loyalty* sub-narrative often align with conspiratorial claims, suggesting that Jews prioritize a global agenda over national loyalties. (e.g. "in Romania, many Israeli swindlers deceived people," "snitching Jews should go to hell")

The *taboo of criticism* sub-narrative asserts that freedom of expression is restricted when addressing topics related to Jews or Israel. Antisemitic comments often claim that such topics are deliberately censored, frequently linking these allegations to broader conspiracies like "Jewish control of the media". (e.g. "Stanzas have been taken from the Lord's Proclamation, not to anger the Jews," "Jewish attack on free speech continues")

Coded predominantly under the "Jew as the other" category were messages and posts that enhanced the us versus them mentality, as well as messages that blamed Jews for the antisemitism that has always existed.

54. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Classic antisemitic stereotypes.



3.1.4 Traditional, religion-based antisemitism

Traditional religious-based antisemitism remains present, with *deicide* accusations (15 to 9 cases) and *blood libel* (5 to 3) decreasing. The *blood libel* sub-narrative refers to the false accusation that Jews engage in blood-related rituals. The *Jew as Satan/devil* stereotype remains significant (29 to 21). However, the sub-narrative *Jews as the “other”* surged significantly (24 to 45).

The traditional religion-based antisemitic narrative has four subcategories: *deicide*, *blood libel/child murder*, *jews as Satan/Devil*, and *Jew as the other (in religious sense)*. The activity regarding this narrative was also constant during 2023 (74 antisemitic pieces of content) and 2024 (72 antisemitic pieces of content), only a slight decrease can be noticed.


For this narrative, was often selected the *deicide* subcategory. (e.g. “the Kykes crucified Jesus and chose the thief, this defines their entire history”) However, *Jew as the other* subcategory was chosen even more often, as many comments focused on themes of extreme segregation stemming from the perceived “higher status” that Jews are believed to claim. This presumption is often linked to the notion that Judaism inherently fosters a sense of superiority. Some of the comments in this sub-narrative involve accusations portraying Jews as deviating from or opposing Christian beliefs, often labeling them as enemies of the faith. (e.g. “heretic, pagan, Antichrist worshipper jews,” “the suffering of Jews is a result of their own wrongdoing and as a punishment from God,” “Jews are evil and sinners”) These narratives are particularly encountered in certain Christian fundamentalist circles and among extreme nationalist groups; these two groups generally converge.

The *blood libel* sub-narrative in Romanian antisemitism refers to the longstanding, false accusation that Jews engage in some obscure rituals. This blood libel myth has had a historical presence, with notable prevalence during the interwar period and under the influence of fascist ideologies. In the

recent years, this accusation shows a slight decrease in occurrences of the *blood libel* sub-narrative, from 2023 to 2024 (from 5 to 3), which may suggest that its usage has diminished. (e.g. “shocking history of Zionism, occultism and satanism surrounding red heifer sacrifice rituals,” “occult and satanic Jewish practices”)

It is noticeable the presence of *Jews as Satan/Devil* type of views in 2023. This sub-narrative included messages calling Jews inherently Satanist in terms of their religion and traditions, being placed in opposition to Christianity. Likewise, content pieces arguing that the anti-Christ is/will be Jewish were included here. (e.g. “the money sent to the Nazi Khazar Satan-Yehova worshippers goes to the manufacture of adrenochrome”, “anti-Christ will be Jewish”)

55. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Traditional, religion-based antisemitism.



3.1.5 Holocaust Denial and Distortion

The Holocaust narrative saw a rise in regard to *denial or distortion* (15 to 27) and *Holocaust as a positive event* (1 to 6), while *Nazi analogies* dropped (31 to 11). Instances of *blaming Jews for the Holocaust* doubled (3 to 6) but remained in small numbers. Narratives attempting to *blur the responsibility* for the Holocaust, which seek to shift or dilute culpability by attributing it to broader or alternative factors and minimizing the accountability of the primary perpetrators, declined from 19 to 7. Mentions of *Judeo-Communism*, meanwhile, emerged minimally (0 to 2).

This category connotes the rejection or diminishment of the Holocaust, often questioning the magnitude of the atrocities or insinuate a manner that minimizes the suffering of the victims. In the Romanian landscape, this narrative is oftentimes tied to nationalist movements that seek to minimize or even negate the role of Romania in the Holocaust. This narrative often emerges in far-right media pieces of content, where the Holocaust is portrayed as a fabricated story or as an event


exaggerated for political reasons. The number of these type of pieces of content increased from 53 in 2023 to 57 in 2024.

The first subcategory, *Denying or distorting the Holocaust*, shows the largest jump between the two years, with a significantly higher representation in 2024. This may reflect the growing prevalence of outright denial or attempts to manipulate historical facts to downplay the magnitude and reality of the Holocaust, in the context of the Israel – Palestine conflict.

The sub-narrative, *Blaming Jews*, increased from 3 to 6 pieces of content. (“the massacre was carried out by Soviets, mostly Ukrainians and Jews”) Similarly, the notion of *Holocaust as a positive event* grew slightly from 1 in 2023 to 6 in 2024. (“The Jews have destroyed everything. If Hitler and Antonescu had been alive, the world would have been free of thieves”) All of these sub-narratives seek to undermine the historical truth of the Holocaust, distorting its significance and impact.

The use of *Nazi analogies* has risen sharply in 2024, making it one of the most prominent categories. This involves drawing inappropriate or exaggerated comparisons between Nazi policies and modern political or social issues, often as a rhetorical device. Such analogies trivialize the Holocaust, eroding its unique historical significance and desensitizing audiences to the atrocities committed during that period.

56. Figure: Sub-narratives of the antisemitic narrative category Holocaust denial and distortion.



3.2 Antisemitic content beyond narratives

3.2.1 Antisemitic hate speech

Out of 7.012 analyzed pieces of content, 183 were classified as hate speech. A majority of these comments carried also a conspiratorial shade.

Most of the pieces of content falling into this category were racial slurs such as the most common example "jidan". Another type of content included in the range of this category consisted of expressions using the word Jew as an insult. These were most commonly found in the following media categories: Far-right pages, Fake news/conspiratorial sites. However, the comment sections of all media categories were not free from such antisemitic remarks.

Hate speech without any sub-narratives refers offensive or abusive statements about Jews. Out of 7,012 analyzed pieces of content, 183 were identified as hate speech, with a significant portion carrying a conspiratorial undertone. The majority of this hateful content consisted of racial slurs, with "jidan" being the most frequently encountered example. Another common form of antisemitic expression involved using the term "Jew" as an insult. These instances were most prevalent on far-right pages and fake news/conspiratorial sites, which frequently serve as breeding grounds for such rhetoric. However, it is important to note that antisemitic remarks were not confined to these platforms; hateful comments appeared across the comment sections of all monitored media categories, highlighting the pervasive nature of this issue.

The main topics generating such reactions are: the Israel-Palestine conflict, Zelensky and the war in Ukraine, but also other domestic political issues.

3.2.2 Antisemitic violence

A total of 28 comments fell under the category of **call for violence**. Notably, all these comments were posted in 2024 and were directly linked to discussions surrounding the events that followed October 7th in the Middle East.

Most of the pieces of content in this category were exclamations chanting the death or disappearance of the Jews/state of Israel.

As mentioned before, this category contains the smallest number of antisemitic comments and as the new antisemitism narrative, it is tied to the October 7th event.

The majority of the content in this category consisted of violent exclamations calling for the death or disappearance of Jews and the state of Israel. These statements often took the form of inflammatory rhetoric, inciting harm or advocating for the annihilation of Jewish individuals and the dissolution of Israel.

3.3 Topics provoking antisemitism

The data suggests that antisemitism can arise in response to a broad spectrum of topics, demonstrating a concerning adaptability of antisemitic narratives. However, certain themes were more likely to provoke antisemitism, often reflecting historical stereotypes and prejudices. For example, discussions around finance, banking, or perceived global influence frequently triggered antisemitic tropes about Jewish control or manipulation. These responses often invoked conspiratorial themes, reinforcing age-old stereotypes.

Certain themes, regardless of context, consistently incited antisemitic responses: most of the antisemitic conspiratorial instances were generated by issues in Romanian politics. Almost any problem could be linked to the presence of a Jew who either corrupts politicians or is himself part of the political scene, which facilitates the fulfilment of his despicable purposes.

Topics touching on Jewish religious practices or cultural differences sometimes spurred discriminatory or prejudiced responses. Misunderstandings or mischaracterizations of Jewish customs were also a common source.

Conversations regarding Israel, particularly its policies or conflicts in the Middle East, were highly likely to provoke antisemitism. Antisemitic rhetoric often blurred distinctions between criticism of Israeli politics and prejudice against Jewish people more broadly.

Unexpectedly, neutral or unrelated topics, such as discussions about holidays, celebrities, philanthropy, or even certain foods associated with Jewish culture, occasionally provoked antisemitic remarks.

Antisemitic narratives showed an ability to adapt to contemporary issues, such as public health debates or digital currency discussions, repurposing older prejudices for new contexts.

3.4 Code words used for Jews, examples

The selection of the keywords for analysis in Romania targeted the most frequently used terms which describe Jewish individuals and groups, spanning references from ethnicity and religion to, notably, words with pejorative charge. The study utilized seven primary terms along with additional related words from the same lexical field. The first five terms in the sequence are neutral, referring to Jewish individuals. As opposed, the last two terms carry a derogatory overtone, reflecting a pejorative connotation aimed at denigrating the Jewish community.

1. “evreu” – This term, meaning “Jew,” originates from the Hebrew root [ג.ב.ע.] with its literal sense “to cross”. The term aligns with the English equivalent, “Hebrew” and it is commonly used to denote ethnicity. Here are some examples of antisemitic remarks including the codeword “evreu”: “the Jew lies even when asking a question,” “Jews can't help being wretched”.

“ovreu” – An alternative to „evreu” with a similar neutral meaning.

2. “iudeu” – “Jew,” “Judean,” “from Judea,” derived from Latin *Iudaeus*, Greek *Ioudaios* or Hebrew יְהוּדִי (Yehudi). (e.g. “Who is this Judean? He should be kicked out of Romania”).
3. “Israel”, “israelian” – Referring to “Israel,” “Israeli” (e.g. “Israel must fall”, “Israel is a bunch of criminal racists and country thieves”).
4. “zionist” / “sionist” – “Zionist” (e.g. “It's time to eliminate the Zionist criminal fanatics and country thieves”).
5. “mozaic” – “Mosaic” (regarding the religious paradigm – “the Mosaic Covenant/Law,” for example; relating to Moses). In the comments section the term is usually employed in religious discussions.
6. “jidan” – “Kyke,” “Jew,” “Judean” (derived from the Slavic “jid” – jew, plus the augmentative suffix “-an”, used as a pejorative term; “jidov” - also “Jew,” “Judean,” but in some regions:

cockroach, whose ankles have a yellow, foul-smelling discharge. These terms are considered highly offensive and derogatory. It is often associated with conspiratorial or dehumanizing rhetoric. (e.g. “since forever the Kykes have done only evil deeds, a nation of wretched people”).

7. “khazar” - a semi-nomadic Turkic people who converted to Judaism. (e.g. “the attack of the Nazi terrorist satanist Khazarians, [...] the terrorists led by Bibi Satanyahu”).

The last term, “khazar”, exhibited particular challenges during the monitoring process. Some of the comments revealed a distinction between Jewish identity and Khazarian origins, where the latter is not genuinely Jewish, but rather a pretender. In contrast, other pieces of content insinuated that “Khazar” was synonymous with “Jew”, blurring the lines between the two. Examples of antisemitic content include: “Khazars and snake people - the worst of the Jews”, “Romania is full of Kykes, Khazars, Jews.” Nevertheless, the term is used preponderantly in contexts that suggest an antagonistic undertone.

Notably, “sionist” frequently appeared in conspiratorial contexts with negative connotations, and the most prevalent derogatory terms were “jidan” and “khazar.”

4. Conclusion

The analysis of Romanian antisemitic discourse during 2023-2024 reveals a multifaceted and evolving issue, deeply influenced by internal sociopolitical dynamics and global events. The persistence of conspiratorial narratives highlights a deeply rooted tendency to scapegoat Jews for economic, political, and societal challenges. The significant rise in new antisemitism, particularly following the October 7th events, reflects the fluid nature of such rhetoric, where traditional stereotypes are recontextualized to align with contemporary geopolitical narratives, such as anti-Zionist rhetoric that equates legitimate political critique with antisemitism.

While far-right and conspiratorial platforms emerge as dominant propagators of antisemitic content, mainstream medias' substantial share of problematic comments indicates the need for enhanced moderation and awareness even in ostensibly neutral spaces. This underscores how antisemitic rhetoric transcends ideological boundaries, appearing not only in overtly biased outlets but also infiltrating mainstream discourses through unmoderated public interactions.

The growing prevalence of Holocaust denial, trivialization through Nazi analogies, and violent rhetoric post-October 7th points to a dangerous shift in the discourse, where historical revisionism and incitement to violence gain traction. The overwhelming presence of such content in the comment sections highlights social medias' dual role as a platform for public expression and a conduit for unchecked hate speech.

These findings underscore the urgent need for a comprehensive response encompassing public awareness, educational initiatives, and stricter content moderation to address and mitigate the spread of antisemitism in Romanian digital and media spaces.

5. Methodology

The research aimed to examine antisemitic narratives in online textual content - such as comments, articles and Facebook posts - before and after 7 October 2023. We analysed content from websites and Facebook pages of previously defined media outlets. The content was collected using social listening software based on pre-defined keywords, covering the same period in both 2023 and 2024. The research was conducted in four countries (Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania) by national research teams coordinated by Political Capital, using the same methodology.

Definition of antisemitism

The basis of the research was the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism: "*Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.*" A detailed explanation of the definition, along with illustrative examples, is available on the IHRA website²⁹.

5.1 Data collection

In our research, we analysed online textual content: articles, posts and comments from websites and Facebook pages. The data was collected using social listening software, SentiOne. SentiOne scrapes data in a given timeframe, from the given media sources based on the given keywords.

5.1.1 Keywords

We defined four keywords that we used to identify potentially relevant content in all countries: 1) Jews, 2) Israel, 3) Holocaust, 4) Zionism/Zionist. In addition, we included specific keywords relevant to each country. In Romania, these were: *jid, iud, mosaic, ovre* and *khazar*. In languages where these words could have different endings, we used the base form of the keywords followed by an asterisk (*). This approach allowed SentiOne to identify results for all variations and endings of the keywords.

5.1.2 Sources monitored

With input from the national research teams, Political Capital identified six categories of online media to monitor content from: 1) independent (mainstream) media, 2) mainstream tabloids, 3) (hyper-)partisan/biased media, 4) right-wing/far-right sites, 5) fake news/conspiratorial sites, 5) left-wing/far-left sites. We collected pages for each category in all countries, including media outlets' websites and Facebook pages. In all countries, we selected the three media outlets per category with the most results for our keywords in the same time period. In Romania, we monitored the following media outlets' websites and Facebook pages:

²⁹ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

- **Independent (mainstream) media:** Digi 24, Cotidianul, Hotnews. These represent news outlets that operate outside direct governmental while maintaining a significant audience reach and influence. The monitored Romanian media platforms represent diverse political and audience perspectives, essential for evaluating how antisemitism is addressed, ignored, or perpetuated in mainstream narratives.
- **Far-right pages:** Incorrect Politic, Activenews, Diana Iovanovici-Şoşoacă, Senator. These pages often promote nationalist, xenophobic, or extremist ideologies, including antisemitic narratives. Analyzing these pages helps track the spread, evolution, and influence of such narratives within fringe and potentially mainstream discourse.
- **Mainstream tabloids:** Click!, Fanatik, RomaniaTV. These pages focus on sensationalist and entertainment-driven content, often prioritizing headlines that grab attention. These tabloid sites influence monitoring by showcasing how antisemitic stereotypes can be subtly embedded in sensationalist content, reaching large audiences and potentially normalizing harmful narratives.
- **Fake news/conspiratorial sites:** Stiripesurse.ro, SACCSIV, Flux 24. These pages spread misinformation and promote unverified or extremist narratives, often exploiting societal fears. Their monitoring is critical for identifying the role of misinformation in shaping antisemitic beliefs, tracking the dissemination of harmful ideas.
- **(Hyper-)Partisan/biased media:** Buna Ziua Iași (BZI), 60m, 5news.ro. These pages promote content aligned with specific political or ideological agendas. Monitoring this type of media is extremely important for understanding biases that are potentially polarizing public opinion on Jewish-related topics.
- **Left-wing/far-left pages:** might intersect with or unintentionally perpetuate antisemitic stereotypes, such as conspiracy theories about Jewish influence in finance or politics. The analyzed sites might reveal how antisemitism can manifest within anti-capitalist rhetoric. However, none of these were included. The single article extracted from such a source, was not antisemitic.

5.1.3 Monitoring period

Based on our previous experiences in coding textual content into previously defined categories and the resources available to the project, we set a goal of analysing 7,000 pieces of content per country. Because we wanted to examine changes in antisemitic narratives after 7 October 2023, we chose the same time period in both 2023 and 2024. This was determined by identifying the country with the least data for our keywords and calculating how many days were needed, starting from a chosen date (in this case, 1 April), for the downloaded data in that country to exceed 7,000 pieces of content. As a result, data collection in all countries was standardised to the same timeframe: April 1 and April 15, 13:00.

5.1.4 The amount of data analysed

We filtered each dataset to include more than 7,000 pieces of content, maintaining the original proportions of keywords, sources (websites and Facebook pages), and years within the dataset. This approach resulted in the following proportions of the total downloaded dataset being analysed in each country: Romania - 100%, Hungary - 73%, Italy - 44%, and Poland - 35%.

In all countries the amount of data collected in 2024 was higher than in 2023. The smallest increase was in Hungary, where the data increased by about one and a half times in 2024. In Romania the data increased by almost three times, in Poland by almost five times and in Italy by almost seven times. In all countries most of the data consisted of comments.

The amount of data also varied between countries by media category:

- Hungary: The majority of data came from far-right pages, followed by mainstream media, biased outlets, tabloids, and minimal data from conspiratorial and left-wing sources.
- Italy: Most data came from mainstream media, followed by tabloids, biased outlets, left-wing and conspiratorial sources, with very little data from far-right pages.
- Poland: Most data came from tabloids, followed by biased outlets, mainstream media, far-right pages, conspiratorial sites and very little from left-wing sources.
- Romania: Most of the data came from mainstream media, followed by conspiratorial sites, tabloids, far-right sources, biased outlets and a small amount of data from left-wing sources.

		Examined content in media categories							
		Mainstream	Far-right	Conspiratorial	Biased	Tabloid	Left	Total amount of data/year	Time amo d
Hungary	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221	
Italy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163	
Poland	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818	
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165	

5.2 Coding the data

5.2.1 Conceptual framework

Using publicly available resources, such as studies, research reports, scientific articles, etc., Political Capital developed a conceptual framework to define the theoretical background of the research. In addition to stating that the research was based on the IHRA's working definition of antisemitism, the document thoroughly presented the main categories of antisemitic narratives and sub-narratives on which the research was based. All partners had the opportunity to discuss, comment on, and add to

the content of the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework was also discussed with members of the BOND project's Advisory Board and external experts.

5.2.2 Finalising the methodology and creating a methodology guide

Finalising the research methodology involved multiple discussions - including consultations with an expert member of the BOND Advisory Board and several attempts to analyse and code online texts in different ways. From these efforts, the final categories for coding the data were established. Four classifications were defined for the nature of content:

5. Antisemitic – Content that contained at least one antisemitic narrative.
6. Potentially antisemitic – Content that included a narrative that could be either interpreted as both antisemitic and non-antisemitic, or it appeared antisemitic only in light of the context (the article/post it was responding to).
7. Not understandable – Content that was incomprehensible (this category was almost only applicable to comments).
8. Not antisemitic – Content that did not include any antisemitic narratives.

Based on the conceptual framework, five main categories of antisemitic narratives were identified, each containing sub-categories (the details and definitions of these categories will be described later):

- Classic antisemitic stereotypes
- Traditional, religion-based antisemitism (anti-Judaism)
- Conspiratorial antisemitism,
- Holocaust denial and distortion,
- New antisemitism (antisemitism based on criticism of Israel).

Two additional categories were defined: "hate speech" and "call for violence".

The coding process was described in detail in a methodology guide.

As part of the coding process, coders were required to document the antisemitic phrases identified in the content. For comments, they also had to record the context - specifically, the subject of the article or post under which the comment was written.

5.2.3 Training of the coders

After sharing the conceptual framework and the methodology guide with the national research teams, Political Capital organised a meeting to explain and discuss these documents and the process and to provide space for questions. Throughout the research process, the research teams met regularly to discuss issues and questions that arose during the research process.

To ensure a common understanding of the theoretical framework and to increase the reliability of the research - within the constraints of resources and team capacities - the research process included a learning phase. During this phase, 350 pieces of content were filtered from the dataset while maintaining the original proportions of results by keyword, media category, and year. A slight overrepresentation of results for the keyword "Israel" was included, based on the assumption that identifying new antisemitism would be the greatest challenge. In each country, two members of the national research teams coded these data independently. Their results were then compared and discrepancies were discussed to reach an agreement. In cases where agreement could not be reached, they were given the opportunity to consult with Political Capital for further clarification.

5.2.4 The coding process

Coding the data followed the same procedure across all countries. The national teams received their content in an Excel file, which included all relevant properties (e.g., comment/article/post, date of publishing, source, context, etc.). During the coding process, coders read the content itself and, for comments, also examined the context.

If antisemitic narratives were identified in the content, coders labelled it as either antisemitic or potentially antisemitic, defined the antisemitic narrative, and categorised it into a main antisemitic narrative category along with one of its sub-categories. A single piece of content could be categorised into multiple (maximum four) narrative categories, as it was possible for more than one antisemitic narrative to appear within the same text. If the content did not contain any antisemitic narratives, or if its meaning was not understandable, it was not assigned to any category.

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Introduction to the BOND project

The BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities) project³⁰ was implemented from January 2023 to December 2024 in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. Its primary goal was to address deep-rooted prejudices, hateful attitudes, and behaviors within society, particularly those targeting European Jewry. The project also aimed to foster understanding, tolerance, and dialogue. A significant focus was placed on educating young people about Judaism and antisemitism, as well as promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. Its activities included researching antisemitism, monitoring antisemitic narratives, developing educational curricula, training teachers, organising youth education and exchange programs, facilitating inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, and hosting local roundtables on tolerance and social inclusion. The project was guided by the definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).³¹

³⁰ Webpage of the BOND project: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

³¹ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

Kutatási jelentés – Magyarország

Online antiszemita narratívák Magyarországon 2023 október 7. előtt és után

Vezetői összefoglaló

- A kutatás célja az volt, hogy megvizsgálja az online antiszemita narratívákat a Hamász 2023. október 7-én Izrael ellen elkövetett terrortámadása előtt és után.
- Magyarországon 2008 valamely előre meghatározott, az antiszemitizmushoz kapcsolódó kulcsos egyikét tartalmazó online tartalom került elemzésre, főként a szélsőjobboldali oldalakról, a mainstream médiából és a kormányzati irányítású oldalakról, valamint kisebb számban álhíroldalakról és baloldali oldalakról. Az elemzett tartalmak nagy része komment volt, 10%-a cikk, és pár Facebook-poszt. Az elemzett adatok mennyisége 2023-ról 2024-re mintegy másfélszeresére nőtt, ami jól mutatja október 7. és az azt követő háború hatását.
- Az elemzett tartalom 52%-a tartalmazott antiszemita vagy potenciálisan antiszemita (antiszamtának és nem antiszemítának is érhető) narratívákat. Ezek többsége komment volt, és a legtöbb antiszemita és potenciálisan antiszemita tartalom 2023-ban és 2024-ben is a szélsőjobboldali felületeken jelent meg.
- Az antiszemita tartalmak aránya 2023-ról 2024-re enyhén csökkent Magyarországon. Az adott évi adatok 50,91%-a volt antiszemita 2023-ban, 2024-ben pedig 44,44%-a. A potenciálisan antiszemita tartalmak aránya nagyjából azonos maradt, 2023-ban 5,13%, 2024-ben pedig 5,45% volt.
- A leggyakrabban megjelenő narratíva kategória az összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemitizmus volt, amelyet a klasszikus sztereotípiák (klasszikus antiszemitizmus) követtek. A harmadik helyen az új antiszemitizmus (Izrael kritikáján alapuló antiszemitizmus) állt, majd a holokausztagadás és -torzítás, valamint a hagyományos-vallási antiszemitizmus következett.
- Bár az antiszemita narratívák mennyisége 2024-ben nőtt, arányuk összességében nagyjából változatlan maradt. Az új antiszemitizmus 2024-ben arányaiban több mint négyszeresére növekedve csaknem hétszer többször jelent meg a vizsgált adatban, miközben a többi narratíva kategória aránya csökkent.
- Az antiszemita gyűlöletbeszéd viszonylag gyakori volt a vizsgált tartalmakban, míg a kifejezetten zsidók elleni erőszakra felszólító tartalmak ritkábban fordultak elő.
- Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy az antiszemitizmust szinte bármilyen téma kiválthatja. Megjelentek antiszemita narratívák a legkülönfélébb témajú cikkek kommentszekcióiban, beleértve a hírességekkel kapcsolatos híreket, kormányzati döntéseket és semleges témaákat is. Sok esetben azonban a cikk témaája befolyásolta a megjelenő narratívák egyes elemeit, például az adott összeesküvés szereplőit. Néhány

narratíva kategória erősen kötődött bizonyos témaikhoz (pl. hagyományos-vallási antiszemizmus/antijudaizmus).

- A zsidók leírására számos, több kategóriába sorolható kódszó megjelent az adatban.

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Bevezetés

A kutatás célja az volt, hogy elemesse az online antiszemita narratívákban bekövetkezett változásokat a 2023. október 7-i, a Hamász által Izrael ellen elkövetett, háborút eredményező terrortámadás után. Ezek az események Európa-szerte az antiszemizmus növekedéséhez vezettek, ami szükségessé tette az online antiszemita narratívák változásainak vizsgálatát. A kutatási módszertan és a kategóriák kidolgozása 2023 végén és 2024 elején fejeződött be, a kutatás pedig 2024 tavaszán kezdődött.

Az Izraellel kapcsolatban megfogalmazott antiszemizmus felismerése és meghatározása, azaz az Izraellel szembeni jogos és jogtalan kritika megkülönböztetése október 7-e óta különösen nagy kihívást jelent. Kutatásunk az International Nemzetközi Holokauszt Emlékezési Szövetség (IHRA) antiszemizmusra vonatkozó munkadefinícióján alapul¹, amelyet 43 ország és számos nemzetközi szervezet, köztük az EU és legtöbb tagállama is elfogadott.

A kutatást négy országban - Magyarországon, Olaszországban, Lengyelországban és Romániában - egyidejűleg végeztük, azonos módszertannal. A kutatás a szöveges tartalmakra fókuszált, beleértve cikkeket, a kommenteket és Facebook-post. A tartalmakat egy social listenint szoftver segítségével gyűjtöttük össze a kutatás témaájához relevánsabb médiumok honlapjairól és Facebook-oldalairól öt média kategóriában: független (mainstream) média, kormányzati irányítású média, bulvár médiumok, baloldali, szélsőjobboldali, és álhíreket/összeesküvéseket tartalmazó felületek. Az adatgyűjtés az antiszemita tartalmak felderítésére szolgáló kulcsszavak alapján történt. Négy alapvető kulcsszót (zsidó, Izrael, holokauszt és cionizmus/cionista) használtunk minden országban a helyi nyelven. Emellett országspecifikus kulcsszavak is segítették az adatgyűjtést. Azokon a nyelveken, ahol ezeknek a szavaknak különböző végződésük lehetett, az alapformákat egy csillag jel (*) követte, lehetővé téve az eredmények összegyűjtését minden változatra és végződésre vonatkozóan.

A kutatás a 2023. és 2024. április 1-15. közötti időszakra összpontosított, és minden országban közel 7000 tartalmat elemezett. A helyi kutatócsoportok minden tartalmat megvizsgáltak, és antiszemita, potenciálisan antiszemita (antiszemitaként és nem antiszemitaként is értelmezhető), nem érthető, vagy nem antiszemita kategóriába soroltak. Nyilvánosan elérhető források (tanulmányok, kutatási jelentések, tudományos cikkek) alapján az antiszemita narratívák öt fő kategóriáját határoztuk meg: klasszikus antiszemizmus, összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemizmus, hagyományos vallási antiszemizmus, holokausztagadás és torzítás, valamint új antiszemizmus (az Izraellel szembeni kritikán alapuló antiszemizmus). Ezek mellett két kiegészítő kategóriát is létrehoztunk:

¹ Az antiszemizmus IHRA munkadefiníciója: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitionantisemitism>

gyűlölésbeszéd és a zsidók elleni erőszakra való felhívás. minden egyes tartalmat alaposan elemeztünk, és a felsorolt kategóriák közül besoroltunk egybe vagy több kategóriába is.


1. Az antiszemita tartalom mértéke a nemzeti adatállományban

1.1 Az antiszemita tartalom mértéke az adatállományban

A magyar adatok 52%-ában jelent meg antiszemita vagy potenciálisan antiszemita tartalom.

Az összesen 7008 tartalomból 3295 volt antiszemita, 373 potenciálisan antiszemita, 3101 nem volt antiszemita és 239 nem volt érhető.


Ábra 1. Az antiszemita tartalom mértéke az adatállományban



1.2 A vizsgált tartalmak megoszlása

A letöltött tartalmak túlnyomó többsége komment volt, és ezekben jelent meg a legtöbb antiszemita tartalom. A letöltött tartalmak 87,5%-a volt komment (6134), 10,5%-a cikk (744), és csak 2%-a volt Facebook-poszt (130). Az antiszemita narratívák túlnyomórészt a commentekben jelentek meg, amelyek több mint 53%-a (3261) antiszemita volt, 6%-a (362) potenciálisan antiszemita volt, 37%-a (2272) nem volt antiszemita, és körülbelül 4%-a (239) nem volt érhető. A cikkek 94%-a (700) nem volt antiszemita, 5%-a (34) antiszemita volt, 1%-a (10) pedig potenciálisan antiszemita. A Facebook-posztok túlnyomó többsége nem volt antiszemita, csak egy minősült potenciálisan antiszemitának.

Ábra 2. Az különböző tartalomtípusok megoszlása az adatállományban



1.3 Antiszemitizmus a különböző médiakategóriákban


Magyarországon az antiszemita tartalmak többsége a szélsőjobboldali felületeken jelent meg, az adathalmazban szereplő összes antiszemita tartalom 68,7%-át kitéve. Ezt követték a független mainstream médiumok (16,5%), a kormányzati irányítású oldalak (10,1%), a bulvárlapok (2,3%), az álhíroldalak (1,8%) és a baloldali felületek (0,6%). Hasonló mintázat volt megfigyelhető a potenciálisan antiszemita tartalmak esetében is, amelyek többsége szintén a szélsőjobboldali felületeken jelent meg (51,2%), melyet a független mainstream médiumok (25,7%), a kormányzati irányítású oldalak (17,4%), a bulvárlapok (2,4%), a baloldali oldalak (2,1%), illetve az álhíroldalak követtek (1,1%).

Azzal, hogy 2024-ben több adat került be az adatállományba, az antiszemita tartalmak száma is nőtt, de arányuk viszonylag stabil maradt a mainstream médiaoldalakon ezen médiakategória összes adatához képest. A baloldali és álhíroldalakon azonban nőtt, a bulvár, kormányzati irányítású és szélsőjobboldali felületeken pedig kissé csökkent.

Az antiszemita tartalmak (beleértve az antiszemita és potenciálisan antiszemita tartalmakat is) a szélsőjobboldali médiaoldalakon voltak a legelterjedtebbek, mind mennyiségileg (2455 darab), mind arányosan (75,5%), különösen a kommentekben. Arányosan az álhíroldalakon gyűjtött adatok 71%-ában szintén jelen volt antiszemita tartalom, bár abszolút számuk viszonylag alacsony volt (62 darab). Az összes többi médiakategóriában az antiszemita tartalmak aránya meglehetősen hasonló volt (mainstream - 30,7%, kormányzati irányítású-

29,8%, bulvár - 39,3%, baloldali - 28,1%). A tartalom teljes mennyiségeit vizsgálva azonban nagyobb különbségek mutatkoztak: a mainstream és a kormányzati irányítású médiakategóriákban volt a legtöbb antiszemita tartalom (640, illetve 379), míg a bulvár (85) és a baloldali (29) felületeken kevesebb.

Ábra 3. Az antiszemita tartalmak jelenléte a különböző médiakategóriákban



2. Az antiszemita tartalmak különböző típusainak áttekintése és ezek mértéke

2.1 Az antiszemita narratívákat tartalmazó adatok

A kutatás fogalmi kerete a öt fő antiszemita kategóriát határozott meg (mindegyiketet további alnarratívákkal kiegészítve):

- **Klasszikus sztereotípiák (klasszikus antisemitizmus):** Történetileg antiszemita előítéletekben gyökerező narratívák. Ide tartozik a zsidókkal szembeni, csupán a létezésükön és zsidó valláson alapuló gyűlölet. Ez egy olyan ellentmondásos logikán keresztül jelenik meg, mely a zsidókat egyszerre tekinti erősnek és gyengének, sőt ember alatti lényeknek. A klasszikus sztereotípiák közé tartozik például, hogy a zsidók gonoszak, kapzsik, hűtlenek vagy hazugok.²
- **Hagyományos-vallási antisemitizmus (antijudaizmus):** A hagyományos, vallási alapú judeofóbia vagy hagyományos antisemitizmus olyan zsidóellenes érzelmekre utal, amelyek vagy a vélt keresztény vagy a vélt zsidó valláshoz és hagyományokhoz kapcsolódó hiedelmekben gyökereznek. A hagyományos, vallási alapú antiszemita

² Matthias J. Becker et al., "Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets", *Humanities & Social Sciences Communications* 9, 2022

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3>; Matthias J. Becker et al., "Decoding Antisemitism" Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, p. 11, 13; ADL Antisemitic Myths. <https://antisemitism.adl.org/>

narratívák közé tartozik például a vérvád/gyermekekgyilkosság, az istengyilkosság vagy hogy a zsidók sátánisták/ördigiek.³

- **Összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemizmus:** Az összeesküvés-elméletek fenntartották az antiszemita hiedelmeket azzal, hogy azt sugallták, hogy a zsidók személyes haszonszerzés céljából befolyást gyakorolnak, és összeesküvést szőnek, hogy uralják az olyan területeket, mint a média, a politika és a gazdaság. Sok ilyen elmélet a "rejtett kéz" antiszemita mítoszában gyökerezik, és a zsidókat vagy zsidónak vélt szereplőket okolja a világ legsúlyosabb tragédiájért, például a háborúk kirobbantásáért vagy akár a COVID-19-ért. Az összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemita narratívák közé tartozik például a zsidó kontroll/ hatalom , a judeobolsevik összeesküvés, a Nagy Lakosságcseré elmélet⁴, vagy az Új Világrend elmélet.^{5,6}
- **Holokausztagadás és torzítás:** A holokausztagadás vagy torzítás a zsidó nép elleni náci népirtás történelmi tényeinek tagadására vagy elfordítésére törekzik. A holokausztagadás magában foglalja a nácik és szövetségeseik által a holokauszt során alkalmazott módszerek és kegyetlenségeik mértékének tagadását. A holokausztagadás és torzítás azt a hamis elképzelést is hirdeti, hogy a zsidók találták ki vagy túlozták el a holokausztot hogy használ húzzanak belőle. A holokausztagadás és a torzítás további alnarratívái közé tartozik például a zsidók hibáztatása a holokausztért, vagy a holokauszt pozitív eseményként való ábrázolása.⁷
- **Új antiszemizmus:** Az új antiszemizmus az Izrael ellen irányuló zsidóellenes érzelmek kifejeződésére utal. Az új antiszemizmus egyik legfontosabb funkciója, hogy lehetővé tegye az antiszemita nézetek politikailag elfogadhatónak tűnő módon történő kifejezését. Az új antiszemizmust Natan Sharansky 3D-tesztjének segítségével határozzuk meg: démonizáció, kettős mérce és delegitimizáció. Az új antiszemizmushoz tartozik például a náci/apartheid/kolonializmus analógia, az az állítás, hogy Izrael terrorista állam, vagy hogy Izrael befolyást gyakorol a médiára.⁸

A magyar adatokban a leggyakoribb narratíva kategória az összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemizmus volt, amely a vizsgált tartalmak 19%-ában (1339 darab) jelent meg. Ezt

³ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, p. 13.

<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

⁴ A Nagy Lakosság-csere egy összeesküvés-elmélet, amely abban a hitben gyökerezik, hogy a fehér fajt a zsidók és más kisebbségek keze által a kihalás veszélye fenyegeti. Ez az elmélet, amelyet fehér csereelméletnek vagy fehér népirtás elméletének is neveznek, azt állítja, hogy a zsidók által vezetett szándékos erőfeszítés folyik a nem fehér tömeges bevándorlás, a fajközi házasságok és más olyan törekvések előmozdítására, amelyek a fehérek „kihalásához” vezetnek. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/great-replacement>

⁵ Az Új Világrend elmélet egy összeesküvés-elmélet, amely azt állítja, hogy egy kis csoport hatalommal bíró egyén titokban dolgozik azon, hogy világhatalmi irányítást hozzon létre. Az Új Világrend mögött álló összeesküvés-elmélet, amelyben zsidó vezetők is részt vesznek, azon az elképzelésen alapul, hogy a zsidók olyan hatalmi struktúrát hoztak létre, amelyben az emberiség minden területét - a gazdaságot, a médiát és a politikai életet - ők irányítják. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/New-World-Order>

⁶ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, pp. 13-14.


<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

⁷ IHRA Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion (2013).
<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion>

⁸ ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>


követte a klasszikus antiszemizmus, amely 14%-ban (1011 darab) volt jelen. A harmadik helyen az új antiszemizmus állt 12%-kal (811 darab), míg a holokausztagadás és torzítás 3%-ban (198 darab), valamint a hagyományos-vallási antiszemizmus (184 darab) jelent meg.

Ábra 4. Az antiszemita narratíva kategóriák aránya az adatállományban



Bár az antiszemita tartalmak aránya a teljes adatban két év alatt nagyjából azonos maradt, a legtöbb narratíva kategória arányosan csökkent az adatban. Az új antiszemita narratívák száma azonban közel hétszeresére nőtt, ami arányaiban több mint négyzetes növekedést jelentett. A többi narratíva mennyisége viszonylag stabil maradt 2024-ben, ami a megjelenésük arányában kisebb csökkenést jelentett. A hagyományos-vallási narratívánál a többi kategóriánál jelentősebb csökkenés következett be 2024-re.

Ábra 5. Az antiszemita narratívák aránya az adatállományban külön 2023-ra és 2024-re vonatkozóan




2.2 A narratívákon túli antiszemita tartalmak

Az antiszemita narratívák mellett az antiszemita tartalmak két másik csoportját is elemezük: a gyűlöletbeszédet és az erőszakra való felhívást.

- Gyűlöletbeszéd:** Gyűlöletkeltő tartalom, amely vagy kifejezetten zsidók ellen irányul, vagy a "zsidó" szót az antiszemita narratívákban megjelenő jelentésen alapuló negatív jelzőként használja.
- Felhívás erőszakra:** A zsidók elleni bármilyen erőszakra buzdító tartalom.


Ábra 6. A narratívákon túli antiszemita tartalmak aránya az adatállományban



A gyűlöletbeszéd viszonylag gyakori volt a magyar adatokban, a tartalmak 14%-ában (998 darab) jelent meg, enyhe csökkenést mutatva 2024-ben. A zsidók elleni erőszakra felszólító tartalmak kevésbé voltak gyakoriak, az adatok mintegy 1.5%-ában (103 darab) jelentek meg,

mennyiségek 2024-ben növekedett, de megjelenésük aránya az adatmennyiséghoz képest nem változott.

Ábra 7. A narratívákon túli antiszemita tartalmak aránya az adatállományban külön 2023-ra és 2024-re vonatkozóan



3. Antiszemita tartalmak a vizsgált adatokban

3.1 Az antiszemita narratívák tartalma

3.1.1 Összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemitizmus

Az antiszemita narratívák leggyakoribb típusa az összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemitizmus volt, amely a vizsgált adatok 19.1%-ában jelent meg. Ennek a narratívának az elterjedtsége a két év során viszonylag magas maradt, de 2024-re arányaiban csökkent. A leggyakrabban megjelenő narratíva kategóriaként, minden médiakategóriában jelen volt, főként a kommentekben, kisebb mértékben a cikkekben. Ezek a narratívák nem kötődtek konkrét témahez, hanem változatos témahez kapcsolódva jelentek meg.

A leggyakoribb narratíva az állítólagos **zsidó irányításról/hatalomról** szólt. Ez a narratíva azt állítja, hogy a zsidók különböző szereplőket és területeket irányítanak vagy támogatnak érdekeik érvényesítése érdekében. A narratívák tárgya – hogy éppen kit/mit irányítanak a zsidók -, sok esetben erősen kapcsolódott aktuális eseményekhez. A zsidó kontroll számos változata megjelent a vizsgált adatokban, például:

- *Politikai szereplők*: A narratívák szerint számos magyar és külföldi politikai szereplőt zsidók irányítanak. Sok esetben ez a vád explicit módon jelent meg, illetve az adott szereplőt vagy zsidónak tartották, vagy azt állították, hogy zsidók támogatják. Kódszavakat is használtak ennek a narratívának a kifejezésére, mint például a "zsidesz"

(a zsidó és a Fidesz szavak kombinációja). Szinte minden politikai szereplő meg lett vádolva, hogy zsidók irányítják vagy támogatják, de a narratíva leggyakrabban Fideszre és Magyar Péterre, a 2024-ben alapított, újonnan alakult ellenzéki TISZA párt vezetőjére összpontosított. Más ellenzéki szereplők, például Gyurcsány Ferenc volt miniszterelnök és a Demokratikus Koalíció, valamint a szélsőjobboldali Mi Hazánk párt és annak helyettes vezetője, Dúró Dóra szintén gyakran felbukkantak ezekben a narratívákbak. A külföldi politikai szereplők közül az európai vezetőket említették a leggyakrabban: Ursula von der Leyen, az Európai Bizottság elnöke; Josep Borrell, az EU korábbi külügyi és biztonságpolitikai főképviselője; európai államok vezetőit, köztük Emmanuel Macron-t, Andrzej Duda-t, Mateusz Morawieckit és Volodimir Zelenszkijt (lásd később). Vlagyimir Putyin és Joe Biden is szóba került, valamint a német szélsőjobboldali párt, az AfD, és olyan történelmi személyiségek, mint Bonaparte Napóleon és Adolf Hitler (lásd még a holokauszt-narratívákat).

- *Nemzetközi szervezetek*: ENSZ, EU, NATO, WHO, jótékonyiségi szervezetek, stb.
- *Országok*: A legtöbbször Magyarország, Németország és az Egyesült Államok kerültek említésre, de számos más ország is megjelent ebben a kontextusban.
- *Pénzvilág*: a helyi és globális gazdaság, a bankok, a tőzsde és a multinacionális vállalatok. Egyes narratívákban felbukkan a zsidó nagytőke is mint befolyásoló tényező.
- *Média*: hírportálok, pl.: Index, Telex, 444, HVG, Lakmusz; televíziós csatornák, pl.: ATV, RTL Klub.
- *Intézmények*: bíróságok, egyetemek, tudományos szervezetek, egyházak.

Számos más utalás is megjelent a zsidó hatalomra, amelyet gyakran a zsidó érdekek titkos érvényesítéseként írtak le. Ezek közé tartoztak a "zsidó lobbira" való utalások és az a meggyőződés, hogy a zsidók a világuralomra törekednek. Különösen gyakori eleme volt ezeknek a narratíváknak az "amerikai zsidó" alakja, amely az Egyesült Államok és annak tevékenysége mögötti állítólagos zsidó irányításra utalt. Egyes narratívák azt állították, hogy a zsidók Magyarország megvásárlására vagy elfoglalására törekednek, megcélozva annak vizeit, földjeit és ingatlanjait. Szintén megjelent, hogy a zsidók olyan ideológiákat terjesztenek, mint a multikulturalizmus, a liberalizmus, a kommunizmus, az anarchizmus, a gender/LGBTQI ideológia, vagy a demokrácia, mint a diktatúrájuk megvalósításának egyik eszköze.

Szintén elterjedt narratíva volt, hogy a **zsidók irányítják Ukránát Volodimir Zelenszkijt ukrán elnökön keresztül**, aki állandólag zsidó érdekeket képvisel. Ezek a narratívák különböző formákat öltöztek, azt állítva, hogy zsidók állnak az orosz-ukrán háború mögött, illetve gyakran tartalmaztak gyűlöletbeszédet, különböző becsmérlő jelzőket és kódszavakat Zelenszkijre vonatkozóan.

A zsidó-kommunizmus (judeobolsevizmus) fogalma olyan narratívákban jelent meg, melyek a zsidókat bolsevikokként vagy kommunistákként ábrázolták, akik politikai szerepet vállaltak a szocializmus/kommunizmus alatt. Szintén megjelent, hogy az Államvédelmi Hatóság, a magyarországi kommunista diktatúra állambiztonsági szolgálatának tagjai is zsidók voltak.


Megjelent a vizsgált tartalmakban a **Nagy Lakosságcseré Elmélet**, amely szerint a zsidók célja, hogy a "fehér őslakosok" eltűnjenek Európából. Ennek érdekében a más kontinensekről érkező migrációt irányítják: szervezik azt, vagy támogatják az ezeket pártoló politikusokat. Néhány narratíva azt sugallta, hogy a zsidók Magyarországot vagy Ukrajnát akarják az "új Izraellel" tenni.

Soros Györgyről is megjelentek narratívák, amelyek gyakran a nyugati világra, az USA-ra, Európára, Magyarországra és a gazdaságra gyakorolt állítólagos befolyását hangsúlyozzák. Ezek a narratívák gyakran olyan klasszikus antiszemita címkékkel jellemezték őt, mint hazug, áruló, sátán, spekuláns stb. Jelen volt a "Soros-terv" kifejezése is, amelyet 2015-ben a Fideszkormány vezetett be Magyarországon, utalva Soros állítólagos tervére, hogy a migránsokat Magyarországra és Európába hozza, a Nagy Lakosságcseré elmélethez hasonlóan. A kormány 2017 óta használja ezt a kifejezést különböző szereplők - civil szervezetek, intézmények és politikusok - lejáratására, azzal vádolva őket, hogy "Soros-ügynökök", akik a "Soros-terv" megvalósítói.

Más, kevésbé gyakori narratívák közé tartoztak az **Új Világrend emelet**, amely a "zsidó világuralomról" és a "zsidó világkormányról" mint a zsidóság feltételezett céljáról szólt; narratívák az **Illuminátusokról**, melyek a "zsidó szabadkőművesekről" beszéltek, olyan személyiségeket említve példaként, mint Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök és Ady Endre magyar költő. A **COVID-19** világjárvány is megjelent néhány narratívában, ahol a vírust és a vakcinákat a mint a zsidók eszközeit ábrázolták, mellyel a társadalmat akarják irányítani. A **Cion bőlcseinek jegyzőkönyve**, egy Oroszországból a 20. század elejéről származó, hamisított dokumentum is említésre került.

Az összeesküvésen alapuló narratívák között a zsidó irányítással és hatalommal kapcsolatos narratívák voltak a leggyakoribbak, amelyek előfordulása 2023-ról 2024-re nőtt. A Nagy Lakosságcseré Elmélet és az Új Világrend Elméletének megjelenése szintén kissé nőtt 2024-re. Ezzel szemben a Volodimir Zelenszkijt, Soros Györgyöt és a COVID-19 világjárványt érintő narratívák jelenléte 2024-re csökkent. Az egyéb témakról szóló narratívák előfordulása többé-kevésbé változatlan maradt.

Ábra 8. Összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemitizmus



3.1.2 Klasszikus antiszemizmus

A klasszikus antiszemita narratívák a második leggyakoribbak voltak a magyarországon vizsgált adatokban, az összes vizsgált tartalom 14.4%-ában jelentek meg, minden média kategóriában megtalálhatóak voltak. Ezeknek a narratívnak az előfordulása 2023 és 2024 között nagyjából állandó maradt. Bár leggyakrabban a kommentekben voltak jelen, alkalmanként a cikkekben is megjelentek. A klasszikus antiszemizmust tartalmazó kommentek változatos témaúj cikkek alatt voltak jelen.

A klasszikus antiszemita narratívák **a zsidókat** leggyakrabban "másként" ábrázolják. Ezek az említések csoportosíthatók.

- 1) A zsidók felsőbbrendűként való jellemzése
 - a. Olyan narratívák, amelyek azt állítják, hogy a zsidók felsőbbrendűnek tartják magukat: ezek azt fejezik ki, hogy a zsidók azt hiszik, hogy okosak, minden tudnak; arrogánsak, beképzeltek, önimádók, azt hiszik, hogy bármit megtehetnek, semmi sem elég jó nekik;
 - b. A zsidókat felsőbbrendűnek tartó narratívák: ezek szerint a zsidók értelmiségek, kiváltságos helyzetben vannak, lenéznek másokat.
- 2) A zsidók alsóbbrendűként való leírása: ezek a narratívák azt állítják, hogy a zsidók
 - a. ostobák, haszontalanok, piszkosak, büdösek stb.
 - b. deviánsok (drogosok, pedofilok, homoszexuálisok);
 - c. paraziták és állatiasak;
 - d. nem emberek (pl. patkányok, férgek, gyíkemberek);
 - e. lélek nélküliek, nincs lelkük;
 - f. a világ/emberiség vírusai, betegségei (pl. rák, pestis).
- 3) A zsidók mint faj leírása: állítólagos fizikai faji jellemzők említése, mint például a "zsidó orr".

4) A zsidók nem fehérekként és/vagy nem magyarokként történő meghatározása.

Gyakori volt az az állítás is, hogy a **zsidók csalók és hazugok**. Ezek a narratívak a zsidókat tisztelességtelennek és becstelennek ábrázolták: tolvajoknak, hazugoknak, csalóknak, megbízhatatlanoknak; emellett manipulatívnak, az áldozat szerepét játszó, ravar és leleményes embereknek állították be őket.


A zsidókról mint **gonoszokról** való beszéd is széles körben elterjedt volt, többek közt a következő állítások fomájában:

- A zsidók gyilkosok, akik fehér embereket/magyarokat/az ellenségeiket akarják megölni, a saját érdekeikért ölnek, élvezik mások halálát, az emberi élet nem fontos számukra;
- A zsidók azt hiszik, hogy szabad bűnöket elkövetniük, nincs lelkiismeretük, ők a bosszú népe;
- A zsidók rosszat akarnak másoknak, konfliktusokat és háborúkat szítanak, erőszakosak, manipulatívak, csak maguknak akarnak jót, hatalomra vágynak;
- A zsidók mérgezik a kutakat, terjesztik a pestist, és sírokat gyaláznak;
- A zsidók gonoszságukkal kiprovokálták az antiszemizmust, ők a hibásak annak jelenlétéért.

A zsidókat széles körben **kapzsinak és gazdagnak** állították be, azt állítva, hogy vagyonosak, haszonlesők, kihasználnak másokat (pl. a magyarokat), ők uralják a nagytőkét. Megjelent a zsidók **hűtlenséggel/kettős lojalitással** való vádolása is, olyan kijelentésekkel, mint árulók, idegen érdekeket szolgálnak, összetartanak, nem lojálisak Magyarországhoz és/vagy magyarellenesenek. Olyan kijelentések is megjelentek, miszerint a zsidóknak Izraelbe/USA-ba kellene költözniük, "ahova tartoznak". Sokkal kisebb mértékben jelentek meg olyan állítások is, hogy a zsidók kritikán felül állnak, nem lehet őket kritizálni (**a kritika tabuja**).

A gonosz, a hűtlenség/kettős lojalitás és a kritika tabuja al-narratívak jelenléte enyhén nőtt 2024-ben a narratív kategórián belül, míg a zsidók „másként” való említése csökkent. Egyes alnarratívak csak konkrét eseményekkel kapcsolatban jelentek meg, mint például a szélsőjobboldali Mi Hazánk párt kampánya a fúrt kutak nyilvántartásba vétele és megadóztatása ellen, amely a zsidók állítólagos kútmérgezéséről szóló narratívákat váltott ki. Ezek az alnarratívak a kérdés lekerülésével a politikai napirendről szintén eltűntek.

Ábra 9. Klasszikus antiszemizmus



3.1.4 Új antiszemizmus

A vizsgált adatok 11,6%-ában jelentek meg új antiszemita narratívák. A két vizsgált év között az új antiszemizmus előfordulási gyakorisága változott a legnagyobb mértékben: az új antiszemita tartalmak mennyisége 2024-re csaknem hétszeresére, arányosan több mint négyeszeresére nőtt, ami a 2023. október 7-i események és az azt követő háború hatását tükrözi. Az új antiszemita narratívák néhány cikkben és egy bejegyzésben jelentek meg, s túlnyomórészt a commentekben voltak megfigyelhetőek. Bár minden média kategóriában jelen volt, ez a narratívakategória a szélsőjobboldali és a független mainstream média oldalakon volt a legelterjedtebb, valamint 2024-ben a kormányzati irányítású oldalakon is megnőtt a jelenléte. Ezek a narratívák elsősorban a háborúval kapcsolatos cikkekhez kapcsolódtak, kiemelkedő koncentrációban az izraeli hadsereg 2024. április 1-jei, a World Central Kitchen segélykonvoj elleni véletlen támadása, valamint Irán április 13-i, Izrael elleni nagyszabású drón- és rakétatámadása körül.

Az új antiszemita tartalmak többsége két fő formában állította, **hogy Izrael terrorista állam**: 1) Izrael Állam vagy Benjamin Netanyahu izraeli miniszterelnök népirtást, háborús vagy emberiség elleni bűncselekményeket követ el; 2) Izrael Állam vagy az Izraeli Védelmi Erők (IDF) terrorszervezetként működik.

Az Izraellel kapcsolatban állítólag jelen levő **kettős mérce** említése szintén gyakori volt, vagy azt állítva, hogy Izrael cselekedeteit másként ítélik meg nemzetközi szinten, általában arra utalva, hogy Izraelt szigorúbban kellene megítélni, mint ahogyan azt teszik; vagy annak állításával, hogy Izrael úgy gondolja, hogy neki megengedett az, amit másoknak nem (pl. nem követi a szabályokat, nem vállalja a felelősséget stb.).


Az **arab-izraeli/Hamász-izraeli konfliktusért Izraelt felelőssé tevő** narratívák szintén széles körben elterjedtek voltak. Ezek a narratívák egyrészt azt sugallják, hogy Izrael provokálta ki a konfliktusokat, és ezért felelős a Hamász október 7-i terrortámadásáért, másrészt pedig azt, hogy Izrael megalakulása óta nem volt béke a Közel-Kelenen.

Megjelent Izrael **delegitimizálása**, vagyis az az állítás, hogy Izrael nem legitim állam, valamint voltak tartalmak, melyek az ország megsemmisítésére szólítottak fel. Izrael **démonizálása** is megjelent, gonoszként és háborúpárti államként ábrázolva, amelynek célja, hogy az egész világot háborúba sodorja. Gyakori volt **Izrael klasszikus antiszemita sztereotípiákkal való** ábrázolása is. Ezek a narratívák azt állították, hogy Izrael más országokat (pl. Magyarország, EU, USA) irányít, hogy hazudik, hogy a globális zsidó (háttér)hatalom védi, hogy minden az áldozat szerepét játssza, vagy a zsidókra gyakran használt becsmérlő kifejezésekkel (pl. patkány, sátánista) jellemezték Izraelt.

Egyes tartalmak **a gyarmatosítás analógiáját** is felhasználták, hogy Izraelt megszálló államként ábrázolják, amelynek célja a területek gyarmatosítása, vagy azt állították hogy területe alapértelmezetten megszállás eredményeként jött létre, területét a palesztinoktól lopták el. A **médiára gyakorolt izraeli befolyásra** vonatkozó állítások is jelen voltak, amelyek vagy azt állították, hogy a nyugati média Izrael érdekei mentén tudósít, vagy azt, hogy Izrael manipulálja a híreket és kontrollálja a média szabadságát. Az **izraeli tevékenység és a nácik közötti analógia** meghúzása is megjelent, azt sugallva, hogy Izrael politikája hasonló a nácikéhoz, és hogy Izrael holokausztot követ el Gázában. Olyan narratívák is előfordultak, amelyek a **zsidókat kollektíven felelősként állították be Izrael tetteiért**, és amelyek Izraelt **apartheid-** vagy elnyomó államként jellemezték. A **Hamász október 7-i támadását tagadó vagy relativizáló** tartalmak is jelen voltak, ezek vagy kétségbe vonták a túszejtést, azzal vádolták Izraelt, hogy hazudik a támadásról, azt állították, hogy Izrael felelős a támadásért és megérdemelte azt, vagy azt állították, hogy Izrael állt a támadás mögött, és hogy az egy Moszad-akció volt. Nagyon kis mértékben megjelentek **Izrael kritizálásának tabujáról** szóló narratívák is, amelyek **Izraelt vádolták a holokausztért**, és **tagadták Izrael önrendelkezési jogát**.

2023-ban a **gyarmatosítás analógiájának** említése és Izrael terrorista államként való beállítása, voltak a leggyakoribb narratívák, leginkább a kommentekben jelent meg. Ezek leggyakrabban az arab-izraeli konfliktussal kapcsolatos izraeli akciókról szóló cikkek alatt jelentek meg, például a Szíriában végrehajtott izraeli légicsapásokról, a jeruzsálemi Al-Aksa mecsetnél történt összecsapásokról, valamint az ezt követő libanoni és gázai támadásokról szóló jelentések alatt. 2024-ben az összes új antiszemita narratíva előfordulása jelentősen megnőtt, különösen az Izraelt terrorista államként leíró narratíváké.

Ábra 10. Új antiszemitizmus



3.1.5 Holokausztagadás és torzítás

A holokausztagadás és -torzítás volt a második legkevésbé gyakori kategória a magyarországi adatállományban, az összes tartalom 2,8%-ában szerepelt. Jelenléte 2024-ben némileg csökkent. Ezek a narratívak minden évben a szélsőjobboldali felületeken jelentek meg a leggyakrabban, főként kommentekben, és csak alkalmanként cikkekben (egy szélsőjobboldali, egy álhíroldalon és egy kormányzati irányítású médiaoldalon).

A **holokausztot tagadó vagy torzító narratívak** vagy megkérdőjelezték a holokauszt különböző elemeit (például az áldozatok számát), eltorzították a történetek súlyosságát, vagy teljes mértékben tagadták a holokausztot.


A **zsidók hibáztatása a holokausztért** szintén jelen volt, azt állítva, hogy a zsidók álltak a holokauszt mögött, például ők irányították Hitlert, ők hozták létre a holokausztot, hogy aztán legyen okuk Izrael létrehozására, részt vettek a holokauszt véghezvitelében, vagy hogy okkal váltak áldozatokká.

A **holokauszt pozitív eseményként** való leírása is megjelent, főként azt sugallva, hogy a holokausztnak újra meg kellene történnie. Volt példa **náci analógiára** is, főként zsidó nácikról beszéltek, gyakran gyűlöletbeszédként, melyben párhuzamot vontak a nácik második világháborús tettei és Izrael – vagy álatlóban a zsidók – jelenlegi tettei között. Egyes tartalmak a holokauszt elkövetőinek **felelősségeit** igyekeztek elhomályosítani, főként Magyarország vagy az akkori magyar politikusok szerepének relativizálásával, említve például Horthy Miklóst vagy Szálasi Ferencet.

2024-ben a holokausztot tagadó és elferdítő elbeszélések aránya kissé csökkent, míg a holokausztot pozitív eseményként leíró elbeszélések aránya némileg nőtt. 2023-ban a

holokausztot tagadó vagy torzító narratívak elsősorban a holokauszt emléknapjáról és a nürnbergi perek egyik ügyészének, Benjamin Ferencznek a haláláról szóló cikkek kapcsán jelentek meg, amelyek a holokausztot pozitív eseményként leíró tartalmakat is kiváltottak. 2024-ben a magyarországi holokauszt 80. évfordulója és Adolf Hitler *Mein Kampf* című könyve megjelenésének 100. évfordulója kapcsán jelentek meg ilyen narratívak.

Ábra 11. Holokausztagadás és torzítás



3.1.6 Hagyományos vallási antiszemizmus


A hagyományos-vallási antiszemita narratívak voltak a legkevésbé gyakoriak, az összes adat 2.6%-ában jelentek meg. Mind 2023-ban, mind 2024-ben ezek a narratívak szélsőjobboldali felületeken jelentek meg, többnyire kommentekben, illetve egy cikkben. 2024-ben ezen narratívak gyakorisága csökkent, de változatos téma alatti kommentekben jelentek meg, de leggyakrabban Izraellel összefüggésben. Ezek a narratívak gyakran tartalmaztak a körülmetéléstre vonatkozó különböző becsmérlő kifejezéseket, amelyeket a zsidóság vagy a zsidó népre vonatkozó kódszavakként használtak.

Az ebbe a kategóriába tartozó tartalmak többnyire a **zsidókat vallási értelemben vett "másként"** ábrázolták, negatívan beszéltek a zsidó vallásról (pl. gyűlöletes, fanatikus/erőszakos, undorító, hazug, erkölcsstelen stb.), vagy negatívan utaltak a zsidókra, mint a "kiválasztott népre". A körülmetéést is gyakran említették negatívan, és ez volt az alapja számos, a zsidókra vonatkozó kódszónak. A **zsidók sátánként/ördögként való ábrázolása** is jelen volt, vagy azt állítva, hogy a zsidók sátánisták/hisznek a sátánban, vagy hogy a sátán leszármazottai. A **vérváddal/gyermekgyilkossággal** kapcsolatos tartalom is megjelent, a zsidókat gyermekgyilkosokként ábrázolva, azt állítva, hogy gyerekeket gyilkolnak/mérgeznek, és örülnek, ha gyerekek halnak meg. Ez megjelent azzal kapcsolatban is, hogy Izrael szándékosan gyilkol palesztin gyerekeket. Kisebb mértékben megjelentek

istengyilkossággal kapcsolatos tartalmak is, amelyek azt állították, hogy a zsidók megölték/elárulták Jézust.

2023-ban ezek a narratívák főként konkrét eseményekkel kapcsolatban jelentek meg, például egy régi és hírhedt magyarországi gyermekgyilkossági ügyről szóló cikk kapcsán⁹, amely a vérvádról szóló tartalmak nagy részét kiváltotta. 2024-ben a vérvádról szóló narratívák szorosabban kapcsolódtak a Hamász-Izrael háborúhoz. Az istengyilkosságról szóló elbeszélések és a zsidók sátáni vagy vallási értelemben vett "másként" való ábrázolása a húsvéti ünnepekről szóló cikkek alatti kommentekben voltak a legelterjedtebbek.

Ábra 12. Hagyományos vallási antiszemizmus



3.2 Antiszemita tartalmak a narratívákon túl

3.2.1 Antiszemita gyűlöletbeszéd

Az antiszemita gyűlöletbeszéd a magyar adatállomány 14%-ában jelent meg, nagyjából egyenlő arányban a két vizsgált év között. Túlnyomó többségben szélsőjobboldali oldalak kommentjeiben és két szélsőjobboldali cikkben fordultak elő.

Az elemzett adatokban az antiszemita gyűlöletbeszéd két különböző típusba volt sorolható:

1. Gyűlöletbeszéd, amely kifejezetten a zsidók ellen irányul: Ez leginkább a szélsőjobboldali felületek kommentjeiben fordult elő, illetve más médiakategóriákban is megjelent, bár sokkal ritkábban. A gyűlöletbeszéd különböző formái mellett antiszemita viccek és mondások is megjelentek ebben a kategóriában.

⁹ Egy 1998-ban Körmenden meggyilkolt gyermeket a magyar szélsőjobboldali média vérvádként állított be, azt állítva, hogy a kislányt egy *sakter* (ortodox zsidó mészáros) ölte meg, és hogy a vérre szükség volt egy zsidó üzletember tulajdonában lévő új üdítőital-gyártó üzem beindításához.

2. Gyűlöletbeszéd, amely a "zsidó" szót negatív jelzőként használja: Ez szintén a szélsőjobboldali felületeken volt a leggyakoribb, de a mainstream és kormányzati irányítású médiaoldalakon valamivel gyakrabban fordult elő, mint az előző kategória.

A gyűlöletbeszéd szinte teljesen hiányzott a baloldali oldalakról.

3.2.2 Antiszemita erőszakra való felhívás

Egyes tartalmak kifejezetten a zsidók elleni erőszakra szólítottak fel. Bár ez a kategória volt a legkevésbé gyakori, az összes adat 1%-ában és csak szerepelt, nagyon erős gyűlöletkeltő kijelentéseket tartalmazott. Ezek a narratívak elsősorban a szélsőjobboldali felületeken fordultak elő, de más oldalakon is voltak erőszakra felszólító kommentek, kivéve a baloldali oldalakat.

Az egyik központi narratíva a zsidók megölésére való kifejezett buzdítás volt, illetve annak kifejezése, hogy a zsidókat ki kell irtani. Más narratívak a zsidóknak okozott károk különböző formáit szorgalmazták. Pár kapcsolódó narratíva Volodimir Zelenszkij ukrán elnököt célozta, és halálára vagy meggyilkolására szólított fel. Ezen túlmenően a holokausztal kapcsolatos állítások is gyakoriak voltak ebben a kategóriában, beleértve egy új holokauszt megavilágítására szóló való felhívást vagy a holokausztal kapcsolatos nyelvezet használatakat (pl. utalások a zsidók Dunába lövésére, a "végső megoldásra", elgázosításra, vagy a zsidók kazánokban való elégetésére).

3.3 Antiszemitizmust kiváltó téma

A tartalnak elemzése során kiderült, hogy szinte bármilyen téma kiválthat antiszemitizmust. Az antiszemita beszéd a téma széles skálájához fűzött kommentekben jelent meg, a hírességekkel kapcsolatos cikkektől a kormányzati döntéseken át bármilyen semleges témaig. Sok esetben a kommentekben megjelenő antiszemita szöveg tartalma nem kapcsolódott az adott cikk témajához, bár voltak olyan esetek, amikor az antiszemita narratívak elemei szorosan kapcsolódtak a cikk témajához. Voltak olyan antiszemita narratívak, amelyek csak bizonyos téma alatt jelentek meg, mint például a vérvád narratíva, amely csak egy körmendi gyermekgyilkossági ügyről szóló cikkek alatt jelent meg, vagy a klasszikus antiszemita narratíva a zsidók kútmérgezéséről, amely a szélsőjobboldali Mi Hazánk párt fúrt kutakkal kapcsolatos petíciójáról szóló cikkek alatt volt megtalálható.

3.4 Zsidókra használt kódszavak

A vizsgált tartalmakban több kódszó is megjelent a zsidók leírására. Ezek a következő fő kategóriákba sorolhatóak:

- **Formai hasonlóságban alapuló kódszavak:** Ezek a kódszavak a zsidókra való utalásra szolgálnak az első szótájuk és a "zsidó" szó első szótája közötti hasonlóság alapján. Ezeknek a szavaknak általában nincs közvetlen kapcsolatuk a zsidókhöz, de sok esetben állatokra vagy pénzre utalnak, például "zsiráf", "zsizsik", "zsé".
- **Kódszavak, amelyeket az előítéleten alapuló szavak torzításával (pl. összehúzásával) hoztak létre:** Ezek a mesterségesen létrehozott, gyakran lealacsonyító, erősen negatív felhanggal bíró szavak főként a zsidó hatalomra és befolyásra utalnak, mint például a "Judapest" (Budapestre utalva), "Jewsa" (az USA-ra utalva), "jewuro" (az euróra utalva), "jewtube" (a Youtube-ra utalva), "zsidesz" (a zsidó és a Fidesz szavakból), "zsindex" (a zsidó és az Index szavakból). Ugyanakkor más negatív jelentésű szavakat is használnak, mint például az "Israhell" (Izrael és a pokol kombinációja).
- **Sztereotípus zsidó megjelenéssel vagy foglalkozással kapcsolatos kódszavak:** Ezek a kifejezések gyakran az ortodox zsidók megjelenésére (pl. "tetűlétrás", "pajeszos", "kipás") vagy a zsidókról alkotott sztereotíp képre (pl. "kilincsorrú") utalnak.
 - Olyan kifejezések, mint "kufárok", és nevek, mint Rockefeller és Rothschild.
- **A vallással kapcsolatos kódszavak:** Ezek a kifejezések vagy a vallási irodalomra (pl. "talmudista"), a körülmetélés vallási hagyományára, a zsidókra mint a Sátán leszármazottaira, vallási szereplőkre (pl. Ábrahám), vagy a zsidók "megkereszteletlenségére" ("biboldó" és "bibsi" – a romani nyelvben megkereszteletleneket jelent) utaltak.
- **Egyéb kifejezések:** Kódszavak, mint például "spinózák", "cionisták".

4. Konklúzió

- A kutatás az online antiszemita narratívákban bekövetkezett változásokat vizsgálta a Hamász 2023. október 7-i, Izrael elleni terrortámadását és az azt követő háborút követően.
- Ezek az események a zsidókkal kapcsolatos online tartalmak jelentős növekedéséhez vezettek minden vizsgált országban, és ennek megfelelően az antiszemita tartalmak száma is emelkedett. Magyarországon 2024-re mintegy másfélszeresére nőtt az adatmennyiség. Az antiszemita narratívák mennyisége is nőtt, de arányaiban a legtöbbük kisebb mértékben jelent meg 2024-ben mint 2023-ban, kivéve az új antiszemitzmust, amely mennyiségileg hétszeresére nőtt 2024-ben, arányaiban pedig több mint négyszeresére.
- A vizsgált tartalmakat a korábban meghatározott antiszemita narratívákba soroltuk, amelyek szinte mindegyike megjelent a vizsgált időszakban. Ezenkívül a tartalomban a zsidókra vonatkozóan különféle kódszavak kerültek azonosításra.
- Az antiszemita narratívák főként a commentekben jelentek meg, de néhány cikkben is, főként szélsőjobboldali oldalakon. Bár az antiszemita tartalom minden vizsgált médiakategóriában megjelent a commentekben, mind mennyiségileg, mind arányaiban a szélsőjobboldali oldalakon volt a leggyakoribb, ezt követően pedig a független mainstream felületek commentszekciójában. Antiszemita tartalom néhány cikkben jelent csak meg, főként szélsőjobboldali felületeken.
- Az antiszemita narratívák jelenléte a hozzászólásokban általában nem kapcsolódott konkrét témahez, hanem a téma széles skálájához kapcsolódva jelentek meg. Sok esetben azonban a cikk témaja befolyásolta a narratívák elemeit, például azt, hogy melyik politikust említették egy adott összeesküvés részeként. Néhány narratíva erősen kötődött konkrét témahez, például kis mértékben a hagyományos-vallási antiszemitzmushoz (antijudaizmus).

5. Módszertan

A kutatás célja az antiszemita narratívák vizsgálata volt az online szöveges tartalmakban - például kommentekben, cikkekben és Facebook-bejegyzésekben - 2023. október 7. előtt és után. Az előzetesen meghatározott médiumok weboldalainak és Facebook-oldalainak tartalmát elemeztük. A tartalmakat előre meghatározott kulcsszavak alapján, egy social listening szoftverrel gyűjtöttük össze, ugyanarra az időszakra vonatkozóan 2023-ban és 2024-ben is. A kutatást négy országban (Magyarországon, Olaszországban, Lengyelországban és Romániában) végezték a Political Capital által koordinált nemzeti kutatócsoportok, azonos módszertan alapján.

Az antiszemitizmus meghatározása

A kutatás alapjául a Nemzetközi Holokauszt Emlékezési Szövetség (IHRA) antiszemitizmusra vonatkozó munkadefiníciója szolgált: „*Az antiszemitizmus a zsidók olyan megítélése, amely a velük szembeni gyűlölet kifejezéseként nyilvánulhat meg. Az antiszemitizmus verbális és fizikai megnyilvánulásai zsidó vagy nem zsidó személyekre és/vagy e személyek vagyonára, a zsidó közösségi intézményekre és vallási létesítményekre irányulnak.*” A definíció részletes magyarázata, illusztratív példákkal együtt, az IHRA honlapján érhető el¹⁰.

5.1 Adatgyűjtés

Kutatásunkban online szöveges tartalmakat elemeztünk: weboldalak és Facebook-oldalak cikkeit, bejegyzéseit és kommentjeit. Az adatokat a SentiOne nevű social listening szoftver segítségével gyűjtöttük. A SentiOne adott időintervallumban, adott felületekről, adott kulcsszavak alapján gyűjti össze az adatokat.

5.1.1 Kulcsszavak

Négy kulcsszót határoztunk meg, amelyek segítségével minden országban azonosítottuk a potenciálisan releváns tartalmakat: 1) zsidó, 2) Izrael, 3) holokauszt, 4) cionizmus/cionista. Ezen kívül minden egyes országra vonatkozó specifikus kulcsszavakat is bevontunk. Magyarországon ezek a következők voltak: holokamu, biboldó, bibsi. Azokon a nyelveken, ahol keresett szavaknak különböző végződésük lehet, a kulcsszavak szótövért használtuk utána egy csillag jellel (*). Ez a lehetővé tette a SentiOne számára, hogy a kulcsszavak minden változatára és végződésére vonatkozóan azonosítsa a találatokat.

¹⁰ IHRA working definition of antisemitism: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

5.1.2 Források

A nemzeti kutatócsoportok közreműködésével a Political Capital hat online médiakategóriát határozott meg a kutatáshoz: 1) független (mainstream) média, 2) bulvár felületek, 3) kormányzati irányítású média, 4) szélsőjobboldali oldalak, 5) álhír/összeesküvés oldalak, 6) baloldali felületek. minden egyes kategóriában minden országban gyűjtöttünk oldalakat a médiumok honlapjáról és Facebook-oldaláról is. minden országban kategóriánként kiválasztottuk azt a három médiumot, amelyre ugyanabban az időszakban a meghatározott kulcsszavakra a legtöbb találat érkezett. Magyarországon a következő médiumok honlapjait és Facebook-oldalait vizsgáltuk:

- **Független (mainstream) média:** 444, Telex, HVG. Ezek az hírportálok függetlenek, és tartalmuk elsősorban a közéletre összpontosít: politika, gazdaság, nemzetközi hírek. A vizsgált médiumok tulajdonosai nem kötődnek semmilyen politikai érdekcsoporthoz.
- **Szélsőjobboldali oldalak:** Magyar Jelen, Vadhajtások, kuruc.info. A Magyar Jelen a szélsőjobboldali Mi Hazánk párt nem hivatalos médiuma. A Vadhajtások egy szélsőjobboldali híroldal, amely kormánypárti narratívákat terjeszt. A Kuruc.info az egyik legszélsősegesebb magyarországi hírportál, amely a Mi Hazánk egyik képviselőjéhez köthető. Az elmúlt évtizedben több kísérlet is történt arra, hogy a teljes oldalt vagy egyes tartalmait eltávolítsák, főként holokausztagadó tartalma miatt, de ezek a kísérletek sikertelenek voltak.
- **Bulvár felületek:** Blikk, Bors, Meglepetés. Ezek a médiumok elsősorban a hírességekkel kapcsolatos hírekre koncentrálnak. A Bors a Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítványhoz tartozó kormányközeli Mediaworks médiakonglomerátum része, míg a másik két oldalt, a Blikket és a Kiskegyedet nemzetközi kiadók jelentetik meg.
- **Álhír oldalak:** Világ Titkai, Kimondott Igazságok, Mai Világ. Ezek a médiumok elsősorban álhíreket, dezinformációkat és összeesküvés-elméleteket népszerűsítnek különböző témaikkal.
- **Kormányzati irányítású média:** Mandiner, Demokrata, Magyar Nemzet. Ezeket a médiumokat kormánypárti médiakonglomerátumok uralják. Ezek a weboldalak a Fidesz-kormány politikai programjának népszerűsítésére összpontosítanak.
- **Baloldali felületek:** Mérce, (Partizán). A Mérce egy független baloldali hírportál, amely napi híreket, vezércikkeket, elemzéseket és élő közvetítéseket közöl. A teljes egészében olvasói által finanszírozott oldal a munkássággal, a társadalmi mozgalmakkal, a kisebbségi jogokkal és a politikai gazdasággal foglalkozik helyi és globális szinten. A Partizán egy független online YouTube-csatorna, amely a közélethez kapcsolódó különböző témaikkal foglalkozik. Azért tettük zárójelbe, mert tartalma főként videókból áll, és mivel csak szöveges tartalmakat

elemeztünk, a kutatásban használt kulcsszavakra vonatkozóan szinte semmilyen adat nem került letöltésre a csatornáiról.

5.1.3 A vizsgált időszak

A szöveges tartalmak előre meghatározott kategóriákba történő kódolásával kapcsolatos korábbi tapasztalataink és a projektben a tevékenységre rendelkezésére álló erőforrások alapján országunként 7000 tartalom elemzését tűztük ki célnak. Mivel az antiszemita narratívakban 2023. október 7. után bekövetkező változásokat kívántuk vizsgálni, ugyanazt az időszakot választottuk 2023-ban és 2024-ben is. Ezt úgy határoztuk meg, hogy megkerestük azt az országot a négy közül, ahol a kulcsszavainkra egy adott időszakban a legkevesebb találat érkezett, és kiszámítottuk, hogy egy kiválasztott dátumtól (ebben az esetben április 1-től) számítva hány napra van szükség ahhoz, hogy az adott országban a letöltött adatok száma meghaladja a 7000 tartalmat. Ennek eredményeképpen az adatgyűjtést minden országban ugyanarra az időkeretre szabványosítottuk: Április 1. és április 15., 13:00 óra.

5.1.4 Az elemzett adat mennyisége

Minden adathalmazt úgy szűrtünk, hogy több mint 7000 tartalmat tartalmazzon, megtartva a kulcsszavak, a források (weboldalak és Facebook-oldalak) és az évekre érkezett találatok eredeti arányát az adathalmazon belül. Ez a megközelítés azt eredményezte, hogy a teljes letöltött adathalmazból az egyes országokban a következő arányokat elemeztük: Románia - 100%, Magyarország - 73%, Olaszország - 44% és Lengyelország - 35%.

A 2024-ben gyűjtött adatok mennyisége minden országban magasabb volt, mint 2023-ban. A legkisebb növekedés Magyarországon történt, ahol 2024-ben mintegy másfélszeresére nőtt az adatmennyiség. Romániában majdnem háromszorosára, Lengyelországban majdnem ötszörösére, Olaszországban pedig majdnem hétszeresére nőttek az adatok. Az adatok nagy részét minden országban kommentekből tették ki.

- **Magyarország:** Az adatok többsége szélsőjobboldali felületekről származott, ezt követték a mainstream média, kormányzati irányítású médiumok, bulvár felületek, és minimális mennyiségű adat érkezett álhíroldalakról és baloldali felületekről.
- **Olaszország:** A legtöbb adat a mainstream médiából származott, ezt követt a bulvár felületek, az kormányzati irányítású, baloldali és álhír oldalak, és nagyon kevés adat származott a szélsőjobboldali felületekről.
- **Lengyelország:** A legtöbb adat a bulvársajtóból származott, ezt követték az kormányzati irányítású lapok, a mainstream média, a szélsőjobboldali felületek, az álhíroldalak, és nagyon kevés baloldali felületekről.
- **Románia:** A legtöbb adat a mainstream médiából származott, ezt követték az álhír oldalak, bulvárlapok, szélsőjobboldali felületek, a kormányzati irányítású média és kevés adat baloldali forrásokból.

		<i>Vizsgált tartalom a médiakategóriákban</i>							
		Mainstream	Szélsőjobb	Álhír	Kormányzati irányítású	Bulvár	Baloldali	Adat/év	Összes adat
Magyarország	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7008
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221	
Olaszország	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7053
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163	
Lengyelország	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7054
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818	
Románia	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7012
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165	

5.2 Az adatok kódolása

5.2.1 Fogalmi/elméleti keret

A Political Capital a nyilvánosan elérhető források, például tanulmányok, kutatási jelentések, tudományos cikkek stb. felhasználásával kidolgozta a kutatás fogalmi/elméleti keretét. Amellett, hogy a kutatás az IHRA antiszemizmusra vonatkozó munkadefinícióján alapult, a dokumentum alaposan bemutatta a kutatásban központi szerepet játszó antiszemita narratívák és alnarratívák fő kategóriáit. minden projektpartner lehetőséget kapott arra, hogy megvitassa, kommentálja és kiegészítse a fogalmi/elmélet keret tartalmát. A fogalmi/elméleti keretet a BOND projekt tanácsadó testületének tagjaival és külső szakértőkkel is megvitásra került.

5.2.2 A módszertan véglegesítése és módszertani útmutató készítése

A kutatási módszertan véglegesítése több alkalmon keresztül zajlott - beleértve a BOND tanácsadó testület szakértő tagjával folytatott konzultációkat, valamint több kísérletet az online szövegek különböző módokon történő elemzésére és kódolására. Ezekből az erőfeszítésekből alakultak ki az adatok kódolásának végleges kategóriái és módja. A tartalom jellegére vonatkozóan négy besorolást határozunk meg:

1. Antiszemita - Legalább egy antiszemita narratívat tartalmazó tartalom.
2. Potenciálisan antiszemita - Olyan tartalom, amely olyan narratívat tartalmazott, amely antiszemitaként és nem antiszemitaként is értelmezhető, vagy csak a kontextus (a cikk/poszt, amelyre reagált) fényében tünt antiszemitának.

3. Nem érthető - Érthatetlen tartalom (ez a kategória szinte csak kommentekben jelent meg).
4. Nem antiszemita - Olyan tartalom, amely nem tartalmazott antiszemita narratívákat.

A fogalmi keret alapján az antiszemita narratívák öt fő kategóriáját azonosítottuk, amelyek mindegyike alkategóriákat tartalmaz (e kategóriák részleteit és meghatározásait később ismertetjük):

- Klasszikus antiszemita sztereotípiák
- Hagyományos, vallási alapú antiszemitizmus (antijudaizmus)
- Összeesküvésen alapuló antiszemitizmus,
- Holokauszttagadás és torzítás,
- Új antiszemitizmus (Izrael kritikáján alapuló antiszemitizmus).

Két további kategória került még meghatározásra: "gyűlöletbeszéd" és "erőszakra való felhívás".

A kódolás folyamata részletesen leírásra került egy módszertani útmutatóban.

A kódolási folyamat részeként a kódolóknak dokumentálniuk kellett a tartalomban azonosított antiszemita kifejezéseket. A megjegyzések esetében a kontextust is fel kellett jegyezniük - konkrétan annak a cikknek vagy posztnak a témáját, amely alá a megjegyzést írták.

5.2.3 A kódolók képzése

A fogalmi/elméleti keretrendszer és a módszertani útmutató nemzeti kutatócsoportokkal való megosztása után a Political Capital találkozót szervezett, hogy ismertesse ezeket a dokumentumokat és a kódolási folyamatot, és teret adjon a kérdéseknek. A kutatási folyamat során a kutatócsoportok rendszeresen találkoztak, hogy megvitassák a kutatási folyamat során felmerülő problémákat és kérdéseket.

Az fogalmi/elméleti keret közös megértésének biztosítása és a kutatás megbízhatóságának növelése érdekében - az erőforrások és a csoport kapacitásának korlátain belül - a kutatási folyamat magában foglalt egy tanulási szakaszt. Ebben a fázisban 350 tartalmat szűrtünk ki az adathalmazokból, megtartva a találatok eredeti arányait kulcsszó, médiakategória és év szerint. Az "Izrael" kulcsszóra vonatkozó találatok enyhén felül voltak reprezentálva, azon a feltételezésen alapulva, hogy az új antiszemitizmus azonosítása jelenti majd a legnagyobb kihívást. Az egyes országokban a nemzeti kutatócsoportok két tagja egymástól függetlenül kódolta ezeket az adatokat. Ezután összehasonlították eredményeiket, és az eltéréseket megvitatták közönen keresve a megoldást. Azokban az esetekben, ahol nem sikerült megállapodásra jutniuk, lehetőségük volt konzultálni a Political Capital munkatársaival.

5.2.4 A kódolási folyamat

Az adatok kódolása minden országban ugyanolyan módon zajlott. A nemzeti kutatócsoportok egy Excel-fájlban kapták meg a tartalakat minden releváns információval együtt (pl. komment/cikk/poszt, közzététel dátuma, forrás, kontextus stb.). A kódolási folyamat során a kódolók elolvasták magát a tartalmat, és amennyiben az comment volt, a kontextust is megvizsgálták.

Ha a tartalomban antiszemita narratívakat azonosítottak, a kódolók antiszemitának vagy potenciálisan antiszemitának minősítették, definiálták az antiszemita narratívát, és besorolták egy fő antiszemita narratívába, valamint annak egyik alkategóriájába. Egyetlen tartalom több (legfeljebb négy) narratíva kategóriába is besorolható volt, mivel lehetséges volt, hogy egynél több antiszemita narratíva jelenjen meg egyazon szövegben. Ha a tartalom nem tartalmazott antiszemita narratívát, vagy ha a jelentése nem volt érthető, nem sorolták be egyik kategóriába sem.

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A BOND projekt bemutatása

A BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities¹¹) projekt 2023 januárjától 2024 decemberéig valósult meg Magyarországon, Olaszországban, Lengyelországban és Romániában. Elsődleges célja a társadalomban mélyen gyökerező előítéletek, gyűlöletkeltő attitűdök és viselkedésformák kezelése volt, különösen az európai zsidósággal szemben. A projekt célja továbbá a megértés, a tolerancia és a párbeszéd előmozdítása volt. A projekt tevékenységei jelentős hangsúlyt fektettek a fiatalok zsidóságról és antiszemizmusról szóló oktatására, valamint a kultúrák és vallások közötti párbeszéd előmozdítására. A projekt tevékenységei közé tartozott az antiszemizmus kutatása, az antiszemita narratívak elemzése, oktatási tantervek kidolgozása, tanárok képzése, ifjúsági oktatási és csereprogramok szervezése, a vallások és közösségek közötti párbeszéd elősegítése, valamint a toleranciáról és társadalmi befogadásról szóló helyi kerekasztalbeszélgetések szervezése. A projekt a Nemzetközi Holokaust Emlékezési Szövetség (IHRA) által meghatározott antiszemizmus definíciót használta.¹²

¹¹ A BOND projekt weboldala: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

¹² Az antiszemizmus IHRA által meghatározott definíciója:
<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

Relazione sulle narrazioni antisemite online – Italia

RISULTATI PRINCIPALI

- L'obiettivo della ricerca era analizzare le narrazioni antisemite online diffuse negli ultimi due anni, 2023 e 2024, con un'attenzione particolare all'attacco di Hamas del 7 ottobre e su quanto questo abbia influito sulle narrazioni antisemite.
- Il nostro dataset conteneva 7053 contenuti, estratti da SentiOne sulla base di parole chiave fornitegli.
- La maggior parte dei contenuti analizzati era composta da commenti degli utenti (84,2%) su Facebook, seguiti da articoli online (13,4%) e post sui social (2,4%).
- La quantità di dati analizzati è aumentata quasi sette volte dal 2023 al 2024, mostrando l'impatto dell'attacco del 7 ottobre e della guerra a cui l'attacco ha dato inizio.
- Circa il 37% del contenuto analizzato conteneva narrazioni antisemite o potenzialmente antisemite, ovvero narrazioni che possono essere interpretate sia come antisemite che non antisemite.
- La maggior parte dei contenuti antisemiti e potenzialmente antisemiti appariva nella sezione commenti delle versioni online dei media mainstream sia nel 2023 che nel 2024.
- La categoria narrativa più comune nei dati italiani è stata il Nuovo antisemitismo, seguita dal Cospirazionismo, dagli Stereotipi classici, dalla Negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto e, infine, dall'Antisemitismo tradizionale basato sulla religione.
- Nel 2024, non solo il numero totale di commenti nel dataset è aumentato significativamente, ma è aumentata anche la proporzione di narrazioni antisemite rispetto al totale dei dati analizzati.
- Dal 2023 al 2024, la distribuzione percentuale delle categorie di narrazione è cambiata. Rispetto al 2023, la percentuale di narrazioni di antisemitismo legato alla religione tradizionale rimasta quasi invariata, mentre le percentuali di antisemitismo legato agli stereotipi classici (circa +1,87%) e all'antisemitismo conspiratorio (circa +0,9%) sono cambiate leggermente.
- Cambiamenti significativi si sono invece registrati per le categorie del Nuovo antisemitismo (-14,7% rispetto al 2023) e della Negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto (più che raddoppiato rispetto al <1% del 2023).
- I discorsi d'odio e l'incitamento alla violenza sono molto presenti nel dataset del 2024 in Italia (discorso d'odio: 11,3% del totale, incitamento alla violenza: 6,2%), rispetto a percentuali trascurabili nel 2023.
- I risultati dell'analisi mostrano che le notizie relative a Israele, in particolare i conflitti in Medio Oriente, sono il principale fattore scatenante dell'antisemitismo online in Italia.
- Le narrazioni antisemite di natura conspiratoria erano particolarmente presenti nei commenti degli utenti riguardo a dichiarazioni di autorità di vertice nell'alleanza occidentale (capi dei governi europei, segretario generale dell'ONU, presidente degli Stati Uniti...).

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Introduzione

La ricerca si è proposta di analizzare i cambiamenti nelle narrazioni antisemite online dopo l'attacco terroristico di Hamas contro Israele del 7 ottobre 2023 e la guerra che ne è seguita. Questi eventi hanno portato ad un aumento dell'antisemitismo in tutta Europa, rendendo necessario esaminare come si sono evolute le narrazioni antisemite online. Lo sviluppo della metodologia di ricerca e delle categorie narrative è stato finalizzato tra la fine del 2023 e l'inizio del 2024, mentre la ricerca effettiva è iniziata nella primavera del 2024.

Riconoscere e definire l'antisemitismo in relazione a Israele, per esempio distinguere tra critiche legittime e illegittime a Israele, è diventato particolarmente difficile dal 7 ottobre. La nostra ricerca si è basata¹ sulla definizione operativa dell'antisemitismo data dall'International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), accettata da 43 paesi e diverse organizzazioni internazionali tra cui l'UE e la maggior parte dei suoi Stati membri.

La ricerca è stata condotta simultaneamente in quattro paesi -Ungheria, Italia, Polonia e Romania- utilizzando la stessa metodologia. Si è concentrata su contenuti di testo, tra cui articoli, commenti e post di Facebook. I contenuti sono stati raccolti, utilizzando software di social listening, dai siti web e dalle pagine Facebook dei media nazionali più rilevanti e sono stati divisi in cinque categorie: media indipendenti (mainstream), media faziosi/iper-partigiani, giornali mainstream, siti di sinistra, pagine di estrema destra, e siti di notizie false/cospirazionisti. Il processo di estrazione dei dati è stato guidato da parole chiave individuate per rilevare contenuti antisemiti. Quattro parole chiave fondamentali -Ebreo, Israele, Olocausto e Sionismo/sionista- sono state usate in tutti i paesi, tradotte nelle rispettive lingue locali. Sono state inoltre incluse parole chiave specifiche per ogni Paese. Nelle lingue in cui queste parole possono terminare con più di una desinenza, le loro forme base sono seguite da un asterisco (*), che consente la raccolta dei risultati per tutte le varianti e le terminazioni.

La ricerca si è concentrata sul periodo 1-15 aprile, sia nel 2023 che nel 2024, con circa 7.000 contenuti analizzati in ogni paese. Tutti i contenuti sono stati esaminati dai gruppi di ricerca nazionali e classificati come antisemita, potenzialmente antisemita (contenuto che può essere interpretato sia come antisemita sia come non antisemita), non comprensibile o non antisemita.


Sulla base di risorse disponibili al pubblico, come studi, relazioni di ricerca e articoli scientifici, sono state definite cinque categorie principali di narrazioni antisemite: stereotipi antisemiti classici, antisemitismo cospirazionista, antisemitismo basato sulla religione tradizionale, negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto e nuovo antisemitismo (quello basato sulla critica di Israele). Oltre a questi, sono state stabilite due categorie supplementari: discorso d'odio e incitamento alla violenza contro gli ebrei. Ogni contenuto è stato analizzato a fondo e assegnato ad una o più di queste categorie.

1. L'entità dei contenuti antisemiti nel dataset nazionale

1.1 L'entità dei contenuti antisemiti nel dataset nazionale

Contenuti antisemiti e potenzialmente antisemiti erano presenti nel 36% dei dati raccolti in Italia. Su un totale di 7053 contenuti, 1994 sono stati etichettati come antisemiti, 581 come potenzialmente antisemiti, 3785 come non antisemiti e 693 come non comprensibili.


Fig. 1: Percentuale di contenuti antisemiti nel set di dati completo.



1.2 Distribuzione dei contenuti esaminati

La stragrande maggioranza dei contenuti scaricati erano commenti e la maggior parte dei contenuti antisemiti compariva al loro interno. Circa il 68,4% dei contenuti scaricati erano commenti (5939), il 13,5% erano articoli (954) e solo il 2,4% erano post su Facebook (169). Le narrazioni antisemite sono apparse prevalentemente nei commenti, di cui oltre il 32,7% (1947) erano antisemite, il 9% (546) erano potenzialmente antisemite, il 46,6% (2768) non erano antisemite mentre circa l'11,4% (678) non erano comprensibili. Per quanto riguarda gli articoli, il 90,6% (865) non era antisemita, il 4% (38) era antisemita, il 3% (29) era potenzialmente antisemita e l'1,4% (13) non era comprensibile. Quasi tutti i post sono risultati non antisemiti, e solo il 5,3% (9) è stato classificato come antisemita, il 3,5% (6) come potenzialmente antisemita e l'1,2% (2) come non comprensibile.

Fig. 2: Distribuzione dei diversi tipi di contenuti esaminati nel set di dati completo.




1.3 L'antisemitismo nei diversi tipi di media

Con un maggior numero di dati nel 2024, sono aumentati tanto il numero quanto la percentuale di contenuti antisemiti nella maggior parte delle categorie di media, ad eccezione dei siti di sinistra e di fake news/cospiratori, dove la percentuale di contenuti antisemiti è diminuita nel 2024.

I contenuti antisemiti (ivi compresi sia quelli antisemiti che quelli potenzialmente antisemiti) sono stati maggiormente diffusi nei siti di media indipendenti, sia in proporzione (37,4%) che in termini di quantità (2.126 pezzi), in particolare nei commenti. Seguono i siti di sinistra (35,5%), i siti di fake news/cospiratori (35%), i tabloid mainstream e i siti faziosi/iper-partigiani. Tuttavia, se si considera la quantità di contenuti antisemiti, sono emerse differenze significative: i tabloid mainstream (221 pezzi) contenevano la quantità maggiore, seguiti dai siti faziosi/iper-partigiani (94 pezzi), mentre i siti di sinistra (71 pezzi) e i siti di fake news/cospiratori (56 pezzi) ne avevano meno. Nelle pagine di estrema destra, i contenuti antisemiti erano inferiori sia in proporzione (17,9%) sia in termini quantitativi (7 pezzi).

Fig. 3: Presenza di contenuti antisemiti nelle diverse categorie di media.



2. Panoramica e portata dei diversi tipi di contenuti antisemiti

2.1 Contenuti con narrazioni antisemite

Il quadro concettuale della ricerca ha identificato le seguenti cinque principali narrazioni antisemite. All'interno di ciascuna di queste narrazioni principali sono state altresì individuate delle sotto-narrazioni.

- **Stereotipi classici:** Narrazioni storicamente radicate nel pregiudizio antisemita. Comprendono l'odio verso gli ebrei in quanto esseri umani, non semplicemente in quanto appartenenti alla religione ebraica. L'odio si basa su una logica contraddittoria che vede gli ebrei contemporaneamente troppo potenti e troppo deboli o peggio subumani. Gli stereotipi classici includono, ad esempio, l'idea che gli ebrei siano malvagi, avidi, sleali o bugiardi.¹
- **Antisemitismo tradizionale basato sulla religione (antigiudaismo):** La giudeofobia tradizionale basata sulla religione, o antisemitismo tradizionale, si riferisce a sentimenti antiebraici radicati in credenze associate alla religione e alle tradizioni cristiane o ebraiche. Le narrazioni antisemite tradizionali basate sulla religione includono, tra le altre, l'accusa del sangue/l'omicidio di bambini, il deicidio o il fatto che gli ebrei siano satanici.²
- **Antisemitismo cospirativo:** Le teorie del complotto hanno alimentato credenze antisemite suggerendo che gli ebrei esercitino un'influenza eccessiva per guadagno personale e cospirino per controllare settori come i media, la politica e l'economia. Molte di queste teorie sono radicate nel mito antisemita della "mano nascosta" e attribuiscono agli ebrei, o a soggetti che vengono percepiti come tali, la responsabilità delle peggiori tragedie del mondo, come le guerre o addirittura il COVID-19. Le narrazioni cospirazioniste antisemite includono, tra le altre cose, il potere/controllo degli ebrei, il giudeocomunismo, la teoria della Grande Sostituzione³ o la teoria del Nuovo Ordine Mondiale^{4,5}.

¹ Matthias J. Becker et al., "Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets", *Humanities & Social Sciences Communications* 9, 2022

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3>; Matthias J. Becker et al., "Decoding Antisemitism" Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, p. 11, 13; ADL Antisemitic Myths. <https://antisemitism.adl.org/>

² Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, p. 13. <https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

³ Il Grande Scambio di Popolazione è una teoria della cospirazione che ha le sue radici nella convinzione che la razza bianca sia in pericolo di estinzione per mano degli ebrei e di altre minoranze. Questa teoria, nota anche come teoria della sostituzione dei bianchi o teoria del genocidio bianco, sostiene che esiste uno sforzo deliberato guidato dagli ebrei per promuovere l'immigrazione di massa dei non bianchi, i matrimoni interrazziali e altri sforzi che porteranno all'"estinzione" dei bianchi.

<https://www.adc.org/translatehate/great-replacement>


⁴ La teoria del Nuovo Ordine Mondiale è una teoria della cospirazione che sostiene che un piccolo gruppo di individui potenti lavora in segreto per stabilire un controllo onnipotente. La teoria della cospirazione dietro il Nuovo Ordine Mondiale, che coinvolge i leader ebrei, si basa sull'idea che gli ebrei abbiano formato una struttura di potere in cui controllano ogni aspetto dell'umanità: l'economia, i media e il panorama politico. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/New-World-Order>

⁵ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, pp. 13-14. <https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

- **Negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto:** La negazione o distorsione dell'Olocausto mira a negare o travisare i fatti storici del genocidio degli ebrei perpetrato dai nazisti. La negazione dell'Olocausto può avere ad oggetto tanto le dimensioni quanto i metodi utilizzati dai nazisti e dai loro alleati durante l'Olocausto. La negazione e la distorsione dell'Olocausto promuovono la falsa idea che gli ebrei abbiano inventato o gonfiato l'Olocausto ad arte per trarne un qualche vantaggio. Le narrazioni di negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto includono, ad esempio, la colpevolizzazione degli ebrei per l'Olocausto o la rappresentazione dell'Olocausto come un evento positivo.⁶
- **Nuovo antisemitismo:** Il nuovo antisemitismo si riferisce all'espressione di sentimenti antiebraici diretti contro Israele. Una delle funzioni principali del nuovo antisemitismo è permettere l'espressione di opinioni antisemite in una forma che sia politicamente accettabile. Definiamo il nuovo antisemitismo utilizzando le 3D dell'antisemitismo di Natan Sharansky: demonizzazione, doppi standard e delegittimazione. Il nuovo antisemitismo comprende, ad esempio, le analogie con i nazisti, l'apartheid e il colonialismo, l'affermazione che Israele è uno Stato terrorista o che Israele esercita un'influenza sui media.⁷

La categoria narrativa più diffusa nella raccolta dei dati italiani è quella del nuovo antisemitismo, che compare nel 26,4% (1861 righe) dei contenuti esaminati. Seguono i contenuti antisemiti di stampo cospiratorio, presenti nel 7,4% (521 righe) dei dati. Gli stereotipi classici sono al terzo posto con il 2% (138 righe), mentre la negazione e la distorsione dell'Olocausto sono presenti nell'0,8% (58 righe) e i contenuti tradizionali basati sulla religione appaiono nell'0,5% (38 righe) dei contenuti esaminati.

Fig. 4: Percentuale di categorie narrative antisemite nel set di dati completo.




⁶ IHRA Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion (2013).

<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion>

⁷ ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>

La quantità di dati è aumentata di quasi sette volte, così come il contenuto di tutte le categorie narrative, in termini sia quantitativi che proporzionali. L'aumento maggiore è stato quello del nuovo antisemitismo, che, in proporzione, è passato dal 20% dei dati del 2023 al 27,3% del 2024. È aumentata anche la presenza dell'antisemitismo cospiratorio e della negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto, mentre gli stereotipi classici e l'antisemitismo tradizionale basato sulla religione sono rimasti più o meno invariati.

Fig. 5: Percentuale di narrazioni antisemite nel dataset per il 2023 e il 2024 (separatamente)




2.2 Contenuti antisemiti oltre le narrazioni

Oltre alle narrazioni, la ricerca ha esaminato altri due tipi di contenuti antisemiti: i discorsi d'odio e gli appelli alla violenza.

- **Discorso d'odio:** Contenuti di odio rivolti contro gli ebrei e/o basati su narrazioni antisemite.
- **Incitamento alla violenza:** Contenuti che incitano alla violenza di qualsiasi tipo contro gli ebrei.


Fig. 6: Percentuale di categorie antisemite oltre le narrazioni nel set di dati completo.



I discorsi d'odio sono relativamente comuni nel dataset italiano, comparando nel 4,6% (324 righe) dei contenuti. Anche i contenuti che incitano alla violenza contro gli ebrei erano relativamente comuni, comparando in circa il 2,5% (175 righe) dei dati.

Entrambe le categorie sono aumentate significativamente nel 2024: i discorsi d'odio erano presenti nello 0,6% dei dati del 2023 e nel 5,2% del 2024, mentre l'incitamento alla violenza era presente nello 0,1% dei dati del 2023 e nel 2,8% del 2024.

Fig. 7: Percentuale di categorie antisemite oltre le narrazioni nel set di dati per il 2023 e il 2024 (separatamente).



3. Tipi di contenuti antisemiti nei dati esaminati

3.1. Contenuto delle narrazioni antisemite

3.1.1 Nuovo antisemitismo

La categoria del *Nuovo antisemitismo* è quella in cui ricadono, per distacco, il maggior numero di commenti nel dataset del nostro Paese.

ISRAELE E' UNO STATO TERRORISTA

Questa sottocategoria presenta almeno cinque versioni differenti, tra cui:

1. Israele sta commettendo un genocidio a Gaza.
2. Israele è come Hamas (se non peggio).
3. Hamas è una creazione di Israele in funzione anti-OLP.
4. Israele è un regime infanticida.
5. Israele colpisce deliberatamente strutture sanitarie, scuole, ospedali e civili in generale.

ANALOGIA CON IL NAZISMO

Questa sottocategoria presenta quattro versioni principali:

1. Israele sta compiendo un nuovo Olocausto nei confronti dei palestinesi, ripetendo ciò che il nazismo aveva fatto con gli ebrei.
2. Il primo ministro israeliano Benjamin Netanyahu viene considerato alla stregua di Adolf Hitler.
3. Gaza è stata trasformata in un campo di concentramento a cielo aperto.
4. Il Sionismo è descritto come un'ideologia nazista.

DELEGITTIMAZIONE

Questa sottocategoria presenta tre versioni:

1. Israele è visto come uno stato artificiale, privo di legittimità storica o culturale, e pertanto non dovrebbe esistere.
2. Il Sionismo è descritto come una "psicopatologia biblica", finalizzata al controllo totale della "Terra d'Israele", ossia il territorio che, secondo la tradizione, Dio avrebbe promesso ad Abramo e ai suoi discendenti.
3. Gli abitanti di Israele sono chiamati a restituire le terre acquisite in modo illecito ai legittimi proprietari palestinesi.

DEMONIZZAZIONE

Questa sottocategoria presenta due versioni principali:

1. Il governo israeliano è rappresentato come demoniaco, perfido e sadico nei confronti dei suoi nemici e del popolo palestinese
2. Israele è uno stato canaglia che minaccia costantemente la guerra in Medio Oriente.

Queste narrazioni mirano a demonizzare lo stato israeliano e il suo governo, dipingendoli come entità intrinsecamente crudeli, suggerendo in alcuni casi che provino un piacere diabolico nel colpire obiettivi civili. Nella seconda versione della sottocategoria, Israele viene accusato di provocare Stati terzi per causare un'escalation del conflitto in Medio Oriente su scala internazionale, in modo da mettere pressione ai propri finanziatori.

DOPPIO STANDARD

Questa sottocategoria presenta due versioni:

1. Israele è considerato uno stato che non rispetta le norme del diritto internazionale.
2. Israele gode di un trattamento privilegiato rispetto ad altri Paesi. I crimini di Israele non vengono perseguiti legalmente né sanzionati, come invece accade per la Russia

Le due versioni della sottocategoria “Doppio standard” denunciano l’esistenza di un doppio standard nel trattamento internazionale tra Israele e altri Stati, come la Russia (che, nell’immaginario degli utenti critici verso Israele, può essere ad esso paragonato per i crimini perpetrati) in relazione alle violazioni dei diritti umani e delle leggi internazionali. Viene, dunque, messa in discussione la qualificazione democratica di Israele.

ANALOGIA CON IL COLONIALISMO E CON L'APARTHEID

Anche questa sottocategoria, analogamente alle due precedenti, presenta due versioni:

1. Israele è accusato di aver colonizzato il territorio palestinese e la Cisgiordania, con l’obiettivo di ripristinare la "terra dei suoi avi promessa da Dio", perpetuando una forma di colonizzazione.
2. Israele, attraverso il controllo di vari territori, avrebbe instaurato un regime razzista, in cui gli israeliani godono di diritti civili e libertà, mentre i palestinesi sono segregati in territori limitati e sotto il controllo dell'esercito israeliano.

Queste narrazioni paragonano le politiche israeliane alla colonizzazione e all'apartheid, accusando Israele di discriminazione razziale e oppressione nei confronti dei palestinesi.

ALTRE NARRAZIONI

Israele viene spesso accusato di esercitare un controllo capillare sui mezzi di informazione, decidendo quali notizie diffondere e quali censurare per manipolare l'opinione pubblica e

perseguire scopi propagandistici. Alcuni ritengono che, attraverso la diffusione di informazioni distorte, Israele costruisca una narrazione favorevole a sé stesso, alimentando una visione positiva presso la comunità internazionale, mentre omette o distorce le verità più scomode. Vi è anche chi sostiene che Israele compri il silenzio dei giornalisti, pagandoli per evitare la pubblicazione di articoli critici, creando così un'informazione sempre favorevole al governo israeliano.

Israele e i suoi sostenitori vengono inoltre accusati di non accettare nessun tipo di critica e di utilizzare l'etichetta di "antisemitismo" come mezzo deterrente.


Sempre nel contesto del conflitto tra Israele e Hamas, alcuni negano o relativizzano l'attacco del 7 ottobre da parte dell'organizzazione terroristica, sostenendo che l'evento non sia mai avvenuto o che sia stato una manovra orchestrata da Israele per ottenere supporto internazionale, oppure per creare un alibi utile a giustificare una premeditata operazione di pulizia etnica a Gaza. Secondo questa visione, Israele sarebbe anche colpevole di aver diffuso notizie false sulle atrocità compiute da Hamas, o di aver amplificato notizie vere con l'obiettivo di attirarsi la compassione globale. Per altri, l'attacco del 7 ottobre non è considerato un atto di terrorismo, ma piuttosto un atto di resistenza, ovvero il risultato di anni di occupazione e oppressione israeliana.

C'è, poi, chi sostiene che gli ebrei, gli israeliani e i sionisti siano collettivamente responsabili delle azioni di Israele, accusandoli di essere complici delle politiche israeliane, in particolare per aver democraticamente eletto Benjamin Netanyahu, per sostenere la sua leadership e per non opporsi in alcun modo al massacro di civili palestinesi.

Israele è accusato, infine, di essere la causa principale del conflitto con Hamas e del conflitto arabo-israeliano. L'occupazione della Palestina, ritenuta illegale, viene considerata l'inizio di una reazione a catena che ha portato a un'escalation del conflitto. A Israele viene attribuita la responsabilità del perpetuarsi di un ciclo di violenza che mantiene la regione in uno stato di guerra permanente.

Confronto 2023/2024: Nel 2024, rispetto allo stesso periodo dell'anno precedente, l'incidenza di tutte le sottocategorie appartenenti alla categoria "Nuovo antisemitismo" è cresciuta in maniera esponenziale (Israele è uno stato terrorista +744%, Analogia con il Nazismo +888%, Delegittimazione +222% etc...), principalmente a causa dell'attacco di Hamas del 7 ottobre 2023 e della successiva risposta militare israeliana, che hanno agito come moltiplicatori dell'antisemitismo.

Fig. 8: Sotto-narrazioni della categoria narrativa antisemita: Nuovo antisemitismo.



3.1.2 Conspirazionismo

POTERE/CONTROLLO DEGLI EBREI

La sottocategoria "Potere/controllo degli ebrei" presenta tre versioni:

1. Israele beneficia del supporto e della protezione dei Paesi occidentali, in particolare degli Stati Uniti, influenzandone le politiche e ottenendo vantaggi.
2. Israele gode di impunità internazionale e non incorre in sanzioni per le sue azioni.
3. Israele esercita un controllo sugli Stati membri dell'UE e ha il potere di influenzare i governi che ne fanno parte, determinandone la caduta, se questi non si allinea ai suoi interessi.

Nella categoria "Cospirazionismo", solo la sottocategoria "Potere/controllo degli ebrei" merita un'attenzione particolare, poiché le altre sottocategorie non raggiungono un numero di commenti tale da offrire una visione d'insieme utile per fare un bilancio e trarre conclusioni significative. Le narrazioni di potere legate a Israele vedono una presenza significativa degli Stati Uniti nei commenti, con l'idea di un asse Israele-USA che trama nell'ombra che risulta essere profondamente radicata nelle narrazioni. L'idea di potere è molto più frequentemente associata a Israele e al Sionismo che agli ebrei in generale.

Molti commenti ribaltano la gerarchia delle fonti internazionali, sostenendo che Israele esercita *de facto* un potere superiore a quello di organizzazioni come l'ONU, la NATO e l'Unione Europea.

ZELENSKY

Un solo commento è stato catalogato nella sottocategoria "Zelensky", che sostiene l'idea che il presidente ucraino, Volodymyr Zelensky, benefici della protezione esercitata dalla cosiddetta "lobby ebraica".

COVID-19

Questa narrazione presenta più versioni, tra l'altro molto diverse tra loro.

1) Le morti dovute agli effetti collaterali dei vaccini vengono paragonate agli ebrei uccisi dai Nazisti. Il vaccino è quindi un nuovo Olocausto

2) Gli ebrei hanno lucrato sul COVID-19

3) Il ministro italiano della salute durante la pandemia, Roberto Speranza, è servo dei Rothschild, nella cui accademia londinese si è formato, e pertanto fa i loro interessi

SOROS

Questa narrazione è evocata in soli due commenti, che identificano il banchiere ebreo ungherese George Soros come il vertice della piramide del potere finanziario giudaico

PROTOCOLLI DEI SAVI DI SION

Un solo commento è stato etichettato in questo modo. In questo commento i "Protocolli dei Savi di Sion" vengono nominati in maniera dispregiativa (i "Savi" vengono chiamati "Nasi" - maggiori informazioni a 3.2 Parole in codice usate per gli ebrei, esempi). In un clima cospiratorio, viene asserito che questo documento è la prova di un complotto segreto degli ebrei per dominare il mondo e che chiunque ne neghi la validità storica, ad esempio Umberto Eco nel suo romanzo "Il cimitero di Praga", sia in mala fede.

TEORIA DEL NUOVO ORDINE MONDIALE

L'accusa agli ebrei di avere un programma occulto di controllo mondiale è presente in tale forma nelle narrazioni antisemite in ogni Paese, dunque non ha una connotazione specifica nel nostro paese

ALTRO


A questa narrazione sono state assegnate diverse sotto-narrazioni, anche diverse tra loro, che non potevano ricadere in altre narrazioni della categoria dell'antisemitismo cospirazionista.

1. La lobby ebraica americana ha pianificato gli attacchi dell'11 Settembre al World Trade Center in modo che il governo americano avesse mano libera in Iraq, i cui giacimenti petroliferi erano un'attrazione per gli ebrei-americani

2. Israele ha concordato con l'Iran l'attacco missilistico di quest'ultimo, in modo che fosse inoffensivo per Israele da un lato, e mettesse a tacere le richieste di parte del popolo iraniano di essere vendicato dall'altro
3. Il Mossad era a conoscenza dei piani di Hamas di oltrepassare la barriera tra Israele e la Striscia di Gaza e di compiere un massacro, ma non è intervenuta per dare al proprio governo l'alibi per bombardare in modo insistente la Striscia

Confronto 2023/2024: Dal 2023 al 2024, le narrazioni associate all'idea di controllo e potere degli ebrei hanno visto un incremento percentuale del 1647%. Le notizie che hanno catalizzato l'antisemitismo di matrice cospirazionista nel 2024 sono state principalmente l'attacco israeliano al consolato iraniano in Siria, in cui sono stati uccisi sette ufficiali del Corpo delle Guardie della Rivoluzione Islamica, cinque miliziani sostenuti dall'Iran, un appartenente a Hezbollah, un consigliere e due civili iraniani. Un altro fattore scatenante è stata la mancata condanna dell'attacco da parte dei leader europei, in particolare Giorgia Meloni, presidente del Consiglio in carica del Governo italiano, e António Guterres, Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite. Infine, l'ipocrisia -sempre presunta dagli utenti- del presidente degli USA, Joe Biden, nel richiamare alla moderazione il leader israeliano Benjamin Netanyahu, ha alimentato ulteriormente queste narrazioni.

Fig. 9: Sotto-narrazioni della categoria narrativa antisemita: Conspirazionismo



3.1.3 Stereotip classici

MALE

La sottocategoria "Male" punta a descrivere gli ebrei come malvagi facendo leva in particolare sul tono del commento. Termini come "sionista" oppure l'aggettivo "radicale" associato ad "ebreo", assumono una carica minacciosa nel contesto in cui vengono evocati. Gli utenti tendono a fare generalizzazioni forzate, suscitando in chi le legge un senso di paura verso gli ebrei.

INGANNO E MENZOGNA


Nel nostro Paese, la sottocategoria "Inganno e menzogna" viene utilizzata in modo mirato, ossia quasi sempre in narrazioni isolate che non si mescolano con altri tipi di discorsi. In queste narrazioni, come avviene per altre categorie, gli israeliani e i sionisti sono frequentemente presi di mira più degli ebrei. Spesso viene messo in discussione tutto ciò che viene affermato da chi difende Israele, in quanto, secondo una visione diffusa, "i sionisti/gli israeliani/gli ebrei mentono". Sebbene possa sorgere il ragionevole dubbio che tali commenti intendano limitare il loro attacco al solo governo israeliano, è altrettanto innegabile che affermare che i sionisti siano falsi per principio o che "la menzogna faccia parte del loro DNA" costituisca una chiara derivazione dello stereotipo secondo cui gli ebrei sarebbero naturalmente abili ingannatori. Per questo motivo, narrazioni di questo tipo sono state incluse in questa sottocategoria.

AVIDITA'/RICCHEZZA

La sottocategoria "Avidità/ricchezza", nel nostro Paese, è associata all'incirca in un quarto dei casi ad "Discorso d'odio" o "Incitamento alla violenza". Non di rado si allude ad alcune delle famiglie ebraiche più ricche (Rotschild e Rockefeller, ad esempio) quali modelli negativi di "finanza speculativa". Alla ricchezza, i commenti antisemiti di questo tenore associano automaticamente la malafede e la disonestà. Più rari, ma comunque presenti, i richiami allo stereotipo degli ebrei usurai, banchieri e mercanti, nel significato di individui motivati esclusivamente dall'avidità di guadagno.

Confronto 2023/2024: Nel 2024, il numero di commenti antisemiti riferibili alla categoria "Stereotipi classici" è aumentato significativamente rispetto all'anno precedente. Anche in questo caso, come per le altre categorie, gli eventi del 7 Ottobre e le loro conseguenze hanno avuto un impatto determinante nell'incremento dei commenti antisemiti degli utenti. Tuttavia, dalle notizie disponibili, risulta difficile rintracciare un trigger specifico per questo tipo di antisemitismo. Le narrazioni sono rimaste sostanzialmente invariate, con una tendenza crescente, nel 2024, a concentrarsi maggiormente sugli israeliani, piuttosto che sugli ebrei in generale. Si può affermare che gli stereotipi antisemiti tradizionali siano stati indirizzati con maggiore intensità verso israeliani e sionisti.

Fig. 10. Sotto-narrazioni della categoria narrativa antisemita: Stereotipi classici



3.1.4 Negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto

INCOLPARE GLI EBREI

Dall'analisi condotta nel nostro Paese emerge una quantità ridotta, ma indicativa, di commenti che accusano ora i sionisti, ora la famiglia ashkenazita dei Rothschild, di aver finanziato Adolf Hitler e il suo progetto di sterminio del popolo ebraico in cambio di uno Stato ebraico in terra palestinese.

ANALOGIA CON IL NAZISMO

Nonostante tale sottocategoria abbia un'incidenza nettamente maggiore all'interno della categoria del "Nuovo antisemitismo", essa risulta essere una delle più presenti anche nella categoria del negazionismo e della distorsione dell'Olocausto. In queste narrazioni, gli ebrei vengono paragonati ai nazisti nella misura in cui, se i primi si ritengono il popolo eletto, i secondi si ritenevano una razza superiore. In alcuni casi, si sostiene addirittura che gli ebrei siano gli eredi naturali della cultura nazista. Tali discorsi non solo minimizzano le sofferenze del popolo ebraico, ma contribuiscono anche ad alimentare un clima di odio e intolleranza.

L'OLOCAUSTO COME EVENTO POSITIVO

Questa sottocategoria presenta tre versioni principali:

1. Hitler aveva ragione a considerare gli ebrei un problema di cui sbarazzarsi
2. I campi di concentramento erano delle "opere d'arte"
3. Sarebbe bene che l'Olocausto si ripetesse

Non sorprende che tali narrazioni siano frequentemente collocate in un contesto di "discorso d'odio" o di "incitamento alla violenza", considerando la violenza intrinseca a contenuti così estremi.

NEGARE O DISTORCERE L'OLOCAUSTO IN QUALSIASI MANIERA


Durante la fase di monitoraggio nel nostro Paese, non sono stati rilevati commenti negazionisti dell'Olocausto nella categoria “Negare o distorcere l’Olocausto in qualsiasi maniera”. Sono comunque emerse due versioni alternative all’interno di questa sottocategoria, che meritano un’analisi:

1. La memoria dell’Olocausto viene sfruttata in modo strumentale da alcuni membri della comunità ebraica per giustificare le azioni efferate dello Stato di Israele.
2. Bisogna smettere di "piangere" per un evento accaduto ormai più di ottant’anni fa. I commenti appartenenti a questa sottocategoria tendono a insistere sulla percezione che Israele stia adottando la retorica della vittima, che sarebbe fuori luogo considerando la distanza temporale dall’Olocausto.

Inoltre, si osserva una confusione tra passato e presente, in cui l’Olocausto viene ridotto a un evento di cui non sarebbe necessario conservare memoria in quanto non più attuale, e si mescolano le sofferenze del popolo ebraico con le politiche attuali dello Stato di Israele. In altre parole, non viene solo negata l’importanza della memoria storica della Shoah, ma si giunge a un punto in cui la figura degli ebrei nel contesto storico dell’Olocausto viene sovrapposta con quella dello Stato di Israele, creando un cortocircuito che mina la distinzione tra i due piani e rischia di distorcere la comprensione dei fatti storici e politici.

Confronto 2023/2024: Nel 2023, le narrazioni che potevano essere classificate nella categoria “Negazione e distorsione dell’Olocausto” erano praticamente assenti nel nostro Paese. A un anno di distanza, è stato possibile riscontrare un cambiamento significativo nel dataset dei commenti analizzati. Nel 2024 si è osservata la diffusione di tale narrazione, in gran parte alimentata dalle notizie relative ai conflitti in corso, tra cui la guerra tra Israele e Hamas e l’escalation delle tensioni con l’Iran.

Fig. 11. Sotto-narrazioni della categoria narrativa antisemita: Negazione e distorsione dell’Olocausto



3.1.5 Antisemitismo tradizionale, basato sulla religione

Se si escludono le categorie di "Discorso d'odio" e "Incitamento alla violenza", la categoria "Antisemitismo tradizionale basato sulla religione" risulta essere la meno presente nel dataset dei commenti analizzati nel nostro Paese. Proprio per la scarsità di commenti a nostra disposizione, si è scelto di fare un'unica analisi comprensiva di tutte le narrazioni presenti in tale categoria.


In tali narrazioni, gli ebrei, e più frequentemente i sionisti, sono accusati di essere adoratori di Satana. Inoltre, viene attribuita loro la colpa dell'uccisione di Gesù Cristo, e i praticanti ebrei vengono messi in ridicolo per i loro riti religiosi. Talvolta la critica viene rivolta in modo ambiguo ad Israele, descritto come uno Stato che rifiuta e discrimina chiunque professi una religione diversa dalla propria.

La parte più radicale della comunità ebraica è accusata di giustificare, attraverso la religione, le azioni militari di Israele, descritte come un male necessario, compiuto in nome di una "guerra santa contro gli infedeli". Infine, il mito della "terra promessa" e la concezione del "popolo eletto" vengono frequentemente ridicolizzati, anche attraverso l'uso di emoticon e espressioni colorite, rafforzando così una narrazione di disprezzo e derisione nei confronti della fede e della cultura ebraica.

Confronto 2023/2024: Anche la categoria "Antisemitismo tradizionale basato sulla religione", come tutte le altre, ha registrato un'impennata di commenti antisemiti nel periodo recente. Alcune sottocategorie, come "Altro", "Ebreo come Satana/demonio" e "Accusa del sangue/omicidio dei bambini", che erano completamente assenti nel 2023, sono invece apparse nel 2024, segnalando un preoccupante aumento di narrazioni che associano agli ebrei satanismo e riti sacrificali.

L'antisemitismo, in questo contesto, è stato alimentato principalmente da notizie di cronaca, ma a sfondo religioso. Tra queste, il pellegrinaggio a La Mecca del cantante italiano Ghali, che già aveva sollevato polemiche per le sue uscite alla kermesse canora Sanremo, la diretta della Via Crucis di Radio Maria bloccata da Facebook per "immagini di nudo", la chiusura di un calzaturificio di Padova in occasione del Ramadan, e infine l'attentato con una bomba Molotov a una sinagoga nel nord della Germania.

Fig. 12. Sotto-narrazioni della categoria narrativa antisemita: Antisemitismo tradizionale, basato sulla religione



3.2 Contenuti antisemiti oltre le narrazioni

3.2.1 Discorso d'odio antisemita

L'analisi condotta ha evidenziato che i discorsi d'odio rilevati erano prevalentemente focalizzati su Israele piuttosto che sulla comunità ebraica in generale. Tale fenomeno era quasi sempre correlato ad aggiornamenti sui vari fronti di guerra in cui Israele è impegnato (Iran, Libano, Gaza, Iraq, Yemen, Siria, Cisgiordania). La categoria di media in cui i discorsi di odio antisemita sono apparsi maggiormente è la combinazione discorso d'odio-incitamento alla violenza. A seguire, la categoria di media “Nuovo antisemitismo”, con la sottocategoria “Israele è uno Stato terrorista” predominante, è pure presente in gran numero nel file di monitoraggio del nostro Paese. Le accuse più ricorrenti nei confronti di Israele erano quelle di essere uno stato terrorista, di commettere crimini di guerra e di beneficiare di un trattamento di favore da parte

della comunità internazionale.

L'analisi ha inoltre mostrato come la piattaforma social Facebook fosse il principale veicolo per la diffusione di questo tipo di discorsi d'odio, rispetto ai siti web delle pagine monitorate. Per quanto concerne l'hate speech direttamente rivolto agli ebrei, questo si presentava spesso sotto forma di offese gratuite e concise, prive di narrazioni o sottotesti ulteriori. Tali espressioni denigratorie erano caratterizzate da un linguaggio scurrile e offensivo.

3.2.2 Violenza antisemita

L'analisi dei contenuti classificati come "incitamento alla violenza" ha rivelato un pattern simile a quello riscontrato nel discorso d'odio. Le statistiche sulle categorie di media più diffuse sotto l'etichetta “ incitamento alla violenza” replicano quanto già visto per i discorsi di odio antisemita nel paragrafo precedente. Il “nuovo antisemitismo” è la categoria mediatica più presente nelle frasi che incitano alla violenza contro gli ebrei.

In prevalenza, le minacce e le incitazioni alla violenza erano dirette allo Stato di Israele, piuttosto che alla comunità ebraica nel suo complesso.

Le notizie relative ai conflitti in Medio Oriente e agli interventi militari israeliani hanno agito come catalizzatori per questo tipo di discorsi, generando un clima di tensione e alimentando sentimenti di odio. Gli utenti che hanno postato questi commenti hanno spesso incitato i paesi arabi a intraprendere azioni violente contro Israele, arrivando a invocare la sua distruzione.

È importante sottolineare che, per quanto rari, sono stati riscontrati anche casi di generalizzazione dell'odio, con attacchi diretti alla comunità ebraica nel suo insieme. Tuttavia, come già detto, la maggior parte dei commenti aveva Israele come bersaglio primario.

Una narrazione ricorrente nei commenti classificati come "incitamento alla violenza" era quella che dipingeva Israele come uno Stato criminale, trattato con favore da ONU, NATO e organismi sovranazionali, e meritevole invece di una punizione severa. Questa narrazione, accompagnata da un linguaggio violento e offensivo, contribuiva a creare un clima di polarizzazione e intolleranza attorno ad Israele e, indirettamente, attorno ai suoi abitanti e sostenitori.

I commenti degli utenti sono il principale canale di diffusione di tali contenuti, staccando nettamente i post e gli articoli, che raramente presentano narrazioni antisemite.

3.3 Argomenti che provocano l'antisemitismo

Il 2024 ha visto un netto aumento dei commenti di odio e disprezzo verso Israele e gli ebrei, strettamente legato all'attacco terroristico di Hamas del 7 ottobre. Questo attacco ha scatenato una serie di eventi, tra cui la risposta armata di Israele e l'escalation del conflitto. Sebbene siano aumentati i commenti antisemiti, è importante relativizzare questo dato. Infatti, ciò che è cresciuto significativamente dopo il 7 ottobre è stato il numero di articoli su Israele sui giornali italiani, suggerendo che l'antisemitismo non è aumentato in modo diretto, ma che sentimenti preesistenti hanno trovato in Israele un bersaglio "facile". L'intensificarsi del dibattito su Israele ha dato voce a rancori preesistenti, non solo legati alla politica israeliana, ma a pregiudizi più ampi. Nel 2023, prima delle incursioni delle milizie palestinesi oltre la linea di confine tra Israele e la Striscia, le notizie principali riguardavano l'irruzione della polizia israeliana nella moschea di Al-Aqsa ad aprile, il lancio di missili da Gaza e Libano e i successivi bombardamenti israeliani su Hamas, e l'attentato terroristico a Tel Aviv che ha causato la morte di un turista italiano e il ferimento di altre 5 persone.

Nel 2024, le notizie che più hanno innescato reazioni antisemite sono state il ritiro delle forze israeliane dall'ospedale Al-Shifa a Gaza, la morte di operatori umanitari della World Central Kitchen durante un raid israeliano, il bombardamento del consolato iraniano a Damasco, la chiusura preventiva delle sedi diplomatiche israeliane dopo l'annunciata rappresaglia iraniana, l'attacco missilistico dell'Iran a Israele, l'uso di sistemi di intelligenza artificiale da parte di Israele per identificare i militanti di Hamas e la messa al bando di Al Jazeera.

Sebbene la maggior parte dei commenti antisemiti fossero diretti a Israele e al Sionismo, queste notizie hanno alimentato anche reazioni antisemite che miravano ad offendere l'intera comunità ebraica. L'antisemitismo tradizionale si è mescolato con narrazioni politiche, spia del fatto che tra gli utenti resiste una confusione tra le varie figure che costellano l'immaginario

ebraico (ebrei, Israele, governo israeliano, sionisti). Questo fenomeno è preoccupante, soprattutto per la diffusione capillare di tali commenti attraverso i social media.

3.4 Parole in codice usate per gli ebrei, esempi

In Italia, come in molte altre parti del mondo, l'uso di termini per descrivere gli ebrei è stato spesso strumentalizzato per diffondere pregiudizi e discriminazioni. Nel nostro paese non esistono codici linguistici specifici e locali come in altri paesi dove l'antisemitismo è più radicato¹ pertanto i termini usati per riferirsi agli ebrei, in maniera più o meno allusiva, sono gli stessi utilizzati in qualsiasi altro angolo del mondo.

Termini utilizzati:

- Sionista: Originariamente legato al movimento politico che ha portato alla creazione dello Stato di Israele, questo termine è spesso utilizzato in modo dispregiativo per indicare tutti gli ebrei, indipendentemente dalle loro opinioni politiche.
- Giudeo: Derivato dal nome biblico di Giuda, questo termine ha acquisito nel tempo una connotazione negativa, spesso associata a stereotipi antisemiti.
- Nasoni/Usurai: Questi termini, basati su stereotipi secolari, sono utilizzati per denigrare gli ebrei, associandoli a tratti fisici (il naso) e a presunte attività economiche (l'usura).
- Kippato: Neologismo derivato dal termine yiddish per indicare la kippah, il copricapo ebraico. Viene utilizzato in senso dispregiativo per identificare gli ebrei in modo stereotipato.

Restringendo il campo ad Israele, invece, una locuzione presente in alcuni commenti è "repubblica delle banane", termine giornalistico utilizzato in origine per descrivere piccoli Stati dell'America Latina considerati politicamente instabili e economicamente dipendenti. E' stato utilizzato in modo dispregiativo per riferirsi a Israele, con l'intento di screditare la legittimità e la democraticità. In questo caso, il termine non è un codice linguistico specifico per gli ebrei, ma viene utilizzato in un contesto antisemita per associare Israele a stereotipi negativi e diffondere pregiudizi.

4. Conclusioni

Nel periodo di monitoraggio, è emerso un quadro piuttosto allarmante riguardo alla diffusione delle narrazioni antisemite sui social media e altre piattaforme online in Italia. Le narrazioni più diffuse sono ascrivibili al cosiddetto “nuovo antisemitismo”, ovvero l'intolleranza e l'odio rivolti al Sionismo e allo Stato d'Israele.

Caratteristiche specifiche del nostro Paese

L'Italia mostra caratteristiche peculiari nell'espressione dell'antisemitismo online. La presenza di discorsi d'odio e di incitamento alla violenza, resta l'aspetto più inquietante di un fenomeno sfaccettato quale l'antisemitismo. Tuttavia, la maggioranza degli utenti ha rivolto commenti sprezzanti, stereotipati o pieni d'odio ad Israele, non tanto agli ebrei, mascherando intenti antisemiti sotto la maschera -socialmente accettata- dell'antisionismo.

Media più colpiti

Le piattaforme social, in particolare Facebook, risultano essere i principali canali in cui dilagano narrazioni antisemite. L'analisi dei contenuti sui media tradizionali, invece, ha rivelato che la stampa e i siti di informazione online sono spesso coinvolti, ma in modo più indiretto, ovvero in quanto canali d'accesso ai commenti degli utenti.

Combattere l'antisemitismo online

Per contrastare efficacemente l'antisemitismo online, sarebbe fondamentale adottare una strategia mirata su più fronti:

- Educazione e sensibilizzazione: promuovere una cultura di rispetto e conoscenza storica dell'Olocausto e delle radici dell'antisemitismo per ridurre la diffusione di pregiudizi, fake news e teorie del complotto sugli ebrei, su Israele e sul Sionismo.
- Monitoraggio attivo e moderazione: rafforzare la presenza di moderatori sui social e migliorare gli algoritmi per identificare e rimuovere contenuti d'odio.
- Collaborazione tra istituzioni e piattaforme: le istituzioni locali e internazionali devono lavorare insieme alle piattaforme digitali per garantire una risposta tempestiva ed efficace contro i contenuti antisemiti.

In conclusione, la lotta contro l'antisemitismo online richiede un impegno collettivo che unisce governo, media e cittadini. Il miglioramento della comprensione storica e la promozione di un dialogo più inclusivo sono passi fondamentali per ridurre l'influenza di queste narrazioni pericolose.

5. Metodologia

La ricerca ha mirato ad esaminare le narrazioni antisemite nei contenuti di testo online - come commenti, articoli e post su Facebook - prima e dopo il 7 ottobre 2023. Abbiamo analizzato i contenuti di siti web e pagine Facebook di media precedentemente scelti. I contenuti sono stati raccolti utilizzando software di social listening sulla base di parole chiave predefinite, che coprono lo stesso periodo di tempo sia nel 2023 che nel 2024. La ricerca è stata condotta in quattro paesi (Ungheria, Italia, Polonia e Romania) da gruppi di ricerca nazionali coordinati da Political Capital, utilizzando la stessa metodologia.

Definizione di antisemitismo

La base della ricerca è stata la definizione operativa dell'International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) dell'antisemitismo: *"L'antisemitismo è una certa percezione degli ebrei, che può essere espressa come odio verso gli ebrei. Le manifestazioni retoriche e fisiche dell'antisemitismo sono dirette verso individui ebrei o non ebrei e/o i loro beni, verso istituzioni² della comunità ebraica e strutture religiose."* Una spiegazione dettagliata della definizione, insieme ad esempi esplicativi, è disponibile sul sito web dell'IHRA.

5.1 Raccolta dei dati

Nella nostra ricerca, abbiamo analizzato i contenuti di testo online: articoli, post e commenti da siti web e pagine di Facebook. I dati sono stati raccolti utilizzando il software di social listening SentiOne. SentiOne raccoglie dati in un determinato arco di tempo da fonti multimediali sulla base delle parole chiave che gli vengono fornite.

5.1.1 Parole chiave

Abbiamo definito quattro parole chiave che abbiamo usato per identificare contenuti potenzialmente rilevanti in tutti i paesi: 1) Ebrei, 2) Israele, 3) Olocausto, 4) Sionismo/sionista. Inoltre, abbiamo incluso parole chiave specifiche relative a ciascun paese. In Italia, queste erano: rabbino e talmudista. Nelle lingue in cui le parole possono avere terminazioni diverse, abbiamo utilizzato la forma di base delle parole chiave seguita da un asterisco (*). Questo approccio ha permesso a SentiOne di identificare i risultati per tutte le varianti e le terminazioni delle parole chiave.

5.1.2 Fonti monitorate

Con il contributo dei gruppi di ricerca nazionali, Political Capital ha identificato sei categorie di media online per monitorare i contenuti: 1) Media indipendenti (mainstream), 2) Giornali mainstream, 3) Media (iper-)partigiani/faziosi, 4) Siti di destra/estrema destra, 5) Siti di disinformazione/cospirazionisti, 5) Siti di sinistra/estrema sinistra. Abbiamo raccolto indirizzi web per ogni categoria in tutti i paesi, inclusi siti dei media e pagine Facebook. In tutti i paesi abbiamo selezionato i tre media per categoria con il maggior numero di risultati per le nostre parole chiave nello stesso periodo di tempo. In Italia abbiamo monitorato i seguenti siti web e pagine Facebook:

Media indipendenti (mainstream): Corriere della Sera; Il Fatto Quotidiano, Ansa

Comprendono media tradizionali, diffusi e affidabili, che garantiscono un'informazione di qualità grazie a una rigorosa verifica delle fonti. Nell'analisi del nostro paese, sono stati inclusi due quotidiani online, che escono anche in edicola, e un'agenzia di stampa. Gli editoriali sono equilibrati e poco faziosi, evitando prese di posizione partigiane.

Giornali mainstream: Il Messaggero

In questa categoria rientra un quotidiano a diffusione nazionale che si occupa di questioni di politica interna ed estera e di attualità nazionale, ma è anche molto attento agli eventi locali. Di tono moderato, è considerato un punto di riferimento per le notizie riguardanti Roma.

Siti di estrema destra: Il Primo Nazionale; L'Italia Mensile; Il Missino

Comprendono media online che promuovono ideologie sovraniste, tradizionaliste, antieuropiste e antiglobaliste. I due quotidiani online analizzati in Italia mostrano affinità con il neofascismo, talvolta richiamando il governo fascista di Mussolini. Questi media sono stati criticati per la diffusione di notizie false e per la polarizzazione del dibattito pubblico.

Siti di disinformazione/cospirazionisti: Luogocomune; La Cruna dell'Ago; Maurizio Blondet blog

Includono media online che diffondono notizie false o fuorvianti, presentandole come rivelazioni. Due quotidiani online monitorati nel nostro paese si propongono come alternativa ai media tradizionali, accusati di manipolazione. Diffondono teorie del complotto e narrazioni senza fondamento scientifico, presentandosi come l'unica fonte affidabile.

Media (iper-)partigiani/faziosi: Osservatorio internazionale per i diritti; Il Tempo; La Verità

Comprendono media online, originariamente cartacei, con un forte allineamento ideologico e un approccio parzialmente schierato. Si ispirano al conservatorismo liberale, con posizioni conservatrici su temi sociali e culturali, e liberiste in economia. Nel nostro caso, si avvicinano al centro-destra nazionale e ne condividono valori e priorità.

Siti di sinistra/estrema sinistra: Potere al Popolo; Contro Piano; L'antidiplomatico

Comprendono testate di ispirazione comunista e marxista, critiche verso il capitalismo e l'imperialismo moderno. Nel nostro contesto, si riferiscono a due riviste online e a un blog politico che criticano l'UE e la globalizzazione. Sostengono la resistenza palestinese e denunciano Israele come uno "stato di apartheid".

5.1.3 Periodo di monitoraggio

Sulla base delle nostre precedenti esperienze di coding di contenuti di testo in categorie definite in precedenza e delle risorse disponibili per il progetto, ci siamo posti l'obiettivo di analizzare 7.000 contenuti online per paese. Dal momento che volevamo esaminare i cambiamenti nelle narrazioni antisemite dopo il 7 ottobre 2023, abbiamo scelto lo stesso periodo di tempo sia nel 2023 che nel 2024. Quest'ultimo è stato determinato identificando il Paese con il minor numero di dati per le nostre parole chiave e calcolando quanti giorni erano necessari, a partire da una data prescelta (in questo caso, il 1° aprile), perché i dati scaricati in

quel Paese superassero i 7.000 contenuti. Di conseguenza, la raccolta dei dati in tutti i Paesi è stata uniformata allo stesso periodo: 1-15 aprile, ore 13:00

5.1.4 Quantità di dati analizzati

Abbiamo filtrato ogni dataset per includere più di 7.000 contenuti, mantenendo le proporzioni originali di parole chiave, fonti (siti web e pagine Facebook) e anni all'interno del dataset. Questo approccio ha portato ad analizzare in ciascun paese le seguenti proporzioni del totale dei dati scaricati: Romania - 100%, Ungheria - 73%, Italia - 44% e Polonia - 35%.

In tutti i paesi la quantità di dati raccolti nel 2024 è stata superiore a quella del 2023. Il più piccolo aumento è stato registrato in Ungheria, dove i dati sono aumentati di circa una volta e mezzo nel 2024. In Romania i dati sono aumentati di quasi tre volte, in Polonia di quasi cinque volte e in Italia di quasi sette volte. In tutti i paesi la maggior parte dei dati è costituita da commenti.

La quantità di dati variava anche tra i paesi a seconda di categoria di media:

- Ungheria: la maggior parte dei dati proviene da pagine di estrema destra, seguite dai media mainstream, da testate faziose, dai tabloid e dati minimi provenienti da fonti cospirazioniste e di sinistra.
- Italia: la maggior parte dei dati proviene dai media mainstream, seguiti da testate faziose, da giornali di sinistra e da fonti cospirazioniste, con pochissimi dati provenienti dalle pagine di estrema destra.
- Polonia: la maggior parte dei dati proviene dai tabloid, seguiti da testate faziose, media mainstream, pagine di estrema destra, siti cospirazionisti e pochissime fonti di sinistra.
- Romania: la maggior parte dei dati proviene dai media mainstream, seguiti da siti di cospirazione, dai tabloid, da fonti di estrema destra, testate e infine da una piccola quantità di dati provenienti da fonti di sinistra.

<i>Contenuto esaminato nelle categorie dei media</i>									
		Mainstream	Di estrema destra	Cospirazionista	Parziale	Tabloid	Di sinistra	Totale dati/anno	Quantità totale di dati
Ungheria	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7008
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221	
Italia	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7053
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163	
Polonia	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7054

	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818	
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165	7012

5.2 Coding dei dati

5.2.1 Quadro concettuale

Utilizzando risorse disponibili al pubblico, come studi, relazioni di ricerca, articoli scientifici, ecc., Political Capital ha sviluppato un quadro concettuale per definire il contesto teorico della ricerca. Dopo aver specificato che la ricerca si basava sulla definizione di antisemitismo dell'IHRA, il documento presentava in modo approfondito le principali categorie di narrazioni e sotto-narrazioni antisemite su cui era basata la ricerca. Tutti i partner hanno avuto l'opportunità di discutere, dare un giudizio e integrare il quadro concettuale. Quest'ultimo è stato discusso anche con i membri dell'Advisory Board del progetto BOND e con esperti esterni.

5.2.2 Finalizzazione della metodologia e creazione di una guida metodologica

La messa a punto della metodologia di ricerca ha richiesto numerose discussioni - tra cui le consulenze di un esperto membro del BOND Advisory Board e diversi tentativi di analizzare e codificare i testi online in modi diversi. Questi sforzi hanno partorito le categorie finali per la codifica dei dati. Sono state definite quattro classificazioni per la natura del contenuto:

1. Antisemita - contenuto che contiene almeno una narrazione antisemita.
2. Potenzialmente antisemita - contenuto che include una narrazione che potrebbe essere interpretata sia come antisemita sia come non antisemita, o che appare antisemita solo alla luce del contesto (l'articolo/post a cui rispondeva).
3. Non comprensibile - Contenuto incomprensibile (questa categoria era quasi esclusivamente applicabile ai commenti).
4. Non antisemita - Contenuto che non include alcuna narrazione antisemita.

Sulla base del quadro concettuale, sono state individuate cinque categorie principali di narrazioni antisemite, ciascuna contenente sottocategorie (i dettagli e le definizioni di queste categorie saranno descritti in seguito):

- Stereotipi antisemiti classici
- Antisemitismo tradizionale, basato sulla religione (antigiudaismo)
- Antisemitismo cospirativo
- Negazione e distorsione dell'Olocausto,

- Nuovo antisemitismo (l'antisemitismo basato sulla critica di Israele).

Sono state definite due ulteriori categorie: "discorso d'odio" e "incitamento alla violenza".

Il processo di *coding* è stato descritto in dettaglio in una guida metodologica.

Come parte del processo di *coding*, i *coder* erano tenuti a documentare le frasi antisemite identificate nel contenuto. Per i commenti, dovevano anche registrare il contesto - in particolare, l'oggetto dell'articolo o del post sotto il quale era stato scritto il commento.

5.2.3 Formazione dei coder

Dopo aver condiviso il quadro concettuale e la guida metodologica con i gruppi di ricerca nazionali, Political Capital ha organizzato un incontro per spiegare e discutere questi documenti e il processo di *coding* e per dare spazio alle domande. Durante la fase di ricerca, i gruppi di ricerca si sono incontrati regolarmente per discutere dei problemi e delle domande che sono sorte nel corso del processo.

Per garantire una comprensione comune del quadro teorico e aumentare l'attendibilità della ricerca - entro i limiti delle risorse e delle capacità del team – è stata organizzata una fase di formazione. Durante questa fase, 350 righe di contenuto sono state filtrate dal dataset mantenendo le proporzioni originali dei risultati per parola chiave, categoria di media e anno. E' stata mantenuta una leggera sovraesposizione della parola chiave "Israele", consci del fatto che identificare il nuovo antisemitismo sarebbe stata la sfida più grande. In ciascun paese, due membri dei gruppi nazionali di ricerca hanno codificato questi dati indipendentemente. I loro risultati sono stati poi messi a confronto e le discrepanze sono state discusse per giungere ad un accordo. Nei casi in cui le vedute dei due membri erano inconciliabili, Political Capital si è reso disponibile per ulteriori chiarimenti.

5.2.4 Il processo di coding

Il *coding* dei dati ha seguito la stessa procedura in tutti i paesi. I team dei vari Paesi hanno ricevuto il loro contenuto in un file Excel, che comprendeva tutti le proprietà rilevanti (ad esempio commento/articolo/post, data di pubblicazione, fonte, contesto, ecc.). Durante il processo di *coding*, i *coder* leggevano il contenuto stesso e, per i commenti, esaminavano anche il contesto.

Laddove venivano identificate narrazioni antisemite, i *coder* le etichettavano come antisemite o potenzialmente antisemite, ne davano una breve spiegazione e le classificavano in una delle categorie principali di narrazioni antisemite e in seguito in una delle relative sottocategorie. Una singola riga di contenuto poteva essere classificata in più categorie narrative (massimo quattro), poiché era possibile che più narrazioni antisemite apparissero contemporaneamente all'interno dello stesso testo. Se il contenuto non conteneva alcuna narrazione antisemita, o se il suo significato non era comprensibile, non veniva assegnato a nessuna categoria.

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Introduzione al progetto BOND

Il progetto BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities)⁸ è stato realizzato tra gennaio 2023 e dicembre 2024 in Ungheria, Italia, Polonia e Romania. Il suo scopo principale è stato quello di affrontare pregiudizi profondamente radicati, atteggiamenti e condotte di odio all'interno della società, in particolare quelle rivolte all'ebraismo europeo. Il progetto si proponeva inoltre di promuovere la comprensione, la tolleranza e il dialogo. Un'attenzione particolare è stata rivolta alla formazione dei giovani sul tema dell'ebraismo e dell'antisemitismo, nonché alla promozione del dialogo interculturale e interreligioso. Le attività hanno incluso la ricerca sull'antisemitismo, il monitoraggio delle narrazioni antisemite, lo sviluppo di programmi educativi, la formazione degli insegnanti, l'organizzazione di programmi di educazione e scambio giovanile, la promozione del dialogo interreligioso e intercomunitario e l'organizzazione di tavole rotonde a livello locale sulla tolleranza e l'inclusione sociale. Il progetto è stato guidato dalla definizione di antisemitismo stabilita dall'Alleanza internazionale per la memoria dell'Olocausto (IHRA).⁹

⁸ <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

⁹ <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

Polski raport z badań

Antysemickie narracje online w Polsce przed i po 7 października 2023 r.

Kluczowe wnioski

Antysemicki przemoc i antysemickie narracje online w Polsce przed i po 7 października 2023 r. pojawiły się w różnych mediach i były opisywane jako zaskakujące. Zdecydowanie najwięcej pojawiło się go w jednoznacznie prawicowych mediach lub od osób określających swoje poglądy jako jednoznacznie prawicowe. Zaobserwowano kilka zjawisk.

- Antysemickich treści było zaskakująco dużo.
- Wiele osób komentujących nie widziało różnicy między Żydami a Izraelem. W wielu komentarzach używanie słowa żyd było synonimem słowa Izrael. Komentarze te zaklasyfikowano jako nowy antysemicki przemoc. W znaczącej większości z nich oskarżano Żydów kolektywnie za działania Państwa Izrael.
- Wśród antysemickich treści bardzo popularne okazały się stereotypy. Przypisywanie Żydom bogactwa i chciwości okazało się najczęstszym stereotypem. Wśród kategorii KLASYCZNY STEREOTYP dominującymi komentarzami były te przedstawiające Żydów jako złych.
- Bardzo dużo antysemickich treści związanych było z atakowaniem państwa Izrael za działania prowadzone na Bliskim Wschodzie, zwłaszcza w Strefie Gazy.
- Stosunkowo niewiele pojawiło się treści mogącej zostać zaklasyfikowanej jako NAWOŁYWANIE DO PRZEMOCY.
- Z łatwością można wskazać jakie wydarzenia były zapalnikami do fali antysemickich komentarzy. Niewielka liczba antysemickich treści pojawiła się w mniejszych kategoriach lub zupełnie bez kontekstu. Niemniej, zupełnie neutralne treści również bywały pretekstem do antysemickich komentarzy.
- W języku polskim łatwo tworzyć antysemickie słowa do nazywania Żydów i edytować już istniejące, żeby były trudniej wychwytywane przez automatyczne filtry. A analizowanym materiale pojawiło się wiele. Słowa te zwykle są łatwe do zrozumienia i nie jest problemem domyślenie się, że chodzi właściwie o społeczność żydowską.
- Słowo ŻYD często pojawiało się w negatywnym kontekście jako wyzwisko. Wielokrotnie służyło do obrażenia kogoś, obniżenia poziomu zaufania do tej osoby lub instytucji, co jest niepokojącym zjawiskiem.
- Duża ilość treści antysemickich dotyczyła teorii konspiracyjnych. Wciąż silny jest w Polsce mit żydokumny i utożsamianie Żydów z Rosją z winą za komunizm w Polsce.

- Częstym zjawiskiem było krytykowanie politycznych wydarzeń (bez względu na partię i stronę politycznego sporu) i wiązanie ich z kontrolowaniem przez żydów jeśli były nietożsame z poglądami osoby komentującej. Często doszukiwano się Polskiej polityce Żydowskich wpływów.

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Wprowadzenie

Celem badania była analiza zmian w internetowych narracjach antysemickich po 7 października 2023 r. - ataku terrorystycznym Hamasu na Izrael i późniejszej wojnie. Wydarzenia te doprowadziły do wzrostu antysemityzmu w całej Europie, co spowodowało konieczność zbadania, jak ewoluowały internetowe narracje antysemickie. Opracowanie metodologii i kategorii badawczych zostało zakończone pod koniec 2023 r. i na początku 2024 r., a badania rozpoczęły się wiosną 2024 r.

Rozpoznanie i zdefiniowanie antysemityzmu w odniesieniu do Izraela, tj. rozróżnienie między uzasadnioną a nieuzasadnioną krytyką Izraela, stało się szczególnie trudne od 7 października. Nasze badania opierają się na roboczej definicji antysemityzmu Międzynarodowego Sojuszu na rzecz Pamięci o Holokauście (IHRA)¹, która jest akceptowana przez 43 kraje i kilka organizacji międzynarodowych, w tym UE i większość jej państw członkowskich.

Badanie zostało przeprowadzone jednocześnie w czterech krajach - na Węgrzech, we Włoszech, w Polsce i Rumunii - przy użyciu tej samej metodologii. Skoncentrowano się na treściach tekstowych, w tym artykułach, komentarzach i postach na Facebooku. Treści zostały zebrane za pomocą oprogramowania do nasłuchiwania społecznościowego ze stron internetowych i stron na Facebooku najbardziej odpowiednich krajowych mediów w pięciu kategoriach: media niezależne (głównego nurtu), media stronicze/nadmiernie stronicze, tabloidy głównego nurtu, strony lewicowe, strony skrajnie prawicowe i fałszywe wiadomości/spiskowe strony. Proces skrobania był kierowany słowami kluczowymi zaprojektowanymi w celu wykrywania treści antysemickich. Cztery podstawowe słowa kluczowe - Żyd, Izrael, Holokaust i syjonizm/syjonistyczny - były używane we wszystkich krajach w ich lokalnych językach. Dodatkowo uwzględniono słowa kluczowe specyficzne dla danego kraju. W językach, w których słowa te mogą mieć różne zakończenia, po ich podstawowych formach umieszczono gwiazdkę (*), umożliwiając gromadzenie wyników dla wszystkich odmian i zakończeń.

Badanie koncentrowało się na okresie od 1 do 15 kwietnia zarówno w 2023 r., jak i 2024 r., a w każdym kraju przeanalizowano prawie 7 000 treści. Wszystkie treści zostały zbadane przez krajowe zespoły badawcze i sklasyfikowane jako antysemickie, potencjalnie antysemickie (treści, które można interpretować zarówno jako antysemickie, jak i nie antysemickie), niezrozumiałe lub nie antysemickie.

Opierając się na publicznie dostępnych źródłach – takich jak badania, raporty z badań i artykuły naukowe – zdefiniowano pięć głównych kategorii narracji antysemickich: klasyczne stereotypy antysemickie, konspiracyjny antysemityzm, tradycyjny antysemityzm oparty na religii, negowanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu oraz nowy antysemityzm (antysemityzm oparty na krytyce Izraela).

¹ Robocza definicja antysemityzmu opracowana przez IHRA: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-antysemityzmu-przyjeta-przez-miedzynarodowy-sojusz-na-rzecz-pamieci-o-holokauscie>

Oprócz tego utworzono dwie dodatkowe kategorie: mowę nienawiści i wezwania do przemocy wobec Żydów. Każda treść została dokładnie przeanalizowana i przypisana do jednej lub więcej z tych kategorii.


1. Zakres treści antysemickich w krajowym zbiorze danych

1.1 Zakres treści antysemickich w zbiorze danych

Treści antysemickie i potencjalnie antysemickie były obecne w 47% polskiego zbioru danych.

Spośród 7054 treści 3128 zostało oznaczonych jako antysemickie, 191 jako potencjalnie antysemickie, 3110 jako nie antysemickie, a 625 jako niezrozumiałe.


Fig.1. Odsetek treści antysemickich w pełnym zbiorze danych.



1.2 Rozkład badanych treści

Zdecydowana większość antysemickich treści pojawiła się w komentarzach. Około 78% pobranych treści stanowiły komentarze (5500), około 16,2% posty (1143), a 5,8% artykuły (411). Antysemickie narracje pojawiały się głównie w komentarzach, z których ponad 51,6% (2840) było antysemickich, 2,9% (162) z nich zostało oznaczonych jako potencjalnie antysemickie, 36,6% (2014) jako nie antysemickie, a około 8,8% (484) jako niezrozumiałe. Jeśli chodzi o artykuły, 84,4% (347) zostało oznaczonych jako nie antysemickie, 5,6% (23) jako antysemickie, 0,5% (2) jako potencjalnie antysemickie, a 2,9% (12) jako niezrozumiałe. 23,2% (265) postów zostało oznaczonych jako antysemickie, 2,4% (27) jako potencjalnie antysemickie, 11,3% (129) jako niezrozumiałe, a 63,2% (722) jako nie antysemickie.

Fig.2. Rozkład różnych typów treści badanych w pełnym zestawie danych.




1.3 Antysemityzm w różnych rodzajach mediów

Przy większej liczbie danych w 2024 r. zarówno liczba, jak i odsetek treści antysemickich wzrosły w większości kategorii mediów, z wyjątkiem stron lewicowych i fake newsowych/konspiracyjnych, w których odsetek treści antysemickich pozostał niezmieniony, oraz stron mediów głównego nurtu, w których odsetek treści antysemickich nieznacznie spadł.

Treści antysemickie (w tym zarówno antysemickie, jak i potencjalnie antysemickie) były najbardziej rozpowszechnione na stronach tabloidów pod względem ilości (1853 fragmenty treści w ciągu dwóch lat łącznie), ale proporcjonalnie treści te pojawiały się najczęściej na stronach stronniczych/bardzo stronniczych (59,5%), fałszywych wiadomości/konspiracyjnych (59,4%) i w niezależnych mediach głównego nurtu (54,3%). Ilościowo ilość antysemickich treści w tych kategoriach była zróżnicowana (658 fragmentów na stronach tabloidów, 495 na stronach mediów głównego nurtu i tylko 180 fragmentów na stronach fałszywych wiadomości/konspiracyjnych). Najmniej treści antysemickich i potencjalnie antysemickich znaleziono na stronach skrajnie prawicowych (132 fragmenty, 29,9%). Dane ze stron lewicowych były prawie nieobecne w polskim zbiorze danych.

Fig.3. Obecność treści antysemickich w różnych kategoriach mediów.



2. Przegląd i zakres różnych rodzajów treści antysemickich

2.1 Treści zawierające antysemickie narracje

W ramach koncepcyjnych badania zidentyfikowano pięć głównych narracji antysemickich. W ramach każdej z tych głównych narracji zdefiniowano również podnarracje.

- Klasyczne stereotypy: Narracje historycznie zakorzenione w antysemickich uprzedzeniach. Obejmują one nienawiść do Żydów opartą na ich istnieniu jako istot ludzkich, a nie tylko jako wyznawców religii żydowskiej. Czynią to poprzez sprzeczną logikę, która postrzega Żydów zarówno jako zbyt potężnych, jak i słabych, a nawet podludzi. Klasyczne stereotypy obejmują na przykład to, że Żydzi są źli, chciwi, nielojalni lub kłamią².
- Tradycyjny, oparty na religii antysemityzm (antyjudaizm): Tradycyjna judeofobia oparta na religii lub tradycyjny antysemityzm odnosi się do antyżydowskich nastrojów zakorzenionych w przekonaniach związanych z postrzegana religią i tradycjami chrześcijańskimi lub żydowskimi. Tradycyjne, oparte na religii narracje antysemickie obejmują na przykład mord rytualny/morderstwo dzieci, zabójstwo lub Żydów jako satanistów³.
- Konspiracyjny antysemityzm: Teorie spiskowe utrwaliły antysemickie przekonania, sugerując, że Żydzi wywierają nadmierny wpływ dla osobistych korzyści i spiskują w celu zdominowania sfer, takich jak: media, polityka i gospodarka. Wiele z tych teorii jest zakorzenionych w antysemickim micie „ukrytej ręki” i obwinia Żydów lub podmioty postrzegane jako żydowskie za najgorsze tragedie na świecie, takie jak podżeganie do wojen, a nawet wywoływanie COVID-19. Konspiracyjne narracje antysemickie obejmują na przykład żydowską władzę/kontrolę, żydokomunę, teorię Wielkiego Zastępstwa lub teorię Nowego Porządku Świata⁴.
- Zaprzeczanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu: Zaprzeczanie lub zniekształcanie Holokaustu ma na celu zaprzeczanie lub fałszywe przedstawianie faktów historycznych dotyczących nazistowskiego ludobójstwa narodu żydowskiego. Zaprzeczanie Holokaustowi obejmuje negowanie skali lub metod stosowanych przez nazistów i ich sojuszników podczas Holokaustu. Zaprzeczanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu promuje fałszywy pogląd, że Żydzi wymyślili lub wyolbrzymili Holokaust i czerpali z niego korzyści. Narracje negujące i zniekształcające Holokaust obejmują na przykład

² Matthias J. Becker et al., "Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets", *Humanities & Social Sciences Communications* 9, 2022

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3>; Matthias J. Becker et al., "Decoding Antisemitism" Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, p. 11, 13; ADL Antisemitic Myths. <https://antisemitism.adl.org/>

³ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, p. 13.

<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

⁴ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, pp. 13-14.


<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

obwinianie Żydów za Holokaust lub przedstawianie Holokaustu jako pozytywnego wydarzenia⁵.

- Nowy antysemityzm: Nowy antysemityzm odnosi się do wyrażania antyżydowskich nastrojów skierowanych przeciwko Izraelowi. Kluczową funkcją nowego antysemityzmu jest umożliwienie wyrażania antysemickich poglądów w sposób, który wydaje się politycznie akceptowalny. Nowy antysemityzm definiujemy za pomocą testu 3D Natana Sharansky'ego: demonizacja, podwójne standardy i delegitymizacja. Nowy antysemityzm obejmuje na przykład analogię z nazizmem/apartheidem/kolonializmem, twierdzenie, że Izrael jest państwem terrorystycznym lub że Izrael ma wpływ na media⁶.⁷

Najbardziej rozpowszechnioną kategorią narracji w polskich danych był nowy antysemityzm, pojawiający się w 18% (1268 fragmentów) badanych treści. Na drugim miejscu znalazły się konspiracyjne narracje antysemickie, obecne w 12,8% (902 fragmenty) zbioru danych. Klasyczne stereotypy znalazły się na trzecim miejscu z 7,5% (526 fragmentów), podczas gdy negowanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu było obecne w 4,3% (124 fragmenty), a tradycyjny antysemityzm oparty na religii pojawił się w 1,8% (70 fragmentów) badanych treści.

Fig.4. Odsetek antysemickich kategorii narracyjnych w pełnym zbiorze danych.



Chociaż odsetek treści antysemickich pozostał mniej więcej taki sam, większość kategorii narracji proporcjonalnie spadła. Liczba narracji z kategorii nowy antysemityzm wzrosła jednak czternastokrotnie, co daje proporcjonalny wzrost ponad trzykrotny. Ilość treści w porównaniu z

⁵ IHRA Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion (2013).


<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion>

⁶ ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>

⁷ ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>

innymi narracjami wzrosła do 2024 r., ale proporcjonalnie nieznacznie spadła, przy czym klasyczne stereotypy wykazały bardziej zauważalny spadek

Fig.5. Odsetek zgłoszeń antysemickich w zbiorze danych za lata 2023 i 2024 (osobno).




2.2 Treści antysemickie poza kategoriami

Oprócz powyższych kategorii antysemityzmu, w badaniu przeanalizowano dwa inne rodzaje treści antysemickich: mowę nienawiści i wezwania do przemocy.


- Mowa nienawiści: Treści o antyżydowskim, nienawistnym charakterze i/lub oparte na antysemickich stwierdzeniach.
- Podżeganie do przemocy: Treści nawołujące do wszelkiego rodzaju przemocy wobec Żydów.

Fig.6. Odsetek kategorii antysemickich poza narracjami w pełnym zbiorze danych.



Mowa nienawiści była stosunkowo powszechna w polskim zbiorze danych, pojawiając się w 8,5% (603 elementy) treści, z niewielkim spadkiem proporcji do 2024 roku. Treści nawołujące do przemocy wobec Żydów również pojawiły się w około 2,2% (158 elementów) danych. Ich ilość wzrosła do 2024 r., a proporcjonalnie ich zasięg pozostał niezmieniony.

Fig.7. Odsetek kategorii antysemickich wykraczających poza narracje w zbiorach danych z 2023 i 2024 r. (osobno).



3. Rodzaje treści antysemickich w badanych danych

3.1 Antysemickie narracje

3.1.1 Nowy antysemityzm

Wiodącymi mediami w tej kategorii są WYKOP (posty i komentarze), TV REPUBLIKA (posty i komentarze) oraz DO RZECZY (posty i komentarze), ale zaskakujące jest to, że tyle samo przykładów z tej kategorii pojawiło się na WYBORCZA.PL (same komentarze), co na DO RZECZY. Jeśli chodzi o artykuły, to pojawiły się one w tej kategorii w takich mediach jak NEON 24 i MAGNA POLONIA.

Najpopularniejszą kategorią w opracowywanym materiale był NOWY ANTYSEMITYZM. Najpopularniejszą podkategorią jest uznanie Izraela za kraj terrorystyczny. W tej podkategorii pojawiło się wiele komentarzy oskarżających Izrael o popełnianie ludobójstwa i zbrodni wojennych w Strefie Gazy oraz eliminowanie Palestyńczyków. Izraelczycy byli często nazywani mordercami. Pojawiły się oskarżenia o tortury, próby zagłodzenia Palestyńczyków na śmierć, czystki etniczne i wywołanie III wojny światowej. Pojawiły się głosy, że celem Izraela było zamordowanie każdego Palestyńczyka co do ostatniego. Izraelczycy byli często nazywani barbarzyńcami, terrorystami, bandytami lub przestępczami. Działania Izraela w Palestynie nazywano również masakrą ludności cywilnej. Pojawiło się wiele oskarżeń o mordowanie przez Izrael kobiet i dzieci oraz ogólnie niewinnych cywilów. Kilkakrotnie pojawiały się wyliczenia, a także porównania z liczbą ofiar (kobiet i dzieci) po stronie ukraińskiej w wojnie z Rosją. Izrael nazywany był krajem brutalnym i agresywnym, był porównywany do Rosji, a czasem nawet nazistowskich Niemiec. Narracja, która czasami się pojawiała, wskazywała na prowokacje Izraela, aby zostać zaatakowanym i mieć pretekst do ataku na inne kraje. Atak 7 października był również postrzegany przez niektóre osoby jako prowokacja do ataku na Palestynę. Co więcej, wydarzenie w polskim parlamencie, gdzie Grzegorz Braun, skrajnie prawicowy polityk i antysemita, zgasił świece chanukowe gaśnicą podczas obchodów Chanuki, było porównywane do działań Izraela i różnych reakcji polskich polityków na zbrodnie na Bliskim Wschodzie.

Wiele antysemickich komentarzy w tej kategorii pojawiło się w kontekście śmierci polskiego pracownika organizacji humanitarnej w Strefie Gazy. Wydarzenie to oraz komentarze ambasadora Izraela do zaistniałej sytuacji wywołały falę krytyki, często bardzo agresywnej i odnoszącej się również do kategorii MOWA NIENAWIŚCI. Izrael został w tym kontekście nazwany krajem terrorystycznym. Pojawiło się wiele komentarzy, że działania te zostały przeprowadzone z premedytacją, celowo, że Izrael z zimną krwią mordował pracowników organizacji humanitarnych.

Wydarzeniem, które było również szeroko komentowane, był irański atak na Izrael po izraelskim bombardowaniu irańskiej ambasady w Syrii. Wiele komentarzy odnosiło się również do

Żydów i działań państwa Izrael, ale te komentarze zostały uwzględnione w innej podkategorii opisanej później.

Komentarze związane z tą kategorią często zawierały fragmenty z kategorii „tabu krytyczmu” lub „podwójne standardy”, gdzie również były klasyfikowane. Wiele osób negatywnie komentowało bierność społeczności międzynarodowej i brak wyraźnego sprzeciwu ze strony innych krajów. Wskazywano na dysproporcję w liczbie Izraelczyków zabitych przez Hamas w październiku 2023 r. i Palestyńczyków zabitych przez Izrael. Komentatorzy pisali również, że Izrael robi co chce, jest bezkarny i choć łamie prawa człowieka i prawo międzynarodowe, nie ponosi żadnych konsekwencji z powodu amerykańskiego wsparcia i finansów. Unia Europejska, NATO i Stany Zjednoczone zostały oskarżone o bycie strażnikami ludobójstwa i wspieranie zbrodni wojennych. Również polski rząd został za to skrytykowany.

Narracja wielu komentarzy koncentrowała się wyłącznie na cierpieniu i śmierci cywilów podczas działań wojennych i przedstawiała działania Izraela jako przestępco i mordercze. W nieantysemickich komentarzach pojawiała się również narracja o walce Izraela z terroryzmem i Hamasem. Jednak w antysemickich komentarzach wydawało się, że mordowanie cywilów jest głównym celem Izraela.

Większość komentarzy w kategorii Zbiorowa odpowiedzialność Żydów za Izrael również opisywała działania Izraela jako terrorystyczne, ale zamiast Izraela pisano, że Żydzi są terrorystami, mordercami i ludobójcami. W tej podkategorii bombardowania Palestyny, śmierć kobiet i dzieci przypisywano po prostu Żydom, nie oddzielając ich od państwa Izrael. Antysemityzm i nienawiść do Żydów bardzo często usprawiedliwiano izraelskimi działaniami wojennymi. Żydom przypisywano odpowiedzialność za zbombardowanie konwoju humanitarnego w Strefie Gazy, w którym zginął Polak, a także odpowiedzialność za atak Iranu na Izrael jako konsekwencję działań żydowskich. Te dwa wydarzenia wydają się być również najbardziej wyzwalające. Żydzi byli często nazywani antysemickimi wyzwiskami, co zostało włączone do kategorii MOWY NIENAWIŚCI.

Inną popularną podkategorią było "Izrael jest odpowiedzialny za konflikt arabsko-izraelski/Hamas-Izrael". Kategoria ta obejmowała oskarżanie Izraela (czasami także Żydów, jak wspomniano wcześniej) o finansowanie Hamasu i budowanie jego potęgi, a wydarzenia z tym związane były później opisywane jako konsekwencje tego. Działania Izraela były często opisywane jako prowokacyjne i nie pozostawiające Iranowi i Hamasowi innej opcji niż zaatakowanie Izraela. Często pojawiały się komentarze, że Izrael sam zorganizował październikowy atak Hamasu na Izrael, aby mieć pretekst do rozpoczęcia wojny. Izrael był wówczas oskarżany o masakrę własnych obywateli. Polityka Izraela była również opisywana jako agresywna wobec innych krajów, co musiało zakończyć się konfliktem. Wydarzenia, które wywołyły największe poruszenie to konflikt Izraela z Iranem i irański atak rakietowy na Izrael po zbombardowaniu irańskiej placówki dyplomatycznej w Syrii przez Izrael, a także sytuacja w Strefie Gazy. Izrael został oskarżony o wyjątkową odpowiedzialność za sytuację w Strefie Gazy, bardzo złe, nieludzkie warunki życia i


doprowadzenie do tego tylko po to, aby wyeliminować Palestyńczyków z tego terytorium. Osoby komentujące pisały, że od 1948/początku Izraelczycy mordowali ludzi i dokonywali ludobójstwa Palestyńczyków ["Holocaust"], budowali nielegalne osiedla na ich terenie, bombardowali obozy dla uchodźców. Bardzo często nazywali ich okupantami.

W kategorii NOWY ANTYSEMITYZM wiele treści dotyczyło również podkategorii "analogia nazistowska". Wiele komentarzy po prostu nazywało Izrael lub Żydów nazistami. Sytuację w Strefie Gazy często porównywano do II wojny światowej i budowy getta, a Strefę Gazy nazywano obozem koncentracyjnym stworzonym przez Izrael. Pisano o głodzeniu Palestyńczyków i mordowaniu "niewinnych ludzi", zwłaszcza dzieci. Powszechnie w tej podkategorii było porównywanie Izraela i Żydów do SS, a nawet pisanie, że Hitler był lepszy i mordował mniej lub że Żydzi/Izraelczycy się od niego nauczyli. Metody prowadzenia wojny były bardzo często porównywane do tych stosowanych przez nazistowskie Niemcy.

Kategorie "analogia nazistowska" i "oskarżanie Izraela o Holokaust" były trudne do rozróżnienia, ale oskarżanie Izraela o działania takie jak Holokaust przeciwko Palestyńczykom w kilku miejscach było jednoznaczne. Działania w Strefie Gazy nazwano Holokaustem 2.0, a Izraelczyków - nazistami.

W kategorii NOWY ANTYSEMITYZM pojawiło się kilka kolejnych podkategorii, w mniejszej liczbie niż poprzednie. Pojawiły się "Tabu krytyki" i "Podwójne standardy", w których świat został oskarżony o bierność w odpowiedzi na zbrodnie Izraela, milczenie ONZ, brak wiarygodnych informacji ze światowych mediów w obawie przed krytyką Izraela. Podkategoria "Izraelski wpływ na media" zawierała również komentarze o celowym ukrywaniu działań Izraela w mediach i kontroli, jaką Żydzi i Izrael mają nad mediami na świecie. Izrael był opisywany jako зло, przypisywano mu złe intencje, a ludzi nazywano barbarzyńcami. Delegitimizacja Izraela występowała również często jak demonizacja. Jeden z głównych polityków skrajnej prawicy, znany ze swoich antysemickich komentarzy i wydarzenia w polskim parlamencie, gdzie gasił świece chanukowe gaśnicą podczas obchodów Chanuki - Grzegorz Braun - określił Izrael jako "państwo położone w Palestynie". Narracja ta była powtarzana kilkukrotnie jako oczywista informacja, że Izrael okupuje ziemie Palestyny i nie powinien tam powstać. Pojawiły się głosy, że Izrael powinien zniknąć z mapy świata, a ziemie, na których się znajduje, powinny wrócić do Palestyny. Kwestionowano również prawo do utworzenia państwa Izrael po II wojnie światowej. "Analogia kolonializmu" nie pojawiła się w ogóle, a "analogia apartheidu" pojawiła się tylko dwa razy.

Fig.8. Subnarracje kategorii narracji antysemickiej: Nowy antysemityzm.



3.1.2 Konspiracyjny antysemityzm

Wiodącymi medium w tej kategorii są WYKOP, TV REPUBLIKA i DO RZECZY, ale także NCZAS (we wszystkich tytulach mediach tylko komentarze). Jeśli chodzi o artykuły, to pojawiły się one w tej kategorii w takich mediach jak NEON 24, W POLITYCE i MAGNA POLONIA.

Kolejną kategorią, która okazała się bardzo popularna jest "Konspiracyjne". Najwięcej treści pojawiło się w podkategorii "Żydowska kontrola/władza", ale wiele zaklasyfikowanych tu komentarzy pasowało również do podkategorii "Teoria nowego porządku świata". Okazało się, że najczęstszym komentarzem w całym badanym dokumencie była reklama książki "patriotycznej". Komentarz miał charakter rekomendacyjny. Był długi i streszczał książkę, która według autora komentarza jest zakazana przez cenzurę, ale dostępna do pobrania online. W komentarzu napisano, że za powstaniem większości partii politycznych w Polsce stoją Żydzi, ale także Niemcy i Amerykanie. Wszystkie te trzy grupy rzekomo kontrolują polski system polityczny. Dowodem na żydowską kontrolę nad polską polityką ma być wspólne świętowanie Chanuki w Sejmie, jednogłośne potępienie czynu Brauna (skrajnie prawicowego posła, który zgasił świece chanukowe gaśnicą podczas obchodów Chanuki w Sejmie), jednogłośne przekazanie 100 mln zł na renowację cmentarza żydowskiego w Warszawie. Komentarz ten pojawił się w różnych kontekstach, na wielu portalach. Głównie w kategorii fake news/konspiracja oraz w mediach prawicowych. Ponadto często pojawiały się komentarze na temat GAZETY WYBORCZEJ (popularnego ogólnopolskiego opiniotwórczego dziennika społeczno-politycznego o profilu centro-liberalnym) i jego redaktora naczelnego Adama Michnika (który wywodzi się z nieformalnego związku przedwojennego działacza i działaczki komunistycznych o pochodzeniu żydowskim. Był politykiem, dziennikarzem historykiem). Gazeta w wielu komentarzach była oskarżana o

sterowanie przez Żydów, w wulgarny sposób zmieniano jej nazwę. GAZETĘ WYBORCZĄ oskarżano o manipulacje, stosowanie żydowskich metod, nazywano żydowską gazetą dla Polaków. Odmówiono jej również prawa do komentowania niektórych wydarzeń, ponieważ jest gazetą żydowską. TVN (najpopularniejsza polska komercyjna stacja telewizyjna) również została oskarżona o żydowską kontrolę. Także polscy politycy byli oskarżani o bycie pod żydowskim wpływem, zwłaszcza Andrzej Duda, Donald Tusk, Radosław Sikorski (ten ostatni głównie z powodu swojej żony). Osoby komentujące sugerowały, że ponieważ ci boją się Żydów, nie potępiają Izraela za jego zbrodnie i nie krytykują ambasadora Izraela w Polsce. Co więcej, podejrzewano, że Żydzi z Ameryki sterują polską lub izraelską polityką i finansują działania Izraela.

Żydowska kontrola była często wspominana w komentarzach na temat Unii Europejskiej, nazywając ją NEUROPA. Cały świat, USA i NATO były również wielokrotnie postrzegane jako rządzone przez Żydów. Oskarżano polskich polityków o podlizywanie się Żydom, ale też mówiono, że są Żydami, aby ich zdyskredytować (komentarze używające słowa Żyd jako obelgi były klasyfikowane jako MOWA NIENAWIŚCI). Polityków wspierających Izrael nazywano zdrajcami. Komentarz, który pojawiał się wielokrotnie, dotyczył historii Polski z 1944 roku, kiedy to Żydzi z Moskwy (lewigowici) wysłali do Polski innych Żydów, którzy zostali umieszczeni w kluczowych miejscach, takich jak media, szkoły filmowe, prokuratura, sądy, aby stworzyć nowe rządy i uruchomić rosyjski plan. Komentarz mówi, że w polskiej polityce nadal są Żydzi - z Platformy Obywatelskiej (PO) lub Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (PiS).


Pojawiło się wiele komentarzy na temat żydowskiej kontroli. Można w nich przeczytać, że Żydzi kontrolują np. banki, media, wszelkiego rodzaju instytucje. Produkty izraelskiej produkcji są oskarżane o szpiegowanie i oszustwa, podobnie jak sami Żydzi. Wiele komentarzy sprowadzało się do zdania - Żydzi są wszędzie na świecie i decydują o wszystkim. Czasami wiązały się z wezwaniem do bojkotu Izraela i izraelskich produktów.

Pojawiło się również wiele komentarzy w podkategorii "ŻYDOKOMUNA", ponieważ nadal istnieje przekonanie, że komunizm został stworzony przez Żydów. Czasami było to używane do obrażania lub dyskredytowania kogoś. "Żydzi to komuniści" było bardzo popularnym komentarzem.

Duże poruszenie wśród komentatorów wywołała wizyta ukraińskiego prezydenta w Polsce. Większość komentarzy skupiała się na żydowskim pochodzeniu Zełenskiego ("wredny ukraiński Żyd", "rosyjski Żyd") oraz na tym, że Żydzi wywołali wojnę w Ukrainie. Osoby komentujące podnosili kwestię braku przeprosin za rzeźie Polaków na Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej. Często wiązano to z MOWĄ NIENAWIŚCI i WZYWANIEM DO PRZEMOCY.

Podkategorie, które praktycznie się nie pojawiały lub pojawiły się raz, bez większego znaczenia, to "Protokoły Mędrców Syjonu", "Iluminaci", "Wielka teoria zastępstwa", "Soros". Kontekstami, w których najczęściej pojawiały się komentarze z tej kategorii, były polskie wybory i ogólnie polska polityka. Wydarzenia na Bliskim Wschodzie miały marginalne znaczenie, choć śmierć polskiego pracownika organizacji humanitarnej w Strefie Gazy pojawiła się jako kontekst w kilkudziesięciu przypadkach. Pojawiło się kilka komentarzy dotyczących powiązań Żydów z pandemią "COVID 19".

Fig.9. Subnarracje kategorii narracji antysemickiej: Konspiracyjny antysemityzm.



3.1.3 Klasyczne stereotypy

Wiodącymi mediami w tej kategorii są WYKOP, WYBORCZA, TV REPUBLIKA i DO RZECZY.

Kategoria "Klasyczny stereotyp" była popularną kategorią. Najliczniejszą z nich było przedstawianie Żydów jako ZŁYCH. Były to opisy poszczególnych sytuacji, w których osoby pochodzenia żydowskiego zachowywały się w określony sposób, co miało być dowodem na to, że wszyscy Żydzi są źli i niesympatyczni (np. zły sędzia = "żydowski sędzia"). W tej podkategorii pojawił się klasyczny mechanizm działania stereotypów. Wszyscy Żydzi byli opisywani przez pryzmat poszczególnych sytuacji. Kilka komentarzy mówiło o roznoszeniu chorób, co brzmi jak narracja z lat trzydziestych. Pojawiły się również komentarze, że Żydzi nienawidzą Polaków, a czasami pojawiały się komentarze, że Żydzi nienawidzą wszystkich. Wiele komentarzy określających Żydów jako morderców, zbrodniarzy i terrorystów mieściło się w kategorii przypisywania Żydom odpowiedzialności za działania państwa Izrael, jeśli kontekst wypowiedzi odnosił się do konfliktu na Bliskim Wschodzie. Pojawiła się też narracja, że ludzie mają Żydów dość wszędzie na świecie i nic dziwnego, że inne kraje wypędzają ich od siebie. Żydzi byli również

oskarżani o bycie przyczyną większości problemów na świecie. Często wiązało się to z MOWĄ NIENAWIŚCI i WZYWANIEM DO PRZEMOCY.

Dużą podkategorię stanowiły również komentarze odnoszące się do klasycznego stereotypu Żydów - "Chciwość/Zamożność". Pojawiło się tu m.in. nazywanie kogoś Żydem, bo jest skąpy, ale też narracja, że Żydzi robią wszystko dla pieniędzy, że zależy im tylko na biznesie, że uważają, że cały świat jest im winien jakieś pieniądze i że cenią pieniądze ponad ludzkie życie, a nawet kradną. Pojawiły się sugestie, że Żydzi oskarżają o Holokaust tylko po to, by dostać odszkodowanie. W języku polskim bardzo często pojawia się też słowo "POŻYDZIĆ" - oznacza, że ktoś jest trochę chciwy i nie chce wydawać na coś pieniędzy. Pojawiło się ono również w opracowywanym materiale.


Odnoszenie się do Żydów jako INNYCH również pojawiło się w tej kategorii. W niektórych przypadkach oddzielano Żydów polskiego pochodzenia od Polaków, mówiono o żydowskich nazwiskach i o tym, że Żydzi zmieniają je na polskie, aby wtopić się w Polaków, podczas gdy Polacy nigdy nie zmieniają swoich nazwisk na żydowskie. Z drugiej strony doszukiwano się żydowskiego pochodzenia, by解释 czyjeś złe zachowanie. Pojawiły się również komentarze graniczące z dehumanizacją. Żydzi byli też określani jako wrogowie Polski, osoby, które chcą Polskę zniszczyć. Pisano też, że żaden Polak nie został porwany przez Hamas, a osoby porwane to Żydzi urodzeni w Polsce.

W podkategorii "Oszustwo i kłamstwo" pojawiały się komentarze, że Żydom nie można ufać, bo kłamią, oszukują, są zdrajcami, ale też portale i gazety nazywano żydowskimi, by obniżyć poziom zaufania do nich. Było to związane z tzw. żydowską propagandą, ale także z kategorią NOWEGO ANTYSEMITYZMU.

Mniej znaczącymi podkategoriami były "Nielojalność/dwulicowość" i "Tabu krytyki". W podkategorii "Tabu krytyki" większość treści dotyczyła braku krytyki ze strony społeczności międzynarodowej wobec działań Izraela, dlatego komentarze te zostały włączone do kategorii NOWY ANTYSEMITYZM. Według komentujących Żydzi są "nietykalni". Tylko kilka przykładów pojawiło się w tej kategorii.

Wśród niesklasyfikowanych treści znalazły się komentarze, że Żydzi są antypolscy, kilka o zaprzeczaniu istnieniu antysemityzmu w Polsce, wstawianie się za posłem antysemitem, który zgasił świece chanukowe w Sejmie. Były też te związane z wyglądem, głównie dotyczące kształtu nosa.

Fig.10. Subnarracje kategorii narracji antysemickiej: Klasyczne stereotypy.




3.1.4 Zaprzeczanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu

Najwięcej treści z tej kategorii pojawiło się na portalu WYKOP (posty i komentarze). Kolejne miejsca zajęły: WYBORCZA (komentarze), TV REPUBLIKA (komentarze), MAGNA POLONIA (komentarze).

Następna w kolejności pod względem ilości treści kategorią było "Zaprzeczanie lub zniekształcanie Holokaustu". Nie była to zbyt liczna kategoria (około kilkudziesięciu komentarzy). Pojawiały się tu głównie narracje oskarżające Żydów o współdziałaniu w Holokauście ("obwinianie Żydów"), ich bierność w czasie wojny, przykłady tego, jak Żydzi zabijali innych Żydów w obozach czy kolaborowali z nazistami, ale były też historie Żydów zabijających Polaków, by udowodnić, że nie zasługują na miano ofiar Holokaustu. Pojawiła się teoria, że Hitler był finansowany przez bogatych Żydów. Holokaust był kilkukrotnie przedstawiany jako pozytywne wydarzenie. Pojawiały się również pytania o liczbę żydowskich ofiar Holokaustu oraz oskarżenia pod adresem społeczności żydowskiej o zawłaszczanie cierpienia podczas II wojny światowej i prowadzenie narracji, że Żydzi byli jedynymi ofiarami. Trudno powiedzieć dokładnie, jakie wydarzenia wywołyły takie komentarze, bo było ich stosunkowo niewiele, ale często dyskutowano ogólnie o II wojnie światowej, rocznicy powstania w getcie warszawskim i wojnie na Ukrainie - oskarżano Ukraińców o bycie głównymi sprawcami Holokaustu oraz prowadzono narrację, że Polacy nie zabijali Żydów ("Rozmycie odpowiedzialności"). Bardzo popularny był argument, że Żydzi wykorzystują Holokaust do własnych celów, zwłaszcza do rekompensaty finansowej.

Fig.11. Subnarracje kategorii narracji antysemickiej: Zaprzeczanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu.




3.1.5 Tradycyjny antysemityzm oparty na religii

Najwięcej treści z tej kategorii pojawiło się na WYKOP (posty i komentarze). Następne w kolejności były DO RZECZY (komentarze), NEON 24 (komentarze).

"Tradycyjny antysemityzm oparty na religii" był niewielką kategorią. Kilkanaście komentarzy odnosiło się głównie do satanizmu i Szatana lub bogobójstwa. Podobna liczba komentarzy dotyczyła naśmiewania się z judaizmu i wyglądu ortodoksynów oraz tego, że religia żydowska jest zła lub dziwna. Autorzy pisali również, że Żydzi kłamią lub "opowiadają kłamstwa" w odniesieniu do swojej religii. Czasami pojawiały się odniesienia do "Żyda jako "innego" (w sensie religijnym)". Kilka komentarzy dotyczyło pedofilów w szkołach rabinicznych. Wskazywały one na Talmud i wynikające z niego złe traktowanie nie-Żydów. Nieznaczna liczba komentarzy dotyczyła kategorii "Mord rytualny/Morderstwo dzieci". Większą kategorią okazało się "bogobójstwo". Po prostu powtórzono frazę, że Żydzi zabili Jezusa.

Fig.12. Subnarracje kategorii narracji antysemickiej: Tradycyjny antysemityzm oparty na religii.



3.2 Treści antysemickie poza kategoriami

3.2.1 Przemoc na tle antysemickim

Najwięcej mowy nienawiści pojawia się w komentarzach. Najczęściej mowa nienawiści sprowadzała się do nazywania Żydów w obraźliwy sposób lub używaniu słowa ŻYD jako wyzwisko i stosowania go w celu obrażenia innych. Najwięcej mowy nienawiści pojawiało się w mediach znanych jako tabloidy. Dzieje się tak głównie dlatego, że strony, na których antysemityzm pojawiał się najczęściej, są tworzone przez użytkowników. Tematy, które wywołyły duże poruszenie i gdzie pojawiło się najwięcej mowy nienawiści to atak Iranu na Izrael, sytuacja, w której skrajnie prawicowy, antysemicki polityk zgasił świece chanukowe gaśnicą w polskim parlamencie, film Agnieszki Holland o imigrantach, rocznica katastrofy lotniczej w Smoleńsku, Wizyta Zełeńskiego w Polsce, cała sytuacja wokół śmierci polskiego pracownika organizacji humanitarnej w Strefie Gazy, który zginął od izraelskiego ostrzału i związane z tym wydarzeniem słowa ambasadora Izraela w Polsce, a także niewłaściwa - zdaniem piszących - reakcja polskich polityków na działania Izraela. Komentarze często miały też charakter nawoływania do przemocy. W tej kategorii znalazły się również antysemickie żarty i powiedzenia.

3.2.2 Przemoc na tle antysemickim

Nawoływanie do przemocy okazało się kategorią, w której pojawiło się niewiele komentarzy. Kontekstem, w którym pojawiło się ich najczęściej, był irański atak na Izrael oraz wywiad

ambasadora Izraela w Polsce po tym, jak polski wolontariusz zginął w Strefie Gazy. Pojawiły się m.in. głosy, że Żydzi powinni zginąć lub że powinni zostać zbombardowani przez Iran. Powtarzały się wezwania do wydalenia Żydów z krajów, w których mieszkają, zwłaszcza ambasadora Izraela w Polsce, wezwania do ich eksterminacji/zabicia, zerwania stosunków dyplomatycznych czy unicestwienia państwa Izrael. Wiązało się to z komentarzami mówiącymi o ludobójstwie Palestyńczyków. Dość często pojawiały się również wezwania typu "Jebać Żydów". Pojawiły się takie komentarze jak: "Jebać żydowskie kanalie", "Jebać tych semickich bandytów" czy "Jebać izraelskich terrorystów". Co więcej, osoby autorskie chciały wykluczyć Izrael z różnych rozgrywek sportowych. W tej kategorii Izrael był często porównywany do Rosji czy nawet nazistowskich Niemiec. Komentarze miały również charakter MOWY NIENAWIŚCI. Jeśli chodzi o media, to najczęściej przykładów "nawoływanie do przemocy" pojawiło się w TV REPUBLIKA i WYKOP.

3.3 Tematy wyzwalające antysemityzm

Tematami, które wydają się być głównymi wyzwalaczami antysemickich treści są konflikty na Bliskim Wschodzie, które można podzielić na węższe konteksty. Jednym z najbardziej popularnych jest atak rakietowy Iranu na Izrael, gdzie najczęściej treści pojawiły się w kategorii NOWY ANTYSEMITYZM, a mniej, choć nadal sporo HATE SPEECH. Wydarzeniem silnie związanym z sytuacją na Bliskim Wschodzie, które stanowiło kontekst dla antysemityzmu, jest śmierć polskiego pracownika organizacji humanitarnej w Strefie Gazy, który zginął po ostrzale przez izraelskie wojsko samochodu należącego do organizacji CETRAL KITCHEN. Wydarzenie to wygenerowało zdecydowanie najczęściej antysemickich komentarzy. Można je podzielić na mniejsze konteksty (wypowiedzi ambasadora Izraela w Polsce, wywiad z nim, wypowiedzi ambasadora Palestyny, pogrzeb pracownika organizacji humanitarnej, żądanie przez polskich polityków przeprosin i zadośćuczynienia od Izraela). Sytuacja ta wywołała również wiele komentarzy o Żydach jako tych złych (STEREOTYP KLASYCZNY), a także oskarżenia o żydowskie wpływy wśród polskich polityków (KONSPIRACYJNY).

Duże poruszenie wśród osób komentujących wywołała wizyta ukraińskiego prezydenta w Polsce. Większość komentarzy skupiała się na żydowskim pochodzeniu Zełenskiego ("wredny ukraiński Żyd", "rosyjski Żyd") oraz na tym, że Żydzi wywołali wojnę w Ukrainie. Pisarze podnosili kwestię braku przeprosin za rzeźie Polaków na Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej. Często wiązano to z MOWĄ NIENAWIŚCI i WZYWANIEM DO PRZEMOCY.

Bardzo zapalnym wydarzeniem okazało się również zgaszenie przez skrajnie prawicowego, antysemickiego polityka Grzegorza Brauna z partii Konfederacja świec chanukowych gaśnicą w polskim parlamencie (kiedy w Sejmie obchodzono święto Chanuka). Ukaranie posła antysemity

również było bodźcem wyzwalającym antysemickie komentarze. Należy dodać, że poseł Grzegorz Braun jest znany ze swojego antysemityzmu i antyukraińskiego podejścia. Jest on postrzegany jako polityk prorosyjski, a jego zachowanie nie miało żadnego związku z konfliktem izraelsko-palestyńskim. Gdziekolwiek pojawiało się słowo "Izrael", można było spodziewać się antysemickich treści. Wiele osób zdecydowanie i jednoznacznie oskarżało Żydów o działania Izraela i słowa te często były używane zamiennie. W komentarzach czasami pojawiała się nie tylko nienawiść do Żydów, ale także do muzułmanów, często obie narracje w jednym komentarzu. Antysemickie komentarze pojawiały się także wtedy, gdy ktoś chciał obniżyć czyjąś wiarygodność, zdyskredytować poprzez nazywanie Żydem, ale także obniżyć zaufanie do pewnych treści, zwłaszcza do GAZETY WYBORCZEJ ("żydowska gazeta"). Przypisywanie żydowskich korzeni politykom w Polsce, szukanie żydowskich przodków czy modyfikowanie ich nazwisk, by brzmiały żydowsko, miało podobny cel, niezależnie od tego, czy komentarz był prawdziwy, czy nie (np. w przypadku żony Radosława Sikorskiego). Nie ma znaczenia, po której stronie sporu politycznego w Polsce stał dany polityk. Pretekstem do antysemickich komentarzy stał się także film Agnieszki Holland o kryzysie uchodźczym na granicy z Białorusią oraz rocznica katastrofy smoleńskiej.

Niejednokrotnie kontekst, tj. post lub artykuł nie miał związku z Izraelem, Żydami czy ogólnie Bliskim Wschodem, ale w komentarzach pojawiał się antysemityzm. Mógł odnosić się do wewnętrznej polskiej polityki, świata czy macierzyństwa.

Sporo antysemityzmu pojawiło się także w kontekście różnych wydarzeń w Polsce. Wybory, sytuacja gospodarcza, poparcie dla Ukrainy, ceny paliw, ustawa aborcjonista. Mniej, choć wcale nie mało, w kontekście II wojny światowej. Temat Holokaustu wywoływanego był zwykle przy okazji kategorii NOWY ANTYSEMITYZM.

3.4 Słowa kodowe używane w odniesieniu do Żydów, przykłady

parchy, pasożydy, żydostwo, żydoszczyny, pejsy, żydkie, żydzioszki, żymanie, żydowy, żydajstwo, żydy, żydowizna, rzymianie, żydotwo, garbate nosy, izraelska/ żydowska dziwka/kurwa, rzydzi, szabesgoje, syjonistyczny nowotwór, obrzezany qutas, starozakonny, żydło, 7ydowski, 7zydy, 7ydzi, zydojobancy

W polskich komentarzach można znaleźć wiele powtarzających się słów opisujących Żydów. Kilka z nich jest wyraźnie popularnych. Do najczęściej pojawiających się słów należy słowo PARCHY. Bardzo pogardliwe, silnie kojarzące się z chorobą. Innym bardzo popularnym słowem jest słowo PEJSY. Równie popularnym słowem jest słowo ŻYMIANIE lub RZYMIANIE. Słowa te zostały stworzone w celu ominięcia cenzury internetowej. Innym sposobem na ominięcie cenzury jest pisanie 7YD.

Wiele innych słów to często zdrobnienia używane w sposób pogardliwy. Te słowa to ŻYDKI, ŻYDZIOSZKI, ŻYDÓWECZKI. Pojawiły się też augmentatywy wyrazów i różne inne formy słowa ŻYDZI (ŻYDY, ŻYDOWSTWO, ŻYDOSTWO, ŻYDÓWY, ŻYDŁA, ŻYDOWIZNY, ŻYDAJSTWO). Pojawiło się również kilka kombinacji słowa ŻYD z innymi słowami. Na przykład połączenie słów ŻYDZI i PASOŻYTY - PASOŻYDZI. Inną kombinacją było połączenie słów ŻYDZI i SZCZYNY (wulgarnie o moczu) - ŻYDOSZCZYNY. Były też kilka modyfikacji nazwisk polityków. Na przykład... od nazwiska polskiej byłej premier Beaty Szydło (ŻYDŁO) czy Wołodymyra Zełenskiego (JEWLENSKI lub ŻYDEŃSKI). Zdarzały się również przypadki używania nazw krajów określanych jako kontrolowane przez Żydów. Polska - POLIN, Ukraina - UKROPOLIN, EU-NEUROPA czy UNIA JEW-ROPEJSKA. Bardzo często nazywano ludzi ŻYDAMI, aby im umniejszyć, zdyskredytować lub po prostu obrazić. Wielu politykom przypisywano w ten sposób żydowskie korzenie. Kłótnie między użytkownikami również często kończyły się nazywaniem siebie nawzajem ŻYDAMI w celu obrażenia.

4. Podsumowanie

Zaskakująco dużo antysemityzmu pojawiło się w Polskim internecie. Platformą gdzie było go najwięcej był zdecydowanie WYKOP.PL. Liczba antysemickich treści stanowiła niemal połowę całego antysemickiego kontentu. Strona ta nie wydaje się dostatecznie dobrze kontrolować treści zamieszczanych tam przez osoby komentujące. Niemniej, trudno jest automatycznie kontrolować i usuwać treści antysemickie, ponieważ w języku polskim łatwo jest tworzyć nowe słowa o charakterze antysemickim lub modyfikować już istniejące w taki sposób, żeby nie były wychwytywane przez filtry. Żeby filtry były skuteczniejsze należałoby co jakiś czas dokonać monitoringu mediów i znaleźć nowe słowa używane do rozpowszechniania antysemickich treści.

Bardzo dużo antysemickich treści dotyczyło polskiej polityki, co oznacza, że stereotypy związane z Żydami są wciąż bardzo żywe i popularne. Słowo ŻYD używane było często do obrażania innych, a jakiekolwiek niezadowolenie z opinii lub poglądów politycznych innych osób było często łączone z żydowską kontrolą. Nawet zupełnie błahe i neutralne tematy mogły być zapalnikiem. Sytuacji takich nie było wiele, ale zdarzały się na tyle często, że dało się to zauważyc.

Bieżące wydarzenia na bliskim wchodzie wygenerowały fale antysemickich komentarzy. Przez ostatnie lata grupą silnie antagonizowaną przez poprzedni rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości byli Muzułmanie (głównie uchodźcy), dlatego zaskakująca jest liczba komentarzy antysemickich w kontekście konfliktu na bliskim wschodzie. Zdarzały się również antymuzułmańskie komentarze, a nawet antymuzułmańskie i antysemickie w jednym, ale to wciąż duża liczba antysemickich i takich gdzie osoby komentujące kibicowały na przykład Iranowi podczas bombardowania Izraela.

Analiza materiału pokazała również jak powszechnie jest utożsamienie wszystkich Żydów z Izraelem. Często pojawiały się treści gdzie słowo ŻYD było synonimem słowa IZRAEL.

Stereotypowe myślenie na temat społeczności żydowskiej również okazało się powszechnie. Postrzeganie Żydów przez pryzmat pojedynczych przypadków i przypisywanie cech pojedynczych osób całemu narodowi pojawiało się wielokrotnie. Wciąż za mało jest w Polsce edukacji na temat stereotypów i rozbrajania mechanizmów ich powstawania. Mało uczy się młodzież i osoby dorosłe strategii kontrolowania stereotypów i korzystania z nich w sposób świadomy.

Temat Żydów w Polsce jest wciąż bardzo polaryzacyjny. Z dużym prawdopodobieństwem pojawią się treści antysemickie kiedy temat artykułu lub posta będzie dotyczył wydarzeń na Bliskim Wschodzie lub bezpośrednio Żydów.

5. Metodologia

Badanie miało na celu zbadanie antysemickich narracji w internetowych treściach tekstowych – takich jak komentarze, artykuły i posty na Facebooku – przed i po 7 października 2023 roku. Przeanalizowaliśmy treści ze stron internetowych i stron na Facebooku wcześniej zdefiniowanych mediów. Treści zostały zebrane za pomocą oprogramowania do nasłuchu społecznego w oparciu o wcześniej zdefiniowane słowa kluczowe, obejmujące ten sam okres zarówno w 2023, jak i 2024 roku. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w czterech krajach (Węgry, Włochy, Polska i Rumunia) przez krajowe zespoły badawcze koordynowane przez Political Capital, przy użyciu tej samej metodologii.

Definicja antysemityzmu

Podstawą badań była robocza definicja antysemityzmu opracowana przez International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA): „Antysemityzm to określone postrzeganie Żydów, które może się wyrażać jako nienawiść do nich. Antysemityzm przejawia się zarówno w słowach, jak i czynach skierowanych przeciwko Żydom lub osobom, które nie są Żydami, oraz ich własności, a także przeciw instytucjom i obiektom religijnym społeczności żydowskiej.”. Szczegółowe wyjaśnienie definicji wraz z przykładami jest dostępne na stronie internetowej IHRA⁸.

5.1 Gromadzenie danych

W naszym badaniu przeanalizowaliśmy internetowe treści tekstowe: artykuły, posty i komentarze ze stron internetowych i stron na Facebooku. Dane zostały zebrane za pomocą oprogramowania SentiOne. SentiOne pobiera dane w określonych ramach czasowych, z podanych źródeł medialnych w oparciu o podane słowa kluczowe.

5.1.1 Słowa kluczowe

Zdefiniowaliśmy cztery słowa kluczowe, których używaliśmy do identyfikacji potencjalnie istotnych treści we wszystkich krajach: 1) Żydzi, 2) Izrael, 3) Holokaust, 4) syjonizm/syjoniści. Ponadto uwzględniliśmy konkretne słowa kluczowe istotne dla każdego kraju. W Polsce były to: żymanie, mycki, pejsy i parchy. W językach, w których słowa te mogą mieć różne końcówki, użyliśmy podstawowej formy słów kluczowych, a następnie gwiazdki (*). Takie podejście pozwoliło SentiOne zidentyfikować wyniki dla wszystkich odmian i zakończeń słów kluczowych.

5.1.2 Monitorowane źródła

Dzięki wkładowi krajowych zespołów badawczych Political Capital zidentyfikował sześć kategorii mediów internetowych do monitorowania treści: 1) media niezależne (głównego

⁸ Robocza definicja antysemityzmu opracowana przez IHRA: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-antysemityzmu-przyjeta-przez-miedzynarodowy-sojusz-na-rzecz-pamieci-o-holokauscie>

nurtu), 2) tabloidy głównego nurtu, 3) media (hiper-)stronnicze, 4) strony prawicowe/dalekoprawicowe, 5) fałszywe wiadomości/spiskowe strony, 5) strony lewicowe/dalekoprawicowe. Zebraliśmy strony dla każdej kategorii we wszystkich krajach, w tym strony internetowe mediów i strony na Facebooku. We wszystkich krajach wybraliśmy trzy rodzaje mediów z każdej kategorii z największą liczbą wyników dla naszych słów kluczowych w tym samym okresie. W Polsce monitorowaliśmy strony internetowe i strony na Facebooku następujących mediów:

- **Media niezależne (głównego nurtu):** gazeta.pl; Wyborcza.pl; Oko press. Analizowane w projekcie media głównego nurtu można określić jako prodemokratyczne. Dwa najważniejsze portale (gazeta.pl i wyborcza.pl) należą do jednej spółki, trzeci powstał przy wsparciu tej spółki i ma charakter informacyjno-opiniotwórczy. Media te są silnie kojarzone z polityką lewicową i centrową. Nie publikują treści antysemickich, ale pod ich artykułami pojawiają się antysemickie komentarze.
- **Strony skrajnie prawicowe:** Fronda.pl; Magna Polonia; Tygodnik Solidarność. Są to media społeczno-polityczne o profilu konserwatywnym. Odwołują się do nauczania Kościoła katolickiego. Niektóre z nich budzą kontrowersje nawet na prawicy.
- **Mainstreamowe tabloidy:** Fakt; Super Express; Wykop. Dwa z nich mają charakter rozrywkowy, plotkarski, ale także dostarczają wiadomości lokalnych i ogólnopolskich dotyczących życia celebrytów, a także zdrowia, kultury, biznesu, polityki, sportu i spraw społecznych. Portale te są niezwykle popularne i zazwyczaj plasują się w czołówce polskich rankingów czytelnictwa. Jednym z nich są jednak wiadomości społeczne. Wiążą się z nimi wiele kontrowersji. Jest tworzony przez społeczność.
- **Fałszywe wiadomości/strony konspiracyjne:** Najwyższy Czas; W Realu 24; neon24. Mają charakter informacyjno-publicystyczny o tematyce społeczno-politycznej. Są prawicowe, antyunijne, a osoby z nimi związane znane są również z antysemickich komentarzy. Są silnie związane ze skrajną prawicą. Używają specyficznego języka. Jawią się jako media, które nie milczą i mówią prawdę.
- **Media (hiper-)stronnicze:** tv republika; dorzeczy; wpolityce. media informacyjne i publicystyczne. Analizowane portale mają charakter konserwatywny z silnie widocznym poparciem dla tradycji chrześcijańskich. Pozycja portalu w politycznym spektrum w Polsce jest jasna i jawią się one jako jednoznacznie prawicowe.

- **Strony lewicowe/skrajnie lewicowe:** Lewicza. Niewiele jest mediów, które są jednoznacznie lewicowe. Ten, który wziął udział w badaniu, również nie jest zbyt popularny.

5.1.3 Okres monitorowania

Opierając się na naszych wcześniejszych doświadczeniach w kodowaniu treści tekstowych do wcześniej zdefiniowanych kategorii oraz zasobach dostępnych dla projektu, postawiliśmy sobie za cel przeanalizowanie 7 000 fragmentów treści w każdym kraju. Ponieważ chcieliśmy zbadać zmiany w narracjach antysemickich po 7 października 2023 r., wybraliśmy ten sam okres zarówno w 2023 r., jak i 2024 r. Określono to poprzez zidentyfikowanie kraju z najmniejszą ilością danych dla naszych słów kluczowych i obliczenie, ile dni było potrzebnych, poczynając od wybranej daty (w tym przypadku 1 kwietnia), aby pobrane dane w tym kraju przekroczyły 7 000 fragmentów treści. W rezultacie gromadzenie danych we wszystkich krajach zostało ustalane do tych samych ram czasowych: 1 kwietnia i 15 kwietnia, godzina 13:00.

5.1.4 Ilość przeanalizowanych danych

Przefiltrowaliśmy każdy zbiór danych, aby uwzględnić ponad 7000 fragmentów treści, zachowując oryginalne proporcje słów kluczowych, źródeł (stron internetowych i stron na Facebooku) oraz lat w zbiorze danych. Podejście to zaowocowało następującymi proporcjami całkowitego pobranego zbioru danych analizowanego w każdym kraju: Rumunia – 100%, Węgry – 73%, Włochy – 44% i Polska – 35%.

We wszystkich krajach ilość danych zebranych w 2024 roku była wyższa niż w 2023 roku. Najmniejszy wzrost odnotowano na Węgrzech, gdzie dane wzrosły około półtora raza w 2024 roku. W Rumunii dane wzrosły prawie trzykrotnie, w Polsce prawie pięciokrotnie, a we Włoszech prawie siedmiokrotnie. We wszystkich krajach większość danych stanowiły komentarze.

Ilość danych różniła się również między krajami w zależności od kategorii mediów:

- Węgry: Większość danych pochodziła ze stron skrajnie prawicowych, a następnie z mediów głównego nurtu, stronniczych mediów, tabloidów i minimalnych danych ze źródeł konspiracyjnych i lewicowych.
- Włochy: Większość danych pochodziła z mediów głównego nurtu, a następnie tabloidów, stronniczych mediów, źródeł lewicowych i konspiracyjnych, przy bardzo niewielkiej ilości danych ze stron skrajnie prawicowych.
- Polska: Większość danych pochodziła z tabloidów, a następnie stronniczych mediów, mediów głównego nurtu, stron skrajnie prawicowych, stron konspiracyjnych i bardzo niewiele ze źródeł lewicowych.

- Rumunia: Większość danych pochodziła z mediów głównego nurtu, a następnie ze stron konspiracyjnych, tabloidów, źródeł skrajnie prawicowych, stronniczych mediów i niewielkiej ilości danych ze źródeł lewicowych.

		<i>Badana zawartość w kategoriach mediów</i>								
		Głównego nurtu	Skrajnie prawicowe	Konspiracyjne	Stronnicze	Tabloidy	Lewicowe	Całkowita ilość danych/rok	Całkowita ilość danych	
Węgry	2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787	7008	
	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221		
Włochy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7053	
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163		
Polska	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7054	
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818		
Rumunia	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7012	

5.2 Kodowanie danych

5.2.1 Ramy koncepcyjne

Korzystając z publicznie dostępnych zasobów, takich jak badania, raporty z badań, artykuły naukowe itp., Political Capital opracował ramy koncepcyjne w celu zdefiniowania teoretycznego tła badań. Oprócz stwierdzenia, że badania opierały się na roboczej definicji antysemityzmu IHRA, dokument ten dokładnie przedstawiał główne kategorie antysemickich narracji i podnarracji, na których opierały się badania. Wszyscy partnerzy mieli możliwość przedyskutowania, skomentowania i uzupełnienia treści ram koncepcyjnych. Ramy koncepcyjne zostały również omówione z członkami Rady Doradczej projektu BOND i ekspertami zewnętrznymi.

5.2.2 Finalizacja metodologii i stworzenie przewodnika metodologicznego

Sfinalizowanie metodologii badań wymagało wielu dyskusji – w tym konsultacji z ekspertem będącym członkiem Rady Doradczej BOND oraz kilku prób analizy i kodowania tekstów

internetowych na różne sposoby. Na podstawie tych wysiłków ustalone ostateczne kategorie kodowania danych. Zdefiniowano cztery klasyfikacje dotyczące charakteru treści:

1. Antysemickie – treści, które zawierały co najmniej jedną narrację antysemicką.
2. Potencjalnie antysemickie – treści, które zawierały narrację, którą można interpretować zarówno jako antysemicką, jak i nie antysemicką, lub które wydawały się antysemickie tylko w świetle kontekstu (artykułu/postu, na który odpowiadały)
3. Niezrozumiałe – treści, które były niezrozumiałe (ta kategoria dotyczyła prawie wyłącznie komentarzy).
4. Nie antysemickie – treści, które nie zawierały żadnych antysemickich narracji.

W oparciu o ramy koncepcyjne zidentyfikowano pięć głównych kategorii narracji antysemickich, z których każda zawiera podkategorie (szczegóły i definicje tych kategorii zostaną opisane później):

- Klasyczne stereotypy antysemickie
- Tradycyjny antysemityzm oparty na religii (antyjudaizm)
- Konspiracyjny antysemityzm,
- Zaprzeczanie i zniekształcanie Holokaustu,
- Nowy antysemityzm (antysemityzm oparty na krytyce Izraela).

Zdefiniowano dwie dodatkowe kategorie: „mowa nienawiści” i „nawoływanie do przemocy”.

Proces kodowania został szczegółowo opisany w przewodniku metodologicznym.

W ramach procesu kodowania osoby kodujące były zobowiązane do udokumentowania antysemickich zwrotów zidentyfikowanych w treści. W przypadku komentarzy musieli oni również rejestrować kontekst – w szczególności temat artykułu lub postu, pod którym komentarz został napisany.

5.2.3 Szkolenie koderów

Po podzieleniu się ramami koncepcyjnymi i przewodnikiem metodologicznym z krajowymi zespołami badawczymi Political Capital zorganizował spotkanie w celu wyjaśnienia i omówienia tych dokumentów i procesu oraz zapewnienia miejsca na pytania. W trakcie całego procesu badawczego zespoły badawcze spotykały się regularnie w celu omówienia kwestii i pytań, które pojawiły się w trakcie procesu badawczego.

Aby zapewnić wspólne zrozumienie ram teoretycznych i zwiększyć wiarygodność badań - w ramach ograniczeń zasobów i możliwości zespołu – proces badawczy obejmował fazę uczenia się. Podczas tej fazy odfiltrowano 350 fragmentów treści ze zbioru danych, zachowując oryginalne proporcje wyników według słów kluczowych, kategorii mediów i roku. Uwzględniono niewielką

nadreprezentację wyników dla słowa kluczowego „Izrael”, opierając się na założeniu, że identyfikacja nowego antysemityzmu będzie największym wyzwaniem. W każdym kraju dwóch członków krajowych zespołów badawczych kodowało te dane niezależnie. Ich wyniki zostały następnie porównane, a rozbieżności omówione w celu osiągnięcia porozumienia. W przypadkach, w których nie można było osiągnąć porozumienia, dano im możliwość skonsultowania się z Political Capital w celu uzyskania dalszych wyjaśnień.

5.2.4 Proces kodowania

Kodowanie danych odbywało się według tej samej procedury we wszystkich krajach. Zespoły krajowe otrzymały swoje treści w pliku Excel, który zawierał wszystkie istotne właściwości (np. komentarz/artykuł/post, datę publikacji, źródło, kontekst itp.) Podczas procesu kodowania koderzy czytali samą treść, a w przypadku komentarzy badali również kontekst.

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Wprowadzenie do projektu BOND

Projekt BOND (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities)⁹ był realizowany od stycznia 2023 r. do grudnia 2024 r. na Węgrzech, we Włoszech, w Polsce i Rumunii. Jego głównym celem było zajęcie się głęboko zakorzenionymi uprzedzeniami, nienawistnymi postawami i zachowaniami w społeczeństwie, szczególnie tymi wymierzonymi w europejskich Żydów. Projekt miał również na celu wspieranie zrozumienia, tolerancji i dialogu. Duży nacisk położono na edukację młodych ludzi na temat judaizmu i antysemityzmu, a także promowanie dialogu międzykulturowego i międzyreligijnego. Jego działania obejmowały badania nad antysemityzmem, monitorowanie antysemickich narracji, opracowywanie programów edukacyjnych, szkolenie nauczycieli, organizowanie programów edukacji i wymiany młodzieży, ułatwianie dialogu międzywyznaniowego i między społecznościami oraz organizowanie lokalnych okrągłych stołów na temat tolerancji i integracji społecznej. Projekt opierał się na definicji antysemityzmu opracowanej przez Międzynarodowy Sojusz na rzecz Pamięci o Holokauście (IHRA)¹⁰.

⁹ Webpage of the BOND project: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

¹⁰ Robocza definicja antysemityzmu opracowana przez IHRA:
<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-antysemityzmu-przyjeta-przez-miedzynarodowy-sojusz-na-rzecz-pamieci-o-holokauscie>

Analiza antisemitismului în România: Raport specific de țară

Rezultate relevante

Prin analiza a 7.012 materiale publicate în perioada 2023-2024, inclusiv articole, postări și comentarii, s-au dobândit noi perspective asupra discursului antisemitic din România și asupra modului în care acesta a evoluat în raport cu evenimentele interne și externe ale perioadei.

Rezultatele indică o consecvență a discursului de natură conspiraționistă, o creștere a unui val de neo-antisemitism în urma evenimentelor din 7 octombrie, persistența stereotipurilor antisemite clasice și influența unor surse media asupra opiniei publice. Mai jos sunt prezentate concluziile cheie ale analizei celor 7.012 materiale:

- **Cu caracter antisemitic:** 1.605 materiale (22,9%)
- **Cu potențial antisemitic:** 256 materiale (3,7%)
- **Neinteligibile:** 366 materiale (5,2%)
- **Fără caracter antisemitic:** 4.785 materiale (68,2%)

Pe parcursul procesului de monitorizare, conținutul antisemitic a fost clasificat în șapte categorii principale pentru a întelege mai bine formele și temele abordate. Acestea includ: **stereotipuri clasice**, care s-au perpetuat de-a lungul timpului, cu privire la evrei sau comunități evreiești; **antisemitism motivat prin tradiție și religie**, folosind argumente teologice sau acuzații istorice; **conținut conspiraționist**, care asociază evreii cu interese ascunse și manipulări de ordin mondial; **negarea sau distorsionarea Holocaustului**, încercând să submineze, falsifice sau denatureze adevăruri istorice; **neo-antisemitism**, care vizează Statul Israel sau sionismul drept pretexte pentru insinuări cu un mai vast caracter; **discursul instigator la ură**, incluzând insulțe explicite sau atacuri verbale care au scopul de a dezumaniza; **îndemn la violență**, care incită sau aprobă daune împotriva evreilor sau comunităților evreiești.

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Introducere

Cercetarea a avut ca scop analizarea schimbărilor în cadrul discursului antisemitic online după data de 7 octombrie 2023—marcată de atacul terorist al Hamas asupra Israelului și războiul care a urmat. Aceste evenimente au dus la o creștere a antisemitismului în întreaga Europă, ceea ce a făcut necesară examinarea modului în care discursul antisemitic din spațiul online a evoluat. Elaborarea metodologiei de cercetare și a categoriilor a fost finalizată la sfârșitul anului 2023 și începutul anului 2024, iar cercetarea a început în primăvara anului 2024.

Recunoașterea și definirea antisemitismului în raport cu Israelul, adică diferențierea dintre critica legitimă și cea ilegitimă a Israelului, a devenit deosebit de dificilă după 7 octombrie. Cercetarea noastră se bazează pe definiția de lucru a antisemitismului elaborată de Alianța Internațională pentru Memoria Holocaustului (IHRA)¹, care este acceptată de 43 de țări și de mai multe organizații internaționale, inclusiv UE și majoritatea statelor sale membre.

Cercetarea a fost realizată simultan în patru țări – Ungaria, Italia, Polonia și România – utilizând aceeași metodologie. S-a concentrat pe conținut scris, inclusiv articole, comentarii și postări pe platforma Facebook. Conținutul a fost colectat folosind tehnologii de monitorizare online aplicate pe site-urile și paginile de Facebook ale celor mai relevante instituții media naționale din următoarele cinci categorii: media independentă (mainstream), media partizană/hiper-partizană, tabloidele mainstream, site-uri de stânga, pagini de extremă-dreapta și site-uri de știri false/conspiraționiste. Procesul de colectare a fost bazat pe cuvinte-cheie menite să detecteze conținutul antisemitic. Patru cuvinte-cheie de bază – evreu, Israel, Holocaust și sionism/sionist – au fost utilizate în toate țările, în limbile locale respective. În plus, au fost incluse cuvinte-cheie specifice fiecărei țări. În limbile unde aceste cuvinte puteau avea terminații diferite, formele de bază au fost urmate de un asterisc (*), permitând colectarea rezultatelor pentru toate variațiile și terminațiile.

Cercetarea s-a concentrat pe perioada 1-15 aprilie atât în 2023, cât și în 2024, cu aproape 7.000 de fragmente de conținut analizate în fiecare țară. Toate fragmentele de conținut au fost examineate de echipele naționale de cercetare și clasificate ca fiind antisemite, potențial antisemite (conținut care ar putea fi interpretat ca având sau neavând caracter antisemitic), neintelibile sau fără caracter antisemitic. Pornind de la resurse publice disponibile—precum studii, rapoarte de cercetare și articole științifice—au fost definite cinci categorii principale de discursuri antisemite: stereotipuri clasice antisemite, teorii conspiraționiste cu caracter

¹ Definiția de lucru a antisemitismului adoptată de IHRA:

<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/definitia-de-lucru-a-antisemitismului>


antisemetic, antisemitism tradițional motivat prin religie, negarea și distorsionarea Holocaustului și neo-antisemitism (antisemitismul bazat pe critica Israelului). În plus față de acestea, au fost stabilite două categorii suplimentare: instigarea la ură și îndemnurile la violență împotriva evreilor. Fiecare unitate de conținut a fost analizată în detaliu și atribuită uneia sau mai multora dintre aceste categorii.

1. Volumul conținutului antisemitic în totalul de date colectate la nivel națională

1.1 Volumul conținutului antisemitic în totalul de date colectate

Conținutul antisemitic și potențial antisemitic a fost prezent în 27% din totalul de date colectate în România. Dintr-un total de 7.012 de unități de conținut, 1.605 au fost etichetate ca antisemitive, 256 ca potențial antisemitic, 4.785 ca neavând caracter antisemitic și 366 ca fiind neinteligibile.


Fig.1. Proportia de conținut antisemit în setul complet de date.



1.2 Clasificarea conținutului analizat

O mare parte din conținutul extras a fost reprezentat de comentarii, iar majoritatea conținutului antisemantic a apărut în acestea. Aproximativ 75,4% din conținutul descărcat a fost sub formă de comentarii (5.288), aproximativ 19,2% au fost articole (1.346) și doar aproximativ 5,4% au fost postări pe Facebook (378). Discursul antisemantic a apărut predominant în comentarii, dintre care peste 29% (1.567) erau antisemitive, 4,6% (247) erau cu potențial antisemantic, 59% (3.115) nu erau antisemitive și aproximativ 6,8% (359) nu erau inteligibile. În ceea ce privește articolele, 96% (1.296) nu au fost antisemitive, 2,7% (37) au fost antisemitive, iar 0,6% (9) au fost potențial antisemitive. Aproape toate postările au fost lipsite de caracterul antisemantic, doar unul fiind clasificat ca potențial antisemantic și trei ca fiind de neînțeles.

Fig.2. Distribuția diferitelor tipuri de conținut examineate în setul complet de date.




1.3 Antisemitism în diverse tipuri de media

Cea mai mare parte a conținutului antisemantic a fost regăsită în comentariile de pe paginile independente (mainstream), urmate de site-urile media de știri false. Cu mai multe date în 2024, numărul de elemente de conținut antisemantic a crescut, de asemenea, dar proporția lor a rămas mai mult sau mai puțin aceeași în majoritatea categoriilor media, cu excepția paginilor media părtinitoare, unde a crescut ușor, și a site-urilor media mainstream, unde a înregistrat o ușoară scădere.

Conținutul antisemantic (atât antisemantic, cât și potențial antisemantic) a fost cel mai răspândit pe site-urile media independente, din punct de vedere cantitativ (1.025 de articole), dar a reprezentat procentual aproximativ un sfert din date (24,8%). Proporțional, conținutul antisemantic a fost cel mai frecvent în paginile de extremă-dreapta (58,8%), în timp ce din punct de vedere cantitativ a fost mai mic (297 de elemente de conținut) decât în categoria anterioară. Acestea au fost urmate de site-urile părtinitoare/hiper-partizane (30,7%) și la un nivel destul de similar cu site-urile de știri false/conspiracioniste (23%) și tabloidele mainstream (21,7%). Cu toate acestea, atunci când se analizează cantitatea totală de conținut antisemantic, apar diferențe mai mari: datele de pe site-urile de știri false/conspiracioniste conțineau cel mai mare număr de remarcări antisemite (327), urmate de site-urile tabloidelor mainstream (147) și de paginile părtinitoare/hiperpartizane (65). Un singur conținut fără caracter antisemantic a apărut pe site-urile de stânga.

Fig.3. Prezența conținutului antisemita în cadrul diferitelor categorii media.



2. Analiză și dimensiunea diferitelor tipuri de conținut cu caracter antisemetic

2.1 Conținut cu caracter antisemetic

Cadrul conceptual al cercetării a identificat următoarele cinci tipuri principale de discurs antisemetic. În cadrul fiecărei categorii principale au fost definite, de asemenea, subcategorii.

- **Stereotipuri antisemite clasice:** Discursuri înrădăcinate istoric în prejudecările antisemitice. Acestea cuprind ura față de evrei bazată pe existența lor ca ființe umane, nu doar ca adepti ai religiei iudaice. Acest lucru se întâmplă printr-o logică contradictorie care îi vede pe evrei atât ca fiind prea puternici, cât și slabii sau chiar subumanii. Stereotipurile clasice includ, de exemplu, faptul că evreii sunt răi, lacomi, neloiali sau mincinoși.²
- **Antisemitism motivat prin religie și tradiție (anti-iudaism):** Judeofobia tradițională bazată pe religie, sau antisemitismul motivat prin tradiție, se referă la sentimentele antievreiești înrădăcinate în credințe asociate fie cu religia și tradițiile creștine, fie cu cele evreiești. Discursul antisemetic tradițional, bazat pe religie, include, de exemplu, conceptele de ritualuri săngeroase și deicid sau faptul că evreii sunt satanici.³
- **Teorii conspiraționiste cu caracter antisemetic:** Teoriile conspirației au perpetuat credințele antisemitice, sugerând că evreii exercită o influență nejustificată în scopuri personale și conspiră pentru a domina sfere precum mass-media, politica și economia. Multe dintre aceste teorii își au rădăcinile în mitul antisemetic al „mâinii ascunse” și dau vina pe evrei sau pe indivizi percepți ca fiind evrei, pentru cele mai grave tragedii ale lumii, precum instigarea la război sau chiar învinuirea acestora pentru apariția COVID-19. Remarcile antisemite conspiraționiste includ, de exemplu,

² Matthias J. Becker et al., "Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets", *Humanities & Social Sciences Communications* 9, 2022

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9520959/#Fn3>; Matthias J. Becker et al., "Decoding Antisemitism" Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, p. 11, 13; ADL Antisemitic Myths. <https://antisemitism.adl.org/>

³ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, p. 13.

<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

puterea/controlul evreilor, iudeo-comunismul, teoria marii înlocuirii⁴ sau teoria noii ordini mondiale^{5,6}.

- **Negarea sau distorsionarea antisemitismului:** Negarea sau distorsionarea Holocaustului urmărește să nege sau să denatureze faptele istorice ale genocidului nazist asupra poporului evreu. Negarea Holocaustului include negarea dimensiunii sau a metodelor folosite de naziști și de aliații lor în timpul Holocaustului. Negarea și denaturarea Holocaustului promovează ideea falsă că evreii au inventat sau exagerat Holocaustul și au profitat de pe urma acestuia. Tipurile de discurs care neagă și denaturează Holocaustul includ, de exemplu, învinuirea evreilor pentru Holocaust sau prezentarea Holocaustului ca eveniment pozitiv.⁷
- **Neo-antisemitism:** Neo-antisemitismul se referă la exprimarea sentimentelor antievreiești la adresa Israelului. O funcție cheie a noului antisemitism este de a permite exprimarea opiniilor antisemite într-un mod care pare acceptabil din punct de vedere politic. Noi definim noul antisemitism folosind testul 3D al lui Natan Sharansky: demonizare, standarde duble și subminarea legitimității. Neo-antisemitismul include, de exemplu, analogia cu nazismul/apartheidul/colonialismul, afirmația că Israelul este un stat terorist sau că Israelul are influență asupra mass-mediei.⁸

Categoria cu cele mai multe ocurențe identificată în datele din România a fost antisemitismul de tip conspiraționist, prezent în 31% (657 de materiale) din conținutul analizat. Aceasta a fost urmată de neo-antisemitism, prezent în 28% (584 de materiale). Stereotipurile clasice s-au clasat pe locul al treilea, cu 18,6% (392 de materiale), în timp ce antisemitismul bazat pe religie și tradiție a apărut în 7% (146 de materiale), iar negarea și distorsionarea Holocaustului în 5% (110 materiale).

⁴ Teoria Marii Înlocuiriri este o teorie a conspirației înrădăcinată în credința că rasa albă este amenințată cu dispariția de către evrei și alte minorități. Această teorie, cunoscută și sub numele de teoria înlocuirii albiilor sau teoria genocidului alb, susține că există un efort intenționat, condus de evrei, de a promova imigrăția în masă a ne-albiilor, căsătoriile interrasiale și alte eforturi care ar duce la „extincția albiilor”. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/great-replacement>

⁵ Teoria Noii Ordini Mondiale este o teorie a conspirației care susține că un grup mic de indivizi puternici lucrează în secret pentru a stabili un control atotputernic. Teoria conspirației din spatele Noii Ordini Mondiale care implică lideri evrei se bazează pe ideea că evreii au format o structură de putere în care controlează fiecare aspect al omenirii - economia, mass-media și peisajul politic. <https://www.adc.org/translatehate/New-World-Order>

⁶ Ildikó Barna et al., "Survey of Antisemitic Prejudices in the Visegrád Countries - Research Report", Tom Lantos Institute, 2022, pp. 13-14.


<https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/files/en-205-sapvc-20220420-done-rc-online-new.pdf>

⁷ Definiția de lucru a antisemitismului adoptată de IHRA (2013).

<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion>


⁸ ADL Antisemitic Myths: Anti-zionism <https://antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/>

Fig.4. Proportia categoriilor narrative antisemite in setul complet de date.



Cantitatea de date analizate a crescut în general în 2024, la fel și cantitatea de conținut antisemit. Cu toate acestea, proporția majorității categoriilor de narări a scăzut, cu excepția neo-antisemitismului. Numărul de noi tipuri de discurs antisemit a crescut de aproape paisprezece ori, rezultând o creștere proporțională de cinci ori (de la 2,1 % la 10,6 %). Proporțional, discursurile antisemite conspirative au scăzut cel mai mult (de la 16,6% la 6,8%).

Fig.5. Proportia relatărilor antisemite din setul de date pentru 2023 și 2024 (separat).




2.2 Conținutul antisemitic dincolo de categorii

În afară de categoriile de antisemitism menționate, cercetarea a examinat alte două tipuri de conținut antisemetic: discursul instigator la ură și îndemnurile la violență.


- **Instigare la ură:** Conținut cu caracter instigator la ură împotriva evreilor și/sau bazat pe afirmații antisemite.
- **Îndemnuri la violență:** Conținut care incită la violență de orice fel împotriva evreilor.

Fig.6. Proporția categoriilor antisemite dincolo de narări în setul complet de date.



Discursul instigator la ură a fost relativ comun în setul de date din România, apărând în 2,6% (183 de piese) din conținut. Conținutul care îndeamnă la violență împotriva evreilor a fost mai puțin frecvent, apărând în aproximativ 0,4% (28 de bucăți) din date și apărând doar în 2024.

Cantitatea de discurs instigator la ură a crescut și în 2024, dar proporțional a rămas în mare parte neschimbată. Deoarece îndemnul la violență nu a apărut în 2023, în 2024 a crescut atât cantitativ, cât și proporțional (apărând în 0,5% din datele din 2024).

Fig.7. Proporția categoriilor antisemite dincolo de narări în setul de date pentru 2023 și 2024 (separat).

3. Tipuri de discurs antisemetic în România

3.1 Prezentarea categoriilor antisemite specifice țării

3.1.1 Teorii conspiraționiste cu caracter antisemetic

Categoria **teoriilor conspiraționiste antisemite** a înregistrat o creștere semnificativă, în special în discursul cu privire la *controlul/puterea evreilor* (de la 177 la 258), care susține că evreii controlează în secret politica globală, finanțele sau mass-media, manipulând adesea evenimentele mondiale în beneficiul lor. Alte conspirații proeminente au inclus teoria *Ordinii Mondiale Noi* (de la 6 la 31), care sugerează că o elită secretă, adesea asociată cu evreii, lucrează pentru a crea un guvern global, erodând suveranitatea națională. Deși mențiunile despre *Iluminati* (de la 19 la 14) și *Soros* (de la 27 la 12) au scăzut, ambele continuă să joace un rol important în categoria teoriilor conspiraționiste: subcategoria *Iluminati* susține că un grup ascuns, în care sunt adesea implicați evrei, orchestreză afacerile mondiale, iar teoria conspirației numită *Soros* se referă la George Soros care este acuzat că își folosește averea pentru a destabiliza guvernele sau pentru a avansa o agendă politică, conspirație prezentată adeseori printr-o optică antisemetică. *Teoria Marii Înlocuiri*, o teorie conspiraționistă care susține ideea că populațiile indigene europene sunt înlocuite treptat cu imigranți evrei, a scăzut (de la 37 la 25) însă nu cu mult. Conspirațiile legate de *Covid-19* au înregistrat o creștere (de la 4 la 10), incluzând afirmații false care acuză evreii de crearea sau răspândirea pandemiei pentru control sau câștig financiar. Mențiunile despre *Iudeo-Comunism* au crescut în număr (de la 17 la 26), sugerând că evreii sunt în spatele mișcărilor comuniste care vizează subminarea societăților capitaliste. Deasemenea, subcategoria *Zelensky*, concentrată pe acuzații conform cărora președintele Ucrainei, Volodimir Zelensky, face parte dintr-o conspirație evreiască mai largă, odată răspândită (63), a scăzut semnificativ la 29.

Tema generală a conținutului antisemetic conspiraționist sugerează că evreii controlează în secret sistemele economice, politice și media. Evreii sunt descriși ca fiind manipulatori și exploataitori, controlând în special sferele financiare și politice, pentru a-și servi propriile interese.


O ipoteză antisemetică predominantă în spațiul românesc implică ideea că evreii controlează sau influențează în mod proeminent politica românească. De exemplu, au existat acuzații persistente că evreii manipulează figuri sau partide politice, în special pe cele aflate la putere. (e.g. „Nicolae Ciucă este sluga satanștilor khazari care au transformat România Sfântă într-o colonie”, „evreii controlează oamenii aflați în poziții de putere precum Mircea Geoană”, „Marcel Ciolacu este sluga Americii și a jidaniilor”, „masonii evrei sunt numeroși în toate partidele, mai puțin în AUR”).

În anul 2023, mesajele antisemitice cu tentă conpiraționistă sunt centrate pe războiul ruso-ucrainean sau pe insinuări și acuzații privind dorința evreilor de a-i dezbină pe creștini și de a distrugă creștinismul. (ex. „Israelul vrea să scoată creștinismul în afara legii”, „Creștinismul este manipulat de evrei”) Cu toate acestea, momentul declanșării conflictului israeliano-palestinian aduce în prim plan o nouă fațetă a acestui discurs, anume acuzațiile privind controlul și puterea evreilor în SUA. Pe această linie, criticiile la adresa sprijinului SUA pentru Israel devin din ce în ce mai frecvente, iar România nu este ferită de astfel de perspective.

Cea mai mare parte a acestei categorii este reprezentată de subcategoria *controlul/puterea evreilor*. Următoarea cea mai răspândită subkategoriă, deși cu mai puține apariții, este la fel de semnificativă și cuprinde teoriile conpiraționiste despre președintele Zelensky și etnia sa evreiască.

Categoria conpiraționistă a avut o dinamică constantă pe parcursul ambilor ani. În 2023, au existat 507 fragmente de conținut antisemitic conpiraționist, iar acest număr a crescut la 550 în 2024 (ex. „Când vom scăpa de tot felul de experimente evreiești, precum comunismul, democrația, plandemia, marea resetare, globalizarea, noua ordine mondială, UE și filialele sale, NATO cu scursurile aferente, bilderberg, davos, g7?”).

Fig.8. Subnarrative ale categoriei narrative antisemite: Antisemitismul conpirativ.



3.1.2 Neo-antisemitism

Neo-antisemitismul care vizează Israelul ca stat a crescut alarmant în 2024, în special în cadrul următoarelor subcategorii: *demonizare* (de la 6 la 178), *subminarea legitimității* (de la 3 la 52) și *analogii referitoare la colonialism* (de la 1 la 43), indicând o creștere a ostilității publice față de Israel. Alte subcategorii au înregistrat, de asemenea, creșteri semnificative, inclusiv acuzațiile

conform cărora *Israelul este un stat terorist* (de la 11 la 84), *responsabilitatea colectivă* (de la 3 la 38) și afirmația că *Israelul este singurul responsabil pentru conflictul arabo-israelian* (de la 2 la 49). Aceste schimbări reflectă o tendință îngrijorătoare cu privire la calomnierea Israelului și a susținătorilor săi, cu generalizări extinse care afectează comunitate evreiască în ansamblu. *Analogiile cu apartheidul* (de la 4 la 27) compară politicile Israelului față de palestinieni cu sistemul de segregare rasială din Africa de Sud, sugerând că Israel pune în aplicare o opresiune de tip sistemică. Subcategoria *responsabilității colective* îi face responsabili pe toți evreii pentru acțiunile Israelului, insinueză o vină extinsă a indivizilor pe baza identității lor etnice sau religioase. *Analogiile cu nazisții* (de la 3 la 44) fac aluzie la acțiunile Germaniei naziste, comparându-le cu cele ale Israelului de astăzi, în timp ce subcategoria *restricționării libertății de a critica* (de la 6 la 30) se referă la convingerea că critica adusă Israelului este adesea suprimată pe nedrept, negând totodată dreptul Israelului de a exista sau de a se apăra. Aceste subcategorii au intensificat atmosfera de ostilitate și polarizare în jurul discuțiilor despre Israel în sfera publică.

Neoantisemitismul reposiționează în contextul actual tipare antisemite perpetuate în domeniul problemelor politice, ale politicilor statului evreiesc și ale Israelului, amestecând uneori aceste tipuri de critici cu conspirațiile globaliste.

Spre deosebire de alte tipuri de discursuri, conținutul cu tentă neoantisemetică a prezentat cea mai substanțială creștere, ca răspuns la evenimentele din 7 octombrie. În 2023, au existat 38 de astfel de cazuri, în timp ce în 2024, numărul a crescut la 546.

În ansamblu, noul tip de discurs antisemit din România este înrădăcinat în dezacordul față de acțiunile Israelului ulterioare datei de 7 octombrie. Cu toate acestea, cele 584 de elemente de conținut considerate antisemite au depășit simpla critică a politicilor israeliene, întruchipând o retorică antisionistă și anti-israeliană. Acest discurs estompează linia de demarcație dintre dezaprobaarea cu privire la politicile de stat și discursul antisemitic, fapt care a determinat un grad ridicat de dificultate în clasificarea acestora.

După cum s-a menționat, printre subcategoriile discursului neoantisemetic, cele mai întâlnite au fost *demonizarea*, *Israelul percepțut ca «un stat terorist»* și afirmația că «*Israelul este singurul responsabil pentru conflictul arabo-israelian*», urmate îndeaproape de *subminarea legitimității, analogia cu colonialismul* și afirmațiile privind *influența asupra mass-media*.

Elementele de conținut care au fost clasificate în secțiunea *demonizare* prezintă Israelul ca pe o forță malefică, un răufăcător sau ca pe un opresor istoric (ex. „statul criminal genocidal al Israelului”, „exponenții regimului sionist sunt posedați de un spirit malefic”). Subcategoria intitulată *Israelul este un stat terorist* a înregistrat, de asemenea, o creștere în urma evenimentelor din 7 octombrie. Aceasta cuprinde o serie de comentarii critice cu privire la acțiunile Israelului în regiune, care intră în sfera antisemitismului în cazul în care declarațiile prezintă


Israelul ca fiind în mod inherent ostil sau folosesc acest context drept mijloc de promovare a ostilității împotriva evreilor (ex., „în Israel ești mâncat dacă spui lucruri împotriva regimului terorist de acolo”, „Israelul este un stat terorist condus de criminali”). Subcategoria *Israelul este singurul responsabil pentru conflictul arabo-israelian* include comentarii care implică o perspectivă reducționistă care pune toată vina pentru conflictul regional complex și de lungă durată exclusiv pe seama Israelului (ex. „israelienii sunt responsabili pentru toate lucrurile rele care se întâmplă în Orientul Mijlociu”, „provocările din zonă sunt create doar de evrei și de tovarășii lor evrei americani”).

Subminarea legitimității implică punerea la îndoială sau negarea dreptului Israelului de a exista ca stat legitim, iar în ceea ce privește conflictul din Orientul Mijlociu care a escaladat în 2024, comentariile antisemite susțin adesea că statul evreiesc nu are niciun fundament istoric sau moral (ex. „Israelul este o țară inventată întâmplător și în mod eronat”, „Evreii nu au dreptul la pământul promis”).

Analogia colonialismului aseamănă Israelul cu o putere colonialistă, implicând faptul că acesta ocupă terenuri care nu îi aparțin. (ex. „Israelul este plin de coloniști care fură, jefuiesc și ucid”). Acest tip de narativă descrie conflictul din perspectiva unei dominații imperiale, mai degrabă decât ca o problemă geopolitică complexă.

Subcategoria care sugerează o influență israeliană asupra mass-media susține că Israelul și unele personalități evreiești controlează sau influențează mass-media nu numai în România, ci și în întreaga lume, pentru a manipula opinia publică cu privire la conflictul arabo-israelian (ex. „Israelul deține mass-media”).

Fig. 9. Subnarrative ale categoriei narrative antisemite: Neo-antisemitism.



3.1.3 Stereotipuri antisemitice clasice

În România, prezența discursului care conține **stereotipuri clasice** a fluctuat semnificativ între 2023 și 2024. Subcategoria *(evreul) malefic* a cunoscut o creștere drastică (de la 33 la 118 de unități de conținut monitorizate), în timp ce acuzațiile de *lăcomie/bogătie* (de la 44 la 45) și *înșelăciune/minciună* nu au depășit cu mult cifrele inițiale (de la 36 la 39). Stereotipul *neloialitatei/duplicitarismului* a crescut (de la 8 la 18), iar numărul mesajelor antisemitice din subcategoria *evreul ca celălalt* a crescut (de la 15 la 23). Totuși, discursul care susține faptul că exprimarea unei critici referitoare la evrei ar fi considerată inacceptabilă sau interzisă social, din motive sensibile, culturale sau politice, redată prin subcategoria *restricționarea libertății de a critica*, a rămas la aceeași cifră (de la 8 la 8).

Această categorie include stereotipurile clasice conform cărora evreul este *rău, lacom, înselător, neloial* sau *periculos* pentru societate, enumerarea reprezentând și câteva dintre subcategoriile acestui tip de discurs. Astfel de stereotipii întăresc ideea că evreii sunt în mod inherent membri problematici ai societății.

În România, aceste stereotipuri vechi sunt adesea invocate în contexte economice, evreii fiind acuzați de crize financiare sau portretizați drept acaparatori nesătui de avere (ex. „nimeni nu a văzut vreodată un jidă sărac”). Aceste presupozitii sunt prezente în special în comentarii cu privire la industria financiară sau la lumea afacerilor, unde evreii sunt adesea considerați a fi manipulatori și prădători. Anul 2023 arată că subcategoria *lăcomiei/bogăției* a fost mult mai răspândită în rândul opinioilor antisemite.

În cadrul acestei categorii, există o creștere îngrijorătoare în anul 2024, în special în subcategoria *(evreul) malefic*. În contextul spațiului românesc, acest stereotip a fost adesea asociat cu ideea că evreii sunt o forță malefică, implicată în diverse comploturi cu scopul de a controla economii, guverne sau instituții media. Acest mit al evreului ca „malefic” este adesea legat de ideea că evreii ar căuta să submineze societățile majoritare pentru a-și impune propria agendă, fiind percepți ca manipulatori sau chiar ca o „amenințare” la adresa identității naționale. De obicei, această categorie este însoțită de acuzații conspiraționiste privind *controlul/puterea evreilor*. (ex. „SUA se află 100% sub controlul evreilor, mai mult de 50% dintre senatorii americani sunt evrei”, „sioniștii formează «elita» de 1% care, prin mijloace criminale, deține resursele lumii”)


Stereotipul *înșelăciunii și minciunii* portretează evreii ca fiind intrinsec nedemni de încredere, acuzându-i că folosesc înșelăciunea și manipularea pentru câștiguri personale sau comunitare. (ex. „evreii sunt lupi în blană de oaie”, „nimic din ceea ce vedeti sau vi se spune în Israel nu este ceea ce pare, sunt mincinoși cu două fețe”)

Comentariile antisemitice din subcategoria *neloialitate/duplicitarism* se aliniază adesea cu afirmațiile conspiraționiste, sugerând că evrei acordă prioritate unei agende globale în detrimentul loialității naționale. (ex. „în România, mulți escroci israelieni au înselat oamenii”, „evrei turnători ar trebui să meargă în iad”)

Subcategoria *restricționării libertății de a critica* susține că libertatea de exprimare este limitată atunci când se abordează subiecte legate de evrei sau de Israel. Comentariile antisemitice susțin adesea că astfel de subiecte sunt cenzurate în mod deliberat, legând frecvent aceste acuzații de conspirații mai largi precum *controlul evreiesc asupra mass-media*. (ex. „Strofe au fost scoase din Proclamația Domnului, pentru a nu-i înfuria pe evrei”, „Atacul evreiesc asupra libertății de exprimare continuă”)

În categoria *evreul ca celălalt* au fost incluse în mod predominant mesaje și postări care consolidează mentalitatea „noi împotriva lor”, precum și mesaje care înnovățesc evrei pentru antisemitismul care a existat întotdeauna.

Fig.10. Subnarative ale categoriei narrative antisemite: stereotipuri antisemitice clasice.



3.1.4 Antisemitism motivat prin tradiție și religie

Antisemitismul motivat prin tradiție și religie rămâne prezent, cu acuzații de *deicid* (de la 15 la 9 cazuri), la fel și acuzațiile referitoare la *ritualuri sângheroase* (de la 5 la 3). Subcategoria *ritualuri sângheroase* se referă acuzația falsă conform căreia evrei s-ar implica în ritualuri care implică vărsare de sânge. Ideea care îl percep pe evreu drept satană/diavol rămâne la un nivel crescut

în rândul mesajelor antisemitice (de la 29 la 21). Subcategoria *evreul ca celălalt* a cunoscut o creștere semnificativă (de la 24 la 45).


Categoria discursului antisemitic bazat pe religie și tradiție are patru subcategorii: *deicid*, *ritualuri săngeroase/ucidere de copii*, *evreii ca satană/diavol* și *evreul ca celălalt (în sens religios)*. Prezența acestui tip de discurs a fost, de asemenea, constantă în 2023 (74 de conținuturi cu caracter antisemitic) și 2024 (72 de conținuturi cu caracter antisemitic).

Pentru această categorie, a fost adesea selectată subcategoria *deicid*. (ex. „jidanii l-au răstignit pe Isus și l-au ales pe hoț, acest lucru definește întreaga lor istorie”) Cu toate acestea, subcategoria *evreul ca celălalt* a fost aleasă chiar mai des, deoarece multe comentarii s-au concentrat pe tema segregării extreme ca rezultat al „statutului superior” presupus a fi revendicat de evrei. Această presupozitie este adesea legată de ideea că iudaismul promovează în mod fundamental complexul superiorității. Unele dintre comentariile din această subcategorie implică acuzații care descriu evreii ca deviind de la sau opunându-se credințelor creștine, etichetându-i adesea ca dușmani ai credinței. (ex. „evrei eretici, păgâni, închinători la Antihrist”, „suferința evreilor este rezultatul propriilor lor greșeli și o pedeapsă din partea lui Dumnezeu”, „evreii sunt răi și păcătoși”) Aceste tipuri de discurs sunt întâlnite în special în anumite cercuri fundamentaliste creștine și în rândul grupurilor ultranaționaliste; aceste două grupuri sunt de regulă convergente.

Subcategoria *ritualuri săngeroase*, în antisemitismul românesc, se referă la acuzația falsă, de lungă durată, că evrei se implică în anumite ritualuri obscure. Acest mit și-a făcut simțită prezența de-a lungul istoriei, inclusiv în perioada interbelică, sub influența ideologiilor fasciste. Între 2023 și 2024, numărul aparițiilor acestui stereotip în discursul antisemitic a scăzut (de la 5 la 3), ceea ce poate sugera că utilizarea sa s-a diminuat în ansamblu. (ex. „istoria şocantă a sionismului, ocultismului și satanismului în jurul ritualurilor de sacrificare a junincii roșii”, „practici evreiești occulți și satanice”)

Se remarcă prezența în 2023 a opinilor de tipul *evreii ca satană/diavol*. Acest tip de discurs a inclus mesaje care îi numesc pe evrei sataniști în ceea ce privește religia și tradițiile lor, fiind plasați în opozitie cu creștinismul. De asemenea, au fost incluse aici elemente de conținut care susțin că antihristul este/va fi evreu (ex. „banii trimiși adoratorilor naziști Khazar Satan-Yehova merg la fabricarea adrenochromului”, „Antihristul va fi evreu”).

Fig.11. Subnarrative ale categoriei narrative antisemite: Antisemitism motivat prin tradiție și religie.



3.1.5 Negarea sau distorsionarea Holocaustului

Categoria referitoare la Holocaust a înregistrat o creștere în dreptul subcategoriei *negare sau distorsionare* (de la 15 la 27 de cazuri) și *Holocaustul ca eveniment pozitiv* (de la 1 la 6), în timp ce *analogiile cu nazismul* s-au redus (de la 31 la 11). Instanțele care încăalcă evreii pentru Holocaust s-au dublat (de la 3 la 6), dar au rămas în număr mic. Tipurile de discurs care încearcă să estompeze responsabilitatea pentru Holocaust, urmărind să transfere sau să dilueze vina prin atribuirea acesteia unor factori mai largi sau alternativi, au scăzut de la 19 la 7 cazuri. Mențiunile despre *Iudeo-Comunism*, în schimb, au apărut într-o proporție mică (de la 0 la 2).

Această categorie se referă la negarea sau alterarea informațiilor cu privire la Holocaust, adesea punând la îndoială amploarea atrocităților sau insinuând o manieră care minimalizează suferința victimelor.


În peisajul românesc, acest discurs este de multe ori legată de mișcările naționaliste care încearcă să minimizeze sau chiar să nege rolul României în Holocaust. Această categorie apare adesea în conținuturile media de extremă dreaptă, în care Holocaustul este prezentat ca o poveste inventată sau ca un eveniment exagerat din motive politice. Numărul acestor tipuri de conținuturi a crescut de la 53 în 2023 la 57 în 2024.

Prima subcategorie, *negarea sau distorsionarea Holocaustului*, prezintă cel mai mare salt între cei doi ani, cu o reprezentare semnificativ mai mare în 2024. Acest lucru poate reflecta prevalența tot mai mare a negării totale sau a încercărilor de manipulare a faptelor istorice pentru a minimaliza amploarea și realitatea Holocaustului în contextul conflictului israeliano-palestinian.

Subcategoria *înviniuirea evreilor* a crescut de la 3 la 6 elemente de conținut („masacrul a fost efectuat de sovietici, majoritatea ucraineni și evrei”). În mod similar, noțiunea de *Holocaust ca eveniment pozitiv* a crescut de la 1 în 2023 la 6 în 2024 ("Evreii au distrus totul. Dacă Hitler și Antonescu ar fi trăit, lumea ar fi fost liberă de hoți"). Toate aceste subcategorii încearcă să submineze adevărul istoric al Holocaustului, denaturându-i semnificația și impactul.

Utilizarea *analogiilor naziste* a crescut brusc în 2024, devenind una dintre cele mai proeminente categorii. Acest lucru implică stabilirea de comparații nepotrivite sau exagerate între politicile naziste și problemele politice sau sociale moderne, adesea ca tehnică retorică. Astfel de analogii trivializează Holocaustul, erodându-i semnificația istorică unică și desensibilizând publicul față de atrocitățile comise în acea perioadă.

Fig.12. Subnarrative ale categoriei narrative antisemite: Negarea sau distorsionarea Holocaustului



3.2 Conținutul antisemetic dincolo de categorii

3.2.1 Discursul instigator la ură

O mare parte a conținutului din această categorie au fost jigniri rasiale (slurs), cel mai frecvent exemplu fiind termenul peiorativ „jidan”. Un alt tip de conținut care se încadrează în această categorie constă în expresii care folosesc cuvântul „evreu” ca insultă. Acestea au fost întâlnite cel

mai des în următoarele categorii media: pagini de extremă dreapta, site-uri de ştiri false/conspiraționiste. În orice caz, secțiunile de comentarii ale tuturor categoriilor media nu au fost lipsite de astfel de remarcă antisemite.

Din cele 7 012 elemente de conținut analizate, 183 au fost identificate ca discurs instigator la ură, o parte semnificativă având o tentă conșpiraționistă. Majoritatea acestor conținuturi instigatoare la ură constau în insulțe rasiale, „jidan” fiind cel mai frecvent exemplu întâlnit. O altă formă comună de exprimare antisemetică a constat în utilizarea termenului „evreu” ca insultă. Aceste cazuri au fost cele mai frecvente pe paginile de extremă dreaptă și pe site-urile de știri false/conspiraționiste, care servesc frecvent drept terenuri propice pentru astfel de retorici. Cu toate acestea, este important de remarcat faptul că afirmațiile antisemite nu au fost limitate la aceste platforme; comentariile pline de ură au apărut în secțiunile de comentarii ale tuturor categoriilor media monitorizate, subliniind natura omniprezentă a acestei probleme.

Principalele subiecte care au generat astfel de reacții sunt: conflictul israeliano-palestinian, acuzații referitoare la Zelensky și războiul din Ucraina, dar și alte probleme de politică internă.

3.2.2 Violență antisemetică

Un total de 28 de comentarii a fost încadrat în categoria **îndemn la violență**. Este de remarcat faptul că toate aceste comentarii au fost poste în 2024 și că sunt direct legate de discuțiile referitoare la evenimentele care au avut loc după 7 octombrie în Orientul Mijlociu.

Conținutul din această categorie implică proclamații care invocă moartea sau dispariția evreilor sau a statului Israel.

După cum s-a menționat anterior, această categorie conține cel mai mic număr de comentarii cu caracter antisemetic și, asemenea categoriei *neo-antisemitismului*, apare doar în raport cu evenimentul din 7 octombrie.

Majoritatea conținutului din această categorie a constat în îndemnuri la violență care solicită moartea sau dispariția evreilor și a statului Israel. Aceste declarații au luat adesea forma unei retorici instigatoare, incitând la vătămare sau pledând pentru anihilarea evreilor și dizolvarea Israelului.

3.3 Subiecte care generează antisemitism

Datele sugerează că antisemitismul poate apărea ca răspuns la un spectru larg de subiecte, demonstrând o adaptabilitate îngrijorătoare a discursului antisemetic. Cu toate acestea, anumite teme au fost mai susceptibile de a instiga la antisemitism, reflectând adesea stereotipuri și prejudecăți istorice. De exemplu, discuțiile despre finanțe, bănci sau presupusa influență globală

au declanșat frecvent retorici antisemite despre controlul sau manipularea exercitată de evrei. Astfel de discuții pot invoca adesea teme conspiraționiste, reactualizând vechi stereotipuri.

Anumite teme, indiferent de context, au incitat în mod constant reacții antisemite: majoritatea instanțelor conspiraționiste antisemite au fost generate de probleme din politica românească. Aproape orice problemă putea fi legată de prezența unui evreu care fie corupe politicienii, fie face el însuși parte din scena politică, ceea ce facilitează îndeplinirea scopurilor sale josnice.

Subiectele referitoare la practicile religioase evreiești sau diferențele culturale au stârnit uneori reacții discriminatorii sau prejudecăți. De asemenea, neînțelegările sau perspectivele defectuoase asupra obiceiurilor evreiești au fost o sursă constantă a unui astfel de discurs.

Conversațiile referitoare la Israel, în special la politicile sale sau la conflictele din Orientul Mijlociu, au fost foarte susceptibile de a fi surse provocatoare de antisemitism. Retorica antisemetică a estompat adesea distincția dintre criticele aduse politicii israeliene și prejudecățile împotriva poporului evreu în general.

În mod neașteptat, subiecte neutre sau fără legătură, cum ar fi discuții despre sărbători, celebrăți, filantropie sau chiar anumite alimente asociate cu cultura evreiască, au provocaț ocazional remarcă antisemite.

Discursul antisemitic a demonstrat o capacitate de adaptare la problemele contemporane, cum ar fi dezbatările privind sănătatea publică sau discuțiile digitale privind valuta, readucând în vizor prejudecăți mai vechi în contexte noi.

3.4 Cuvinte-cheie cu referire la evrei, exemple

Selecția cuvintelor-cheie pentru analiza din România s-a concentrat asupra celor mai frecvent utilizăți termeni care descriu evreul și comunitățile evreiești, acoperind referințe ce țin de etnie și religie, și, în mod deosebit, cuvinte cu conotație peiorativă. Pentru analiza aceasta, au fost utilizăți șapte termeni principali, împreună cu alte cuvinte adiacente din același câmp lexical. Primii cinci termeni din secvență sunt neutri, referindu-se la evreitate. Spre deosebire de aceștia, ultimii doi termeni poartă o nuanță derogatorie, reflectând o conotație peiorativă destinată denigrării comunității evreiești.

0. „evreu” – Acest termen provine de la rădăcina ebraică [הָבָשׂ] cu sensul literal „a traversa”. Termenul este echivalentul, în engleză, pentru cuvântul „Hebrew” și este folosit în mod obișnuit pentru a desemna etnia evreiască. Exemple de remarcă antisemite care includ

cuvântul „evreu”: „evreul minte chiar și când întrebă ceva”, „Evreii nu se dezmint în ticăloșie”.

„ovreu” – Un termen alternativ pentru „evreu” cu un înțeles similar, neutru.

1. „iudeu” – din Iudeea, derivat din latină „ludaeus,” greacă „loudaios” sau ebraica יְהוּדִי (iehudi). (ex. „Cine-i iudeul ăsta? Dați-l afară din România!”).
2. „Israel,” „israelian” (ex. „Israel trebuie să cadă”, „Israel nu este un stat, este o încrangingătură de rasiști, nebuni, criminali și hoți de țară”).
3. „zionist” / „sionist” (ex. „E momentul să fie eliberați fanaticii criminali și hoți de țară sioniști”).
4. „mozaic” – referindu-se la paradigma religioasă – „Legământul/Law Mozaic”, de exemplu; legat de Moise). În secțiunile de comentarii, termenul este folosit adesea în discuții religioase.
5. „jidan” – derivat din slavonă „jid” – „evreu”, plus sufixul augmentativ „-an”, folosit ca termen peiorativ; „jidov” – în unele regiuni: gândac de bucătărie, ale cărui articulații prezintă o secreție galbenă și mirosoitoare. Acești termeni au o conotație jignitoare și sunt asociați cu o retorică bazată pe teorii ale conspirației sau care subminează demnitatea umană. (ex. „de când sunt pe pământ jidani au făcut numai rău, nație de nenorociți”).
6. „khazar” – Un popor semi-nomadic turcic care s-a convertit la iudaism. (exemplu: „atacul naziștilor teroriști sataniști khazari, [...] teroriștii conduși de Bibi Satanyahu”).

Ultimul termen, „khazar”, a generat, în mod deosebit, dificultăți pe parcursul procesului de monitorizare. Unele dintre comentarii au relevat o distincție între identitatea evreiască și originile khazarilor, sugerând că aceștia din urmă nu ar fi cu adevărat evrei, ci mai degrabă pretenși evrei. În contrast, alte conținuturi insinuau că termenul „khazar” este sinonim cu „evreu,” estompând deosebirile semantice dintre cele două. Exemple de conținut antisemetic care includ acest termen: „Un evreu ce vrea să alunge poporul ucrainean indiferent de etnie ca să facă loc khazarilor ziși și oamenii șarpe. Cei mai rai dintre evrei”, „Romania e plina de jidani, khazari, evrei.” Termenul este folosit preponderent în contexte care sugerează o atitudine ostilă.

Este de remarcat și faptul că termenul „zionist” apare frecvent în contexte conspiraționiste cu conotații negative, cei mai uzitați termeni derogatori fiind „jidan” și „khazar.”

4. Concluzii

Analiza discursului antisemetic românesc în perioada 2023-2024 relevă o problemă multifațetată și evolutivă, profund influențată de dinamica sociopolitică internă și de evenimentele globale. Persistența discursului conspiraționist evidențiază o tendință adânc înrădăcinată de a-i socoti pe evrei drept țapi ispășitori pentru provocările economice, politice și societale. Creșterea semnificativă a neo-antisemitismului, în special după evenimentele din 7 octombrie, reflectă natura fluidă a unei astfel de retorici, în care stereotipurile tradiționale sunt recontextualizate pentru a se alinia la narațiunile geopolitice contemporane, cum ar fi retorica antisionistă care confundă critica politică legitimă cu antisemitismul.

În timp ce platformele de extremă-dreapta și conspiraționiste apar ca propagatori dominanți ai conținutului antisemetic, ponderea substanțială a comentariilor problematice din media *mainstream* indică necesitatea unei moderări și a unei conștientizări sporite chiar și în spații aparent neutre. Acest lucru evidențiază modul în care retorica antisemetică transcende granițele ideologice, apărând nu numai în medii vădit părtinitoare, ci și infiltrându-se în discursurile publice prin interacțiuni nemoderate.

Prevalența tot mai mare a mesajului care neagă Holocaustul, a trivializării prin analogii naziste și a retoricii violente după 7 octombrie indică o schimbare periculoasă în discurs, în care reinterpretarea evenimentelor istorice și incitarea la violență câștigă teren. Prezența copleșitoare a unui astfel de conținut în secțiunile de comentarii evidențiază rolul dublu al rețelelor de socializare, atât ca platformă pentru exprimarea publică, cât și ca vehicul pentru răspândirea necontrolată a discursului de ură.

Aceste constatări subliniază necesitatea urgentă a unui răspuns cuprinzător care să includă sensibilizarea publicului, inițiative educaționale și o moderare mai strictă a conținutului pentru a aborda și a atenua răspândirea antisemitismului în spațiile digitale și media din România.

5. Metodologie

Cercetarea a avut ca scop examinarea discursurilor antisemite în conținutul de tip text din online - cum ar fi comentarii, articole și postări pe Facebook - înainte și după 7 octombrie 2023. Am analizat conținutul de pe site-uri web și pagini de Facebook ale canalelor media deja definite. Conținutul a fost colectat folosind tehnologii de monitorizare online, pornind de la cuvintele-cheie predefinite și acoperind aceeași perioadă atât în 2023, cât și în 2024. Cercetarea a fost realizată în patru țări (Ungaria, Italia, Polonia și România) de echipele naționale de cercetare coordonate de Political Capital, utilizând aceeași metodologie.

Definiția antisemitismului

Baza cercetării a fost definiția de lucru a antisemitismului formulată de Alianța Internațională pentru Memoria Holocaustului (IHRA): „Antisemitismul este o anumită percepție referitoare la evrei, care poate fi exprimată ca fiind ură împotriva evreilor. Manifestările retorice și fizice ale antisemitismului sunt îndreptate împotriva evreilor sau neevreilor și/sau proprietăților acestora, împotriva instituțiilor comunităților evreiești și lăcașurilor lor de cult.” O explicație detaliată a definiției, împreună cu exemple ilustrative, este disponibilă pe site-ul IHRA⁹.

5.1 Colectarea datelor

În cercetarea noastră, am analizat conținut online: articole, postări și comentarii de pe site-uri și pagini de Facebook. Datele au fost colectate folosind softul de monitorizare a dinamicii sociale, SentiOne. SentiOne preia date într-o perioadă de timp specifică, de la sursele media selectate, pe baza cuvintelor cheie stabilite.

5.1.1 Cuvinte cheie

Am stabilit patru cuvinte cheie pe care le-am folosit pentru a identifica conținutul potențial relevant în toate țările: 1) Evrei, 2) Israel, 3) Holocaust, 4) Sionism/Sionist. În plus, am inclus cuvinte cheie specifice fiecărei țări. În România, acestea au fost: jid, iud, mozaic, ovre și khazar. În limbile în care aceste cuvinte ar putea avea terminații diferite, am folosit forma de bază a cuvintelor cheie urmată de un asterisc (*). Această abordare a permis softului SentiOne să identifice rezultate pentru toate variațiile și terminațiile cuvintelor cheie.

5.1.2 Sursele monitorizate

Cu ajutorul echipelor naționale de cercetare, Political Capital a identificat șase categorii de media online pentru a monitoriza conținutul: 1) media (mainstream) independentă, 2) tabloidele mainstream, 3) media partizană/(hyper-)partizană, 4) site-uri de dreapta/extremă dreapta, 5)

⁹ Definiția de lucru a antisemitismului adoptată de IHRA:

<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/definitia-de-lucru-a-antisemitismului>

site-uri de știri false/conspiraționiste, 6) site-uri de stânga/extremă stângă. Am colectat pagini din fiecare categorie în toate țările, inclusiv site-uri ale instituțiilor media și pagini de Facebook. În toate țările, am selectat cele trei instituții media din fiecare categorie care au avut cele mai multe rezultate pentru cuvintele noastre cheie în același interval de timp. În România, am monitorizat următoarele site-uri și pagini de Facebook ale instituțiilor media:

- **Media independentă (*mainstream*):** [Digi 24](#), [Cotidianul](#), [Hotnews](#). Acestea sunt platforme media care funcționează independent de guvern și mențin o audiență semnificativă și influentă. Platformele media românești monitorizate reflectă diverse perspective politice și de audiență, esențiale pentru evaluarea modului în care antisemitismul este abordat, ignorat sau perpetuat în discursul *mainstream*.
- **Pagini de extremă dreapta:** [Incorrect Politic](#), [Activenews](#), [Diana Iovanovici-Sosoacă](#). Aceste pagini promovează adesea ideologii ultranaționaliste, xenofobe sau extremiste, incluzând discursuri antisemite. Analiza acestor pagini ajută la urmărirea răspândirii, evoluției și influenței unor astfel de perspective în cadrul discursului marginal și potențial *mainstream*.
- **Tabloide *mainstream*:** [Click!](#), [Fanatik](#), [RomaniaTV](#). Aceste pagini se concentreză pe conținut provocator și dedicat divertismentului, punând adesea accent pe titluri care captează atenția. Aceste site-uri tabloide influențează monitorizarea prin modul în care stereotipurile antisemite pot fi subtil încorporate în conținutul provocator, vizând audiențe largi și riscând să normalizeze discursuri periculoase.
- **Site-uri de știri false/conspiraționiste:** [Stiripesurse.ro](#), [SACCSIV](#), [Flux 24](#). Aceste pagini răspândesc informații false și promovează informații neverificate sau viziuni extremiste, adesea explozând fricile colective. Monitorizarea acestora este esențială pentru identificarea rolului dezinformării în formarea credințelor antisemite și urmărirea răspândirii ideilor dăunătoare.
- **Media partizană:** [Buna Ziua Iași \(BZI\)](#), [60m](#), [5news.ro](#). Aceste pagini promovează conținut aliniat cu agende politice sau ideologice specifice. Monitorizarea acestui tip de media este extrem de importantă pentru a înțelege părtinirea care poate polariza opinia publică pe teme legate de evrei.
- **Pagini de stânga/extremă stângă:** pot perpetua neintenționat stereotipuri antisemite, precum teoriile conspirației despre influența evreiască în finanțe sau politică. Site-urile analizate pot revela modul în care antisemitismul se poate manifesta în cadrul retoricii anti-capitaliste.

5.1.3 Perioada de monitorizare

Pe baza experiențelor anterioare în clasificarea conținutului în funcție de categoriile definite anterior și a resurselor disponibile pentru proiect, ne-am stabilit obiectivul de a analiza 7.000 de bucăți de conținut pe țară. Deoarece am dorit să examinăm schimbările în discursul antisemetic

după 7 octombrie 2023, am ales aceeași perioadă de timp atât în 2023, cât și în 2024. Acest lucru a fost determinat prin identificarea țării cu cele mai puține date pentru cuvintele noastre cheie și calcularea numărului de zile necesare, pornind de la o dată aleasă (în acest caz, 1 aprilie), pentru ca datele descărcate din acea țară să depășească 7.000 de bucăți de conținut. Drept urmare, colectarea datelor în toate țările a fost standardizată la aceeași perioadă de timp: 1 aprilie și 15 aprilie, ora 13:00.

5.1.4 Volumul conținutului analizat

Am filtrat fiecare set de date pentru a include mai mult de 7.000 de bucăți de conținut, păstrând structura prestabilită a cuvintelor cheie, a surselor (site-uri web și pagini de Facebook) și a anilor în baza de date. Această abordare a avut ca rezultat următoarele procente din totalul datelor descărcate pentru a fi analizate în fiecare țară: România - 100%, Ungaria - 73%, Italia - 44% și Polonia - 35%.

În toate țările, cantitatea de date colectate în 2024 a fost mai mare decât în 2023. Cea mai mică creștere a fost în Ungaria, unde datele au crescut de aproximativ o dată și jumătate în 2024. În România, datele au crescut de aproape trei ori, în Polonia de aproape cinci ori și în Italia de aproape șapte ori. În toate țările, cea mai mare parte din date a constat în comentarii.

Cantitatea de date a variat, de asemenea, între țări în funcție de categoria de media:

- Ungaria: Majoritatea datelor au provenit de pe paginile de extremă dreapta, urmate de media mainstream, sursele părtinitoare, tabloide și un număr minim de date din surse conspiraționiste și de stânga.
- Italia: Majoritatea datelor au provenit din media mainstream, urmate de tabloide, surse părtinitoare, surse de stânga și conspiraționiste, cu foarte puține date de pe paginile de extremă dreapta.
- Polonia: Majoritatea datelor au provenit de la tabloide, urmate de surse parțiale, media mainstream, pagini de extremă dreapta, site-uri conspiraționiste și foarte puține date din surse de stânga.
- România: Majoritatea datelor au provenit din media mainstream, urmate de site-uri conspiraționiste, tabloide, surse de extremă dreapta, surse parțiale și o cantitate mică de date din surse de stânga.

<i>Conținut analizat în categoriile media</i>							
	Mainstream	Extremă-dreapta	Teorii conspiraționiste	Media partizană	Tabloide	Ideologie de stânga	Volum total
Hungary 2023	671	1300	38	626	130	22	2787 7008

	2024	1410	1949	49	646	86	81	4221	
Italy	2023	704	1	9	19	142	15	890	7053
	2024	4987	38	151	284	518	185	6163	
Poland	2023	310	137	51	63	674	1	1236	7054
	2024	601	224	253	1041	3697	2	5818	
Romania	2023	809	191	469	85	293	0	1847	7012
	2024	3332	361	959	127	385	1	5165	

5.2 Clasificarea datelor

5.2.1 Cadrul conceptual

Folosind resurse publice disponibile, cum ar fi studii, rapoarte de cercetare, articole științifice etc., Political Capital a dezvoltat un cadrul conceptual pentru a defini fundamentele teoretice ale cercetării. În plus față de precizarea că cercetarea s-a bazat pe definiția de lucru a antisemitismului oferită de IHRA, documentul a prezentat în detaliu principalele categorii și subcategorii ale discursului antisemitic pe care s-a fundamentat cercetarea. Toți partenerii au avut oportunitatea de a discuta, comenta și adăuga la conținutul cadrului conceptual. Cadrul conceptual a fost, de asemenea, discutat cu membrii Comitetului de Consiliere al proiectului BOND și cu experți externi.

5.2.2 Finalizarea metodologiei și crearea unui ghid al metodologiei

Finalizarea metodologiei de cercetare a implicat multiple discuții - inclusiv consultări cu un membru expert al Comitetului de Consiliere BOND și mai multe încercări de a analiza și clasifica conținutul online în moduri diferite. În urma acestor eforturi, au fost stabilite categoriile finale pentru analizarea datelor. Au fost definite patru categorii pentru natura conținutului:

1. Cu caracter antisemitic – Conținut care include cel puțin o remarcă antisemetică.
2. Cu potențial antisemitic – Conținut care include o remarcă ce putea fi interpretată ca având sau neavând caracter antisemitic sau care pare antisemetică doar în contextul mai larg (al articolului/postării la care răspunde).
3. Neinteligibil – Conținut care este incomprehensibil (această categorie se aplică aproape exclusiv comentariilor).
4. Fără caracter antisemitic – Conținut care nu include nicio remarcă antisemetică.

Pe baza cadrului conceptual, au fost identificate cinci tipologii principale de discurs antisemitic, fiecare conținând subcategorii (detaliile și definițiile acestor categorii vor fi descrise mai târziu):

- Stereotipuri antisemitice clasice
- Antisemitism tradițional motivat prin religie (anti-iudaism)
- Teorii conspiraționiste cu caracter antisemitic
- Negarea și distorsionarea Holocaustului
- Neo-antisemitism (antisemitism bazat pe critica la adresa Israelului)

Alte două categorii suplimentare au fost stabilite: discursul instigator la ură" și "îndemnul la violență".

Procesul de analiză a datelor a fost descris în detaliu într-un ghid metodologic.

Ca parte a procesului de analiză a datelor, analiștii de date au fost instruiți să noteze frazele antisemitice identificate în conținut. Pentru comentarii, aceștia trebuiau, de asemenea, să înregistreze contextul - mai exact, tematica articolului sau postării sub care a fost scris comentariul.

5.2.3 Instruirea celor care codifică

După ce a împărtășit cadrul conceptual și ghidul metodologic cu echipele naționale de cercetare, Political Capital a organizat o întâlnire pentru a explica și discuta aceste documente și întreg procesul, oferind în același timp un moment propice întrebărilor. Pe parcursul întregului proces de cercetare, echipele de cercetare s-au întâlnit regulat pentru a discuta problemele și întrebările apărute în timpul procesului de cercetare.

Pentru a asigura o înțelegere comună a cadrului teoretic și pentru a crește fiabilitatea cercetării – în limitele resurselor și capacitateilor echipei – procesul de cercetare a inclus o fază de învățare. În această fază, 350 de bucăți de conținut au fost filtrate din setul de date, menținând structura prestabilită a rezultatelor în baza cuvintelor cheie, a categoriilor media și a anilor. A fost inclusă o ușoară supra-pondere a rezultatelor pentru cuvântul-cheie „Israel”, pe baza presupunerii că identificarea noii forme de antisemitism ar fi cea mai mare provocare. În fiecare țară, doi membri ai echipelor naționale de cercetare au codificat aceste date independent. Rezultatele lor au fost apoi comparate, iar discrepanțele au fost discutate pentru a ajunge la un acord. În cazurile în care nu s-a putut ajunge la un acord, li s-a oferit oportunitatea de a consulta Political Capital pentru clarificări suplimentare.

5.2.4 Procesul de clasificare a datelor

Clasificarea datelor a urmat aceeași procedură în toate țările. Echipele naționale au primit conținutul într-un fișier *Excel*, care includea toate proprietățile relevante (ex. comentariu/articol/postare, data publicării, sursa, contextul etc.). În timpul procesului de clasificare a datelor, analiștii au citit conținutul în sine și, pentru comentarii, au examinat și contextul.

Dacă au fost identificate remarci antisemite în conținut, analiștii le-au etichetat ca fiind antisemite sau potențial antisemite, au identificat remarca antisemantică și au încadrat-o într-o tipologie principală de discurs antisemitic, împreună cu una dintre subcategoriile acesteia. Un singur conținut putea fi încadrat în mai multe (maximum patru) tipologii de discurs, deoarece era posibil ca mai multe remarci antisemite să apară în același text. Dacă conținutul nu includea remarci antisemite sau dacă sensul său nu era clar, nu i se atribuia niciunei categorii.

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Introducerea în proiectul BOND

Proiectul BOND¹⁰ (Building tOlerance, uNderstanding, and Dialogue across communities)¹¹ a fost implementat în perioada ianuarie 2023 - decembrie 2024 în Ungaria, Italia, Polonia și România. Obiectivul său principal a fost acela de a aborda prejudecățile adânc înrădăcinate, atitudinile și comportamentele de ură din cadrul societății, în special cele care vizează populația evreiască europeană. Proiectul a urmărit, de asemenea, să promoveze înțelegerea, toleranța și dialogul. Un accent semnificativ a fost pus pe educarea tinerilor cu privire la iudaism și antisemitism, precum și pe promovarea dialogului intercultural și inter-religios. Activitățile sale au inclus cercetarea antisemitismului, monitorizarea discursurilor antisemite, elaborarea de programe educaționale, formarea cadrelor didactice, organizarea de programe educaționale și de schimb pentru tineri, facilitarea dialogului interconfesional și intercomunitar și organizarea de dezbateri locale privind toleranța și incluziunea socială. Proiectul a fost ghidat de definiția antisemitismului stabilită de Alianța Internațională pentru Memoria Holocaustului (IHRA).¹²

¹⁰ Pagina WEB a proiectului BOND: <https://www.bond-project.eu/>

¹¹ In Romanian: „Construirea toleranței, înțelegerii și Dialogului între comunități”.

¹² Definiția de lucru a antisemitismului adoptată de IHRA:

<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>